


1166
MERLAN, P.
1960
p. 11-33



IAMBlichus (?)
See H. P. L'Orange, *Studien zur Geschichte des spätantiken Porträts* (Oslo 1933) p. 43

FROM PLATONISM TO NEOPLATONISM

Second edition, revised

PHILIP MERLAN
DR. IUR., DR. PHIL. (VIENNA)
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY
SCRIPPS COLLEGE AND CLAREMONT GRADUATE SCHOOL



THE HAGUE
MARTINUS NIJHOFF
1960

see the survey in F. M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides* (1939) V-IX: 131-134.

On Plato's system as presented in Aristotle see e.g. W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, 2 vv. (1924), v. I, p. XLV-LXXI.

In its brevity remarkable is E. Lask, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 3 vv. (1923-1924), v. III 36-38.

On Aristotle's Platonism see W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles*² (1955).

On Iamblichus, *De communi mathematica scientia* we find a few lines or words in Zeller III/2⁵ 758-760; T. Whittaker, *The Neo-Platonists*² (1928) 225-228; G. Mau and W. Kroll, art. Iamblichus in *RE*; Ueberweg-Praechter¹² 612-617; K. Praechter, "Richtungen und Schulen im Neuplatonismus" (see above) 128.

Examples of works written with sympathy for excessive realism: H. Bett, *Johannes Scotus Erigena* (1925), esp. 109-115; G. R. G. Mure, *Aristotle* (1932); G. R. G. Mure, *An Introduction to Hegel* (1940); N. Hartmann, *Aristoteles und Hegel* in: *Kleinere Schriften*, v. II (1957) 214-252, esp. 229-244.

Appendix

AD BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

1. On the general plan of Iamblichus' work on Pythagorism see P. Tannery, *Pour l'Histoire de la Science Hellène* (1887) 372-374 and "Sur l'arithmétique pythagoricienne", in: *Mémoires scientifiques*, v. II (1912) 179-201.

2. A particularly penetrating discussion concerning the difference between the mysticism of Plato and that of Plotinus can be found in P. Friedlaender, *Plato*, v. I (1958) 82-84. According to Friedlaender, in Plato the climactic experience does not imply the soul's becoming one with the supreme object of contemplation, whereas in Plotinus such an identification does take place. But from the *Epinomis*, whoever its author, can easily be seen how close such an identification is to Plato (or a Platonist). It is necessary, says the *Epinomis*, to espy the One that links all the μαθήματα (τὴν ὁμολογίαν οὖσαν μίαν ἀπάντων). And this link (δεσμός εἰς πάντων scil. of arithmetics, geometricals, harmonicals, astronomicals — see below, p. 89) will be revealed to the learner who εἰς ἓν βλέπων μνησθήνη (991 A; 992 A). Such a learner will after his death have overcome the plurality of sensations and μιᾶς τε μοίρας μετεληφρότα μόνον καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἓνα γεγονός, εὐδαίμων τ' εἶσθαι (992 B). How far are we here from the formula μόνος πρὸς μόνον or its alternative εἰς πρὸς ἓν (or ἓν)?

Admittedly, the *Epinomis* does not speak of such a 'unification' in this life, whereas Plotinus does. But clearly the contemplation of the One results in the soul itself becoming what she contemplates, viz. One. Thus, contrary to what Friedlaender asserts, there is within the orbit of Platonism space for the identification of the contemplator with the object of his contemplation. Cf. also W. Jaeger, "The Greek Ideas of Immortality", *Harvard Theological Review* 52 (1959) 135-147, esp. 144 f. (in its ascent through knowledge the soul gradually becomes what it knows).

I. SOUL AND MATHEMATICALS, *a discussion of*

When Festa edited Iamblichus, *De communi mathematica scientia* * (subsequently referred to as *Isc*) in his Preface (p. IX) he noticed its similarity to the First Prologue of the Proclus commentary on Euclid ** and in the apparatus pointed out the literal coincidences and parallels. We are going to discuss one aspect of this similarity.

Both Iamblichus and Proclus are "realists" (anti-abstractionists, conceptual realists, ontologists, excessive realists) with regard to mathematical. They are convinced of the full subsistence of mathematical (cf. also Proclus *In Eucl.* Def. XIV, p. 139, 22-26 Fr; 142,8 Fr). The realist-nominalist controversy usually concerns itself with non-mathematical universalia; we should not overlook, however, that here we have an example of "multiple" realism, i.e. a realism asserting the subsistence of more than one type of non-sensibles and universals. Thus in addition to and above the mathematical we have in Iamblichus and Proclus intelligibilia, also fully subsisting. Below the mathematical we find the sensibilia or the subject-matter of physics. Therefore, as a rule, Iamblichus and Proclus describe the mathematical as intermediate, assuming a tripartition of being (*Isc* ch. XIV, p. 52, 6 F; 54, 2. 10-13 F). They are realistic "trialists". The intermediate character of mathematical is stressed by Iamblichus time and again (*Isc* ch. I, p. 10, 8-24 F; ch. III, p. 14, 1-6 F; ch. XII, p. 46, 1-3 F; ch. XIII, p. 48, 26-27 F; p. 50, 14-25 F; ch. XIV, p. 51, 11 F; 54, 2-13 F; ch. XV, p. 55, 5-56, 4 F; cf. Proclus *In Eucl.* Prol. I, p. 3, 1-14, 12; 11, 26-12, 2 Fr; 19, 12 Fr; 35, 7 Fr). To the intermediate character of mathematical corresponds the intermediate character of mathematical knowledge (*Isc* ch. I, p. 11, 10 F; ch. XXXIII, p. 95, 5-22 F) ***. In obvious connection with his trialism of being Iamblichus accepts also the tripartition of theoretical philosophy into theology, mathematics, and physics

* Iamblichi *De communi mathematica scientia liber* ... ed. N. Festa (1891).

** References are to Procli Diadochi *In primum Euclidis elementorum librum commentarii* rec. G. Friedlein (1873). F will stand for Festa, Fr for Friedlein.

*** On the intermediate character of mathematical cf. K. Praechter, "Richtungen und Schulen im Neuplatonismus", *Genethliakon* ... C. Robert (1910) 100-156, esp. 132. More on it later.

(*Isc* ch. XV, p. 55, 8. 23 F; ch. XXVIII, p. 88, 19 F; ch. XXX, p. 91, 13. 24 F; ch. XXXI, p. 92, 19 F; 93, 2 F).

