

Antioch. John Malalas reports that in 335 the first comes Or 2001 name of Felicianus, established his headquarters in the Temple of the Muses at Antioch, but this does not necessarily mean that he had been the first imperial official to do so (Mal. Chron. 13.4). I suggest that he pulled rank and commandeered a building which had long seen official use, probably as the headquarters of the governor of Syria, from as early as 326 even. Hence the fact that Ammianus dates Constantine's bestowal of the nickname of Musonianus upon Strategius to the time of his alleged investigation of the Manichaeans reinforces my argument that this investigation took place at Antioch, and is identifiable, in fact, with the council of Antioch in 327.

It is my argument, therefore, that the Strategius mentioned in Eusebius' *Vita Constantini* is identifiable as the Strategius Musonianus of Ammianus' *Res Gestae*. Not only are their names identical, but both attended church councils on behalf of Constantine I and reported to him concerning the same. For Ammianus' statement that Constantine appointed Strategius to investigate the Manichaeans and similar sects is not meant to be taken literally. Rather it is a derogatory characterization of church councils based on what Ammianus knew of them in the west by the end of the fourth century when various episcopal factions were accustomed to accuse their opponents of Manichaeism as a matter of routine almost even though this had little or nothing to do with the real subjects of their disputes.

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MAJERCİK, R[uth]. – *Chaldean triads in Neoplatonic exegesis: some reconsiderations*. CQ 2001 N. S. 51 (1): 265-296. • The process whereby various Chaldean divine entities and principles are harmonized with their perceived Platonic, Pythagorean, and Orphic equivalents is perhaps most systematically worked out in the writings of Proclus, who finds a Chaldean equivalent for every degree of his complex triadic structure of reality. By focusing on two triads (the «father», «power», and «intellect»; and «once beyond», «Hecate», «twice beyond») we can determine some of the ways in which Proclus and other Neoplatonists interpreted the Chaldean Oracles. While a triadic principle of some sort informed the teaching of the Oracles, the precise nature and function of the Chaldean triads, apart from Neoplatonic exegesis, cannot be known. [72-03630

CHALDEAN TRIADS IN NEOPLATONIC EXEGESIS: SOME RECONSIDERATIONS

The role of the *Chaldean Oracles*¹ as a sacred text in later Neoplatonism is well known. Unfortunately, the original text of the *Oracles* is not extant; only fragments remain, embedded in the writings of the various Neoplatonists. The largest number of fragments are found in the writings of Proclus, who has thoroughly integrated Chaldean verses and terminology into his various commentaries and other writings (notably the *Platonic Theology*). Proclus also wrote an extensive *Commentary on the Oracles* following the earlier examples of Porphyry and Iamblichus.² All these commentaries on the *Oracles* are lost (with the exception of a few extracts from Proclus' commentary).³ Since there is no independent text of the *Oracles* to compare with the Neoplatonic utilization and interpretation of this material (and often what is quoted is a single line of verse, sometimes a half-line or only a single word), reconstructing the original context and meaning of a given verse or verses (no less the meaning and intent of the *Oracles* as a whole) is difficult at best.

What can be done with more confidence, however, is a reconstruction of Neoplatonic interpretation of the *Oracles*. From Porphyry onward, a tradition of interpretation emerges whereby various Chaldean divine entities, beings, principles, and so on are equated or 'harmonized' with their perceived Platonic, Pythagorean, Orphic (and other) equivalents. This process is most systematically worked out in the writings

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² See Marinus, *V. Procli* 26 Boissonade = 363 T Smith. According to Marinus, Proclus' commentary was a massive compendium that took five years to complete; it included interpretations from the commentaries of his predecessors along with Proclus' own 'considered judgement' of the Chaldean 'hypotheses'. In specific reference to Porphyry and Iamblichus, Marinus notes 'countless' commentaries on both the *Oracles* and 'related writings of the Chaldeans'. Cf. Damascius, *De Princ.* § 43; 2.1.7-8 W-C, who makes a reference to the 'twenty-eighth book' of Iamblichus' 'most perfect *Chaldean Theology*'. Saffrey and Westerink estimate that Proclus' commentary contained 1,120 pages! See their 'Introduction' to volume 1 of Proclus' *Platonic Theology*, xx.

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of Proclus, who finds a Chaldean equivalent for every degree of his complex triadic structure of reality.⁴ The purpose of this paper, then, is to examine some of the ways in which the Neoplatonists interpreted the *Oracles* by focusing on two triads—those of Father, Power, Intellect and Once Beyond, Hecate, Twice Beyond—since both play an important role in the later Neoplatonic construct of reality. In doing so, I first trace the tradition of interpretation of these triads in a variety of Neoplatonic writings and contexts and then consider the problem of their legitimacy as genuine triads of the *Oracles*.

I. FATHER, POWER, INTELLECT

Porphyry, it seems, was the first of the Neoplatonists to conceive the Chaldean 'Father' as constituted triadically in terms of Father, Power, Intellect. This triad, not attested as such in any extant verse of the *Oracles*, was elicited by Porphyry from an interpretive reading of the verses preserved in the following two fragments (fr. 3): 'the Father snatched himself away, and did not enclose his own fire in his intellectual power' (ὁ πατήρ ἤρπασσεν ἑαυτόν, οὐδ' ἐν ἐῇ δυνάμει νοεῖ κλείσας ἴδιον πῦρ); (fr. 4): 'For power is with him but intellect is from him' (ἡ μὲν γὰρ δύναμις σὺν ἐκείνῳ, νοῦς δ' ἀπ' ἐκείνου). In his *Commentary on the Parmenides* (9.1–8 Hadot),⁵ Porphyry interprets these verses in the following way:

Others, although they say that he has snatched himself away from all of the things within him, grant to him a power and an intellect that are co-unified in his simplicity, and yet another

⁴ Proclus' particular method of 'harmonizing' the teachings of various authorities was immediately dependent on that of his teacher, Syrianus, who is credited with writing a 'Harmony of Orpheus, Pythagoras and Plato with the *Oracles*'. See H. D. Saffrey, 'Accorder entre elles les traditions théologiques: une caractéristique du Néoplatonisme Athénien', in E. P. Bos and P. A. Meijer (edd.), *On Proclus and His Influence in Medieval Philosophy* (Leiden, 1992), 35–50.

⁵ There is still doubt among some scholars concerning Hadot's attribution of this 'anonymous' commentary to Porphyry. Recent critics include Andrew Smith, 'Porphyrian studies since 1913', in *ANRW* 2.36.2 (Berlin and New York, 1987), 738–41; id., 'Υπόστασις and ὕπαρξις in Porphyry' in *Hyparxis e hypostasis*, 38–41 and Alessandro Linguisti, who has edited a new edition of the Anonymous Commentary in *Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici greci e latini. Parte iii: Commentari* (Florence, 1995), 87–91. Both suggest that the author was later than Porphyry and perhaps dependent on him. M. J. Edwards, 'Porphyry and the intelligible triad', *JHS* 110 (1990), 14–25 and 'Being, life, mind: a brief inquiry', *Syllecta Classica* 8 (1997), 191–205, also questions Porphyry's authorship by insisting that the triadic sequence Being, Life, Intellect, *contra* Hadot, first finds its 'canonical expression' in Iamblichus. More recently, others have challenged Hadot's claims by arguing that the Commentary should be considered Middle Platonic or Neopythagorean, perhaps from the 'school' of Numenius and Cronius; see G. Bechtle, *The Anonymous Commentary on Plato's «Parmenides»* (Bern, Stuttgart, and Wien, 1999); K. Corrigan, 'Platonism and gnosticism. The Anonymous commentary on the *Parmenides*, middle or Neoplatonic?', in J. D. Turner and R. Majercik (edd.), *Gnosticism and Later Platonism* (Atlanta, 2000). On the other hand, John Dillon, a previous critic, now affirms Hadot's position and provides a number of supporting arguments; see 'Porphyry's doctrine of the one' in *ΣΟΦΙΗΣ ΜΑΙΗΤΟΡΕΣ*, 356–66. See, also, H. D. Saffrey, 'Connaissance et inconnaissance de Dieu: Porphyre et la Théosophie de Tübingen', in id., *Recherches sur le Néoplatonisme après Plotin* (Paris, 1990), 11–30, who also supports and strengthens Hadot's position. Last, S. Lilla, in a recent article, remarks that Hadot has 'rightly' attributed the Anonymous Commentary to Porphyry and then demonstrates how Pseudo-Dionysius has incorporated some of its key ideas and terminology in his treatises on the *Divine Names* and the *Mystical Theology*; see 'Pseudo-Denys l'Aréopagite, Porphyre et Damascius' in Y. de Andia, ed., *Denys l'Aréopagite et sa postérité en orient et en occident* (Paris, 1997), esp. 117–35. In this debate, I am on the side of Porphyrian authorship and present additional evidence in this paper to support this view.

intellect, and although they do not remove him from the triad, they see fit to abolish number, in that they absolutely refuse even to say that he is one.

οἱ δὲ ἀρπάσαι ἑαυτὸν ἐκ πάντων τῶν ἑαυτοῦ εἰπόντες δύναμιν τε αὐτῷ διδόναι καὶ νοῦν ἐν τῇ ἀπλότῃ αὐτοῦ συνηγῶσθαι καὶ ἄλλον πάλιν <ν>οῦν καὶ τῆς τριάδος αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐξελόντες ἀναιρεῖν ἀριθμὸν ἀξιούσιν, ὥς καὶ τὸ ἐν λέγειν αὐτὸν εἶναι παντελὺς παραιτεῖσθαι.

The context of these comments occurs in a summary list (truncated) of various views on the nature of the First God. The 'others' (οἱ δέ) of the passage is a reference to Julian *pater* and/or Julian *filius*, the purported 'authors' or compilers of the *Oracles*.⁶ In citing this material, Porphyry does not quote the *Oracles* directly, but paraphrases and interprets the verses in the following way:⁷ First, he suppresses the Stoicizing reference in fr. 3 to the Father's 'fire'. Second, he conflates the language of frs. 3 and 4 so that the terms 'power' and 'intellect' are clearly understood in relation to the first term of the triad (which is not the case if fr. 3 is read alone; if fr. 4 is read alone, the actual subject of the fragment becomes ambiguous). Third, by clearly differentiating between Father, Power, and Intellect, Porphyry has formalized what is otherwise an implicit triad. Fourth, he adds a Neoplatonic tag by stating that power and intellect are 'co-unified in the simplicity' of the Father, wording that goes beyond the terminology of the fragments.⁸ Fifth, the awkwardly placed phrase—'and yet another intellect'—is either an allusion to the 'second' or demiurgic intellect of fr. 7 ('For the Father perfected all things and handed them over to the second intellect, which you—the entire human race—call the first intellect') or to the 'paternal intellect' (πατρικὸς νοῦς) mentioned in several fragments.⁹ If the latter, then this 'other' or paternal intellect can be identified with the third term of the triad Father, Power, Paternal Intellect. This triadic variant—also a construct of Porphyry's theorizing—is that which Augustine has in mind when he says that Porphyry placed a *medium* between the Father and *paternum intellectum* or *paternam mentem* of the *Oracles*.¹⁰

⁶ On this point, see P. Hadot, 'Fragments d'un commentaire de Porphyre', *REG* 74 (1961), 427–9; 'La métaphysique de Porphyre' in *Entretiens Hardt* 12 (Geneva, 1965), 161–2; *Porphyre* 1.107–9, 2.93, n. 4. Saffrey (n. 5), 29, attempts to link this interpretation of the *Oracles* to a certain 'Antoninus' mentioned by Proclus in his *Commentary on the Timaeus*, 2.154.9, but his arguments, in my view, are not convincing. In response to Saffrey, see R. Majercik, 'The Chaldean Oracles and the school of Plotinus', in *The Ancient World* 29 (1998), 102–4.

⁷ On this material, cf. Hadot, *Porphyre* 1.124–9; Saffrey (n. 5), 14–15.

⁸ Similar terminology is found in Porphyry's *History of Philosophy* (220 F Smith = fr. XV Nauck) where he notes that the name 'One' is used of the First Principle in the sense of τὸ μὲν ἐμφαίνει τὴν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀπλότητα. Cf. Proclus, *Exc. Chald.* 4 = des Places, 210 (with reference to the τι νοητόν or intelligible object of fr. 1): τῆς τοῦ νοητοῦ ἐνιαίας ἀπλότητος; *P.T.* 3.3; 13.2–4 S–W (in connection with his doctrine of henads): τὸ τῶν πάντων αἴτιον περὶ ἑαυτὸ τὸν θεῖον ἀριθμὸν ἰδρύσατο καὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ συνήνωσεν ἀπλότῃ.

⁹ See fr. 39, 49, 108, 109; *νοῦς πατρός*: frs. 22, 36, 37, 134. It is unclear from the fragments whether the paternal intellect should be identified with the Father or considered as an entity separate and distinct from the Father. The relation of the paternal intellect to the second or 'demiurgic intellect' of fr. 7 is also unclear. For various discussions of this problem, see Kroll, 14–15; Lewy, 79, n. 48; A.-J. Festugière, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* 3 (Paris, 1953), 52–9; Hadot, *Porphyre* 1.260–7.

¹⁰ *De Civ. Dei* 10.23 = Porphyry, *De Regressu An.*, fr. 8 Bidez = 284 F Smith: 'Dicit enim deum patrem et deum filium, quem graece appellat *paternum intellectum* vel *paternam mentem*; de spiritu autem sancto aut nihil aut non aperte aliquid dicit; quamvis quem *alium* dicat *horum medium*, non intellego.' Cf. 10.29 = fr. 9 Bidez = 284a F Smith: 'Praedicat patrem et eius filium, quem vocas *paternum intellectum* seu *mentem*, et *horum medium*'; Damascius, *De Princ.* § 121; 3.153.23–4 W–C: ὧν καὶ ἄλλο μέσον, ἢ δύναμις; Proclus, *P.T.* 3.24; 85.21 S–W: 'power is hidden between the extremes'; Synesius, *H.* 1(3) 232–5: 'I worship the hidden order (κρυφίαν τάξιν) of

Last, Porphyry underscores the Father's transcendence by stressing that the *Oracles*, although connecting the Father to the triad, do not then call him 'one'. This means, in Porphyry's view, that the Father cannot be numbered, that is he cannot be counted as one or first in relation to the other terms of the triad since he is 'snatched away' from all things.¹¹ In this transcendent state, the triad is 'co-unified' in the Father's 'simplicity', that is it exists within him without distinction. By arranging and reading the verses of frs. 3 and 4 in this manner, Porphyry can argue that the Chaldean Father, although connected to the triad, can also be equated with the First God or First Principle in its absolute sense.¹²

Proclus' reading of these verses is clearly situated in this tradition of interpretation. In his *Commentary on the Parmenides*, Proclus, like Porphyry, connects the Chaldean Father to the triad, but in criticism of Porphyry, he refuses to equate the Father with the First God or the One. Although Proclus does not mention Porphyry by name here (he alludes instead to 'certain experts in theology'), Porphyry's identity in connection with this opinion is elsewhere confirmed by Damascius.¹³ Proclus says (*In Parm.* 1070.15–1071.3):

We shall, therefore, be very far from making the First God the summit of the intelligible world, as I observe to be the practice of certain experts in theology, and making the Father of that realm the same as the Cause of all things. For this entity is a participated henad. After all, he is called an intelligible Father and the summit of the intelligible world, and even if he is the connective principle of the whole intelligible world, yet it is as its Father that he is so. The First

νοερός; it makes room for a certain median (τι μέσον) that cannot be classed'. For Synesius, 'Will' is the mean term between the Father and Son; cf. Porphyry, *De Regressu An.*, fr. 7 Bidez = 291 F Smith: 'πατρικὸν νοῦν, id est paternam mentem sive intellectum, qui paternae est conscius voluntatis'; fr. 37, verse 1: νοῦς πατρὸς νοήσας ἀκμάδι βουλῇ.

¹¹ The same idea is expressed by Synesius in *H.* 1(3) 223–6: 'It is not right to say there is a second from you; it is not right to say there is a third from the first.'

¹² Porphyry's reading of these fragments reflects a wider issue concerning the problem of how to resolve the teaching of Parmenides concerning 'the one' in *Parm.* 137D: 'If it has no parts, it can have neither beginning, middle nor end' with that of the 'Athenian Stranger' in *Laws* 715E, who says that God 'possesses the beginning, end and middle of all things'. In his *Commentary on the Parmenides*, Proclus presents a summary of solutions to this problem including that of an unnamed commentator who says that 'the First Principle possesses beginning and middle and end and does not possess them; for it possesses them in a hidden manner (κρυφίως; cf. Synesius, *H.* 1(3) 233: κρυφίαν ταξίν, cited above, n. 10) but does not possess them distinctly. For it possesses all things in itself in a manner ineffable and unknowable to us, but knowable to itself' (1114.2–5). The same opinion is expressed at an earlier point, but in connection with the triad Being, Life, Intellect (1107.9–17): 'But others have said that the First Principle, although the Cause of all things and situated beyond Life, beyond Intellect, beyond Being itself, somehow possesses the causes of all these things in a manner ineffable and unknowable and in the most unified way, and unknowable to us <but knowable to itself: Moerbeke>.' These comments reflect the opinions of Porphyry, attested not only in his arrangement and reading of the verses in frs. 3 and 4, but also in the concept of 'learned ignorance', which is attested in his *Parmenides Commentary* (9.24–6, 25–9), in *Sent.* 25 Lamberz, and is explicitly attested for Porphyry by the Christian editor of the *Tübingen Theosophia* (§ 65 Erbse = 427 F Smith): 'Porphyry the Phoenician, the fellow student of Amelios and disciple of Plotinus, speaks thus: "Concerning the First Cause we know nothing; for he is the object of neither sensible contact nor intellectual knowledge, but knowledge of him is ignorance"'. Saffrey (n. 5), 26, argues that the author of the *Theosophia* drew this formula, either directly or indirectly, from the Anonymous Commentary whose author he knew to be Porphyry. For Porphyry as the source of Proclus' comments, see Hadot, *Porphyre* 1.357–9.

