

PLOTINUS 6. 9. 7 (2. 518. 3ff. VOLKMANN)

If the soul is to be filled with the vision of the One, it must beforehand be emptied of all other content; for as long as there are in it other impressions or Forms (τύποι) the illumination cannot take place: ἀλλ' ὥσπερ περὶ τῆς ὕλης λέγεται, ὡς ἄρα ἄποιον εἶναι (εἰδῶν) δεῖ πάντων, εἰ μέλλει δέχεσθαι τοὺς πάντων τύπους, οὕτω καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀνείδειον τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεσθαι εἰ μέλλει μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον ἐγκαθήμενον ἔσεσθαι πρὸς πλήρωσιν καὶ ἑλλαμψιν αὐτῇ τῆς φύσεως τῆς πρώτης. In the Platonic passage (*Tim.* 50E4f.) to which the λέγεται refers the right condition of the Receptacle—ever since Aristotle (*Phys.* 4. 2.209b11–13) treated as ὅλη—is described in these words: πάντων ἐκτὸς εἰδῶν εἶναι χρεὼν τὸ τὰ πάντα ἐκδε-

ξόμενον ἐν αὐτῷ γένει. The sentence is specific about the absence πάντων ... εἰδῶν, and so is another statement a few lines earlier in the *Timaeus* (50D7 ... ἀπασῶν τῶν ἰδεῶν). Is Plotinus likely to have left out the word which he takes up at the beginning of the main clause when continuing οὕτω καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀνείδειον τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεσθαι (sc. δεῖ)? ἀνείδειον does not here mean "formless" but rather "emptied of every Form" (so E. R. Dodds, *Select Passages Illustrating Neoplatonism* [London, 1923], p. 119).

FRIEDRICH SOLMSSEN

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

ADDENDUM TO "IMITATION" IN THE FIFTH CENTURY,"

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Professor B. Einarson has kindly called my attention to certain compounds of μῖμος and μιμεῖσθαι which had escaped me.

ἀντίμιμος: Aristoph. *Thesm.* 17, ὀφθαλμόν, ἀντίμιμον ἡλίου τροχῶ, "the eye, a counterfeit of the sun's disk."

γυναικόμιμος, "woman-aping": [Aesch.] PV 1005, Soph. Frag. 769 P. (sole occurrence of any word of the μῖμος family in S.; my statement should be modified accordingly), Eur. *Bacch.* 980. The word is clearly contemptuous in all three passages. The Sophocles passage may be from a satyr play. Implicit reference to the mime itself is possible; cf. the γυναι-

κεῖτοι μῖμοι (Suid. s.v. Σώφρων; *P Oxy.*, II, p. 300) of Sophron.

ἐκμιμεῖσθαι, "ape," "counterfeit": Eur. Frag. 210 N². (referring to Amphitryon's appearance), HF 1298 (Ixion's posture or situation).

ἀντιμίμησις, "(counter-)imitation" (of the Syracusan battle preparations): Thuc. 7. 67. 2.

It is to be noted that all the cases except the last refer to a mimicking of external shape, posture, or movement.

GERALD F. ELSE

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

827. ELSE G.F., *Imitation in the fifth century*: CPh 53 1958 79–90; 245.

Hermann Koller (*Die mimesis in der Antike*, 1954) renversait l'interprétation courante en soutenant que *mimésis* n'a signifié d'abord que la force d'expression cathartique particulière à la musique et à la danse, et que c'est chez les Pythagoriciens du 5^e siècle qu'il faut trouver la source de cette signification. Else conteste une telle interprétation en réexaminant les textes, sans nier toutefois l'affinité établie par les Pythagoriciens entre la musique et l'âme, et donc entre la musique et l'éducation. Ce dernier point est capital pour la formation du concept d'*imitation* propre à Platon.

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"IMITATION" IN THE FIFTH CENTURY

GERALD F. ELSE

A RECENT book by Hermann Koller¹ puts forward a radically new and challenging account of the origin and development of the concept of "imitation" (*mimêsis*) among the Greeks: challenging because it turns our usual understanding of the word and its history almost exactly upside down. According to the prevailing view, *mimêsis*—or *mimeisthai*—began by meaning "imitation," "Nachahmung," and then took on other senses by extension or adaptation, for example, in the *Poetics*, where it clearly denotes something more than a mere copying of nature. Koller maintains, on the contrary, (1) that the original sense was not "imitation," but "Darstellung," "Ausdruck(sform)," "Formwerdung des Seelischen";² (2) that the ambit of the word was originally limited to *music and dancing*, denoting the expressive power of *mousikê* in its primeval unity;³ and (3) that the meaning "imitation" is a later development, a watered-down application of the idea to fields (e.g., painting) where it did not properly belong.⁴ The primeval idea was expanded by Damon and the fifth-century Pythagoreans (identity unspecified, as is their relation to Damon) into a grandiose "Ausdrucks-" or "Ethoslehre," embracing the whole range of emotional,

therapeutic (cathartic), and educational uses of music. This Pythagorean-Damonian doctrine was partly adopted, partly adapted and distorted, by Plato and Aristotle, and provides the necessary background not only for their discussions of *mimêsis* but for the conception of music which was dominant throughout antiquity.