With their realism goes what we could call intuitionism. Mathematics do not become objects of our knowledge by being abstracted by us from the sensibles in which they are embodied (*Isc* ch. V, p. 19, 19–20, 20 F; ch. VIII, p. 34, 9 F; ch. XXVIII, p. 89, 5 F; cf. Proclus *In Eucl.* Prol. I, p. 11, 26–14, 23 Fr). Rather they are known directly*. Regardless of whether knowledge of them begins with sensation, this knowledge most certainly does not stem from sensation (to use Kant's language). We even may ask whether we could "know" sensibilia at all without our knowledge of mathematics. But whether or not the mathematics are prior with regard to us, they are prior by nature (*Isc* ch. XXXIV, p. 97, 9 F). Significantly, mathematics are called the object matter of recollection** (*Isc* ch. XI, p. 44, 7 F).

The same holds true for the relation between the intelligibles and the mathematics. The latter are "derived" from the former, not the other way around. And the intelligibles, too, are objects of direct "intuition". It is one of the great tasks of mathematics to train the eye of our soul in the perception of the intelligibles. This task mathematics can fulfill because its objects too can be "seen" if one trains oneself, while the untrained person has an eye that sees only the sensible.

* The mathematical realism of Proclus and — by implication — of Iamblichus is presented in N. Hartmann, *Des Proklus Diadochus philosophische Anfangsgründe der Mathematik nach den ersten zwei Büchern des Euklidkommentars dargestellt* (1909); A. Schmekel, *Die positive Philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, 2 vv. (1938, 1914), esp. v. I 100–106, see below p. 40; A. Speiser, *Die mathematische Denkweise* (1945) 57–61; M. Steck, *Proklus Diadochus ... Kommentar* (1945) 1–152, passim. On the First Prologue see also P. Tannery, *La Géométrie grecque* (1887) 21. Neo-Kantians (like the early Hartmann) are in sympathy with anti-abstractionism, but not with intuitionism and realism; they are inclined to interpret intuitionism as apriorism (see below p. 77). It is only in Husserl that anti-abstractionism and intuitionism meet again; whether this combination implies excessive realism is a matter of controversy. Husserl himself answered the question in the negative. There is a sense in which abstractionism and intuitionism are not opposed: see A. Hufnagel, *Die intuitive Erkenntnis nach dem hl. Thomas von Aquin* (1932) 49 n. 4.

** Archytas fr. 3 Diels reads: δὲ γὰρ ἡ μαθόντα παρ' ἄλλω ἢ αὐτὸν ἐξευρόντα ... ἐπιστάμενα γενέσθαι... ἐξευρεῖν δὲ μὴ ζατούντα ἀπορον καὶ σπάνιον, ζατούντα δὲ εὐπορον καὶ ῥαδίον, μὴ ἐπιστάμενον δὲ ζητεῖν ἀδύνατον. The last words are usually translated: "for him who does not know [how] to seek it is impossible to find". It is characteristic that Iamblichus interprets them as meaning: "for him who does not know it is impossible to seek; therefore there must have been a time when we knew — obviously before our birth" (*Isc* ch. XI, p. 45, 7 F). In other words, according to Iamblichus, Archytas taught the doctrine of anamnesis.

Now, how do Iamblichus and Proclus describe the three realms of being of which the mathematical are the intermediate?

The two words most characteristic of the two outer terms are: indivisible and divisible (*Isc* ch. I, p. 10, 9 F; ch. III, p. 14, 4–6 F; Proclus *In Eucl.*, Prol. I, p. 3, 14–4, 8). Accordingly, mathematical are a kind of mixture of the indivisible and the divisible, limit and the unlimited, one and many (*Isc* ch. III, p. 12, 26–13, 9 F; ch. XII, p. 46, 1–6 F).

A series of predicates attaches itself to these two basic terms; particularly important are the terms "limited" and "unlimited" (*Isc* ch. III, p. 12, 22–24 F), and "intelligible" and "sensible" (*Isc* ch. XXXIII, p. 95, 5–6 F).

It is impossible for any one (and least of all for a neo-Pythagorean or Platonist) to read the description of the mathematical and the two other realms between which they mediate, without being reminded of Plato's *Timaeus*. Here (35 A) in precisely the same words, the (world) soul is described as being intermediate between two other "realms"*. How, then, could Iamblichus and Proclus (cf. *The Elements of Theology*, prop. 190, p. 166 Dodds and his commentary a.l.) describe mathematical in terms used by Plato to describe the world soul?

But the problem is even somewhat more complicated by the fact that in his psychogony Plato describes (in a highly baffling manner) the constitution of the world soul, using profusely mathematical terms (numbers, relations, circles). In other words, the soul itself looks like a mathematical entity.

* The correct interpretation of the *Timaeus* passage can be found e.g. in F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (1937) 60–66. The soul is a compound of intermediate essence (being, substance), intermediate identity, and intermediate diversity. "Intermediate" means in all three cases, intermediate between divisible and indivisible. (What Plato meant to say is: In the realm of the permanently changing no thing truly is, no thing is truly identical with itself, no thing is truly different from any other. In the realm of the eternally unchanging everything truly is, everything is truly identical with itself, everything truly differs from every other thing. This created cosmos of ours is neither completely changing nor completely changeless. It shows elements of both change and changelessness — i.e. disorder mastered, though not subdued completely, by order. This is due to the presence of the world soul, intermediate between being and becoming).

Cornford's interpretation is essentially that of Proclus, as Cornford himself points out. It is also that of Hermias, who with great brevity and precision says: intermediate essence, intermediate identity, and intermediate diversity are the three elements of which the soul was made (*Hermias Alexandrini In Platonis Phaedrum scholia* ed. Couvreur [1901], p. 123, 7–11). The agreement between Proclus and Hermias may prove that both had this interpretation from Syrianus.

Certainly this was not overlooked by Iamblichus and Proclus. What did they think, when they described the mathematical in the way in which Plato described the soul? How did they explain that Plato's soul so much resembles a mathematical entity?

Or, to make the problem simpler: since it is the soul which is described by Plato in the *Timaeus* as being an intermediate between the indivisible and the divisible in the realm of body, and since Iamblichus and Proclus use the same terms to describe the mathematical, what is the relation between their mathematical (intermediate) and Plato's soul (intermediate)?

After all, even a philosopher who does not start from a description of the mathematical in terms used by Plato to describe the soul may, simply on reading the *Timaeus*, ask himself: of what is Plato actually speaking? of the soul? or of mathematical?