¹³ *De Princ.* § 43; 2.1.11–13 W–C = 367 F Smith: 'Or do we say with Porphyry that the single principle of all things is the Father of the intelligible triad?' Cf. Proclus, *In Parm.* 1091.12–14, who mentions a commentator who identifies the 'summit' of the intelligible with the One.

God, however, who is celebrated in the first hypothesis, is not even a Father, but is superior to all paternal divinity. The former entity is set over against its Power and Intellect, of whom it is said to be the Father, and with these it makes up a single triad. But the truly First God transcends all contrast and coordination with anything, so *a fortiori*, he is not an intelligible Father. For he is not involved with any entity secondary to him, nor is he participated in any way, falling neither in the category of intellectual nor intelligible essence, but he transcends in unity all the participated henads, and is snatched away above (*ὑπερήρπασται*) from all the processions of Being.
(trans. Morrow–Dillon, modified)

This is a clear statement of Proclus' position. The 'truly First God' or One is singular and distinct, uncoordinated with any lower principle and thus beyond all categories of noetic or noeric reality. As such, the One cannot be considered a Father (or paternal principle) and certainly not an intelligible Father who remains related in some sense to his Power and Intellect (as Porphyry would have it). Such an entity, according to Proclus, is properly situated at the summit or first rank of the intelligible realm but cannot be equated with the One. It is interesting to note that this line of argument leads Proclus to engage in a bit of terminological one-up-manship: if, in Chaldean terms, it is the Father who is 'snatched away', then the One, who in Proclus' thinking clearly transcends the Father, must be 'snatched away above' (*ὑπεραρπάζω*, a Proclan neologism)—an expression that is obviously intended to convey a sense of absolute transcendence. This same neologism is found in a fragment from Proclus' *Commentary on the Oracles*. In this instance, the immediate context of Proclus' remarks is a bit of commentary on the first verse of fr. 1: 'For there exists a certain intelligible, which you must perceive by the flower of intellect' (*ἔστιν γάρ τι νοητόν, ὃ χρεὶ σε νοεῖν νόου ἀνθεί*). In the course of interpreting this verse, Proclus brings the *τι νοητόν* of the fragment into relation with frs. 3 and 4 by identifying this 'intelligible' with the Father as the first term or summit of the intelligible triad. As in the previous passage, Proclus then distinguishes this 'intelligible' or 'First Father' from the One by again underscoring the absolute transcendence of the latter. (*Exc. Chald.* 4 = des Places, 210):

For if the First Father is said to snatch himself away from his Intellect and Power, who then is the one who has no need of snatching himself away, but is snatched away above (*ὑπερηρπασμένος*) from all things absolutely (*ἀπλῶς*) and is praised as god of all?

It is in this context that Proclus will then say that the One, as the true First Principle, cannot be perceived by the 'flower of intellect' (as the *Oracles* maintain *vis-à-vis* cognizing the *τι νοητόν*), but must be perceived by an even subtler organ of thought, the 'flower of our whole soul'.

Fragment 3 itself is drawn from Psellus (*Exegesis*, P.G. 122, 1144 a = des Places, 180) who, in turn, is utilizing Proclus' *Commentary on the Oracles*. Psellus first cites the verses and then, in his usual manner, attempts to interpret the fragment in light of Christian teaching. He says:

The meaning of the oracle is this: The god over all (*ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων θεός*), also called Father, makes himself incomprehensible (*ἀκατάληπτον*) and inconceivable (*ἀπερίληπτον*), not only to the first and second natures and to our souls, but even to his very own power. But the power of the Father is the Son. For 'the Father,' it says, 'has snatched himself away' from every nature. But this is not the orthodox position. In our view, the Father is decreed to be in the Son, just as the Son is in the Father. And the definition of the Father is the Son and the transcendent, divine Word.

Of interest is Psellus' use of the terms *ἀκατάληπτον* and *ἀπερίληπτον* as descriptive of the Father. These terms, of course, have a long history in the tradition of negative theology, both pagan and Christian, and are used frequently in various contexts in

Proclus' many writings.¹⁴ Unless he added them on his own, it is possible that Psellus already found these terms linked to fr. 3 somewhere in Proclus' *Commentary on the Oracles*. On the other hand, the expression $\delta \epsilon \pi \iota \pi \acute{\alpha} \nu \tau \omega \nu \theta \epsilon \acute{o} \varsigma$ —although reminiscent of the well-known Porphyrian phrase $\delta \epsilon \pi \iota \pi \acute{\alpha} \sigma \iota \nu \theta \epsilon \acute{o} \varsigma$ —is probably Christian in inspiration.¹⁵

As for fr. 4, this verse is drawn from Proclus' *Commentary on the Alcibiades* (37 [84 Cr.] 14 Westerink = 1.69 [84 Cr.] 16–17 Segonds). Here, the immediate context is an interpretation of Socrates' remarks in *Alc.* 103A concerning why he, Socrates, has not spoken to Alcibiades in years: 'The cause of this has not been human', says Socrates, 'but a certain daimonic hindrance, whose *power* you will learn of later.' This statement provides an opportunity for Proclus to reflect on the nature of spirits or *daimones* in general. In doing so, he cites an opinion of Iamblichus (= *In Alc.* Fr. 4 Dillon) to the effect that such beings are constituted triadically of essences ($\upsilon \pi \acute{\alpha} \rho \xi \epsilon \iota \varsigma$) or substances ($\omicron \upsilon \sigma \acute{\iota} \alpha \iota$), powers ($\delta \upsilon \nu \acute{\alpha} \mu \epsilon \iota \varsigma$), and acts ($\epsilon \nu \acute{\epsilon} \rho \gamma \epsilon \iota \alpha \iota$), a triad that Proclus then links to the Father, Power, Intellect triad in the following way:

For power is the median between substance and act, produced from substance but generating act. For everywhere power has been assigned the middle place; and among the intelligibles it connects the Father and Intellect: 'For power is with him, but intellect is from him'; and among intelligibles it connects acts with substances, for act is a product of power and substance produces powers from itself.

In terms of the larger context, the oracular verse (and appended commentary) is clearly out of place. Although Proclus gamely attempts to tie the whole discussion together by explaining how all of this means that Socrates 'all but states clearly that true power exists among the spirits', this larger context can be safely ignored. The immediate context of the verse, however, is important, since it provides a good example of how Proclus can read this verse in connection with other triads, in this instance that of the 'Aristotelian' triad substance, power, act.¹⁶ What these two triads have in common, from a Neoplatonic point of view, is their respective use of power or $\delta \upsilon \nu \acute{\alpha} \mu \iota \varsigma$ as a mean term, articulated by Proclus in terms of a general law or principle: 'For everywhere power has been assigned the middle place.'¹⁷

Of further interest is how Proclus, in his *Platonic Theology*, elicits the triad from a creative reading of certain passages in the *Timaeus*. In this context, Proclus' purpose is to demonstrate that the triad, on the authority of Plato, properly belongs to the demiurgic order. Thus, in *P.T.* 3.21; 76.4–77.2 S–W, he elicits the name Father from *Tim.* 41A7: 'Those works of which I am Demiurge and *Father*'; Power from *Tim.* 41C5–6: 'Imitating my *power* in your generation'; Intellect from *Tim.* 39E7–9: 'Therefore, as *intellect* perceives the ideas which exist in the living-in-itself, and sees how many and what kind they are, such and so many he decided that this All should have.' In *P.T.* 5.16, fr. 4 itself is slightly paraphrased (with reference to the Demiurge) at 58.11–13: 'And because he is Father, at the same there is within him both Power and Intellect' and at 59.7–8: 'Therefore, indeed, as we have said, the Father is in him and Power and

¹⁴ See e.g. *E.T.* prop. 93; *In Parm.* 620.11, 685.14, 713.18, and *passim*.

¹⁵ Cf. Eph. 4:6 and Ro. 9:5: $\delta \epsilon \pi \iota \pi \acute{\alpha} \nu \tau \omega \nu \theta \epsilon \acute{o} \varsigma$. On this point, see Lewy, 510, n. 5; cf. J. Bouffartigue and M. Patillon, *Porphyre. De l'Abstinence* 2 (Paris, 1977), 30–4.

¹⁶ On this triad, which is elicited from certain passages in Aristotle's *De Anima*, see Festugière (n. 9), 190, n. 1.

¹⁷ Cf. Proclus, *P.T.* 3.8; 31.20–1 S–W: 'Everything that produces, produces by means of its own power, which is a median between the producer and that which is produced.' This is an elaboration of *E.T.* prop. 7; see Saffrey and Westerink, note ad loc.

Intellect'. In *P.T.* 6.8; 42.4–12, Proclus again connects the triad with the Demiurge: 'Indeed, Timaeus surmises within him a *paternal* cause, a generative *power*, and a royal *intellect*'¹⁸—as well as with the 'theology' of the 'Athenian Stranger':¹⁹ 'For the *paternal* is everywhere beginning, *power* is in the middle, and *intellect* finishes the end of the triad'—but in this instance, Proclus concludes by citing fr. 4 explicitly as its source or authority: '“For power is with him but intellect is from him”, according to the oracle.' This strategy is repeated by Proclus in other contexts (e.g. *P.T.* 3.21; 73.19–21 S–W, where the 'Chaldean' triad is linked with the 'Platonic' triad elicited from the *Philebus* 23C: '... in every intelligible triad, the term Limit is named Father, the term Unlimited, Power, and the term Mixed, Intellect') and becomes a regular feature of his exegetical method. In fact, Proclus' desire to harmonize and equate the teaching of the *Oracles* with that of Plato becomes so intense that at one point he actually attributes some verses of the *Oracles* to Plato himself!²⁰

Another verse the Neoplatonists linked with the Father, Power, Intellect triad was fr. 27: 'For in every world shines a triad which a monad rules.' This verse is drawn from Damascius, who cites it in two different contexts. In the first instance, Damascius' interpretation is dependent on a metaphysical problem he poses in his *De Principiis* § 43; 2.1.4 ff. W–C, that is how many principles exist prior to the intelligible triad?²¹ Damascius first reviews the opinions of his predecessors on this problem, noting (i) that Iamblichus posited *two* principles before the triad ('that which is absolutely ineffable' and 'that which is uncoordinated with the triad'); (ii) that 'the majority' of philosophers after Iamblichus posited *one* principle ('an ineffable and single cause') before the triad;²² and (iii) that Porphyry identified 'the Father of the intelligible triad' as 'the single principle of all' (a position that Damascius, like Proclus, explicitly rejects).²³ Damascius then goes on to make the following argument (2.11–3.2):

But it is probably better to speak in the manner of Iamblichus. Whether, then, there is a Monad, Indefinite Dyad and, after these, a Triad—as that which makes up the intelligible triad as a whole, as the Pythagoreans say—before these three there would be the One, as these noted men also say;²⁴ whether there is Limit, Unlimited and Mixed, the One is again placed before these three by Plato, who says that the One is the cause of the blending in the mixed; whether there is Father, Power and Intellect, there would be that which is before these three, the single Father before the triad: 'For in every world shines a triad which a monad rules', says the oracle. And if it is so in the worlds, it is even more so in the hypercosmic abyss, for it is least suitable for that (order) to begin from plurality. If, then, before the triadic there is the unitary, and if before this there is the absolutely ineffable, as we say it, the result is obvious.

¹⁸ See *Philebus* 30D2: βασιλικὸν νοῦν.

¹⁹ *Laws* 715E8–716A1: (ὁ θεός) ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτήν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων ἔχων.

²⁰ *P.T.* 3.27; 99.14–15 S–W, where Proclus attributes two verses from fr. 34 to Plato.

²¹ On this material, cf. Hadot, *Porphyre* 1.96–8; Dillon, 'Porphyry's doctrine of the one' (n. 5); id., 'Iamblichus of Chalcis', in *ANRW* 2.36.2 (Berlin and New York, 1987), 880–5; A. Linguisti, 'Giamblico, Proclo, e Damascio sul principio anteriore all'Uno', *Elenchos* 9 (1988), 95–106.

²² The sequence of authorities after Iamblichus is Theodore of Asine, Syrianus, Proclus. See Westerink and Combès, note ad loc.

²³ In his subsequent critique of Porphyry's position in 2.1–10 (which mirrors that of Proclus in his *Parmenides Commentary*), Damascius adds two interesting details: (i) the naming of the 'paternal intellect' as the third term in the triad (cf. Augustine's comments on Porphyry's triad); (ii) mention of the expression 'One-All' (ἐν πάντα) which is otherwise attested in Porphyry's *Commentary on the Parmenides* 12.4 as a descriptive term for the 'One-Being' of the second hypothesis of the *Parmenides*.

²⁴ See Westerink and Combès, note ad loc., for a good overview of Pythagorean doctrine concerning the relation between the one and the monad.

In this context, Damascius utilizes fr. 27 to show that the monad of the verse can be equated with the single Father who functions here as a principle *prior* to the triad, an interpretive strategy that allows Damascius to bring Chaldean teaching about the First Principle into agreement with that of 'Plato' and 'the Pythagoreans'. On this point of interpretation, Damascius is following the example of Proclus.²⁵ In fact, the placement of the monad *before* the triad, in connection with an interpretive reading of fr. 27, may have been intended by Proclus (or his predecessors) as a corrective of Porphyry's position, who probably identified the monad of the verse with the Father as First Principle in terms of monad *and* triad or one and three, that is the Father as (Paternal) Monad containing within himself his Power and Intellect. This, of course, is the well-known thesis of Hadot, which is based on Lewy's reading of fr. 27.²⁶ Lewy, in turn, maintained that this principle was the actual teaching of the *Oracles* themselves (see further below). For Damascius, however, neither the position of Porphyry, nor that of Proclus, is sufficient. In the end, he is most sympathetic with the two principles position of Iamblichus, which he articulates at the conclusion of the passage and then adds, 'the result is obvious' or, in the paraphrase of Westerink and Combès, 'the thesis of Iamblichus is preferable'.²⁷

In the second instance, Damascius utilizes fr. 27 to make a cosmogonic point. In his *Commentary on the Parmenides*, he links the fragment with the three worlds (empyrean, ethereal, material) of Chaldean cosmology and their respective rulers or teletarchs (τελετάρχαι) as a way of explaining how these entities are able to produce a 'series' (σειρά) or 'chain' of realities. He says (*In Parm.* § 205; 2.33.11–18 W–C):

As for the teletarchs, there is a hebdomadic descent (ὕπόβασις ἑβδομαδική) which advances through the seven firmaments, with the empyrean teletarch producing from himself (ἄφ' ἑαυτοῦ προβαλλομένου) an empyrean triad, the ethereal teletarch, <three> ethereal triads and, likewise, the material teletarch, three material triads: 'For in every world shines a triad which a monad rules', according to the oracle.

²⁵ See n. 22.

²⁶ *Porphyry* 1.261, n. 1; 2.93, n. 2. Porphyry's reading of this verse in connection with the First Principle appears to be preserved in Damascius' description of the first triad of the noetic order, where he identifies the 'Father' term of the triad with the 'paternal monad' in the following way (*De Princ.* § 119; 3.145.10–18 W–C): 'We divide each monad of the intelligible triad in three ways; for example, the paternal monad into Father, Power, Intellect. For this entire single Father, in that he is by himself, is Father alone; but in that Power is brought into relation with him and he, himself, communicates with it, in a certain manner he becomes Power; and in that he is Father of Intellect and Intellect pertains to him, in this manner he becomes Intellect. Thus, although being single, he nevertheless signifies the triad of his own simplicity (ἐμφαίνει τὴν τριάδα τῆς οὐκείας ἀπλότητος).' The last words of this statement echo the language of Porphyry in *In Parm.* 9.1–4, where he describes the 'power' and 'intellect' of the Father as ἐν τῇ ἀπλότητι αὐτοῦ συνηνῶσθαι. (Cf. *Hist. Phil.* 220 F Smith = fr. XV Nauck: τὸ μὲν ἐμφαίνει τὴν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀπλότητα, cited above, n. 8). The passage also combines an interpretive reading of frs. 3 and 4 that is similarly reminiscent of Porphyry. Like Porphyry, Damascius describes the 'paternal monad' (= Father) as both 'single and alone' (= fr. 3: 'the Father snatched himself away') as well as 'brought into relation with' his Power (= fr. 4: 'For power is with him') and 'pertaining to' Intellect ('Intellect pertains to him' = fr. 4: 'intellect is from him'). Damascius' reference to 'the single Father' (ὁ εἷς πατήρ) who is 'alone' (adv. μόνον) is also found in Porphyry's *Hist. Phil.* 223 F Smith = fr. XVIII Nauck, where Porphyry refers to the 'First God' as 'single and alone' (εἷς καὶ μόνος). (The ὁ εἷς πατήρ of Damascius' passage also replicates the same in *De Princ.* § 43; 2.2.18 W–C, providing a link to fr. 27.) Last, the structure of Damascius' passage—which is an interpretive reading of frs. 3 and 4 combined with the statement about the Father's 'simplicity'—reflects that of Porphyry in his *Parmenides Commentary*. On Damascius' structure of the intelligible order as a whole, see below, n. 42.