I am far from wishing to challenge everything in Koller's book. It is full of interest and sets off in bold relief the crucial importance of Pythagoreanism for the Greek view of music, not that that importance was unrecognized heretofore. But much of Koller's material has relatively little to do with the concept of "imitation" per se; and at a number of points it seems to me that he has seriously misinterpreted the evidence, both for Plato and for the period before Plato, while other evidence of at least equal importance is neglected. Thus, following and developing a lead suggested by Deiters and Schäfke,⁵ Koller relies heavily upon the second book of Aristides Quintilianus *On Music* as a prime source for Damon and the fifth-century Pythagoreans, while on the other hand he considers only a small fraction of the instances of *mimeisthai* and *mimêsis* in actual fifth-century authors. The result is an inter-

pretation which contains important elements of the truth but also, in my opinion, some serious distortions.

A reconstruction of the fifth-century concept of *mimēsis* is of interest above all as a background for understanding the use of the term by Plato and Aristotle; but it is also interesting in itself. In any case I hope to deal with Plato in another article; here my concern is with the fifth century. What was the original meaning of *mimēsthai* and *mimēsis*, and what line of development did that meaning take before Plato? The crucial question is the one raised so energetically by Koller: Did these words originally mean "imitation," the copying of something, or "expression," the giving of outward form to some kind of spiritual content? Secondly, is their original center of gravity in the sphere of music and dancing, as Koller maintains, so that the application of *mimēsis* to poetry in general, including the drama, is a secondary extension (by Plato)?

We will begin with the actual occurrences of *mimēsthai* and *mimēsis*, especially the former, since *mimēsis* is a rare word in the fifth century. Now the first and most obvious thing about *mimēsthai*, whatever its meaning, is that it is a denominative verb based on *mimos*. Koller recognizes this, but only by implication, in his semantic chart on page 120, where the root of the whole development is shown as "μῖμος = Akteur eines dionysischen Kultdramas (Maske?)."⁶ On the preceding page, as well as on page 39 where it is first put forward, we are told that this identification of *mimos* with the Dionysiac cult is nothing more than a conjecture, on which too great weight is not to be laid. However, we are also warned that in any case we must hold fast to the basic meaning

"tänzerische Darstellung" for *mimēsthai*; and Koller leaves no doubt that by dancing he means religious or cult dancing, the representation of some sacred story (*drōmenon*), and normally by a group ("Gruppentanz," p. 45). Thus "*mimos* = actor in a cult drama" is the real *fons et origo* after all; the only word on which Koller does not insist is "Dionysiac."

This whole idea, conjecture or not, rests on a passage cited by Strabo from the *Edōnoi* of Aeschylus.⁷ Here the chorus—composed, undoubtedly, of the Edoni, the subjects of King Lycurgus of Thrace—is describing a Dionysiac orgy and evidently comparing it with the rites of its native goddess Cotys or Cotyto. After speaking of the droning of bass flutes (*bombykes*), the clashing of cymbals (*kotylai*), and the twanging (*psalmos*) of stringed instruments, it adds: ταυρόφοθοι γοῖ δ' ὑπομυκῶνται ποθεν ἐξ ἀφανοῦς φοβεροὶ μῖμοι, τυπάνου δ' εἰκὼν ὥσθ' ὑπογαίου βροντῆς φέρεται βαρυταβῆς. "Wer sind diese μῖμοι?" asks Koller, and goes on to say, "Es müssen Darsteller, Teilnehmer des orgiastischen Spieles sein" (i.e., "actors in a Dionysiac cult drama"). But it is a curious fact that these actors are not seen but only heard ποθεν ἐξ ἀφανοῦς. Closer inspection of the passage, and of the words with which Strabo introduces it,⁸ shows clearly that what we have here is a list of *musical instruments*, among which are "bull-voiced, dreadful imitators (-tions) bellow(ing) from somewhere unseen," just as there is an "image" or effect of a drum pounding somewhere underground. A scholar as versed in anthropology as Jane Harrison had no difficulty in recognizing what the chorus is talking about: it is the little instrument called the "bull-roarer."⁹ Consisting simply of a flat, thin

piece of wood swung on the end of a string, it is an unimpressive-looking affair; but all those who have actually heard it testify to the unearthly quality and demoniacal power of its "voice." The bull-roarer first came to the attention of modern anthropologists in Australia, as a central feature of the initiation rites of the Bushmen. But it is in use among many peoples around the world, as a toy or in more serious employments, and was known to the Greeks; its technical name in Greek was *rhombos*.¹⁰