Indeed, we find this problem discussed in full in *Isc* and referred to in Proclus' commentaries on Euclid and on the *Timaeus* *.

It is remarkable that Iamblichus should discuss this problem in a work devoted to philosophy of mathematics — not to an interpretation of the *Timaeus* or to the study of the soul. It is remarkable that precisely the same problem is treated by Proclus in his commentary on the *Timaeus*. This proves clearly that it is more than a special problem. We can safely say: whoever within the orbit of Platonism accepts either the intermediacy of mathematical or the intermediacy of the soul, will have to discuss the relation between the two intermediates **. Let us discuss Iamblichus first.

After having described the mathematical as intermediate (*Isc* ch. I-II, p. 10, 10-24 F; 11, 3-15 F; 11, 25-12, 2 F), Iamblichus says (ch. III, p. 12, 22-13, 9 F) that the principles of mathematical are the limited and the unlimited in the form appropriate to mathematical, these principles being, in some form, omnipresent in all reality.

Incidentally, it is somewhat misleading to use these terms (see Plato, *Philebus* 24 A; R. G. Bury, *The Philebus of Plato*

[1897] and R. Hackforth, *Plato's Examination of Pleasure* [1945] a.l.; Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus* s.v. Πυθαγόρειοι). We should think, "limit" and "unlimited" would be more appropriate (Plato, *Philebus* 23 C). The limited means obviously: figure considered from its circumference, not from its area or volume. We shall see later on (p. 38) why this is of some importance. For the time being we go back to Iamblichus.

"Are these principles also causes of motion [= change]?" Iamblichus goes on to ask (p. 13, 9 F) *.

A strange question. How does the problem of motion (change) come in at all in a philosophy of mathematics? And why, after all, should the limited and the unlimited be considered principles of motion (change)? Whatever the intrinsic reason, we find that according to Iamblichus some made these two principles principles of motion (change) — those, namely, who assume the existence of these two principles ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ζωᾷ καὶ δυνάμεσι (p. 13, 11 F).

Here for the first time some connection between the mathematical and the soul is established. The passage is difficult, but at least Iamblichus' objection is clear. It is better, he says, to posit the soul in a different sphere of being and to assume that the mathematical principles and the mathematical spheres of being are unmoved or unchanging (*ibid.*, lines 12-16; line 25; cf. *Isc* ch. IV, p. 18, 17 F).

This much is clear: Iamblichus interprets the assertions of his adversaries. These are (1) that the limited and the unlimited are principles of the soul; (2) that they [therefore] are principles of motion (change), soul being obviously considered as a principle of motion (change); (3) that, therefore, the mathematical are or contain principles of motion (change). According to Iamblichus, this implies an identification of the soul with the mathematical to the extent that both would belong to the same sphere of being. He criticizes this identification; he prefers to keep the two spheres of being separated and to exclude motion (change) from mathematical.

Before proceeding further, a word of warning must be added. We cannot expect a consistent terminology. What one writer calls divisible and indivisible (partible and impartible) another

* Square brackets within a translation or a paraphrase indicate my additions.

* Procli Diadochi *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria* ed. E. Diehl, 3 vv. (1903-1906).

** On these and related problems cf. L. Robin, *La Théorie platonicienne des Idées et des Nombres d'après Aristote* (1908) 592-595; cf. 203-211 and 265 f.

may call unlimited and limited (or limit); a third, the same and the other; a fourth, one and multitude; a fifth, ungenerated and in the process of generation (or generated); a sixth, intelligible (or intellectual) and sensible, and so forth. It is obvious that we must understand the idea, whereupon we can easily see that all these pairs express one and the same dualism, though somewhat different points of view. Once we see this, we perceive clearly that the whole problem discussed by Iamblichus, whether the mathematical is motive (see below), is connected with problems of the interpretation of the *Timaeus*.

One more word of warning. We distinguish plainly between a principle of motion (change) and what is moved (changing). This distinction is not always made in Greek. An orthodox Aristotelian would be careful to distinguish; but not so Iamblichus. "Mathematicals are unmoved (changeless)" often means for him that they are not principles of motion. Thus, whenever we use the adjective "motive" we use it as equivalent to: *κινητόν, κινήσιμον, κινούμενον*, i.e. changer, changeable, changing, leaving it to the context to decide which is meant.

We can now resume our discussion. Iamblichus says: we had better assume the soul to have a separate kind of existence. This means that in addition to the three spheres of being which we have met so far (and which we meet in *Isc* time and again) we have to assume a fourth one. Indeed this is stressed in chapters III and IV (p. 13, 13-15 F; p. 18, 13-20 F). These chapters leave us with the impression that instead of a tripartition we should assume at least a quadripartition of being.

Whatever the origin of the problem, the solution certainly is no longer within the framework of the *Timaeus*. In the *Timaeus* there is no place for a fourth sphere of being. Whether the intermediate is interpreted as soul or as a mathematical or as both, there can be no more than one such intermediate. This can be said with confidence.

Therefore the question is legitimate: how are we to reconcile the presuppositions of the problem with its solution? These presuppositions are: soul as intermediate; three spheres of being; problem as to the identity of the soul and mathematical. They are still well within the problems of the *Timaeus*. But the solution is: mathematical not motive; soul in a sphere of being

different from mathematical; four or more spheres of being.

To answer this question we must resume our analysis of *Isc*.

Ch. IV ended with the assertion that mathematical principles differ from the corporeals by being immaterial; from the intelligibles by their composite character; and from the principles of the soul by being unmoved. "The principles of life" (or to use Iamblichus' more circumstantial description, "the principles which one investigates with regard to life") is only another expression for soul; and thus the chapter reiterates the doctrine of four different kinds of principles, mathematical differing from soul.

This seems to wind up the topic concerning the relation between mathematical and the soul. Ch. V gives a survey of theorems common to all branches of mathematical and makes it clear that "common" does not mean "abstracted" and in this sense later than the specific theorems but on the contrary designates what is prior to all specific cases. Ch. VI gives a series of excerpts from the *Republic* and the *Epinomis*. Ch. VII (identical with *In Nicomachi arithmeticae introductionem* p. 7, 3-9, 23 Pistelli and derived from Nicomachus) contains a discussion of the continuous and the discontinuous and introduces us to a quadripartite mathematical (arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy; see below p. 89). Ch. VIII contains an exposition of Plato's quadripartite line and in connection with this an anti-abstractionist statement as to the way in which we come to know mathematical, and a quotation from "Brotinos" on the difference between *νοῦς* and *διάνοια* together with a commentary on it, finally a quotation from "Archytas" on the quadripartite line with a commentary on it. None of these topics has anything to do with the relation between mathematical and the soul.