²⁷ See note ad loc.

In this context, the monad of fr. 27 becomes a principle of singularity identified with each teletarch who rules a world; the triad, then, becomes a principle of plurality which is ‘produced’ or ‘projected’ by each teletarch, thus initiating a series or chain of descending realities. This process is then repeated by Damascius for the connectors (*συνοχεῖς*) and iynges (*ἰγγες*), other cosmic entities. He then goes on (34.3–35.4) to show that not only are there triads of teletarchs, iynges, and connectors, but a ‘plurality’ of each—notably seven each—one for each ‘firmament’ (citing, respectively, frs. 80, 81, 76, and 75 as authorities).²⁸

In this instance, despite the Chaldean terminology, Damascius’ line of argument follows a general law of Proclus based on Pythagorean arithmology and formally stated as prop. 21 of the *Elements of Theology*:

Every order originates from a monad and proceeds into a plurality which is coordinated with the monad; and the plurality of any order may be brought back to a single monad.

Proclus then elaborates on the principle in the following way:

For the monad, having the status of principle, generates its own plurality. Therefore, a series and an order are both single, in that an order as a whole derives from the monad its descent (*ὑπόβασιν*) into plurality. Thus, in each order there is a single monad before the plurality.

The principle is restated in *P.T.* 5.14; 45.3–7 S–W but in specific connection with the orders of gods. In this theogonic context, the principle is combined with a paraphrase of fr. 27 (as emphasized):

But it is necessary that *in each world-order the monad preexist before the triad* and before all plurality (*δεῖ δὲ αὖ καὶ πρὸ τῆς τριάδος καὶ πρὸ παντὸς πλήθους ἐν ἐκάστω διακόσμῳ τὴν μονάδα προϋπάρχειν*). For all the orders of gods originate from a monad, because each of all the world-orders becomes like the entire procession of the gods.

Following this Proclan line of argument, Damascius’ oblique statement in the first citation (‘And if it is so in the worlds, it is even more so in the hypercosmic abyss, for it is least suitable for that order to originate from plurality’) can now be readily explained. What Damascius is saying is this: If the principle that a monad is prior to a triad (or prior to plurality) is a law that applies to the ‘worlds’ (that is, the empyrean, ethereal, and material *κόσμοι* of Chaldean cosmology), then this principle is even more applicable to the noetic order or ‘hypercosmic abyss’ (= fr. 18: ‘hypercosmic paternal abyss’), since this order is the most unified of all and thus even less likely ‘to originate from plurality’.²⁹ This seems a bit convoluted, but makes sense in the context of Neoplatonic logic.

What remains to be decided is whether Damascius’ citation of fr. 27 in either of these passages has any relation to its original context and meaning. Modern commentators, following Lewy, have all linked the fragment to the noetic triad (Father,

²⁸ Fr. 27 is also linked to the three worlds by Simplicius in *In Phys.* 613.1–5, following Proclus’ interpretation of the word ‘light’ (*φῶς*) found in verse 3 of fr. 51: ‘For this is the “light” which is beyond the empyrean, since it is the *monad before the triad* of the empyrean, ethereal and material (worlds)’. Cf. 616.3–4: ‘And perhaps this “light” is the *monad of the triad* of the worlds which Proclus, himself, admits’.

²⁹ Although Damascius (following Proclus) identifies the ‘hypercosmic paternal abyss’ of fr. 18 (‘You who know the hypercosmic paternal abyss by perceiving it’) with the noetic order of Neoplatonic speculation, in its primitive sense, this expression may have been intended as a descriptive term for the Father and/or his dwelling place. See Lewy, 159–60 and n. 351; Theiler, ‘Die chaldäischen Orakel und die Hymnen des Synesios’ in *Forschungen*, 263–4.

Power, Intellect) of the first passage³⁰ while ignoring the cosmogonic context of the second citation, which actually links the fragment more closely to specific Chaldean material. But even in this second instance, the fragment is cited as an authority along with other fragments to affirm the truth of a general principle. Thus neither context may be relevant to its original situation. That fr. 27, itself, may reflect a general law of reality is, of course, possible, but without its original context this cannot be known with certainty. The most that can be said is that the later Neoplatonists cited it *as though* this were the fact to suit their own exegetical purposes.

Fragment 27 may also be echoed in a line from one of Proclus' hymns (lost), but here in connection with the Chaldean ἄπαξ ἐπέκεινα or Once Beyond (as reported by John Lydus, *De Mens.* 23.9–12 Wuensch = *Procli Hymni*, fr. II, Vogt):

That the monad *is conceived* in terms of a triad, one can learn from the book of hymns. For concerning the Once Beyond, Proclus speaks in this way: 'For seeing you as a monad, containing a triad, the world has honored you'.

ὅτι ἡ μονὰς ἐν τριάδι θεωρεῖται, δυνατόν ἐκ τῶν ὑμναρίων λαβεῖν· πρὸς γὰρ τὸν ἄπαξ ἐπέκεινα ὁ Πρόκλος οὕτω· 'μουνάδα'³¹ γάρ σε τριούχον ἰδὼν ἐσεβάσματο κόσμος'.

If this verse is inspired by fr. 27,³² then Proclus has reinterpreted the fragment so that the monad and triad are now clearly perceived as one and three and 'every world' becomes the cosmos as a whole praising or honoring a specific god. Although des Places has included this verse among his undoubted fragments (fr. 26), Lydus' attribution of the verse to Proclus makes its authenticity doubtful.³³ This is further reinforced by Proclus' linking of the ἄπαξ ἐπέκεινα with the expression μουνάδα τριούχον. This poetic turn of phrase is not Chaldean in origin but Proclan; it is modelled on that of μονὰς τριαδική, a Proclan technical term designed to express the unity in triplicity of each triadic structure within a given order.³⁴ Thus the Once Beyond, which Proclus situates at the summit of the first triad of the noeric order as its unifying or 'monadic' term, becomes a 'triadic monad'.³⁵ It is in this particular context that Proclus most likely composed his hymn, with the phrase μουνάδα τριούχον invented on this occasion as a poetic substitute for μονὰς τριαδική.³⁶ If so, then its relation to fr. 27 becomes problematic, as Proclus' own theorizing (θεωρεῖται) is sufficient enough for its inspiration.

If this line of interpretation is correct, then evidence for a well-defined concept of a

³⁰ Lewy, 106 and n. 164; cf. 78–80; Hadot, *Porphyre* 1.261 and n. 1; 2.93, n. 2; des Places, *Oracles chaldaïques*, 12–13; Majercik, *Chaldean Oracles*, 7–8 and notes to frs. 4 and 27.

³¹ It should be noted that Wuensch's text of Lydus (Leipzig, 1898; repr. Hildesheim, 1967) has μονάδα (and so E. Vogt, *Procli Hymni* [Wiesbaden, 1957] fr. II, 33) which does not scan; J. Bidez, *Vie de Porphyre* (Leipzig, 1913; repr. Hildesheim, 1964), 47, n. 1 was the first to note and correct this error. Lewy, 106, n. 164 misplaces the accent: μούναδα; and so Hadot, *Porphyre* 1.96, n. 2 but corrected on 261, n. 1.

³² This is Lewy's opinion, 106, n. 164: 'This verse has been imitated by Proclus'. Cf. Hadot, *Porphyre* 1.294 and n. 2.

³³ Fr. 26* is considered doubtful in my edition (indicated by the asterisk). See notes ad loc.

³⁴ See e.g. *P.T.* 3.14; 51.11 S–W: μονάδες τριαδικαί; cf. 3.22; 81.6; Damascius, *In Parm.* § 265; 2.132.4–5 Ruelle: τριαδική μονάς; cf. § 192; 2.4.14–15; 61.12 W–C.

³⁵ See *P.T.* 5.2; 10.19–11.15 S–W.

³⁶ Proclus' poetic μουνάδα was perhaps modelled on the same from a verse of the Pythagorean (or Orphic) 'Hymn to Number' (μουνάδος ἐκ κευθμώνος ἀκράτου . . .) which he cites in various contexts: *In Tim.* 1.316.21–4, 2.53.3–4, 3.107.14–17; *In Rem p.* 2.169.24–27. See Kern, *O.F.* 315; H. Thesleff, *The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period* (Åbo, 1965), 173; E. Delatte, *Études sur la littérature pythagoricienne* (Genève, 1974), 208–27.

triadic monad in the *Oracles* remains elusive. Although Damascius sometimes uses the expression 'triple-barbed monad' (τριγλώχης μονάς)³⁷ to express this idea—he also mentions the 'triple-barbed god' (τριγλώχης θεός)³⁸—this usage reflects a creative application of the term 'triple-barbed strength' (ἀλκή τριγλώχης) drawn from fr. 2.³⁹ This was a common enough practice among the later Neoplatonists, who found it necessary to isolate a given term or expression from certain fragments—and then hypostatize it as a distinct entity—as a way of filling out an increasingly complex structure of reality. The hypostatization of the term ὑπεζωκός, drawn from fr. 6, is an excellent example of this strategy. Once extracted from the fragment this entity becomes situated at the lowest level of the noeric order. But like the ἀπαξ ἐπέκεινα of this order, this 'diaphragm' also becomes a 'triadic monad'.⁴⁰ As for other verses, triads are mentioned in a general sense (frs. 23, 28, 29, 31) as well as a 'paternal monad' (fr. 11), but no extant verse speaks explicitly of a 'triadic monad' (or 'triple-barbed monad') in either a metaphysical or cosmological sense. This suggests that the principle was derived from Neoplatonic speculation independent of the *Oracles*, but was applied to the *Oracles*, as to the *Orphica* and other authorities, as the situation and context demanded.

This is true of another principle, that of implication and predominance, which was applied to the Father, Power, Intellect triad as well as to other intelligible triads of Neoplatonic speculation (e.g. Being, Life, Intellect) and is formally stated as prop. 103 of Proclus' *Elements of Theology*: 'All things are in all things, but in each according to its proper nature.' In terms of this principle, the 'Chaldean' triad is schematized as an ennead of three triads with predominating terms, that is *Father*, Power, Intellect; *Father*, *Power*, Intellect; *Father*, Power, *Intellect*. Such a schema is attested for both Proclus⁴¹ and Damascius, although Damascius introduces certain complexities, for example introducing the Paternal Intellect as the first term of the third triad and then structuring his ennead overall in terms of three monads (paternal, potential, intellectual) as well as monad, dyad, triad.⁴² In either case, it is an ennead of three triads

³⁷ See *In Parm.* § 214; 2.47.19–20 W–C where Damascius identifies the 'triple-barbed monad' with the intelligible intellect.

³⁸ See *In Parm.* § 187; 1.100.1–2 W–C and *De Princ.* § 98; 3.58.1–3 W–C, where Damascius identifies the 'triple-barbed god' with the 'intellect of the Father' (= intelligible intellect) drawn from verse 1 of fr. 22.

³⁹ ἀλκή τριγλώχινι νόον ψυχὴν θ' ὀπλίσαντα. The entire fragment is cited by Damascius in *De Princ.* § 70; 2.106.6–9 W–C. Porphyry was evidently the first to isolate this expression; cf. Synesius, *H.* 9(1) 65–6: 'an ineffable monad pouring forth contains a triple-bloomed strength (τρικάρυμβον ἀλκάν)'. On the primitive sense of the fragment, see Lewy, 192–5, who thinks the oracle should be understood in connection with the theurgical elevation of the soul. Cf. S. Iles Johnston, *Hekate Soteira* (Atlanta, 1990), 128–30 for a similar analysis but in specific connection with Hecate; id., 'Riders in the sky: cavalier gods and theurgic salvation in the second century A.D.', *CPh* 87 (1992), 303–21 and esp. 316–21. τριγλώχης is originally Homeric; e.g. 'triple-barbed arrow' *Il.* 5.393.

⁴⁰ Damascius, *In Parm.* § 265; 2.132.4–5 Ruelle: 'But it is necessary to know that the ὑπεζωκός is a triadic monad. For Proclus, himself, says this'. For Proclus, the ὑπεζωκός is the 'distinguishing' or 'separative cause' of the noeric order. See *P.T.* 5.2; 10.20–11.11 and the comments of Saffrey and Westerink in their 'Introduction' to this volume, p. xv.

⁴¹ See e.g. *P.T.* 3.9 and 13 and Psellus' various summaries of the Chaldean system in des Places's edition of the *Oracles*, 189–201; Psellus' summaries are dependent on Proclus' *Commentary on the Oracles*.

⁴² See *De Princ.* § 119; 3.145.10–146.2 W–C where the ennead is schematized 'vertically' as three monads (paternal, potential, intellectual) and 'horizontally' as three triads (*Father*, Power, Intellect; *Father*, Power, Intellect; Paternal Intellect, Intellectual Power, Intellect). In terms of monad, dyad, triad, the first triad represents the 'paternal monad' in a state of unity or

which makes up the noetic or intelligible world of Neoplatonic speculation, understood in Chaldean terms as the 'paternal abyss' (= Damascius' 'hypercosmic abyss' = fr. 18, 'hypercosmic paternal abyss').

In addition, Damascius elsewhere links this schema more closely to specific Chaldean teaching (*De Princ.* § 111; 3.109.4–5 W–C): 'For the theurgists hand down to us that there are *three triads* there, having been instructed by the gods themselves.' Proclus, in his *Commentary on the Parmenides*, 1090.25–8, also mentions a doctrine of three triads in connection with the *Oracles* ('It is necessary to keep in mind that among the intelligibles there are many orders, and as praised by the theologians, there are *three triads* among them'), but neither Proclus nor Damascius, to my knowledge, ever cites a specific verse or verses in which three triads are explicitly mentioned. One might suppose that an authority for these triads could be found in fr. 22, which is cited in whole or part in a variety of contexts by both Proclus and Damascius. The fragment reads: 'For the intellect of the Father said for all things to divide into three, governing all things by the intellect <of the very first> eternal <Father>. He nodded his assent to this and immediately all things were divided'. However, in none of the contexts in which this oracle is cited (the first verse is the preferred authority) is there ever mention of three *triads*.⁴³

An ennead of three triads is also attested for Porphyry in connection with the *Oracles* by John Lydus (*De Mens.* 159.5–8 Wuensch = 366 F Smith: 'Divine is the number of the ennead completed by three triads and, as Porphyry says, maintained as the summits of the theology according to the Chaldean philosophy') but without further elaboration. Hadot has theorized that this Porphyrian ennead would have consisted of Father, Power, Paternal Intellect (with predominating terms), basing his analysis on the bit of Chaldean exegesis preserved in Porphyry's *Commentary on the Parmenides* 9.1–8 plus the testimony from Augustine.⁴⁴ Damascius also introduces the Paternal Intellect as a term in his schema, but his enneadic structure overall is more developed than that which Hadot has in mind.

What remains to be decided, however, is whether an ennead of first principles—

'simplicity' (cf. above, n. 26); the second triad represents the 'potential monad' as hidden or 'remaining within itself' between the dyad or 'two extremes' of Father and Intellect (cf. above, n. 10); the third triad represents the 'intellective' or 'noeric monad' as a distinct triad in which each moment becomes an 'intellect' in turn: Paternal *Intellect*, *Intellective* Power, *Intellect*. It should also be noted that Damascius' ennead is further structured according to a principle by which the last term of a triad undergoes a process of 'three reversions' in relation to the other terms of the triad and itself. On this complication, see *De Princ.* §§ 78–9; 2.135.1–139.10 W–C, where Damascius discusses the theory at length in connection with the triad Being, Life, Intellect. S. Gersh, *Iamblichus to Eriugena* (Leiden, 1978), 143–51, has a good discussion of this principle.

⁴³ See Proclus, *In Tim.* 3.243.16–21 where he cites verses 1 and 2 for the specific purpose of comparing the term *ἐντε* from verse 1 with *ταύτ' ἐντε* from *Tim.* 41D4; *In Parm.* 1091.6–9 where he cites verses 1 and 3 in connection with his analysis of *Parm.* 137C; *In Rem P.* 2.201.17–21 where he paraphrases verse 1 ('The *Oracles*, as usual, have divided the All into three') in connection with Chaldean cosmology, i.e. 'the summit' is 'fire', 'the median' is 'ether', 'the third' is 'worlds'; Damascius, *In Parm.* § 184; 1.96.14–20 W–C who links verses 1 and 3 with the work of the 'first world-creator' (= the Paradigm) as creator 'of every diacosmos—material and immaterial, noeric and noetic'; § 187; 1.99.21–100.2 where he cites verse 1 and then connects the expression 'intellect of the Father' with the 'triple-barbed god'; the same identification is made in connection with verse 1 in *De Princ.* § 98; 3.58.1–3 W–C; *In Parm.* § 201; 2.28.25–29.2 W–C where Damascius paraphrases verse 1 in the following way: 'and if a certain intelligible father is said to divide all things into three, he has divided all things according to a triad which cannot be numbered'. On this last, cf. Porphyry, *In Parm.* 9.5–8.