Who, then, are the ταυρόφθογγοι μῖμοι? Not actors in a cult drama, of which there is no mention in the passage; not the persons who swing the bull-roarer(s);¹¹ and, to judge by τυπάνου εἰκῶν in the next clause, not even the bull-roarers themselves, but their effect. In other words the phrase must refer to the performance itself, the production of a voice which sounds like that of bulls: ταυρόφθογγοι μῖμοι = τὰ ὑρῶν φθεγγομένων μιμήσεις.¹² What is described here is a *calculated sound effect*. The instrument itself is not seen, it is only heard ποθεν ἐξ ἀφανοῦς. For one cardinal fact about the bull-roarer is that its puny appearance is out of all proportion to its dreadful sound. Hence, wherever it is used for a ritual purpose, the irrefragable law is that *it must not be seen*. In Australia it is never shown to the women at all, to the boys only after they have completed the initiation, and then as a portentous secret. Clearly the same rule held good in the Dionysiac rites, as indeed it must.

Thus Koller's interpretation of this key passage collapses. There are no cult actors here, but only the bull-roarer. Even more important, the context forces upon us the sense of "imitation" (rather than "imitator"). The whole point is that a sound is

produced which resembles the bellowing of bulls but does not come from bulls.

We can perhaps venture one step further. As we said, the speaker of these lines is almost certainly the chorus of Edoni; and the anapaestic meter, together with the fact that the Dionysiac rites seem to be described here as something new, strongly suggests that the passage comes from the beginning of the play: the parodos, then. Now we know that the tetralogy to which the *Edónoi* belonged dramatized the futile resistance of Lycurgus to Dionysus.¹³ And we know further that Euripides drew the theme, and in all probability many of the details, of his *Bacchae* from Aeschylus. Still further, without subscribing to the extravagant hypothesis of Verrall and Norwood, that all the miracles performed by Dionysus in the play are a hoax,¹⁴ we can observe that in the early scenes the idea of trickery, faking, pretense, constantly recurs, *in the mouth of Pentheus*. The king is in fact obsessed by the conviction that the whole Dionysiac cult is an imposture.¹⁵ There is every likelihood that this attitude was modeled on that of Aeschylus' Lycurgus,¹⁶ in other words, that Lycurgus similarly charged Dionysus or his votaries with trickery and deception.¹⁷ But the Edoni who formed the chorus of Aeschylus' play were Lycurgus' own people. It is plausible therefore that they may have shared his attitude. Our fragment, with its expressions pointing to the use of mimicry, that is, deception (μῖμοι, εἰκῶν), is perhaps consonant with this. Μῖμοι would then be contemptuous, like γόης ἐπωδός in *Bacchae* 234.¹⁸

The special interest of this interpretation is that it would give us here, in the earliest appearance of *mimos* in extant Greek literature, an implication

which Koller finds nowhere before Plato: that of deliberate deception. However that may be, the word *mîmos* is strikingly rare in the period under review. The instance we have just discussed is in fact the only certain one in the fifth century, and there are only two others before Aristotle. In [Euripides?] *Rhesus* 256, the chorus describes Dolon as τετράπουν μῖμον ἔχων ἐπιγαίου θηρός. But this is a close paraphrase of Dolon's own words (207 ff.): "I will put on a wolfskin and, adapting my gait to his, τετράπουν μιμήσομαι λύκου κέλευθον"; so that here, as in Aeschylus, *mîmos* denotes not the actor but the act of imitation. (*Mîmos* seems to be chosen in preference to *mimêsis*, which in any case is never used in tragedy.) It may be worth noting also that, as in Aeschylus, the imitation is of an animal. In Demosthenes, on the other hand (2d *Olyn.* 19), *mîmoi* are the mime actors (= *gelôtopoi*) with whom Philip consorts.