But in ch. IX the problem emerges again.

However the point of view is this time completely different. The problem is not whether the mathematical is motive; it is with what branch of mathematical we should identify the soul. Iamblichus says:

"Let us discuss first the doctrine held by those who refer mathematical to the soul. *

* Or, as we could also say, utilizing the summary of this chapter (p. 4, 15-19 F): those who reduce the mathematical sphere of being to the soul.

It would not be reasonable to posit the soul as being just one branch [kind] of mathematical . . . Therefore the soul should not be defined either as [1] idea of the all-extended [three-dimensional] or as [2] self-motive number or as [3] mathematical, subsisting harmony [attunement] nor as anything else of this kind specifically, but rather all this should be intertwined together, because the soul is, it is true, idea [form] of the numerable [determinable by number] but it also subsists according to numbers comprising harmony; and *all* the symmetries occurring in mathematics should be listed as belonging in common to the soul; as a result, then, the soul coexists simultaneously with the geometrical, arithmetical, and harmonical proportion, so that the soul is identical with [all] formulas of analogies [λόγοι κατ' ἀναλογίαν] . . ." (p. 40, 9-41, 1 F).

"And, to sum up the whole doctrine, we think that the soul exists in relations common to *all* mathematical . . . The concept [definition] of the soul contains the complete fullness of mathematics" (p. 41, 24-42, 6 F).

Iamblichus rejects, then, the identification of the soul with any single branch of mathematical. Therefore we should not describe the soul as idea (form) of the all-extended (three-dimensional). It is clear, and will become even more so, that whoever described it in this way, identified it with geometricals. The word "extended" sufficiently indicates it. We should not describe the soul as a self-moved number. It is clear that he who described it in this way, identified it with arithmeticals. And we should not describe it as subsisting mathematical attunement (harmony). Whoever does so, would identify it with harmonicals (such as the arithmetical, geometrical, and harmonical proportion). And no similar descriptions are admissible which would identify the soul with a special part of mathematical instead of making it a compound of all of them, because the soul is an idea (form) of the numerable (see below p. 19), i.e. has a geometrical nature; its existence is number-like, i.e., it has an arithmetical nature; and these numbers contain ratios, i.e., the soul has also a harmonic nature — in short, the soul exists according to relations common to *all* branches of mathematics; he who says "soul" expresses mathematics in its fullness. And the presupposition is that there are three such branches: arithme-

metic, geometry, harmonics (cf. also *Isc* ch. IX, p. 40, 24-25 F, where three "analogies", the geometric, the arithmetic, and the harmonic, are enumerated, and p. 41, 5-15 F, describing the "debt" of the soul to arithmeticals, geometricals, and harmonicals).

There is one word in our passage which needs some explanation: numerable (ἀριθμῖος). It is a difficult word. Sophonias (*In libros Aristotelis de anima paraphrasis*, p. 131, 17 Hayduck), who copied the passage, changed it to number (ἀριθμός: ἰδέας οὐσας ἀριθμοῦ). But it is obvious that Iamblichus intended to give a description of the soul which would be a summing up of the three descriptions mentioned by him. According to him, what is wrong with these descriptions is only their one-sidedness; and the only suggestion made by Iamblichus is a description sufficiently many-sided. Therefore, his own description must contain all three partial descriptions. The words "in accordance with numbers comprising attunement (harmony)" correspond with the two descriptions self-moved [self-changing] number and mathematical attunement (harmony). Therefore "idea (form) of the numerable" must correspond to "form of the all-extended", and "numerable" must correspond to "all-extended".

How is this possible? Ἀριθμῖος means "numerable"; how could it mean "extended"? But ἀριθμῖος does not mean anything else but ἀριθμητός, which is simply "body" as numerable (cf. e.g. Moderatus in Stob. I, Pr, 8, p. 21, 19-21 Wachsmuth) or in other words — geometrical quantity or the geometrical "stuff"*.

In Latin, too, "numerabilia" can designate the geometrically extended as subject to number (see e.g. Cassiodorus, *Inst.* p. 151, 21 f.; 152, 1 Mynors).

However, we also have an excellent commentary on our passage in one of the excerpts from Iamblichus' *On the Soul*, preserved in Ioannes Stobaeus**.

"After this I am going to review those who posit the essence of the soul as mathematical essence.

* But even regardless of the details of this passage, the much longer passage ch. IX, p. 41, 6-15 F makes it obvious that according to Iamblichus the soul unites in itself the three aspects of mathematical.

** On this passage cf. P. Merlan, "Ueberflüssige Textänderungen", # 3, *Philologische Wochenschrift* 1936, 909-912; [A. J.] Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, v. III (1953) 179-182.

Now, one kind of mathematical is [formed by] figure (which is the limit of extension) and by this extension itself. The Platonist Severus defined the soul in these very terms, while Speusippus [defined it] as idea [form] of the all-extended ... [fr. 40 Lang].

Number is still another kind [of mathematical]. Indeed, some Pythagoreans find "number" without any qualification to be a fitting description of the soul. Xenocrates, however, [defined the soul] as a self-moved [self-changing] number. Moderatus [defined it] as comprising ratios ...

Let us further consider attunement (harmony), ... viz. mathematical. Moderatus defined the soul by it ... (Iambl. in Stob. I 49, 32, p. 363, 26-364, 20 Wachsmuth).

The similarity of the two Iamblichus passages is palpable. In both the basic question is: with what branch of mathematical should we identify the soul? With the help of the second passage we can find who identified the soul with arithmetics alone, with geometricals alone, with harmonicals alone.

Let us consider those, says Iamblichus, who think that the essence (substance) of the soul is mathematical. There are three branches (kinds) of mathematics: arithmetic, geometry, and harmonic, and accordingly we find definitions of the soul in terms of arithmetic, geometry, or harmonic.

Examples of the first are Xenocrates and Moderatus. The former speaks of the soul as a self-moving [self-changing] number; the latter, as of a number containing ratios (proportions). Examples of the second are Speusippus and Severus. The former describes the soul as form of the all-extended three-dimensional; the latter, as limit of the extended (dimensional). An example of the third is Moderatus again *.