⁴⁴ Hadot, *Porphyre* 1.266–7.

apart from Neoplatonic speculation—was, in fact, a teaching of the *Oracles*. Lewy⁴⁵ attempted to reconstruct such a schema by creatively piecing together an interpretive reading of various fragments so as to arrive at the following sequence of three triads: (i) a Paternal Monad or Father constituted of Intellect, Will, Power; (ii) a triad of universal or ‘primordial’ Ideas; (iii) a triad of particular or ‘divided’ Ideas. But in making this reconstruction, Lewy admits that it is hypothetical and ultimately prefers to remain undecided on the issue.⁴⁶

But even if an ennead could be positively affirmed for the *Oracles*, Lewy’s reconstruction is problematic. First, in his schematization of the first triad as Intellect, Will, and Power, Lewy, in effect, has utilized the exegetical method of the Neoplatonists by eliciting the triad from a creative reading of several select fragments, including (illegitimately) several verses from oracles in the *Tübingen Theosophia*.⁴⁷ Like the triad Father, Power, Intellect, a schematized (and hypostatized) triad of Intellect, Will, Power is nowhere attested in any undoubted fragment. For Lewy further to link this triad with the paternal monad of fr. 11 and the monad of fr. 27 in a triadic monad sense is similarly unjustified, and again reflects the influence of Neoplatonic strategy. In contrast, a reading of the fragments *independent* of Neoplatonic triadic concerns reveals that the Father (and equivalent entities) is associated with *several* qualities, for example will,⁴⁸ power,⁴⁹ intellect,⁵⁰ perfection,⁵¹ strength,⁵² love⁵³—all of which are mentioned in various contexts, but none of which are triadically conceived. In addition, in those fragments in which the term triad does appear, surprisingly, no triad of any kind is *specifically* named.⁵⁴ The one exception is the triad ‘faith, truth and love’ found in a truncated verse cited by Proclus (fr. 46 = *In Tim.* 1.212.21), but even this triad may be illegitimate, as elsewhere these terms are linked with a fourth term, ‘hope’.⁵⁵

As for the two triads of Ideas, a basic distinction between universal and particular can be claimed for the Ideas from a reading of fr. 37,⁵⁶ but their further triadization is speculative, based again on the linking of several disparate fragments. The evidence, then, for an ennead of first principles in the *Oracles*, especially as reconstructed by Lewy, is weak. In the end, one gets the sense that an enneadic construct was imposed

⁴⁵ Lewy, pp. 105–17.

⁴⁶ Ibid. 117, n. 197.

⁴⁷ See 78–81 and esp. 79, n. 49 on ‘Will’. Scholars and commentators since Lewy have all rejected his claim that certain of these ‘theosophical’ oracles should be considered among the undoubted fragments; see E. R. Dodds, ‘New light on the “Chaldean Oracles”’, *HTR* 54 (1961), 265–6; repr. in Lewy, 695; des Places, 55–6; Majercik, 46. A number of these ‘theosophical’ oracles (including no. 13, which Lewy identifies as Chaldean) derive from oracle sites at Didyma and Claros; see L. Robert, ‘Trois oracles de la Théosophie et un prophète d’Apollon’ in *Comptes-Rendus de l’académie des inscriptions et belles lettres* (Paris, 1968), 568–99; ‘Un oracle gravé à Oinoanda’ in *ibid.* (Paris, 1971), 597–619.

⁴⁸ βουλῇ: frs. 37, 77, 81, 107; τὸ θέλειν: fr. 22; νεῦμα: fr. 44, but this term is disputed; see Majercik, note ad loc.

⁴⁹ δύναμις: frs. 1, 3, 4, 5, 136.

⁵⁰ νοῦς: frs. 4, 5, 7, 22, 36, 37, 39, 42, 44, 49, 108, 109, 134.

⁵¹ τέλος, αὐτοτελής: fr. 37.

⁵² ἀλήθεια: frs. 1, 49, 82.

⁵³ ἔρως: frs. 39, 42, 44.

⁵⁴ See frs. 2 (cj.), 23, 27, 28, 29, 31.

⁵⁵ It should be noted that the term ‘triad’ is linked to these terms only as part of Proclus’ commentary; it is not found in the fragment itself. Cf. Iamblichus, *D.M.* 5.26, who mentions divine love, good hope and faith; Porphyry, *Marc.* 24: ‘May four elements (στοιχεῖα) especially strengthen you with respect to God: faith, truth, love, hope.’ Cf. fr. 47: ‘May fire-bearing hope nourish you’.

⁵⁶ The fragment speaks poetically of ‘primordial’ ideas which ‘leap forth’, ‘whirr’ or ‘spout forth’ from the Father as ‘intellect’ or ‘paternal source’ and then are ‘divided’ by the ‘noetic fire’.

on the *Oracles* in light of the Pythagorean interests of the later Neoplatonists. Such a construct, of course, was imposed on Plotinus' writings (the *Enneads*) by Porphyry, and it is quite likely that he did the same with the *Oracles*.

II. ὕπαρξις

It should also be noted that the term ὕπαρξις ('existence') is often substituted for the Chaldean 'Father' in Neoplatonic exegesis. Again, this substitution apparently goes back to Porphyry and subsequently becomes a virtual technical term in later Neoplatonism. The evidence from Porphyry has been treated at length by Hadot.⁵⁷ More recently, the origin and history of the term have been analyzed in a number of papers published in the volume *Hyparxis e hypostasis nel Neoplatonismo* (Florence, 1994). Of particular interest is Proclus' mention of ὕπαρξις as a name for the First Principle in a list preserved in his *Platonic Theology* 3.7; 30.3–6 S–W: 'Source of divinity', 'King of all things', 'Henad of all henads', 'Goodness, mother of truth', 'Existence which transcends all things', 'Cause beyond all causes'.⁵⁸ A similar list is found in the Emperor Julian's *Hymn to King Helios*. In this list, 'Idea of Being(s)' appears as one of the names for the First Principle (132CD): 'King of all things', 'That which transcends intellect', 'Idea of Being', 'One', 'the Good'. In this list, Julian glosses 'Idea of Being' in the the following way: 'Idea of Being, and by Being I mean the intelligible as a whole' (ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων, ὃ δὴ φημι τὸ νοητὸν ξύμπαν). The only other Neoplatonic source that I know of in which 'Idea of Being' appears as a name for the First Principle is Porphyry's *Commentary on the Parmenides*. In 12.31–3, Porphyry says of the One that it is 'beyond Being, Being (εἶναι) in the absolute sense and, as it were, Idea of Being' (ὥσπερ ἰδέα τοῦ ὄντος). Julian's gloss, which explains 'Being' as 'the intelligible as a whole', also links this expression to Porphyry. This is attested by Proclus who, in his summary of Porphyry's division of the hypotheses of the *Parmenides* (*In Parm.* 1053.37–1054.10), exactly identifies his second hypothesis (= One-Being) with 'the intelligible plane' (ἡ δευτέρα περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ πλάτους).⁵⁹ To the best of my knowledge this evidence from Julian, which would shore up the claim that the Anonymous Commentary is Porphyrian, has been overlooked by scholars, including Hadot.

What remains unclear, however, is whether Proclus' list and that of Julian derive from the same source. In the case of Julian, he explicitly indicates his dependence on Iamblichus (146AB, 150D, 157CD). If so, then we have to suppose that Iamblichus, in

⁵⁷ Hadot, *Porphyre* 1.267–72, 488–90.

⁵⁸ See Saffrey and Westerink, note ad loc., who give a summary of sources from which these names derive. Regarding ὕπαρξις, they note: 'It is not impossible that the word ὕπαρξις was a name for god in the *Chaldean Oracles* and according to Porphyry.' On this point they follow Hadot, who was the first to suggest the substitution of ὕπαρξις for 'Father' in the *Oracles* themselves; see *Porphyre* 1.267 and n. 7. Hadot notes here that earlier scholars either mention the substitution in passing (Kroll, Theiler) or ignore it (Lewy). des Places thinks the substitution 'seems later' than the *Oracles*; see 'Les oracles chaldaïques' in *ANRW* 2.17.4 (Berlin and New York, 1984), 2325; cf. below n. 86.

⁵⁹ The same identification in connection with Porphyry is also found in Simplicius, *In Phys.* 230.37–231.1, where 'the second One' (in connection with Simplicius' report of Porphyry on Moderatus' teaching) is glossed by Porphyry as τὸ ὄντως ὄν καὶ νοητόν. Cf. Proclus, *In Tim.* 1.233.2–3, who refers to 'certain ancients' (= Porphyry; see 322.23) who 'call truly being the intelligible plane' (ὄντως ὄν καλοῦσι τὸ νοητὸν πλάτος). Both Simplicius and Proclus then use the same term, τὸ ψυχικόν, to describe the level of Soul. See Hadot, *Porphyre* 1.148 and 166; Saffrey and Westerink, *P.T.* 1, lxxxii, n. 1.

one of his works, has preserved a few names from a Porphyrian list of First Principles, a list that would include not only 'Idea of Being' but 'King of all things' as well. This last is drawn from Ps.-Plato's *Second Letter* 312E, a point noted by Saffrey and Westerink in their excellent overview of the history of the interpretation of the *Second Letter* in the 'Introduction' to Volume 2 of Proclus' *Platonic Theology*. They note that Julian, who otherwise presents himself as a 'faithful disciple of Iamblichus', follows what they term the 'Roman' rather than 'Syrian' school in this matter, a fact these editors rightly find 'surprising'.⁶⁰ As they describe it, the 'Syrian' school (Amelius, Theodore, Iamblichus) identified the three kings of the *Second Letter* with three demiurges or three intellects conceived as subordinate to the One; in contrast, the 'Roman' school (Plotinus, Porphyry) identified the first king (or 'King of all things') with the One.⁶¹ Julian's list follows this Plotinian-Porphyrian order. This is also true of Proclus, who likewise identifies the 'King of all things' with the First Principle. Thus in both lists, we find three names—*ὑπαρξίς*, Idea of Being, King of all things—each of which can be linked with Porphyry's teaching. Proclus, then, like Julian, may have utilized the same or a similar list. In the case of Julian, this list was apparently mediated through a work of Iamblichus, perhaps his *On the Gods*.⁶² Proclus was also familiar with this work and this may have been his source as well.⁶³ What remains to be decided, however, is whether the name *ὑπαρξίς*—like Idea of Being—was derived from Porphyry's metaphysical speculations or was borrowed, instead, from the *Oracles*.

The evidence here is ambiguous, since none of the later Neoplatonists cites a verse or verses in which this term occurs. On the other hand, Damascius, in several instances, seems to suggest that he did find it in the *Oracles*. The first example is found in *De Princ.* § 38; 1.118.11–15 W–C. The wider context of Damascius' remarks is a lengthy consideration of the various ways in which 'the One' (= the first term of Damascius' intelligible triad the One, the Many, the Unified), as absolutely undetermined, relates to its effects. One possibility, says Damascius, is to say that the things after the One are in relation to it by a 'certain distinction'. He says that this 'distinction' would be 'the very first of all distinctions':

I mean the very first of all distinctions, that which would be absorbed, more or less, by the undetermined, so that the second principle seems to be the power of the first, *a power which has been conflated with existence, as certain authors of sacred texts already hint at* (δύναμιν τῇ ὑπάρξει συμπεπηγυῖαν, ὡς ἤδη τινὲς ἱερολόγοι τοῦτο αἰνίττονται).

As Westerink and Combès point out in their note to this passage, Damascius' comments allude to fr. 4 of the *Oracles*: 'For power is with him but intellect is from him.' In this instance, Damascius has substituted *ὑπαρξίς* for Father as the implied subject of the verse and then interprets the verse, in part, by saying that 'power' is 'with' *ὑπαρξίς* in the sense of being 'conflated with' it. He then notes that certain *hierologoi* (= the *Juliani*) 'hint at' this meaning, that is, it is suggested by the verse but not explicitly stated as such. The use of the verb *αἰνίττομαι* (lit. 'speak in riddles') in

⁶⁰ See *P.T.* 2, lviii.

⁶¹ Ibid. lix.

⁶² See J. Dillon, *Iamblichi Chalcidensis Fragmenta* (Leiden, 1973), 23. Iamblichus mentions this work in *D.M.* 8.8.

⁶³ *P.T.* 1.11; 52.3–4 S–W; cf. Damascius, *De Princ.* § 61; 2.71.26–72.1 W–C. As for the Porphyrian source in which Iamblichus found these names, it is possible that he borrowed them directly from Porphyry's *Commentary on the Parmenides*. If not, at the very least, the source utilized would have to be post-Plotinian, as the names 'Idea of Being' and 'King of all things'—as descriptive terms for the One or First Principle—are reflective of this later stage of Porphyry's thinking.

this connection is of some interest. This verb is often used by the Neoplatonists when invoking a textual authority to confirm the truth of their own point of view.⁶⁴ Although a given text is often quoted directly, it is sometimes paraphrased with its new meaning, for example Porphyry's paraphrase of *Rep.* 509B ('the Good is beyond being in eminence and transcending power') in *In Parm.* 12.22–4: 'See, then, if Plato does not seem to speak in riddles (μὴ αἰνισσομένῳ ἔοικεν): the One which is beyond substance and being', and so on.⁶⁵ It is this method that Damascius has in mind when he paraphrases part of fr. 4 ('power is with him' becomes 'a power which is conflated with ὑπαρξίς') and then suggests that this new meaning was already 'hinted at' by the 'authors' of the *Oracles*. That fr. 4 is invoked in this regard underscores its significance in Neoplatonic interpretation as a textual authority for the Father, Power, Intellect triad, a triad that is then equated by the Neoplatonists with that of Existence, Power, Act. That Damascius substitutes ὑπαρξίς for Father in this context reflects this equation. (The triad Existence, Power, Act is not explicitly mentioned here, but is drawn into Damascius' discussion at an earlier point; see § 37; 1.114.14ff.) In the following passages, the relation of this particular triad to the *Oracles* is made explicit. The first citation is from *De Princ.* § 61; 2.71.1–4 W–C:

Now the first principle *is conceived* according to Existence, as in the *Oracles*, the second according to Power, and is called this explicitly; the third, then, will also include Act.

οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν πρώτη ἀρχὴ κατὰ τὴν ὑπαρξιν θεωρεῖται, ὡς ἐν τοῖς λογίοις, ἡ δὲ δευτέρα κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν σαφῶς οὕτω καὶ λέγεται· ἡ τρίτη ἄρα προσλήψεται καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν.

The second example is found in *In Parm.* § 221; 2.57.11–14 W–C:

And then, to speak in the Chaldean manner, Intellect is established moreover according to Act, Life according to Power, Being according to the Existence of the Father.

ἐπεὶ καί, ὡς χαλδαϊκῶς εἰπεῖν, ὁ μὲν νοῦς κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἵσταται μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ ζωὴ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν, ἡ δὲ οὐσία κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ὑπαρξιν.

Although these examples can be construed to mean that Damascius did, indeed, find the term ὑπαρξίς in the *Oracles*,⁶⁶ a third example links this line of interpretation with the theorizing of Iamblichus. This evidence is found in *De Princ.* § 120; 3.148.8–19 W–C:

And these are the principles that other philosophers wished to express through other names; for example, the Pythagoreans by Monad, Dyad and Triad, or Plato by Unlimited, Limited, and Mixed, or which we earlier expressed by the One, the Many and the Unified, that the *Oracles* of the gods (οἱ χρησμοὶ τῶν θεῶν) express by Existence, Power and Act. For *he explicitly names* the Father, Existence (τὸν μὲν οὖν πατέρα σαφῶς ὑπαρξιν ὀνομάζει), but as for Power, *he hands down* (παραδίδωσιν) no other name. But if the Father is Existence (ὑπαρξίς) and Power the median principle, would not the third be Act and be called Act? At any rate, it is in this way that the *great Iamblichus conceives* (θεωρεῖ) this.

Although at first glance, οἱ χρησμοί appears to be the subject of the verbs ὀνομάζει

⁶⁴ See e.g. Plotinus, *Enn.* 6.2.22.13: αἰνιττόμενος ὁ Πλάτων and *passim*. For a good overview on the use of this verb and related terms in connection with the Neoplatonic exegesis of myths, see R. Lamberton, *Homer: Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading and the Growth of the Epic Tradition* (Berkeley, 1989).

⁶⁵ Cf. *Hist. Philos.* 222 F Smith = fr. XVII Nauck: ὁ αὐτὸς Πορφύριος περὶ Πλάτωνος· διὸ ἐν ἀπορρήτοις περὶ τούτων αἰνιττόμενός φησὶ κτλ.

