

In later editions of the *Oeuvres* the situation is different, and Malgaigne has drawn attention to this in his edition of the *Oeuvres*. He states: "Dans presque toutes les premières éditions de Paré on lit *guérir*, *guérison*; dans les dernières, *guarir*, *guarison*. Bien que j'eusse raisonnablement le choix, je n'ai pas toujours voulu en user; et par exemple le mot célèbre de Paré: *Je le pensay*, *Dieu le guarit*, est incrusté sous cette forme dans toutes les mémoires; c'est ainsi qu'il a été originairement écrit; j'ai donc écrit moi-même, selon les occurrences, tantôt *guéri*, tantôt *guari*."<sup>2</sup> In his own version of the *Oeuvres*, Malgaigne gives the famous epigram thus: "Je le pensay, et Dieu le guarist" (vol. 3, p. 689).

Malgaigne's whimsical usage of now one and now another variant of Paré's apophthegm seems capricious, and I would suggest—if only to have our textbooks agreeing with one another and not, albeit unintentionally, misleading students—that we adopt from now on the wording as it first appears in the 1585 edition of the *Oeuvres*, namely "I[Je] le pensay, & Dieu le guarit."

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I am grateful to the librarians of the institutions mentioned in this paper for their kindness and courtesy in providing photocopies of the relevant passage in the 1585 edition of Paré's *Oeuvres*.

<sup>2</sup> Malgaigne, J. F. *Oeuvres complètes d'Ambroise Paré*, Paris, Baillière, 1840-41, 3 vols.: vol. 1, p. ccxliii.

### *Hippocrates and Philosophy*

The *De Medicina* of Celsus is an important source for ancient Greek medicine. One well-known passage in the Prooemium has resulted, I believe, in considerable confusion. Celsus wrote, "At first the science of healing was held to be part of philosophy, so that treatment of disease and contemplation of the nature of things began through the same authorities; clearly because healing was needed especially by those whose bodily strength had been weakened by restless thinking and night watching. Hence we find that many who professed philosophy became expert in medicine, the most celebrated being Pythagoras, Empedocles and Democritus. But it was, as some believe, a pupil of the last, Hippocrates of Cos, a man first and foremost worthy to be remembered, notable both for professional skill and for eloquence, who separated this branch of learning from the study of philosophy."<sup>1</sup>

There are three features of note here. First is the general statement, as if a matter of historical fact, that "medendi scientia sapientiae pars habebatur." This seems entirely reasonable, and is quite acceptable without cavil, that those who devoted their lives to the pursuit of wisdom should also have acquired a knowledge of medicine. The propriety of translating "sapientia" as "philosophy" may be questioned, for there are many post-renaissance overtones connected with this word, often of an unfavorable character, regarding the distinction between mere "speculation" on the one hand and "natural philosophy" or science on the other.

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The second noteworthy feature of this passage is the reason alleged for the relationship between medicine and wisdom. It is suggested that too much thinking was bad for the health, that the thinkers, therefore, found it advisable to be their own physicians. That this is true, we may reasonably doubt. It might rather be one of those statements which reveal more about the historian than about history.

The third important feature is the remark that Hippocrates, "vir et arte et facundia insignis," was the first who ". . . a studio sapientiae disciplinam hanc [i.e., medicine] separavit." Again it is very questionable whether "philosophy" is the best translation for "sapientia." That Hippocrates was opposed to much of the speculation of his era is, of course, clearly established in "genuine" writings, and in the area of unbridled speculation the word "philosophy" might well have an unfavorable connotation. But Hippocrates had his own philosophy of nature and philosophy of science, and in this context "philosophy" should not have a pejorative sense.

Just what Celsus intended to convey by this widely quoted statement has not been very clear. It might be of interest, therefore, to note a relevant passage in Boerhaave, which throws some oblique light on the subject. Boerhaave began the *Praelectiones academicae*<sup>2</sup> with a sketch of medical history. When he discussed Hippocrates he said, among other things, "Et quando philosophiam ad medicinam nihil facere adseruit, de philosophia dixit morali, in qua sola tunc versabatur Schola Pythagorica."<sup>3</sup> This may be translated, "And when he declared that philosophy had nothing to do with medicine, he referred to moral philosophy, to which alone, at that time, the school of Pythagoras was devoting itself." There is no explicit mention of Celsus' statement, but the reference seems quite implicit.

Boerhaave thus suggests that Hippocrates separated medicine only from ethical theory, not from metaphysics or knowledge of first principles. And not from all ethics, for the Hippocratic oath precludes any exclusion of ethical philosophy as a whole. But it is, perhaps, suggested that only the bizarre Pythagorean doctrines were to be excluded while more conventional ethical questions might still come within the confines of medicine. Since Celsus' original statement is rather obscure, it seems worthwhile calling attention to all references which bear on the subject—even though they add new problems for interpretation. Can any readers throw more light on this problem?

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#### REFERENCES

1. Celsus, *De Medicina*, with an English translation by W. G. Spencer. London, William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, reprinted 1948-1953, 3 vols.: vol. I, pp. 4-5.
2. Hermann Boerhaave, *Praelectiones academicae*, Albertus Haller, Ed. Taurini, Typographia Regia, 1742-1745, 5 vols.
3. *Op. cit.*, I, 20 (§13, note).