In *On the Soul* these three main mathematical interpretations of the soul are simply reported by Iamblichus. Not so, however, in *Isc*. We saw that here Iamblichus considered them to be one-sided and wanted to replace them by one expressing the identity of the soul with all the branches of mathematics. "Neither Speusippus, nor Xenocrates, nor Moderatus", says

* It is obvious that in a definition like "the soul is number comprising harmony" (or "the soul subsists according to a number which comprises harmony", etc.) we either can stress the number element or the attunement element. Hence, Iamblichus can quote Moderatus twice.

Iamblichus in *Isc* in effect: "Only by combining the three do we get an adequate description of the soul". In short, while the identity of the soul and mathematical was denied in *Isc* ch.s III and part of IV, this identity is virtually proved in ch. IX. It is wrong to identify the soul with *a* mathematical; it should be identified with *the* mathematical.

The whole problem is well known to Proclus, too *. His solution is rather similar to that of Iamblichus. Of the two passages in which he deals with it, one resembles the passage in Iamblichus' *On the Soul*. In his commentary on Euclid Proclus defends (p. 12, 9-18, 4 Fr) the realistic point of view in various ways. He objects particularly to the theory of abstraction. Where does the soul receive its knowledge of mathematical? Not from itself, nor from the $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ alone. And it was proved before that it cannot receive it from the sensibles (it is remarkable how here the three spheres of being are presupposed). The only possibility left is: the soul receives it jointly from the $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ and from itself. After all, the soul is "iconically" all that the $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ is "paradigmatically". Therefore Plato is right when he constructs the soul of *all* mathematical branches [kinds] and divides it numerically and binds it by proportions and harmonical ratios and places the erstwhile principles of figures in it ... and makes the circles in it move in an intellectual motion. Thus, *all* mathematical exist primarily in the soul ... and the soul is the fullness of all mathematical ...

The soul has its essence ** in these branches of mathematical ... (p. 16, 16-17, 6 Fr).

Having made sure that the soul should be identified with all branches of mathematics — i.e. arithmetics, harmonics, geometry, astronomy (on this order and on the emergence of a fourth branch of mathematics see below p. 89), Proclus now adds some words of caution. We quote them, because some of the most characteristic terms reappear in them establishing a closer connection between Proclus and Iamblichus.

"Neither should we take the number as [applied] to it to be a multitude of monads, nor should we interpret [the phrase] 'idea of the extended' as [meaning a] body ..." (p. 17, 7-9 Fr).

* See in this connection A. Speiser, *Die mathematische Denkweise*² (1945) 58 f.

** I suggest the verb "to essence" (the soul essences).

"In the soul are present the live and intelligent paradigms of the phenomenal [1] numbers, [2] figures, [3] proportions, and [4] motions ..." (p. 17, 9-11; 15-21 Fr).

"Thus, the mathematical relations constituting the souls in their fulness are essential and self-moved ..." (p. 17, 22-24 Fr).

Further and in a different context, "the motion peculiar to mathematics is neither local nor motion as change ...; it is lifelike [vital]" (p. 18, 22-24 Fr).

In other words, Proclus insists that though the soul has been said to be a number [i.e., an arithmetical], it is not a number containing a multiplicity of units. Though it has been said that the soul is $\text{ἰδέα τῶν διαστατῶν}$ [i.e., a geometrical, $\text{τῶν διαστατῶν ἰδέα}$ corresponding to σχῆμα], it is not a body [by which Proclus means both geometrical body having geometrical extension and sensuous body having extension in the ordinary sense of the word] *. Though soul has been described in terms of ratios [i.e., as harmonical] these ratios are not only relations; they subsist and are self-moved (on motion in connection with harmonicals see below p. 29). Though the soul has been described in terms of motion (i.e., as an astronomical, having been designated as containing a plurality of circles) this motion, being mathematical, is neither spatial motion nor change.

And Proclus is obviously none too sure that to make the soul motive (via mathematics as motive) is strictly Platonic **. In a different context he notices that sometimes Plato seems to make the soul itself motive, sometimes he lets the soul receive its motive character from the realm of intelligibilia (p. 32, 7-10 Fr). Indeed, it is well known that of the five genera in the *Sophist* (being, sameness, otherness, motion, rest) only the first three appear in the *Timaeus*.

Thus, the identification of the soul with all branches of mathematics — the pleromatic character of the soul — is stressed by both Iamblichus and Proclus. Both do it within the frame of a philosophy of mathematics; both move well within the orbit of the *Timaeus*.

* On the difference between these two kinds of extension as insisted upon by Aristotle see below p. 98.

** On the problem of the motive character of the soul, cf., for the time being, K. Mras, "Macrobius Kommentar zu Cicero's *Somnium*", *SB der Berl. Ak., Philos.-hist. Kl.*, 1933, 232-286, esp. 274 f.

The second Proclus passage (cf. above p. 21) is similar to the passage in *Isc*. In his commentary on the *Timaeus*, Proclus says: We should not interpret the intermediacy of the soul (between the divided and undivided; cf. *In Tim.* 35 A, 187 E, v. II 155, 25 Diehl) as the soul being partly somatic, partly asomatic, as Eratosthenes did, nor should we define it in terms of geometrical extension, as Severus did (186 E, v. II 152, 25-28 Diehl). The objections to Eratosthenes and Severus are treated together, obviously because of the reason given above on p. 22, i.e. that the soul is neither a sensible nor a geometric body. Continuing, Proclus returns to the problem of the mathematical nature of the soul and says:

"Of our predecessors who make out the essence of the soul to be mathematical, because the soul is intermediate between physicals and superphysicals, some say that the soul is number and make it out to be of the monad, as being indivisible, and of the unlimited dyad, as being divisible; some others, taking the soul to be a geometrical entity, construct it of point and extension.

Of the former opinion are men like Aristander and Numenius and very many other interpreters; of the latter opinion is Severus" (*In Tim.* 35 A, 187 A, v. II 153, 17-25 Diehl).

And having distinguished between the discontinuous (the element of arithmetic) and the continuous (the element of geometry), he sums up by saying:

"With regard to the soul both coincide (συντρέχει), the unification and the differentiation ... Therefore the substance of the soul is not merely arithmetical or the soul would not be continuous; nor is it [merely] geometrical, or the soul would not be differentiated. But the soul is the one and the other at the same time ...

[Furthermore], by being arithmetical, the soul possesses substantially [i.e., in the form of being, not in the form of knowing] harmonics ... by being geometrical the soul possesses astronomy, because the circles in the soul are both moved and unmoved ... [Therefore the soul is] a substantial bond of [all branches of] mathematics [the soul not only knows mathematics, the soul is mathematics]" (*In Tim.* 36 B, 213 D-E, v. II 238, 16-239, 6 Diehl).