⁶⁶ This is the opinion of Westerink and Combès; see note ad loc. to second passage and J. Combès, 'Υπαρξίς et ὑπόστασις chez Damascius' in *Hyparxis e hypostasis*, 131–2. This is also the view of Hadot, cited above n. 58.

and *παράδιδωσιν*, this does not make grammatical sense. One would expect the verbs to be plural. This grammatical anomaly has led the editors of the *De Principiis*, Westerink and Combès, to surmise that Damascius, in writing *οἱ χρησμοί*, really had in mind *τὰ Λόγια* (citing Damascius' first two citations as evidence). Since the neuter plural can take a singular verb, they translate Damascius' words as *though τὰ Λόγια*, in fact, was the subject ('ils nomment clairement', etc.).⁶⁷ But in making this judgement, Westerink and Combès oddly ignore the larger context of this material, which identifies the 'he' in question with Iamblichus. It is in a work of Iamblichus, then, that Damascius found this bit of commentary on the *Oracles* with its explicit substitution of Existence or *ὑπαρξίς* for Father (as well as Act for Intellect), a method of interpretation or theorizing (*θεωρεῖ*) that is also reflected in the two examples cited above. (This substitution was noted earlier in connection with Iamblichus' teaching in Proclus' *Commentary on the Alcibiades*, where *ὑπάρξεις* is substituted for *οὐσία*; a similar substitution of terms is found in Iamblichus' *De Mysteriis*.)⁶⁸

That this substitution of terms was already made by Porphyry, however, is suggested by Proclus. In his *Commentary on the Parmenides* 1167.15–36, Proclus takes issue with a commentator who attributes 'act' to the First Principle.⁶⁹ Proclus argues that act should not be ranked prior to substance nor should it be attributed to the One. If act is attributed to the One, he argues, then power can be attributed to it as well, with the result that multiplicity will be introduced into the One ('the One will no longer be one'). He then adds that, in his opinion, there is something immediately following the One which is 'superior' to power and act. He identifies this 'something' with *ὑπαρξίς* in the following way: 'For if the *ὑπαρξίς* of the first triad of intelligibles is beyond (*ἐπέκεινα*) all power and all act, how much more so is the One, which rising above all *ὑπαρξίς* (*τὸ πᾶσαν ὑπαρξίν ὑπεραίρον*), we affirm as superior to act.' This statement reflects the same kind of argument Proclus makes against Porphyry concerning the ontological status of the One *vis-à-vis* the Chaldean Father in connection with their respective interpretations of frs. 3 and 4, but with a substitution of terms: The triad Existence, Power, Act for that of Father, Power, Intellect, 'beyond' for 'snatched away', 'rising above' for 'snatched away above'. The argument, however, remains the same. In a word—from Proclus' point of view—whether named *ὑπαρξίς* or Father, the first term of the intelligible triad—although perceived as 'beyond' or 'snatched away' from all things—cannot then be equated with the One (Porphyry's view), since the One—as Proclus sees it—'rises above' or is 'snatched away above' from all things absolutely, be it *ὑπαρξίς* or Father, Power, Act or Intellect. In this context, Proclus' description of the One as 'rising above all *ὑπαρξίς*' is close in sense to a descriptive term for the First Principle, *ὑπερύπαρξίς*, found in Ps.-Dionysius, *D.N.* 1.5; 117.6 Suchla—an expression that may have originally been coined by Proclus in connection with his exegesis of these fragments. This noun is of the same form as Proclus' verb, *ὑπεραρπάζω*. As with this term, Proclus again engages in a bit of terminological one-upmanship: if Porphyry can denominate the One, *ὑπαρξίς*, then he, Proclus, will go one better and name him *ὑπερύπαρξίς*—or that which 'rises above' or is 'snatched away above' absolutely. Although *ὑπερύπαρξίς* is not attested in any of Proclus' extant works, the

⁶⁷ See note ad loc.; repeated in Combès, *ibid.*

⁶⁸ See *D.M.* 1.5: *ἐν τῷ εἶναι τε καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἐνεργεῖν*; *D.M.* 1.6: *ἐν τῷ ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἐν τῷ δύνασθαι τε καὶ ἐνεργεῖν*. Cf. Damascius, *De Princ.*, § 61; 2.71.25–72.1 W–C, who notes a distinction between *τὸ ὑπάρχειν* and *τὸ εἶναι* 'made by the philosophers (sc. Syrianus and Proclus) and Iamblichus, himself, in his treatise "On the Gods" and in many other places'.

⁶⁹ On this passage, cf. C. Steel, 'Υπαρξίς chez Proclus' in *Hyparxis e hypostasis*, 92–4.

quality of absolute transcendence associated with this term is suggested in *P.T.* 2.11; 65.13–14 S–W where Proclus praises ‘the Ineffable’ as ‘more unknowable than all ὑπαρξίς’.

In addition, the fact that Proclus specifically isolates ‘act’ as a quality of the One—as the view of his opponent—also points to Porphyry, who exactly equates the One with ‘act’ or ‘pure act’ in his *Commentary on the Parmenides* 12.25–6.⁷⁰ It is in this section of the commentary (lines 32–3) that Porphyry also refers to the One as ‘absolute Being’ and ‘Idea of Being’. Porphyry then goes on (14.5–34) to link the One with the triad existence, life, intellection (ὑπαρξίς, ζωή, νοήσις—conceived as a sequence of ‘acts’) by arguing, in the manner of his exegesis of frs. 3 and 4, that the One, when it is ‘in itself’ and ‘by itself’—and thus ‘one and simple’—can be viewed as transcending the triad, but when deployed as the triad—and thus no longer ‘neither one nor simple’—becomes multiple, and thus is identified with Intellect or the One-Being of the second hypothesis. At this level, the One becomes equated with ὑπαρξίς as the first term of the intelligible triad. Although Porphyry does not explicitly name the One ὑπαρξίς here (he speaks instead of two states or moments of Intellect) his line of argument clearly leads to this conclusion.⁷¹ This is confirmed by Proclus, who exactly equates One, act and ὑπαρξίς in a refutation of this same type of Porphyrian argument.

A third example is found in a fragment from Porphyry’s *History of Philosophy* (223 F Smith = fr. XVIII Nauck). Here, Porphyry states that the First God, who is ‘single and alone’, can neither be ‘conumerated’ with the things after him nor can their ‘worth’ be ‘coordinated’ with his ‘ὑπαρξίς’.⁷² This is the same point that Porphyry makes in connection with the Chaldean Father in *In Parm.* 9.1–8: That the Father, when ‘snatched away’ from all things—and thus single and alone—cannot be ‘numbered’ with his power and intellect. Rather, in this transcendent state, the triad is ‘co-unified in his simplicity,’ that is it exists within him in a state of pure unity and indetermination. But this is precisely the sense in which ὑπαρξίς is used by the later Neoplatonists and which Hadot has traced back to the speculations of Porphyry. Hadot, however, has not realized the significance of ὑπαρξίς—in this sense—in this passage from the *History of Philosophy*.⁷³ In this passage, ὑπαρξίς, in effect, is equivalent to Porphyry’s use of ‘simplicity’ in his *Parmenides Commentary*.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ On what follows, see Hadot, *Porphyre* 1.129–39.

⁷¹ On this point, see *ibid.* 133.

⁷² The passage compares the First God with Intellect in the following way: ‘Just as the First God is always single and alone (εἷς καὶ μόνος; cf. above, n. 26), even if (καὶν) all things are generated by him, he cannot be conumerated with these things nor can their worth (τὴν ἀξίαν) be coordinated with the existence (ὑπάρξει) of that god (ἐκείνου); so Intellect is also eternally alone, since it subsists both outside of time and is itself the time of things within time, while remaining in the sameness of its own eternal hypostasis (ὑποστάσεως)’. ὑπαρξίς and ὑπόστασις are perhaps intended as synonyms here; cf. *In Parm.* 6.20 where Porphyry, in reference to the First God, speaks of ‘the incomparable nature of his own hypostasis (ὑποστάσεως)’. Certain stylistic features in this passage are also attested in Porphyry’s *Parmenides Commentary* (see Hadot, *Porphyre* 2: Index IV), notably the frequent use (some nineteen times) of the demonstrative pronoun (ἐκεῖνος) in reference to the First God or the One and a preference (five times) for the phrase ‘even if’ (καὶν). These terms are typical of Porphyry, e.g. *Letter to Marcella* (ἐκεῖνος, five times with reference to God; καὶν, four times); see E. des Places, *Porphyre: Lettre à Marcella* (Paris, 1982): Index Verborum. The construction ‘just as . . . so’ (ὥσπερ . . . οὕτως) is also typical of Porphyry; cf. e.g. *In Parm.* 13.23–14.4. On Porphyry’s use of ἀξία as equivalent to τάξις see Theiler, ‘Porphyrios und Augustin’ in *Forschungen*, 182–3.

⁷³ See *Porphyre* 1.121; Cf. A. Smith, ‘Ὑπόστασις and ὑπαρξίς in Porphyry’ in *Hyparxis e hypostasis*, 39.

⁷⁴ Cf. Damascius, *De Princ.* § 121; 3.153.8–11 W–C, where ὑπαρξίς is equated with ‘simplicity’

Whether ὑπαρξίς, in turn, was also a term of the *Oracles* is more problematic. As noted above, there is no verse extant in which ὑπαρξίς appears, either in its existential sense or in the more technical usages of the later Neoplatonists. This is itself significant, given the widespread use of this word among the later Neoplatonists. Indeed, if anyone, we would expect Proclus to preserve a verse in which this term was used, but he does not. On the other hand, Proclus provides us with an interesting example of how he linked ὑπαρξίς to Chaldean teaching by including it in the frame material of fr. 84. The fragment, as it stands, is a single line of verse drawn from Book 4 of Proclus' *Platonic Theology* (4.21; 64.11–12 S–W): 'For connecting all things he, himself, exists entirely outside' (πάντας γὰρ συνέχων αὐτὸς πᾶς ἔξω ὑπάρχει). The larger context of the fragment is a bit of commentary on the *Phaedrus* 247BC concerning Plato's description of the 'immortal souls' who reach the 'summit' (ἄκρον) of heaven and then pass 'outside' (ἔξω) and 'stand on the back of the sky'. After citing the passage, Proclus then 'harmonizes' it with the *Oracles* by claiming that Plato's expressions 'summit' and 'outside' are 'attributes of the first of the connectors' (τοῦ πρώτου τῶν συνοχέων), a Chaldean entity that then becomes the subject of fr. 84:

'For connecting all things' in the single summit of his own existence, according to the Oracle, 'he, himself, exists entirely outside'.

ἄντας γὰρ συνέχων τῇ ἑαυτοῦ μιᾷ τῆς ὑπάρξεως ἀκρότητι, κατὰ τὸ λόγιον, αὐτὸς πᾶς ἔξω ὑπάρχει.⁷⁵

Although 'summit' (ἀκρότης) and 'existence' (ὑπαρξίς) have become part of the frame material here, 'summit'—unlike 'existence'—is a legitimate term of the *Oracles*. It is attested twice: in fr. 76, it is connected with the role of the iynges who are said to 'stand upon' the 'three summits' of the 'worlds'; in fr. 82, the 'summits' are said to receive the 'lightning-bolt' protection of the 'connectors' ('He has given the summits the protection of his lightning-bolts, having mixed his own force of strength among the connectors'). That Proclus makes 'the first of the connectors' the subject of fr. 84 underscores its connection with this cosmogonic material. (Damascius, in fact, cites part of fr. 84 in his introductory comments to fr. 82.)⁷⁶ In addition, Proclus also connects this material with his interpretation of fr. 3. This is confirmed by his remarks in the passage cited at the beginning of this paper (*In Parm.* 1070.15ff.). Here (as cited above), Proclus makes the following comments about the Father: 'After all, he is called an intelligible Father and the *summit* (ἀκρότης) of the intelligible world,

as 'paternal'; Synesius, *H.* 9(1) 60–1, where God is described as 'uniting the simplicities of summits' (ἀπλότητας ἀκροτήτων ἐνίσασα). 'Summit' (ἀκρότης) is a term of the *Oracles* and is regularly equated in Neoplatonic exegesis with ὑπαρξίς (see discussion below). 'Simplicity' (= ὑπαρξίς) is borrowed from Porphyry (e.g. *In Parm.* 9.4) as is the term ἐνίζω (e.g. *Sent.* 11 and 36 Lamberz; *Marc.* 10). Cf., also, Marius Victorinus, *Adv. Ar.* 1.55.19–21, who refers to the 'Father' as the 'existence-source' (*fontana exsistentia* = πηγαία ὑπαρξίς) situated at the summit (*verticem* = ἀκρότητα).

⁷⁵ Proclus may have felt authorized to introduce ὑπαρξίς in the frame material here based on the use of the verbal form found in the verse. The verbal form also appears in frs. 1 and 20. In fr. 1, verse 10, it is the intelligible object or τι νοητόν that 'exists outside intellect' (νόου ἔξω ὑπάρχει). Although Proclus' commentary on this verse is not preserved, it is probably echoed in that of Psellus (*Exegesis*, *P.G.* 122, 1148d = des Places, 185), who explains that the intelligible 'exists outside intellect' in terms of its 'intelligible transcendence and the particularity of its existence' (τὴν ιδιότητα τῆς ὑπάρξεως). Cf. e.g. *E.T. prop.* 77: κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ιδιότητα; *prop.* 120: ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ὑπάρξει.

⁷⁶ *In Parm.* § 257; 2.97.23–98.1 W–C: 'Most of all, the function of guarding has been assigned to the connectors, inasmuch as they encompass and connect all things within themselves'.

and even if he is the *connective principle* (συνεκτικός = συνοχεύς)⁷⁷ of the whole intelligible world, yet it is as its Father that he is so.' In this instance, the cosmogonic language of fr. 84 has been transposed by Proclus into a metaphysical reflection concerning the First Principle. Since frs. 3 and 84 are conceptually the same—each fragment describes a principle or entity that is separated from all things—one wonders if the cosmogonic context of fr. 84 was the original setting for *both* fragments, and the 'Father' of fr. 3 was, in fact, 'the first of the connectors'.⁷⁸ If so, then it is this cosmogonic father who is 'snatched away' or 'exists outside' all things, not a separate and distinct metaphysical principle in the Neoplatonic sense.

In any event, whatever the original setting of these verses, the terms 'summit' (ἀκρότης) and 'existence' (ὑπαρξίς)—closely linked in the frame material of fr. 84—are elsewhere virtual equivalents for Proclus. Of note is his mention of the terms 'one', 'divinity', and 'existence' as equivalent terms for the 'summit' of the intelligible triad in *P.T.* 3.12; 46.2–3 S–W and his mention of the intelligible gods (also called 'fathers') as defined by their 'existences' and 'summits' in *P.T.* 4.39; 112.27–8. That this equivalency derived, in part, from Proclus' reading of fr. 82⁷⁹ is confirmed by Psellus, who gives an interpretive paraphrase of the verses and, in doing so, exactly substitutes 'existences' for 'summits' in the following way (*Hypotyp.* 10 = des Places, p. 199):

The implacables, receiving the lightning-bolt *power* of the connectors, protect the *existences* from the fathers on high and guard their immaculate source *acts*.

οἱ δὲ ἀμείλικτοι, ὑποδεξάμενοι τὴν πρηστήριον τῶν συνοχέων δύναμιν, φρουροῦσι τὰς ὑπάρξεις ἄνωθεν τῶν πατέρων καὶ τὰς πηγαίας αὐτῶν ἐνεργείας ἀχράντους φυλάττουσιν.

In this reading, Psellus not only substitutes 'existences' for summits but adds the words 'power' and 'acts' in a subtle allusion to the triad existence(s), powers(s), act(s). The fragment is further reworked by introducing the expressions ἀμείλικτος and πηγαία, terms which are drawn from verses in other fragments (see frs. 35, 36, 42) and take on a life of their own in Neoplatonic exegesis. ἄχραντος, on the other hand, is a Proclan term, used with reference to his ἀχράντοι θεοί as the equivalent of the οἱ ἀμείλικτοι. The mention of 'fathers on high' can be compared to Proclus' remarks in *P.T.* 3.12 (above), where the term 'fathers' is equated with the intelligible gods.

Why ὑπαρξίς for 'summit' in this and other instances? Because ὑπαρξίς, in Neoplatonic speculation, was also understood precisely in this sense, that is as the summit, high point, or first of something.⁸⁰ This is evidenced by the substitution of ὑπαρξίς or 'existence' for the First Principle as well as the first term or 'summit' of various triads. Proclus even equates this term—in an anagogic context—with the Chaldean 'flower of intellect', understood as the fine point or summit of the mind. Of particular interest in this regard are his remarks in *P.T.* 1.3; 15.1–6 S–W, where he states

⁷⁷ Cf. Proclus, *P.T.* 4.39; 111.12–13 S–W: 'Why, among the three connectors (τῶν τριῶν συνεκτικῶν), is the first empyrean, the second ethereal, the third material?'; 17: τοῖς συνοχεύουσιν.

⁷⁸ It is possible that frs. 3 and 84 may have originally followed one another in a single oracle: 'the Father snatched himself away and did not enclose his own fire in his intellectual power. For connecting all things, he, himself, exists entirely outside' (see below n. 116). Psellus suggests that the 'Connector of all' was the principle deity in Chaldean speculation when he reports that Julian *pater*, before conceiving his son, Julian the Theurgist, entreated the 'Connector of all' to give him 'the soul of an archangel'. See *De aurea catena* in C. Sathas, *Annuaire pour l'encouragement des études grecques en France* (1875), 215–17; cited in Lewy, 224, n. 195.

⁷⁹ Since these equivalencies are also found in Synesius and Marius Victorinus (see above, n. 74), Porphyry must have been the first to read fr. 82 (and probably fr. 84) in this manner.