The connection with the *On the Soul* passage is evident; Proclus

enumerates the opinions identifying the soul with single branches of the mathematical. We also know his objections: "number", when referring to the soul, must not mean a number consisting of monads, extension must not mean "geometrical" extension. The end-result of this whole discussion regarding the mathematical nature of the soul we find a little later: the soul is arithmetical, geometric, harmonic, and astronomic and knows the corresponding branches of mathematics — the soul contains *all* the branches of mathematics — the stress being on "all". To describe these branches, in the two passages we find all the phrases familiar from Iamblichus: *all* branches of mathematics; number; harmonic ratio; figure; fullness of all branches of mathematics; the idea (form) of things extended; point (corresponding to limit) and extension (cf. *In Tim.* 36 B, 213 E, v. II 239, 6–16 Diehl).

We now return to Iamblichus. *Is* still continues the discussion of the problem concerning the relation between mathematical and the soul in ch. X. The content of this chapter is stated in the summary * (p. 4, 20–24 F) in following words: In what way does the soul [or, more precisely: the sphere of being "soul"] consist of all branches of mathematics? By what kind of distinction could one mark off the mixture [of mathematics] within the soul? Does the soul contain the complete reality of [the objects of] mathematics or is there some additional principle of them to be taken into consideration?

In other words, it is taken for granted, the soul consists of all branches of mathematical. The problem still left is to find out what each of these branches contributes to the soul so as to make it one soul and how, on the other hand, in spite of the unity of the soul (or the unity of mixture), the diversity of the several branches still is preserved. And another problem still left is whether there are any mathematical outside the soul or whether the soul contains in itself all the mathematical reality.

Now, when we turn from the summary to what is marked off in Festa's edition as chapter X, corresponding to the summary # 10, we may have some doubts as to the agreement between

* On the summaries (κεφάλαια) in Iamblichus see H. Oppermann in *Gnomon* 5 (1929) 545–558 esp. 552 f.; L. Deubner, "Bemerkungen zum Text der Vita Pythagorae des Iamblichos", *SB der Berl. Ak., Philos.-hist. Kl.*, 1935, 612–690; 824–827, esp. 689 n.; 690; 690 n. 2.

the summary and the actual content. The last question of the summary (whether there are any mathematical outside the soul) is indeed being discussed in ch. X; but all the preceding questions seem to be discussed in the second part of ch. IX (p. 41, 5–42, 6 F). In this section Iamblichus relates the different branches of mathematics to different aspects of the soul. Its "determinate" and "defining" character the soul receives from numbers (its "unitary" λόγος from the number One); for its capacity to discharge itself into the realm of the extended the soul is indebted to geometricals; its capacity to establish harmony, order in motion, and common measure in what is incommensurable and to elevate accord to concord (symphony to eumetry) comes to the soul from harmonicals (and this is the reason why the soul can perceive harmony, being itself harmony and its essence consisting of numbers and other similar mathematical measurables).

It may be, therefore, that the division between ch.s IX and X is not in complete agreement with the summary — either as the result of somebody's slip of the pen, marking off ch. X at the wrong place or some slight inconsistency between outline and its execution (or content and subsequent summary), likely to occur in any writer.

But in the present context the question of the composition of the two chapters is entirely secondary. What is important is to see that the whole inspiration of ch.s IX and X is completely different from that of ch.s III and IV. In the latter, the soul and mathematical were said to belong to different spheres of being; in the former, the soul becomes virtually indistinguishable from a mathematical entity. It is a mathematical entity of its own kind, to be sure, by being an arithmetical, a geometrical, and a harmonical at the same time, but a mathematical entity it still is. All these identifications of the soul and the mathematical may ultimately be a correct or a mistaken interpretation of the *Timaeus*; in any case the net result is a division of being into three spheres, the middle sphere being described in such a way as to obliterate virtually any difference between soul and mathematical. It is this tripartition of being which occurs in Iamblichus most frequently; but we saw that ch.s III and IV lead to a quadripartition of being with the soul being distinguished

from mathematical (whereas ch. VIII leads to still another quadripartition, viz. that corresponding to Plato's quadripartite line, i.e. into intelligibles, mathematical, sensibles, and images). The unity of Iamblichus' book is most precarious as we can already see and as we shall see time and again.

Let us now resume our discussion of ch. X.

In spite of the mathematical constitution of the soul already established the question can still be asked: is the soul the product of the combination of the three branches of mathematical? Or are the three branches, on the contrary, products of one soul? In other words, is the diversity of the branches prior to the unity of the soul or is the unity of the soul prior to the diversity of the three branches?

Iamblichus rejects both alternatives. The first would deprive the soul of its status which is to be the principles of mathematical, make the branches of mathematics a scattered plurality, and the soul an almost accidental product of their concurrence, and have other odd consequences. The second would make the soul the cause of mathematical and introduce a difference between the two according to the principle that the cause is superior to and different from its effects. What is left is the third alternative: neither is prior to the other. The soul coincides (concurs) with the mathematical (*συντρέχει πρὸς αὐτά* — one is almost tempted to translate: the soul and mathematical form one single team of runners — only we must not imagine these runners to exist independently from the team) and coexists with them (*συνυφίστηκεν*) with the paradoxical result of an uncomposed and undivided mixture. A complete interpenetration of the mathematical and the soul takes place so that the soul gives complete unity to the different branches of mathematical and in turn abandons itself to all and several of them. There are no mathematical outside the soul. But the unity of the soul does not prevent its differentiation*. The last question of the summary (whether mathematical have any principle in addition to the soul) has been answered in the negative.

* A good parallel illuminating the point of Iamblichus' discussion would be provided by the question: "Is the organism prior to its parts or are the parts prior to the organism?" with the subsequent answer that neither is the case; that the whole organism is indivisibly in its parts and in turn exists only in virtue of the plurality of them. The organism is not the result of its parts; nor is it the cause of them.

To sum up: ch.s III and IV stress the difference between the mathematical and the soul. They do not fit into the tripartition of being into intelligibles, mathematical, and sensibles. Ch.s IX and X virtually abolish any difference between the soul and mathematical, and particularly stress the fact that the soul should be identified with all branches of mathematical rather than with one alone. They are therefore compatible with the tripartition of being. In both respects i.e., in identifying the soul with all branches of mathematical rather than with a single one and in keeping the tripartition of being, the two chapters agree with a number of passages in Proclus.