⁸⁰ See esp. Damascius, *De Princ.* § 121; 3.152.19–24; cf. J. Rist, 'Mysticism and transcendence in later Neoplatonism', *Hermes* 92 (1964), 213–25.

that union with the henads (αἱ ἐνάδες) and, through them, union with the primal ἔνωσις ('the hidden Unity of all the divine henads') is accomplished through 'the summit (τὴν ἀκρότητα) of intellect and, as they say (ὡς φασι), flower (τὸ ἄνθος), and existence (τὴν ὑπαρξιν)'. Here, the indirect quotation alludes only to the 'flower of intellect' as attested in fr. 1; ὑπαρξιν, unattested, is then linked to this term as part of Proclus' exegesis.⁸¹ Similar language is used in 2.8; 56.8–14, where 'all divine things' are said to be united to the First Principle through 'their highest unities (ταῖς ἀκροτάταις ἐνώσεσιν ἐαυτῶν), superessential fires (ὑπερουσίους πυρσοῖς) and first existences (ταῖς ὑπάρξεσιν ταῖς πρώταις)'. In the case of the human soul, this is achieved by first 'arousing its own existence' (τὴν ὑπαρξιν τὴν ἐαυτῆς ἀνεγείρουσαν), that is its summit or flower.⁸² In these instances, ἄνθος⁸³ and πυρσός⁸⁴ are terms of the *Oracles*; ὑπαρξιν, ἐνάς, ἔνωσις, and ὑπερουσίος are terms of Neoplatonic speculation; ἀκρότης is a term of the *Oracles* and Neoplatonic speculation; the expression 'arousing its own existence' is a combination of later Neoplatonic (ὑπαρξιν) and Plotinian terminology (cf. *Enn.* 4.8.1.1 πολλάκις ἐγειρόμενος εἰς ἐμαυτὸν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος).

This method of freely combining isolated terms and expressions from a variety of sources is a hallmark of later Neoplatonic exegesis, reaching its zenith in the 'harmonizing' strategies of the Athenian School. That ὑπαρξιν—as the 'first' of something—becomes linked to this material derives from this tradition of interpretation. As such, it can be traced back to the metaphysical speculations of Porphyry, for whom ὑπαρξιν was viewed as a foundational principle, that is the first ἀρχή of things. This understanding of ὑπαρξιν stems from what Hadot⁸⁵ calls a 'metaphysical transposition of Stoicism', that is a method of transposing Stoic concepts of the real—applied to physical substance—into a Platonizing metaphysics of transcendent realities. This method, already developed to some extent in Middle Platonism (Plotinus utilized it) becomes, in Hadot's words, 'systematic and conscious' in Porphyry's thinking. In the case of ὑπαρξιν, this means that this concept—which denotes a sense of 'quasi-reality' in Stoic ontology—becomes 'transposed', in Porphyry's thinking, into a (neo-) Platonizing principle denoting pure, undetermined being, that is the pure unity or 'one' of things. Thus, ὑπαρξιν, in Neoplatonic exegesis, becomes identified with the pure unity (= simplicity) of the First Principle, the first (= summit) or unifying term of certain triads and the summit, 'flower', or unifying element of intellect. That the authors of the *Oracles*, in turn, had already come to this understanding (either independently or drawing on some lost tradition of Middle Platonism)—and then made the appropriate substitution of terms—cannot be demonstrated by the extant evidence. Porphyry, then, was the first to make some of these substitutions as well as to

⁸¹ Cf. similarly *In Parm.* 1044.28–9: 'ὑπαρξιν and, so to speak (οἶον), flower'; 1049.36–7: 'For these henads are superessential and, as someone says (ὡς φησί τις), flowers and summits'; *De Mal. Sub.* 2.11; 3.43.31–32 Isaac: 'summitates et velut flores et supersubstantialia lumina'; Ps-Dionysius, *D.N.* 2.7; 132.2–3 Suchla: οἶον ἄνθη καὶ ὑπερούσια φῶτα; Synesius, *H.* 1(3) 140: ἄνθεα φωτός.

⁸² Cf. *In Alc.* 114 [247 Cr.] 7–11; [248 Cr.] 3–4 Westerink = 2.294 [247 Cr.] 8–14 and 295 [248 Cr.] 3–4 Segonds, where Proclus similarly refers to 'arousing the very summit, the ὑπαρξιν of the soul' which he then equates with the 'flower of our being' and 'flower of intellect'. On these distinctions, see C. Guérard, 'L'hyparxis de l'âme et la fleur de l'intellect dans la mystagogie de Proclus' in J. Pépin and H.D. Saffrey (edd.), *Proclus. Lecteur et interprète des anciens* (Paris, 1987), 335–49; cf. C. Steel (n. 69), 97–100.

⁸³ ἄνθος; frs. 1, 49 ('flower of intellect'); frs. 34, 35, 37, 42 ('flower of fire'); fr. 130 ('flower of fiery fruits').

⁸⁴ πυρσός; frs. 126, 130.

⁸⁵ On these ideas, see *Porphyry* 1, esp. 485–90.

elicit and equate some of the triads; Iamblichus put the method on a broader basis with the Athenian School integrating it into every aspect of their exegetical program.⁸⁶

III. ONCE BEYOND, HECATE, TWICE BEYOND

Another triad that the Neoplatonists elicited from their reading of the *Oracles* was that of Once Beyond (*ἄπαξ ἐπέκεινα*), Hecate, Twice Beyond (*δὶς ἐπέκεινα*). This triad, not attested in any of the extant fragments, was drawn in part from an interpretation of this enigmatic verse: fr. 50 = Damascius, *In Parm.* § 293; 2.164.19 Ruelle: 'The center of Hecate is carried in the middle of the fathers' (*μέσσον τῶν πατέρων Ἐκάτης κέντρον πεφορήσθαι*). Now Hecate plays a dual role in the *Oracles*: she functions as a goddess in the traditional sense (and, specifically, as a goddess who can be evoked in the context of various Chaldean theurgic rites),⁸⁷ she also functions as a cosmic principle closely identified with the Platonic World Soul.⁸⁸ This latter association was developed, in part, by a metaphysical reading of Hecate's cult statue, wherein various attributes of the goddess (hair, hips, loins, girdle, torches) were given cosmic significance.⁸⁹ The general image is that of a powerful life-giving or *zoogonic* goddess who mediates between the intelligible realm of ideas and the sensible realm of nature.

As for the expressions Once Beyond and Twice Beyond, it is unclear whether these terms derive from the *Oracles* or from a prose work of the *Juliani*.⁹⁰ There is no verse extant in which these terms are included, although des Places has isolated the expression *ἄπαξ ἐπέκεινα* as the final hemistich in a truncated hexameter (fr. 169 = Proclus, *In Crat.* 59.20). In doing so, however, des Places admits the difficulty of placing either term comfortably in the metrical schema of the *Oracles*.⁹¹ The use of

⁸⁶ This point is especially emphasized by Cremer, 40–1. It should also be noted that the term *ὑπαρξίς* appears as a name for the First Principle as well as the first term of the triad existence, life, intellect in the Nag Hammadi gnostic texts *Allogenes*, *Zostrianos*, and *The Three Steles of Seth*. I have argued elsewhere that these texts, in their present form, cannot be the same as those mentioned by Porphyry in *V.P.* 16 since the use of this and related triads (e.g. essentiality, vitality, mentality) can only be paralleled in the writings of the later Neoplatonists and figures like Marius Victorinus. See R. Majercik, 'The existence-life-intellect triad in gnosticism and Neoplatonism', *CQ* 42 (1992), 475–88. In response, see M. Tardieu, *Recherches sur la formation de l'Apocalypse de Zostrien et les sources de Marius Victorinus* and P. Hadot, 'Porphyre et Victorinus'. *Questions et hypothèses*, *Res Orientales* 9 (Bures-sur-Yvette, 1996), esp. 112–13, where Tardieu speculates that the common material in *Zostrianos* and Marius Victorinus derives from Numenius and 124–5, where Hadot suggests a gnostic or Christian intermediary of the original Greek source.

⁸⁷ Frs. 2(?), 72, 146–8; see Johnston (n. 39), 111–33.

⁸⁸ Frs. 32, 35, 38, 50(?), 51–56, 96; see Johnston (n. 39), 49–70, 153–63.

⁸⁹ See Kroll, 28–30; Lewy, 88–98.

⁹⁰ This was the opinion of Kroll, 17, followed by Theiler, 'Die chaldäischen Orakel und die Hymnen des Synesios' in *Forschungen*, 258. Lewy, 77, n. 43, followed by Hadot, *Porphyre* 1.262 and nn. 2–3, considers them terms of the *Oracles*. On the prose works of the *Juliani*, the *Suda* (no. 433) attributes to Julian *pater* a work in four books *On Demons*; to Julian *filius*, 'the Theurgist' (no. 434), works on *Theourgika* and *Telestika* as well as 'Oracles in verse'. Proclus (*In Tim.* 3.124.33) and Damascius (*In Parm.* § 341; 2.203.29–30 Ruelle) both mention Julian the Theurgist's *Hyphegetika* (Damascius, *Hyphegematika*); Proclus (*In Tim.* 3.27.10) also mentions a book *On Zones*. See Cremer, 88; Lewy, 123, n. 220. Cremer, following Lewy, identifies the book *On Zones* with the *Hyphegetika*, understanding the latter as a descriptive term for the former, that is as a book of 'instructions' or 'directions'; cf. Proclus, *In Tim.* 3.247.28: *ταῖς τῶν θεολόγων ὑφηγήσεσιν*.

⁹¹ See note ad loc., p. 147.

these terms can be traced back to Porphyry who, in his *Commentary on the Oracles*,⁹² identified the Twice Beyond with the 'universal Demiurge' whom, he says, 'the Chaldean' called 'the second from the Once Beyond'. In making these distinctions, Porphyry also identifies the Twice Beyond with the 'god of the Jews', the Once Beyond with 'the Good'. The identification of the Twice Beyond with the Demiurge is also found in Damascius' *De Principiis*, who notes that 'the Chaldeans' or 'the theurgists' divided the 'universal Demiurge' into a hebdomad of seven demiurges, with each of the seven called *δὲς ἐπέκεινα* or, simply, *δὲς*.⁹³ These expressions are also alluded to in Proclus' *Commentary on the Parmenides* in the form of the names 'Ad' and 'Adad' (= Syrian Hadad).⁹⁴ Proclus notes in this connection that the 'true theologians' refer to the First Principle in their own language as 'Ad', which Proclus says is their word for one, and then 'double it in order to name the demiurgic intellect of the world, which they call Adad, worthy of all praise'. Thus 'Ad' = one, 'Ad + Ad' = two. The equivalent Latin expressions, 'unus' and 'unus unus', are otherwise found in the Latin Neoplatonic tradition dependent on Porphyry.⁹⁵

This Latin tradition also attests to the linking of these names with Hecate. Martianus Capella, for example, in his *The Marriage of Philology and Mercury* (2.205), says that Philology, in her ascent through the spheres, 'prays to a certain virgin source (*fontanam virginem*) and, also, following the mysteries of Plato,⁹⁶ to the powers Once and Twice Beyond (*ἅπαξ καὶ δὲς ἐπέκεινα potestates*)'. The expression 'virgin source' is an allusion to Hecate, derived from an interpretive reading of fr. 52: 'In the left flank of Hecate exists the *source* of virtue, which remains entirely within and does not give up its *virginity*.' An analogous expression, 'soul source' (*anima fons, anima fontana*), is found in Marius Victorinus⁹⁷ and Favonius Eulogius;⁹⁸ the latter also preserves the Greek term, *πηγαία*, which is otherwise attested in Proclus (*πηγαία ψυχῇ*)⁹⁹ and Damascius (*πηγαία Ἐκάτη*).¹⁰⁰ This particular expression reflects an interpretive reading of fr. 52 in combination with fr. 51 ('Around the hollow of her right flank a great fount of the *primal soul* gushes forth in abundance, totally ensouling light, fire, ether, worlds').¹⁰¹ The specific expressions *πηγαία ψυχῇ* and *πηγαία Ἐκάτη* are modelled on that of *πηγαῖος κρατῆρ*, which is drawn from fr. 42. These verses, then, provide a basis for teaching about Hecate. The next step was to bring this material into relation with fr. 50 for the purpose of constructing a triad of principles, that is Once Beyond, Hecate (= soul source), Twice Beyond. This triad, however, is clearly forced: it takes a certain leap of imagination to link up the unnamed 'fathers' of fr. 50 with the two curious abstractions Once Beyond and Twice Beyond—a problem complicated by

⁹² *Apud* John Lydus, *De Mens.* 110.18–22 Wuensch = 365 F Smith.

⁹³ *De Princ.* § 94; 3.30.13–16 W–C and note ad loc.; 31.8; § 96; 3.36.12–13; *In Parm.* § 160; 1.67.23–68.10 W–C.

⁹⁴ *In Parm.* 60.1–9 Klibansky–Labowsky = 512.98–107 Steel.

⁹⁵ For example, Macrobius, *Sat.* 1.23.17; Marius Victorinus, *Adv. Ar.* 1.50.22; 51.1; cited and discussed in Hadot, *Porphyre* 1.274 and n. 10; 275 and n. 1.

⁹⁶ This expression alludes to a commentary on the *Oracles*; see S. Gersh, *Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: the Latin tradition 2* (Notre Dame, 1986), 610.

⁹⁷ *Adv. Ar.* 4.5.10–11; 11.13; cf. *fontana exsistentia*, above n. 74.

⁹⁸ *In Somn. Scip.* 19.37.3–5 van Weddingen.

⁹⁹ *In Tim.* 1.318.12; 2.117.29; 275.2 = Theodore of Asine, *Test.* 6; 32.19 Deuse.

¹⁰⁰ *In Parm.* § 182; 1.94.17 W–C.

¹⁰¹ In his introductory comments to fr. 51 (*In Rem P.*, 2.201.12), Proclus makes 'the source of souls' (ἡ πηγὴ τῶν ψυχῶν = τῆς πηγαίας ψυχῆς, line 22) the subject of the fragment; cf. Simplicius, *In Phys.* 613.2, 615.36, 617.4, who repeatedly substitutes *πηγαία ψυχῇ* as subject in connection with his citations and exegesis of verse 3.

the fact that these terms may be extraneous to the *Oracles* in the strict sense. That Proclus further identifies the triad as constituted of three 'source fathers' further underscores its illegitimacy.¹⁰²

The term Once Beyond, however, is close in sense to an expression that does appear in an oracular fragment, that of First Fire Beyond. This Stoicizing expression is found in fr. 5, a fragment which has not been properly understood in relation to this material.¹⁰³ The fragment reads:

For the First Fire Beyond (*πῦρ ἐπέκεινα τὸ πρῶτον*) does not enclose its own power in matter by means of works, but by Intellect. For Intellect derived from Intellect (*νοῦ νόος*) is the Craftsman of the fiery cosmos (*ὁ κόσμου τεχνίτης πυρίου*).

Fragment 5 (in whole or part) is cited several times by both Proclus and Damascius in a variety of contexts.¹⁰⁴ In one instance, Damascius, in his introductory material to the fragment, indicates that the first verse refers specifically to the Once Beyond,¹⁰⁵ suggesting that this expression was probably substituted in Neoplatonic exegesis for the Stoicizing First Fire Beyond. To the best of my knowledge, First Fire Beyond, unlike that of Once Beyond, is never found in any Neoplatonic text independent of the verse in which it occurs. Since Porphyry apparently refrained from incorporating the Stoicizing terminology of the *Oracles* in his interpretations of various verses, he may have been the first to make this substitution.

This suggestion is given further weight by reflections of Proclus and Damascius on the Orphic figure, Kronos, an entity that is regularly identified in later Neoplatonic exegesis with the Chaldean Once Beyond. In making this identification, Proclus and Damascius regularly identify Kronos (= Once Beyond) with the First Fire Beyond of fr. 5. The 'Intellect derived from Intellect' of the fragment is then equated with the 'universal Demiurge' (= Zeus = Twice Beyond). What lies behind these equations is a long history of Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato, *Crat.* 396B, where Plato derives the name Kronos as 'pure intellect' from *κόρος* (= *καθαρός*) and *νοῦς* and then identifies Zeus as 'the offspring of a great intellect'. In his extended commentary on this passage (*In Crat.* 56.24ff.), Proclus accepts Plato's etymology (he even coins the word *κορόνους* as expressive of Plato's combination of words)¹⁰⁶ while rejecting as 'hubristic' those explanations that understand *κόρος* as meaning either 'fullness' or 'child'.¹⁰⁷ He then goes on to approve the explanation (57.2–4) that 'praises' Kronos as

¹⁰² This point is emphasized by Lewy, 142, n. 283.

¹⁰³ Kroll, 17, notes a possible relation in passing; Cremer, 48, is affirmative and identifies the *ἅπαξ ἐπέκεινα* with the 'First Fire Beyond' as well as with the 'one fire' of fr. 10: 'all things have been generated from one fire'. Cf. Michael Italicus, *Letter 17* = des Places, 214: 'The Father himself is praised by them as a "sacred fire".'

¹⁰⁴ Like other verses from the *Oracles*, the context determines the interpretation. Thus, when commenting on the *Timaeus*, Proclus, *In Tim.* 2.57.9–58.11, cites the fragment in connection with Plato's demiurgy and the three worlds of Chaldean cosmology in the context of a long analysis of *Tim.* 32C5–8. Proclus' comment at the end is telling: 'It is necessary to examine these things again, for there are many difficulties on how to make all of this agree with Plato.' When commenting on the *Cratylus*, Proclus connects the fragment with Kronos and Zeus in an elaborate interpretation of *Crat.* 396B (see below). When commenting on the *Parmenides*, Damascius, *In Parm.* § 270; 2.136.4–26 Ruelle, brings the fragment into relation with the Parmenidean attributes 'in itself' and 'in another'.

¹⁰⁵ *In Parm.* § 362; 2.218.2–7 Ruelle.

¹⁰⁶ *In Crat.* 59.5; cf. *P.T.* 5.10; 35.5 S–W and note ad loc.; Damascius, *In Parm.* § 267; 2.134.19–20 Ruelle. LSJ s.v. incorrectly identify Damascius, rather than Proclus, as the source of this neologism.

¹⁰⁷ This criticism is probably directed at Plotinus; see e.g. *Enn.* 3.8.11.37–8: 'Who is it who has

'sated with purity and immaculate perception and leader of implacable life'. In this string of praises, the word 'purity' is drawn from Plato's discussion, 'immaculate' (*ἄχραντος*) is a Proclan substitute for Plato's term 'undefiled' (*ἀκήρατος*),¹⁰⁸ 'implacable' (*ἀμειλικτος*) is drawn from the *Oracles*.¹⁰⁹

This link with the *Oracles* becomes more explicit when Proclus subsequently equates Kronos with the First Fire Beyond of fr. 5. In doing so, Proclus also describes Kronos, in Neoplatonic terms, as an Intellect which reverts or 'turns back to himself'. He also identifies Kronos with the summit of the noeric order in connection with the three orders of Neoplatonic ontology (noetic, noetic-noeric, noeric), makes an allusion to the Kronos of Hesiod's genealogical myth ('he has turned back and enfolded within himself the things which have emerged from him') and even identifies Kronos with the separable intellect of Aristotle (57.4–22):

For King Kronos is Intellect and sustainer of all noeric life, but an Intellect which transcends the order of sense perceptibles since he is both immaterial (*ἄυλος*) and separable (*χωριστός*). He, himself, is turned back toward himself (*αὐτὸς εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστραμμένος*), the one who, at any rate, has turned back and enfolded within himself the things which, in turn, have emerged from him, and he is the one who is established firmly within himself (*ἐν ἑαυτῷ σταθερῶς ἱδρυσεν*).¹¹⁰ On the other hand, the universal Demiurge, even though he is a divine Intellect, nevertheless orders sense perceptibles and provides for things that are in need. But the very great Kronos is essentialized (*οὐσίωται*) in the separable and pre-eminent perceptions of the whole: 'For the First Fire Beyond does not enclose'¹¹¹ his own power in matter', says the oracle. But the Demiurge is dependent on that one and proceeds from him, since he is an Intellect who subsists around the immaterial Intellect and is active around him as an intelligible and causes to appear that which is hidden within him. 'For Intellect derived from Intellect' is the creator of the cosmos. And it appears to me that Kronos is the summit (*ἀκρότατος*) of what we specifically call the noeric gods.

This line of interpretation—especially the language of reversion—was also applied to the Once Beyond. This is attested by John Lydus (*De Mens.* 21.15–18 Wutsch): 'For, as the mystical teaching says, the Once Beyond is a substantial intellect (*νοῦς οὐσιώδης*), remaining in his own substance and *turned back toward himself* (*πρὸς ἑαυτὸν συνεστραμμένος*) while abiding and remaining (*ἐστῶς τε καὶ μένων*)'. Since Lydus appears to attribute this teaching directly to the *Oracles* ('the mystical teaching'), some have suggested that this passage may be a paraphrase of a lost verse or verses.¹¹² But this is not the case. What has happened here is that the language of reversion traditionally associated with Kronos as Intellect has simply become attached to the Once Beyond, Kronos' Chaldean equivalent.¹¹³ In this connection,

produced such a child as intellect, the beautiful child who is also fullness'; 5.1.4.9–10: 'truly the life of Kronos, a god who is fullness and intellect'. (Citations from Plotinus in this paper are taken from Henry and Schwyzer, *editio minor*.) In the *Cratylus* itself (396B), Plato considers 'hubristic' only that interpretation which considers Kronos (= *κόρος*) as 'child'.

¹⁰⁸ *Crat.* 396B6–7: 'the pure and undefiled (*ἀκήρατον*) nature of his intellect'. Cf. Proclus, *P.T.* 5.39; 145.8–10 S–W.

¹⁰⁹ Fr. 35: *ἀμειλικτοὶ τε κεραυνοί*; fr. 36: *ἀμειλίκτου πυρός*.

¹¹⁰ The *locus classicus* of this expression is Plato, *Theat.* 176A8: *ἐν θεοῖς ἱδρῦσθαι*; cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* 4.8.1.5: *ἐν αὐτῷ* (sc. *τῷ θεῷ*) *ἱδρυθεῖς*.

¹¹¹ Here I read *κατακλείει* ('enclose'; cf. *κλείσας*, fr. 3) for *κατακλίνει* ('inclines downward'). The latter is a copying error repeated in Proclus, *P.T.* 5.39; 145.12 S–W; see note ad loc. *κατακλείει* is otherwise attested by both Proclus and Damascius in all other citations of this verse.

¹¹² This is the opinion of Hadot, *Porphyre* 1.293 and n. 2; cf. des Places (n. 58), 2326–7.

¹¹³ Cf. Damascius, *In Parm.* § 268; 2.135.10–11 Ruelle: 'The noetic substance is *essentialized* (*οὐσίωται*) according to remaining, the noetic and noeric according to procession, the *noeric* according to *reversion* (*τὸ ἐπιστρέφειν*)'.

allegorical readings of Hesiod's genealogical myth also come into play, since the Kronos-Intellect of *Crat.* 396B is also associated in Neoplatonic exegesis with the Kronos of the myth. This association begins with Plotinus who, as Hadot has demonstrated,¹¹⁴ was the first to interpret the mythic themes connected with Kronos' activity—mutilation, swallowing, binding—as different ways of understanding Intellect's true nature, that is as a principle which reverts or turns back to itself while remaining in a state of immobility or rest. It is this mythic connection that Proclus has in mind when he says that Kronos 'has turned back and enfolded within himself the things which have emerged from him'.¹¹⁵ It is this tradition of interpretation, then, originally connected with Kronos, that the later Neoplatonists utilized when describing the Once Beyond. Thus the Once Beyond, like Kronos, becomes an Intellect which reverts or 'turns back to himself'.

Further, since this theme of reversion is linked to an interpretive reading of fr. 5, this suggests that this fragment must have served as the principle oracular authority for teaching about the Once Beyond. If so, then the 'mystical teaching' mentioned by Lydus would refer to the Neoplatonic reading of this fragment, with the Once Beyond substituted for the First Fire Beyond and the 'theological' language of the fragment ('the First Fire Beyond does not enclose his own power in matter') interpreted 'metaphysically' to mean that the Once Beyond (= Kronos = substantial intellect) reverts or 'turns back to himself'.¹¹⁶ As such, the Once Beyond or Kronos can also be described as a principle that is 'established firmly within himself' (= 'remaining in his own substance' = 'abiding and remaining').¹¹⁷ The Twice Beyond (= Zeus) could then readily be equated with the 'Intellect derived from Intellect' (= 'Craftsman of the fiery

¹¹⁴ P. Hadot, 'Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus in Plotinus' treatise against the gnostics', in H. J. Blumenthal and R. A. Markus (edd.), *Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought* (London, 1981), 124–37.

¹¹⁵ Cf. Damascius, *In Parm.* § 277; 2.149.8–10 Ruelle (in connection with an exegesis of *Parm.* 145E): 'in that the parts are turned back to the whole, he produces the parts from himself. For Kronos himself vomits his own offspring.'

¹¹⁶ Proclus also links this terminology to his reading of frs. 84 and 152. In *In Crat.* 59.1–4, he refers to Kronos (= Once Beyond) as 'uncut' (ἀμιστύλλεντος = fr. 152; cf. Damascius, *In Parm.* § 206; 2.37.21–3 W-C: οἱ θεοὶ τὸν δὲ ἀπαξ "ἀμιστύλλεντον" ἀνυμνοῦσιν; Iamblichus, *D.M.* 2.4: πῦρ ἄτμον; Cremer, 48) and 'Connector of all' (= fr. 84): 'For he [= Kronos = Once Beyond] is, as the oracle says, "uncut", simple, indivisible and "Connector of all" the sources, turning all things back to himself, since he is unified and separated from all things purely'. On the previous page (58.7–9), he connects Kronos (= Once Beyond) with fr. 3: 'But Kronos is established firmly within himself and "snatches himself away" from the whole of secondary things.' Although nothing can be said with certainty about the original context of these fragments, the fact that Proclus links all three—in addition to fr. 5—to this same complex of ideas, suggests that the various entities of these fragments may have originally been one and the same: Father = First Fire Beyond (= Once Beyond) = Connector of all. If so, then the principle deity of the *Oracles* (as suggested above, n. 78; cf. n. 103) was probably this fiery, cosmogonic 'Father' and not the metaphysical 'Father' of Neoplatonic speculation.

¹¹⁷ The concept of 'abiding and remaining' (ἐστώς τε καὶ μένων) is Platonic, e.g. *Parm.* 145E7–8: τὸ ἐν ἐστάναι (see Proclus, *P.T.* 5.38; 142.1; 22: ἐστώς); *Tim.* 42E5–6: the Demiurge ἔμεινεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τρόπον ἡθελί (see *P.T.* 5.39; 145.18–19; here, Proclus links this terminology from the *Timaeus* to his exegesis of *Crat.* 396B and fr. 5). Cf. Iamblichus, *D.M.* 1.7: 'Intellect, then, is leader and king of beings and the demiurgic artisan of the universe, and he forever stands by the gods, perfectly and self-sufficiently and without need, according to a single act which abides purely in himself (ἐστώσαν ἐν ἑαυτῇ καθαρῶς); 7.2: 'God himself is established within himself (ἱδρυται καθ' ἑαυτὸν), august and holy, beyond simple (ὑπερηπλωμένος) and remaining in himself (μένων ἐν ἑαυτῷ); Plotinus, *Enn.* 5.3.12.33–4, who links Plato's language in *Tim.* 42E5–6 with the One as that which 'remains in itself'. On Plotinus' use of this terminology, see Hadot, *Porphyre* 1.320, n. 4.

cosmos') as Demiurge. Once interpreted in this manner, fr. 5 could then be brought into relation with fr. 50 as a way of identifying the unnamed 'fathers' of the verse with the ἄπαξ and δις ἐπέκεινα. Hecate, then, would become the 'median' or 'center' between these two entities. That the later Neoplatonists did not simply invent these names is suggested by both Porphyry and Damascius, who mention 'the Chaldean(s)' or 'the theurgists' as a source (indicating a prose work if the *Oracles* are ruled out), but perhaps in the simpler forms of ἄπαξ and δις.¹¹⁸ If ἐπέκεινα was not originally linked with these terms by the *Juliani* (suggested by Proclus in his comments on the names 'Ad' and 'Adad' and by the Latin equivalents, 'unus' and 'unus unus'), then it must have been added by the Neoplatonists when they brought ἄπαξ and δις into relation with fr. 5. The further linking of these names with Kronos and Zeus would then have occurred in the context of the harmonizing strategies of the Athenian school—as would their placement in the noeric order. Porphyry, in contrast, may have simply equated the 'two beyonds' of fr. 5 with the 'two intellects' of fr. 7 as First Principles. If so, then Hecate as 'soul source' would rank third in order *after* the 'two beyonds' or 'two intellects', a placement that is suggested by Porphyrian material in Arnobius' *Adversus Nationes*¹¹⁹ as well as in Martianus Capella's description of Philology's ascent. In this ranking, which follows the Plotinian order of principles,¹²⁰ Chaldean authority would be based on interpretive readings of frs. 5 and 7 in combination with fr. 53: 'after the paternal thoughts I, the Soul, am situated, animating the All with my heat'.

Now, in the same way that Kronos and Zeus become equated with the Once Beyond and Twice Beyond in Neoplatonic exegesis, so the Orphic Rhea becomes identified with Hecate. As such, Rhea, like Hecate, becomes the mean term between 'two fathers' (Kronos and Zeus) in connection with a reading of fr. 50. Of particular interest is the following description of Rhea found in Proclus' *Platonic Theology* 5.11; 36.12–20 S-W:

This goddess is the median center (τὸ μέσον κέντρον) of the paternal noeric triad and the receptive womb (ὁ ἐκδόχιος κόλπος) of the generative power which is in Kronos. On the one hand, she is filled (πληρουμένη) with noetic and fecund power from the father who is prior to her; on the other, she fills (πληροῦσα) with life-giving abundance (ζωογονικῆς περιουσίας) the demiurge and father who subsists from her.

Although Proclus cites this passage as though it belonged to the Orphic tradition (Brisson identifies it as such),¹²¹ all the descriptive terms he applies to Rhea

¹¹⁸ See above n. 93 and cf. Damascius, *In Parm.* § 343; 2.205.24 Ruelle, who refers to the Demiurge or 'dyad' as 'twice the once', the 'archic gods' as 'twice the twice'.

¹¹⁹ *Adversus Nationes* 2.25; 95.10–14 Marchesi²: 'Is this that learned soul of which you speak, immortal, perfect, divine, holding fourth place after God, the principle of the universe, and after the two intellects, and flowing forth from living mixing bowls?' It is unclear whether this schema of four principles (= Father, Paternal Intellect, Demiurgic Intellect, Soul) is Arnobius' own or derives from his source. In either case, it reflects an attempt to sort out the otherwise ambiguous relation in the *Oracles* between the Father and the 'two intellects' (see above, n. 9). On Porphyry as the source of Arnobius, see P. Courcelle, 'Les sages de Porphyre et les "viri novi" d'Arnobé', *REL* 31 (1953), 257–71; M. Bland Simmons, *Arnobius of Sicca* (Oxford, 1995), 216–42 and *passim*; P. Mastrandea, *Un Neoplatonico Latino: Cornelio Labeo* (Leiden, 1979), 127–34 and 193–8, who argues that this Porphyrian material in Arnobius was mediated through Cornelius Labeo, a member of Porphyry's circle in Rome.

¹²⁰ Cf. Porphyry *apud* Lydus (n. 92) where the 'Twice Beyond' or Demiurge is mentioned as 'second' from the 'Once Beyond' or 'the Good'; *Hist. Philos.* 221 F Smith = fr. XVI Nauck, where 'the Good', 'Demiurge', and 'Soul of the universe' are schematized, respectively, as 'the highest god', 'second' and 'third'.

¹²¹ L. Brisson, 'Proclus et l'Orphisme' in *Proclus. Lecteur et interprète des anciens* (n. 82), 76–7.

(‘median’, ‘center’, ‘life-giving’, ‘receptive womb’, ‘fullness’) are drawn from descriptions of Hecate in the *Oracles*.¹²² This is confirmed in a subsequent line (37.1) when Proclus explicitly refers to Rhea, in the language of fr. 50, as ‘the median between the two fathers’ (μέση οὔσα τῶν δύο πατέρων). The substitution of Rhea for Hecate, in this instance, is determined by Proclus’ context, as Book 5 of the *Platonic Theology* is organized and arranged on the authority of the Orphic not Chaldean tradition.

Another example of this conflation of Rhea and Hecate is found in Proclus’ commentary on the *Cratylus* 402AB, where Socrates reflects on the name Rhea as ‘stream’. In this context, Proclus attributes to the *Oracles* several verses which have Rhea as the subject (*In Crat.* 81.2–8):

Concerning Rhea, the *zoogonic* source, from whom all divine life—noeric, psychic and encosmic—is generated, the *Oracles* speak in this way: ‘Truly Rhea (ῥέη) is the source (πηγή) and stream (ῥοή) of blessed noeric realities (νοερῶν). For she, first in power, receiving (δεξαμένη) the birth of all things (πάντων) in her inexpressible wombs, pours it forth on the All as it runs its course’.

Proclus’ attribution of these lines to the *Oracles* has resulted in a vigorous scholarly debate about the possible role of Rhea as a legitimate Chaldean deity. des Places, for example, includes these verses as an undoubted fragment (fr. 56) in his edition of the *Oracles*, arguing for a single goddess, Rhea-Hecate, as part of the Chaldean system.¹²³ Lewy, however, argues that Rhea was not part of the ‘Chaldean pantheon’, and prefers to read ῥέη in the first verse not as the epic equivalent for the more common ‘Ρέα, but as an adjectival variant for the Homeric ῥεία (= ῥάδιως), and thus constructs verse 1 to mean: ‘The source and stream of the spiritual blessed ones is easy-flowing’ (with source and stream referring to the Chaldean Father as ‘paternal intellect’ or ‘paternal source’). Lewy thinks that this verse is modelled on the Homeric line, θεοὶ ῥεία ζῶοντες, which Proclus cites at 81.14.¹²⁴ Hadot accepts Lewy’s analysis of this verse, but then misreads Lewy when he identifies source and stream with Hecate rather than with the Father as ‘paternal source’.¹²⁵ Festugière thinks that the problem lies not with the term ῥέη—which he accepts as an undoubted reference to the goddess—but with Proclus’ confusing some Orphic verses with those from the *Oracles*.¹²⁶ Kroll¹²⁷ is similarly suspicious, but he conjectures that the verses—although Chaldean in origin—were interpolated at some point to bring them into conformity with Iamblichean doctrine. Iamblichus (on the testimony of Damascius) distinguished between noeric, psychic and encosmic gods, each with their own ‘source’. As further evidence, Kroll points out that similar distinctions are also made by the Emperor Julian in his *Hymn to the Mother of the Gods*, 166AB (cf. 179D), where he describes the ‘Mother of the Gods’ as ‘the source of the noeric and demiurgic gods’ and then paraphrases fr. 56 in the following manner: ‘For receiving (δεξαμένη) in herself the causes of all (πάντων) the gods, both noetic and hypercosmic, she became source (πηγή) for the noeric (νοερούς) gods’. In paraphrasing these verses, Julian clearly follows Iamblichus in identifying the νοεροί of the fragment with a class of gods (the fragment itself is ambiguous), but in doing so,

¹²² The terms ‘median’ and ‘center’ derive from fr. 50; ‘life-giving’ and ‘fullness’ from fr. 32; ‘receptive womb’ from fr. 35.