For the present purpose it is not all-important to ascertain to what extent Iamblichus and Proclus themselves were ready to accept a complete and unconditional identification of the soul with mathematical. What matters is that both discuss this identification as a serious interpretation of the relation between the two. It is sufficient for our purpose to assume that both say in substance: if the soul is to be identified with the mathematical, it must not be identified with just one branch of it, it should rather be identified with all — three or four — branches.

In other words, the question asked on p. 16 how to reconcile the presupposition of the problem (tripartite being) with its solution (offered in ch. III in the form of a quadripartition of being, differentiating between soul and mathematical) should be answered by saying that it is only ch. s IX and X with their virtual identification of the soul and mathematical which are consistent with the original assumption of a tripartite being, whereas ch.s III and IV are indeed inconsistent with it. And these ch.s IX and X are in better agreement with Proclus than are ch.s III and IV, because Proclus does not say that the difference between soul and mathematical consists in the former being motive, the latter being not.

But is it not unfair to Iamblichus to charge him with such inconsistency? Is it possible to assume that he should not have noticed the contradiction between ch. III and IV on one hand, ch.s IX and X on the other?

The answer to the first question is that *Isc* is quite obviously a series of excerpts from different authors rather than Iamblichus' own work. It seems what he did was to entrust a scribe with

copying passages indicated by him, on loose sheets and patching them up into a whole by introductions, summaries, changes of a word every now and then, etc. It is obvious that no particular consistency can be expected to result. Nor should it be expected: Iamblichus' book is comparable to a selection from sources rather than to an exposition of the views of one author. It is not quite a florilegium; but it is not meant to be an original either. To a certain extent Iamblichus assumes the responsibility for his sources; but he does not have to make them appear entirely consistent.

An example well known already reveals immediately the kind of Iamblichus' editorial activity. One and the same passage (as we know today, taken from Aristotle's *Protrepticus*) appears in his *Protrepticus* and in *Isc*. In the former it is part of ch. VI, p. 38, 3-41, 2 Pistelli. In the latter it is part of ch. XXVI, p. 81, 7-83, 2 F. Unhesitatingly, by cuts and replacing some words of Aristotle by his own, Iamblichus adapts the original text for his purpose, but he does not mind using the same passage as a whole twice in two different books. Once more we have the impression that Iamblichus intends to produce something which is neither an original nor a florilegium.

Besides, it appears that Iamblichus is not quite insensitive to the contradiction between ch.s III and IV on one hand, ch.s IX and X on the other. In fact, he avoids in ch.s IX and X anything which would make either the soul or the mathematical appear to be motive. We shall see this better when we investigate once more the relation between the identifications of the soul with mathematical as present in Proclus and Iamblichus.

The most outstanding difference between the two is as indicated. Iamblichus' mathematics in ch.s IX and X is tripartite, containing only arithmetics, geometry, and harmonics (acoustics), with astronomy wanting. Proclus' mathematical are quadripartite, with astronomy included*. Now, it was Nicomachus

* On the subdivisions of mathematics see P. Tannery, *La Géométrie grecque* (1887) 38-52; W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* (1924) ad I² 2, 1004a8 (v. I 259). It is well known that in addition to a quadripartition we find also an entirely different division of mathematics in Proclus, reported by him as that of Geminus (cf. J. G. van Pesch, *De Procli fontibus* [1900] 87-113, esp. 97). Mathematics is divided into two parts, which today would be called pure and applied. Pure mathematics contains arithmetics and geometry, leaving astronomy and acoustics to applied mathematics (*In Eucl.*, Prol. I, p. 38, 1-12 Fr; on the designation of acoustics as canonic see p. 40, 22 Fr).

(see below p. 89) who justified the quadripartition of mathematics by basing it on the principle that mathematics is science of quantity, quantity being either discreet or continuous, discreet quantity being either per se (arithmetics) or in relations (acoustics or harmonics), continuous quantity being either unmoved (geometry) or in motion (astronomy). This quadripartition Iamblichus reports after Nicomachus in *Isc* ch. VII, p. 30, 19-31, 4 F (cf. also *Isc* ch. V, p. 18, 27-19, 1 F) and it is the same quadripartition which Proclus is ready to accept in both his commentary on the *Timaeus* (e.g. *In Tim.* 213 C, v. II 238, 14 Diehl) and in his commentary on Euclid (see above p. 21; 23). But of course nobody should in one and the same breath assert that mathematics contains the four branches enumerated above and also that mathematical are unmoved. On the other hand, he who accepts a tripartition of mathematics with the exclusion of astronomy can, indeed he should, cling to the interpretation of mathematical as being unmoved.

Because in ch.s IX and X Iamblichus accepts a tripartite mathematics, his mathematical are unmoved. Accordingly, the problem of the motive character of the soul is entirely suppressed. We see this with particular clarity in two places. In *Isc* ch. IX he quotes (p. 40, 16-17 F) Xenocrates' definition of the soul as self-moving (self-changing) number to reject it as one-sided. But though he professes to suggest a definition based on the principle of κοινή συμπλέκειν πάντα (p. 40, 19 F, i.e., πάντα τὰ γένη of mathematical [p. 40, 12-13 F]; cf. Stob. I 49, 32, p. 363, 26-365, 4 Wachsmuth, presenting also three mathematical γένη, i.e., arithmetics, geometricals, and harmonicals) in this "synthetic" definition we miss the word αὐτοκίνητος, i.e. the synthetic definition contains part of the definition of Xenocrates (number) and omits another (related to motion). Furthermore, describing the aspect of the soul for which the soul is indebted to harmonicals he says that the soul has the power of harmonic motion (p. 41, 12-13 F), but the stress is entirely on "harmonic" — he almost could have said that the soul is not the source of motion but rather of whatever is orderly in the motions of the universe. In other words, there is not a hint in ch. IX that the soul is moved nor should there be one, because in this chapter the soul is identified with tripartite

mathematics, excluding astronomicals. To this extent Iamblichus may have tried to avoid too flagrant a contradiction between ch.s III and IV on one hand, ch.s IX and X on the other. He does it at the cost of suppressing the question of the motive character of the soul, though he does not succeed completely. At the end of ch. X we read that the soul will be differentiated in accordance with its different *δυνάμεις*, *ζωαί*, and *ἐνέργειαι* (p. 43, 8-10 F). This immediately reminds us of the argument of those who tried to make mathematics motive, according to *Isc* ch. III. Some, says Iamblichus here, will perhaps grant motion to the principles of mathematics (i.e., the limited and the unlimited) — viz. those who posit these principles in the soul and the *ζωαί* and *δυνάμεις* of the soul (p. 13, 9-12 F). On reading the passage in ch. X quoted above, one feels inclined to ask: is the mention of *ζωαί* and *δυνάμεις* as peculiar to the soul an indication that the mathematical of which it consists are indeed moved? No clear answer can be found in ch. X — we are left feeling that the relations between motion and mathematics, motion and the soul, mathematics and the soul as presented in ch.s III and IV, and again in ch.s IX and X are in several respects inconsistent.