¹²³ See note ad loc., 134. Cf. Majercik, 165, where I discuss some of the problems with this fragment.

¹²⁴ See Lewy, 84, n. 65; 159 and n. 350.

¹²⁵ *Porphyre* 1.396, n. 2.

¹²⁶ A.-J. Festugière, *Proclus: Commentaire sur le Timée* 5 (Paris, 1968), 117, n. 1.

¹²⁷ See Kroll, 30–1.

Julian makes no allusion to the Great Mother as 'stream'; rather, she is referred to only as 'source'.¹²⁸

This is also the case in a lengthy passage from Proclus' *Commentary on the Timaeus* (2.127.26–130.29) in connection with his analysis of *Tim.* 35A1–4. The specific point in question concerns why Plato considers the Soul a 'median'. In the course of his comments (129.25–29) on this question, Proclus first appeals to the authority of 'the gods' and 'the theologians' by paraphrasing frs. 50 and 51: 'the Goddess who is the cause of Soul is the bond between two fathers and from her flanks proceeds the life of soul'. Proclus then refers to the Goddess as 'the soul principle' (τὴν ψυχικὴν ἀρχήν), an expression analogous to that of 'soul source' in Neoplatonic exegesis.¹²⁹ Toward the end of his discussion (130.23–9), Proclus describes Soul in the following way: 'she is visible on both sides (ἀμφιφαής) and faces both ways (ἀμφιπρόσωπος) and she holds the rudder of the universe, receiving in her wombs (ὑποδεχομένη τοῖς ἐαυτῆς κόλποις) the processions from the intelligibles; on the one hand, she is filled (πληρουμένη) from noeric life, on the other, she produces the channels (τοὺς ὀχετούς) of corporeal life, and she contains the center (τὸ κέντρον) of the procession of all beings within herself'. This description of Soul contains a litany of allusions to Hecate (= soul source) in the *Oracles*,¹³⁰ including a paraphrase of fr. 56 (emphasized). This suggests that it was Hecate, not Rhea, who was the original subject of the fragment. In fact, Proclus' formulaic expression 'median center and receptive womb' was undoubtedly drawn from his reading of this fragment in combination with frs. 50 and 35 (πρηστηροδόχοι κόλποι 'Εκάτης). The introduction of 'Rhea' as 'stream' in line 1, then, must have occurred in the specific context of commenting on *Crat.* 402AB. This, in fact, is confirmed by Proclus in his *Platonic Theology*. In *P.T.* 5.11; 37.7–10, just following his description of Rhea in Chaldean terms ('median center and receptive womb'), Proclus refers explicitly to *Crat.* 402AB: 'This is why Plato likens her fecund abundance to

¹²⁸ Julian (166A) also refers to the 'Mother of the Gods' as 'the Mistress of all life' (ἡ πάσης κυρία ζωῆς), an expression that is probably modelled on that of ζωῆς δεσπότις found in fr. 96. In this fragment, 'Soul' is the subject, described as a 'radiant fire' which 'possesses full measures of the many wombs <of the world>'. This imagery links fr. 96 to the description of Hecate in fr. 32 ('filling the life-giving wombs of Hecate') and that of 'Rhea' (= Hecate) in fr. 56 ('receiving in her inexpressible wombs').

¹²⁹ Cf. *In Crat.* 94.29–95.4 where Proclus replaces πηγὴ with ἀρχή in an exegesis of frs. 51 and 52. ἀρχή and πηγὴ are both terms of the *Oracles*, associated with the 'Father' (frs. 13, 37) and various noetic and cosmic entities (frs. 30, 40, 49, 73, 74, 168). In connection with Soul, ἀρχή and πηγὴ ultimately derive from Plato, *Phaedrus* 245C. 'Principles' and 'sources' can also be distinguished, e.g. Psellus, *Expos.*, *P.G.* 122, 1152b = des Places, 189–190, who distinguishes 'principles' from 'sources' on the basis that the latter are 'more primordial'. Based on this doctrine, the 'zoogonic principles' of 'Hecate', 'the archic soul' and 'archic virtue' (drawn from frs. 51 and 52) are situated beneath various 'sources', including the 'source fathers' Once Beyond, Hecate, Twice Beyond.

¹³⁰ The terms ἀμφιφαής, ἀμφιπρόσωπος, and ἀμφίστομος are all used as descriptive of Soul by Proclus; e.g. *In Tim.* 2.130.23; 246.19; 293.23. Cf. Damascius, *De Princ.* § 122; 3.158.4 W–C and *In Parm.* § 281; 2.152.23 Ruelle: ἡ ἀμφιφαής 'Εκάτη. Following des Places, I only cite ἀμφιπρόσωπος (= fr. 189) as a term of the *Oracles* (see Kroll, 30, n. 1) in my edition, but I now think that the three terms, as well as the expression ἀμφιφαής 'Εκάτη, probably derive from lost verses. See Lewy, 93, n. 111, who refers to the three terms as 'epithets' of the *Oracles*; Westerink and Combès, note ad loc. to Damascius, *De Princ.* § 122; 3.158.4, who refer to ἀμφιφαής 'Εκάτη as 'a literal citation' from the *Oracles*. As for Proclus' other expressions, that of Soul as 'filled from noeric life' derives from a reading of fr. 32; Soul as that which 'produces the channels of corporeal life' from a reading of fr. 65; Soul as 'center' from fr. 50. Lewy, 93, n. 111 and 97, n. 132, thinks the expression 'holds the rudder of the universe' may also be Chaldean; Kroll (30, n. 1), however, suggests a possible allusion to *Orph. Hymn* 58.8.

streams (ρεύμασιν; 402B4), as Socrates says in the *Cratylus*, and demonstrates that this goddess is a certain *flux* (ρόήν; 402A9).

This 'harmonizing' of Platonic and Chaldean material is also apparent in Proclus' comments above concerning 'the Goddess' in his *Timaeus Commentary*. In his allusion to fr. 50, Proclus refers to the Goddess (= Hecate) not as 'median', but as 'bond' (συναγωγός), utilizing Plato's term from *Tim.* 36E; in paraphrasing fr. 56 he uses the term ὑποδεχομένη—rather than δεξαμένη—utilizing Plato's language for the Receptacle (ὑποδοχή) in *Tim.* 49A and 51A (cf. 53A: ὑπὸ τῆς δεξαμένης). It is this method, then, that is applied to fr. 56, with the Orphic Rhea as 'stream' becoming identified with the Chaldean Hecate as 'source'; in this instance, however, the desire for harmony has resulted in the alteration of a verse.¹³¹ Whether Proclus himself or, perhaps, a predecessor (Syrianus?) was responsible for this development cannot be known with certainty. At the very least, given Julian's evidence, the reworking of the verse must have been post-Iamblican. The fragment, then, *pace* Festugière, is Chaldean, not Orphic, in origin.¹³² Kroll was correct on this point, although wrong in over-emphasizing Iamblican influence on the actual verses themselves. As for Lewy, his reading of the fragment is much too strained to be credible; the adjectival variant he suggests would be a virtual *hapax legomenon*. Lewy is correct, however, in rejecting Rhea as a legitimate deity of the *Oracles*. The final witness is Psellus. In his various summaries of the Chaldean system (which depend on Proclus), Psellus never once names Rhea among the Chaldean deities; rather, it is Hecate who is repeatedly mentioned in various contexts, both independently¹³³ and in relation with the Once Beyond and Twice Beyond.¹³⁴ It is Hecate, then, not Rhea or Rhea-Hecate, who is the singular Goddess of the *Oracles*.

Now it is in Damascius' *Commentary on the Parmenides* that we find the most extensive treatment of the triad Once Beyond, Hecate, Twice Beyond, discussed both independently and in conjunction with the Orphic triad Kronos, Rhea, Zeus. In the context of this commentary, the triads are brought into a complex relation with the Parmenidean attributes (constructed as a 'triad' of pairs) 'in itself' and 'in another' (= Kronos = Once Beyond), 'in repose' and 'in movement' (= Rhea = Hecate), 'same' and 'other' (= Zeus = Twice Beyond).¹³⁵ The following passages illustrate some of these relations:

If it is said by the gods that 'the center of Hecate is carried in the middle of the fathers' (= fr. 50), then in terms of center she is in repose, but in terms of being carried she is moved. And if

¹³¹ An approximate hexameter verse can be constructed with Hecate (= Soul) as subject and described as 'source' and 'principle': ἡ Ἐκάτη νοερῶν μακάρων πηγὴ τε καὶ ἀρχή. Cf. fr. 49: πηγαῖς τε καὶ ἀρχαῖς.

¹³² Cf. Damascius, *In Parm.* § 422; 2.277.7 Ruelle: ἐν τοῖς κόλποις τῆς 'Ρέας, ὡς ποιεῖ Ὀρφεύς. This is a paraphrase of fr. 56, verse 2 with Rhea as subject; thus Damascius attributes it (falsely) to Orpheus. Proclus also mentions 'womb' in connection with Rhea in *In Tim.* 1.47.1–2: 'This goddess is the womb of every power of Kronos', but this is a restatement of what he says about 'Rhea' (= Hecate) in *P.T.* 5.11; 36.13–14 S–W, i.e. that she is 'the receptive womb of the generative power which is in Kronos'. Apart from these two passages and a reference to Kroll's citation of our fr. 56 (= Kroll, 30), Kern, *O.F.* 132, cites no other evidence for Rhea as 'womb'. This lack of independent evidence confirms that this language became falsely associated with Rhea as a result of the 'harmonizing' strategies of the later Neoplatonists.

¹³³ See *Expos.*, P.G. 122, 1152b = des Places, 190: Hecate *Trioditis*, Hecate *Komos*, Hecate *Ekklyste*.

¹³⁴ See esp. *Hypotyp.* §§ 6–9 = des Places, 198–9.

¹³⁵ For an analysis of these relations, see J. Combès, 'Symbolique de l'intellect dans l'*In Parmenidem* de Damascius' in *ΣΟΦΙΗΣ ΜΑΙΗΤΟΠΕΣ*, 433–50.

the Great Rhea embraces in herself Hestia and Hera, then according to Hera she is moved, but according to Hestia she is in repose. And if she is in Zeus, according to rest she desires to remain separated within herself, but according to movement, she desires and brings order to the All.

(*In Parm.* § 293; 2.164.18–23 Ruelle)

For Rhea is the stream (ῥοή) of all things according to Socrates in the *Cratylus*, and she establishes all things in themselves and calls them back to herself. The Great Hecate, on the other hand, is the ‘center’ (κέντρον) who is carried toward each of the fathers’, and she sends forth a life-giving whirr (ζωογόνον ῥοίζημα),¹³⁶ and she is coordinated with the Once Beyond by means of a singular, immobile union, and advances toward all things with the Twice (Beyond).

(*In Parm.* § 282; 2.154.15–20 Ruelle)

For Zeus, by means of Rhea, and the Twice Beyond by means of Hecate, who shines on both sides (ἀμφιφαοὺς Ἐκάτης),¹³⁷ are attached, respectively, to Kronos and the Once Beyond.

(*In Parm.* § 281; 2.152.22–24 Ruelle)

In these examples, Damascius is careful to separate Rhea and Hecate: Rhea is ‘stream’ (following the *Cratylus*), Hecate is ‘center’ (following the *Oracles*). This provides further evidence that the two goddesses were regarded by the Neoplatonists as separate and distinct, with any conflation of the two—as in *P.T.* 5.11; 36.12–20 where Rhea is described as ‘center’—deriving from the exegetical demands of a specific context.

As for Hecate’s role as the ‘median’ or ‘center’ between the ‘fathers’, it should be noted that Lewy rejects the Neoplatonic reading of this verse in favor of a cosmological interpretation.¹³⁸ In his view, fr. 50 alludes to a sequence of planetary spheres and their ruling ‘fathers’, with Hecate named instead of the moon (her celestial dwelling-place) and the term ‘center’ (κέντρον) identified with the median or central position of the sun. In order to arrive at this interpretation, Lewy has to bring this fragment into a complex relation with several others (which deal strictly with sequences of material elements and/or various celestial spheres but with no mythic figure introduced as in fr. 50), a ‘harmonizing’ strategy that, in this instance, is as problematic as that of the Neoplatonists. Although a cosmological rather than metaphysical interpretation of this fragment is quite possible (as is the case with other fragments), without the original context of the verse, neither Lewy’s interpretation nor that of the Neoplatonists is entirely satisfactory. The verse remains an enigma.

In any event, the Chaldean triad (as the Orphic triad), was then situated by Proclus at the summit of the noeric order, the noeric order as a whole constituted as a hebdomad made up of ‘Seven Sources’ or ‘Source Fathers’:

1. Once Beyond, Hecate, Twice Beyond
2. Three Implacables (τρεις ἀμείλικτοι)
3. The Diaphragm (ὁ ὑπεζωκός)

The origin of this hebdomadic structure needs some explanation. As noted above, Proclus structured the noetic order as an ennead of three triads, that is the Father, Power, Intellect triad repeating itself with different predominating terms. He also conceived the noetic-noeric order as an ennead: in this case, composed of a triad of Teletarchs, a triad of Connectors, and a triad of Iynges. The last order, however, the noeric, was conceived as a hebdomad (in the manner noted above). The origin of this

¹³⁶ Cf. fr. 32: ζωογόνον Ἐκάτης κόλπον. On ῥοίζημα (‘whirr’), cf. ῥοιζέω, fr. 37, verse 1: ‘The intellect of the Father whirred forth the multiformed ideas’; Proclus, *In Tim.* 1.318.13–14: ‘The *Oracles* hand down that the multitude of ideas whirr forth in the soul source.’

¹³⁷ See above, n. 130.

¹³⁸ Lewy, 142–4.

hebdomad has long puzzled scholars; Lewy, for example, thought that it probably derived from a reading of a lost fragment.¹³⁹ The recent editors of the *Platonic Theology*, Saffrey and Westerink,¹⁴⁰ have now demonstrated how it was probably elicited by Proclus from a creative reading of fr. 35 (= Damascius, *In Parm.* § 266; 2.133.3–6 Ruelle):

For implacable thunders leap from him and the lightning-receiving wombs of the shining ray of Hecate, who is generated from the Father. From him leap the girdling flower of fire and the powerful breath situated beyond the fiery poles.

By carefully analyzing the comments of Damascius and Proclus with respect to these verses in a number of contexts, both Orphic and Chaldean, Saffrey and Westerink come up with the following: (1–3) ‘From him’ = Kronos = Once Beyond; Hecate = Rhea; ‘powerful breath’ = Zeus = Twice Beyond; (4–6) ‘implacable thunders’ = Three Implacables; (7) ‘girdling flower of fire’ = The Diaphragm.¹⁴¹ Once elicited from the *Oracles*, Proclus could then bring this hebdomadic structure into harmony with Pythagorean and Platonic teaching as a way of proving that ‘seven’ is the number proper to the noeric gods. To what extent this hebdomadic structure was developed in Neoplatonism before Proclus and Syrianus, however, is unclear, but there is some suggestion that it may have gone back in some form at least to Iamblichus.¹⁴² Damascius’ evidence is also suggestive here, in that he equates the *dis épékaina* with the hebdomadic structure of the universal Demiurge. It is perhaps on the basis of this demiurgic hebdomad, drawn from a prose work of the *Juliani*, that the later Neoplatonists also found authority for the structure of their noeric order.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The triadic structures discussed in this paper all derive from the theoretical speculations of the later Neoplatonists. Although frequent appeal is made to the *Chaldean Oracles* in various ways as the source of these triads, what is clearly intended is an appeal to the *tradition of interpretation* of this material and not to the *Oracles* themselves. In fact, the triadic structure of reality as gleaned from the *Oracles* is a confusing one. As noted earlier, ‘triads’ are often mentioned in a general sense (e.g. fr. 27: ‘For in every world shines a triad which a monad rules’; fr. 28: ‘For in the womb of this triad all things are sown’; fr. 29: ‘For in this triad the Father has mixed every breath’) but there is no verse extant in which a *specific* triad is actually named (save, perhaps, that of ‘faith, truth, love’). The existence, then, of schematic triads such as Father, Power, Intellect and Once Beyond, Hecate, Twice Beyond are even less likely to have been part of primitive Chaldean speculation. That a triadic principle of some sort informed the teaching of the *Oracles* is evident. But the precise nature and function of the ‘Chaldean’ triads—apart from Neoplatonic exegesis—cannot, with confidence, be known.

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¹³⁹ Ibid. 136, n. 266.

¹⁴⁰ See *P.T.* 5, ix–xxxiii.

¹⁴¹ In Neoplatonic exegesis, the ‘girdling flower of fire’ (*ὑπεζωκὸς πυρὸς ἀνθος*) of fr. 35 = the ‘diaphragm’ or ‘membrane’ of fr. 6: ‘For like a diaphragm (*ὑπεζωκῶς*), a kind of noeric membrane (*ὑμῆν*) separates the first fire and other fire which hasten to mingle’. See Damascius, *In Parm.* § 265; 2.131.29 Ruelle; Saffrey and Westerink, *ibid.*, xx, who translate *ὑπεζωκὸς πυρὸς ἀνθος* as ‘la fleur du feu, qui diaphragme’.

¹⁴² See Proclus, *In Tim.* 1.308.17–23; Festugière, *Proclus: Commentaire sur le Timée* 2 (Paris, 1967), 164, n. 3; cf. Dillon (n. 62), 417–19: appendix C.