Let us now sum up the results of the foregoing discussion. Both Iamblichus and Proclus describe the mathematical (which they take to subsist) as intermediate. The realms between which they mediate are often described in terms of the divisible and the indivisible. Both are aware of the "intermediacy" of the soul, though Proclus stresses it more than Iamblichus. Both deal with the problem whether mathematics and the soul are identical — Iamblichus arguing sometimes pro, sometimes contra; Proclus assuming identity. In connection with this question both assert the identity of the soul with *all* branches of mathematics — three in Iamblichus, four in Proclus. These assertions are closely linked with the motive or nonmotive character of mathematics. Proclus asserts the former, Iamblichus sometimes the former, sometimes the latter. The solution is closely connected with the problem of a tripartite mathematics without astronomy, or a quadripartite one, including astronomy.

This much is immediately clear: *Isc* is based on different sources, in which some of the problems treated above were

decided in different ways*. Iamblichus did not bother to reconcile contradictory opinions. As a result, his mathematics sometimes include, sometimes exclude motion; his mathematics is sometimes tripartite, sometimes quadripartite.

We now have a substantial number of key terms. They are a safe guide through the tangle of many problems. This will become obvious in what follows; but even now we can see how easy it is to discover the different sources from which Iamblichus drew, once we have a clear insight into the difference (and what it implies) between a tripartite and a quadripartite mathematics.

And we can conclude this chapter with a synopsis of the passages involving the basic contradiction as to the motive or non-motive character of mathematics.

Isc ch. III, p. 13, 12-15 F

It is better to assume that the mathematical principles and the mathematical sphere of being [*οὐσίαι*] are nonmotive.

Isc ch. IV, p. 18, 14-18 F

The mathematical principles are nonmotive.

Isc ch. XIII, p. 50, 18-19 F

Mathematics differ from the realm of becoming by their nonmotive nature.

Isc ch. XV, p. 55, 14-15 F
Mathematics prepares for theology also by being a contemplation of things stable and nonmotive.

Isc ch. XXIV, p. 75, 18-19
Mathematics is concerned

Isc ch. VII, p. 30, 25-31, 2 F

Geometry ... received as a helpmate the spheric [astronomy] which is the instrument of knowledge of continuous quantity in motion.

Isc XII, p. 47, 6-16 F

Most men believe that the branches of mathematics are nonmotive and that the objects of their knowledge are nonmotive; this, however, is a wrong opinion. For there are branches of mathematics investigating the number of motion ... and the incorporeal circular motions of the soul with which the heavenly revolutions coexist In such investigations astronomy and harmonics are contained.

Isc ch. XIX, p. 63, 23-64, 13F

The mathematician deals

* Cf. Zeller 111/2³ (1923) 759.

with a kind of nature stable and void of motion.

Isc ch. XXVI, p. 81, 11–12 F

Things belonging to the non-motive mathematical kinds are limited and ordered.

Isc ch. XXVIII, p. 89, 2–8 F

The mathematical ratios are nonmotive, corresponding to the character of mathematical, which are exempt of motion.

The source of the first right-side passage is Nicomachus, *Intr. arithm.* I 3, 1; p. 6 f. Hoche (cf. Festa's adnotation a.l.); there can hardly be much doubt that the left-side passage is from some other source. They contradict each other and the same holds true for the rest of the two columns.

Appendix

1. The contradiction between ch. III and ch. IX of *Isc* is only apparent, according to Loenen *. This he proves by saying that the same (apparent) contradiction must have, at least implicitly, been present in Posidonius. For he, on one hand, identified the soul with mathematical but on the other must have known that the soul according to Plato was motive. How then does Loenen resolve the apparent contradiction? By assuming that Iamblichus when speaking of the motive soul means soul in the ordinary sense of the word, whereas when he speaks of non-motive mathematical he still can identify them with the soul, viz. with the soul as idea (ideal soul). This distinction, says Loenen, should be of great interest to students of Plato.

Loenen's explanation is a classic example of an *ad hoc* hypothesis. There is not the slightest hint of the doctrine of a double soul in *Isc*. As to what Posidonius *must* have known about the

* J. H. Loenen, *Mnemosyne*, S. IV, vol. X/1 (1957) 80–82.

relations between mathematical and the soul with regard to the problem of motion, we know nothing.

2. The relation between the two chapters of *Isc* has in a very interesting manner been interpreted by Kohnke *. These two chapters, says Kohnke, not only contradict each other. They closely correspond to each other like thesis and antithesis. It is therefore to be assumed that both appeared in one and the same work whose author first presented the doctrines and then proceeded to refute them. And Kohnke even guesses that this author was nobody else but Posidonius.

I am not quite sure that the fact that the two chapters correspond to each other (Kohnke is right on this point) is best explained by his hypothesis. After all, Iamblichus could have excerpted ch. III of *Isc* from the work in which it originally appeared and ch. IX from the work in which it was refuted. Kohnke might object that I attribute too much to the diligence of Iamblichus. I see no way on which to arrive at certainty. But if Iamblichus did what Kohnke suspects him of having done, it would illustrate the kind and scope of his editorial activity.

Incidentally, if Kohnke guessed correctly and both chapters are from Posidonius, this would explain the presence of the phrases ψυχῆς ζωαὶ καὶ δυνάμεις appearing in ch. III, p. 13, 11 F and ch. IX, p. 43, 9 F. They could be rooted in the concept of ζωτικὴ δύναμις (*vis vitalis*), which we connect with Posidonius (see K. Reinhardt, art. Poseidonios, *RE* XXII/1 [1953] 648 f.).

3. The importance of the term συντρέχειν to designate the unity of distinct natures or the distinction in spite of unity: *Symbolum Chalcedonense* (e.g. in P. Schaff, *The Creeds of Christendom* [1877, later reprints] 62).

4. On the meaning of Iamblichus' 'authorship' see below, p. 156–8.

* F. W. Kohnke, *Gnomon* 27 (1955) 157–164.