The only other testimony which we can take as equivalent to fifth-century evidence for *mîmos* is that of Aristotle, *Poet.* 1 [1447b10]: τοὺς Σώφρονος καὶ Ξενάρχου μίμους, and *Frag.* 72 Rose (Ath. 11 [505C]): τοὺς καλουμένους Σώφρονος μίμους, "the so-called 'mimes' of Sophron." It can hardly be doubted that Aristotle here is alluding to *mîmoi* as the original, native designation of Sophron's little dramas, not simply as the term by which they were known in his (Aristotle's) day. Here again, then, *mîmos* denotes the performance, not the actors.¹⁹ We can safely infer, I think, in spite of the scantiness of the evidence, that that was its original meaning. The passage in Demosthenes is not enough to establish the contrary, at least for the early period.

The fact that *mîmos* is so rare in the fifth century is surely significant also.

It is not found in writers who have no hesitation about using *mîmeisthai*, *mimêma*, or even *mimêsis*.²⁰ Sophocles goes farther: neither *mîmos* nor any of its progeny appears in his vocabulary at all. This reticence on the part of Attic and Ionian writers must have some connection with the fact that *mîmos*, whatever its ultimate provenance, was the name of a Sicilian dramatic genre, and of one which gave an unvarnished picture of life, usually low life. It is hardly very venturesome to suggest that Athenians at least felt the word to be (a) foreign and (b) vulgar.²¹

But the prejudice against *mîmos*, if it was one, seems not to have extended in full force to its descendants *mîmeisthai* and *mimêma*. We even find the former very early indeed, in the *Delian Hymn to Apollo* (l. 163), where it is said that the choruses of Delian maidens πάντων (δ') ἀνθρώπων φωνάς καὶ κρεμβαλιαστὺν μιμεῖσθ' ἴσασιν. Koller (p. 37) makes much of this passage as confirming the inherent connection of *mimêsis* with dancing, especially group dancing, and avers that the meaning "imitate" is clearly impossible. On the contrary, it seems to me unavoidable; for the poet goes on to say, φαίη δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἕκαστος φθέγγεσθ', οὕτω σφιν καλὴ συνάρηρεν ἀοιδή, "and each man would think that *he himself is speaking*, so beautifully is their song put together." It is quite true that the imitation is in the medium of song and dance. But it is an imitation for all that, of men's characteristic speech and movements. In fact φωνάς here may well mean "dialects," as in Aeschylus' *Choephoroe* (see just below). The Delian girls impress and flatter their guests by imitating their native accents and dances (in this connection see the acute observations of H. T. Wade-

Gery on page 17 of *The Poet of the "Iliad"* [Cambridge, 1952]). In any case there is no cult drama, and the singing and dancing has nothing to do with sacred legend.

The next earliest (?) example, Theognis 370 (μωμεῦνται δέ με πολλοί... μιμεῖσθαι δ' οὐδεὶς τῶν ἀσόφων δύναιται), shows an extension of meaning from physical mimicry to moral imitation, a sense which is of course important much later, in Plato. But in view of the continuing uncertainty over the date or dates of "Theognis" and the possibility that these verses are a late addition, we will not press this case.²²

Mimeisthai appears once in Aeschylus, *Cho.* 564 (Orestes to Pylades): ἄμφω δὲ φωνῇ ἥσομεν Παρνησίδα, γλώσσης αὐτὴν Φωκίδος μιμουμένω, "we will both put forward a Parnassian accent, imitating [mimicking] the sound of the Phocian dialect." The meaning is clearly similar to that in the *Delian Hymn*; and although there is no question of singing or dancing—the imitation is performed by the voice—it involves *mimicking the way other people sound*.

Pindar uses *mimeisthai* three times, each time in a musical context but also with clear allusion to a mimetic effect. *Pyth.* 12. 21: Athena invented the αὐλῶν πάμφωνον μέλος, ὅφρα τὸν Εὐρυάλας ἐκ καρπαλιμᾶν γενύων χριμφθέντα σὺν ἔντεσι μιμήσαιοιτ' ἐρίκλαγκταν γόον. The *aulos* was precisely the instrument that could imitate the range and various timbres of the human voice, as the lyre could not.²³ Somewhat different is the second instance, from the second *partheneion* (Frag. 94b Snell), line 15: "I will sing of the hospitable mansion of Aioladas and his son Pagondas," σειρῆνα δὲ κόμπον αὐλίσκων ἀπὸ λωτίνων μιμήσοιμ' αἰοδαῖς, κεῖνον, ὃς κτλ. The meaning of σειρῆνα κόμπον is certainly obscure;²⁴ but it is

hardly to be thought that the maidens are going to "represent," that is, portray, a Siren—especially a male Siren (?). What they intend must be an imitation of some kind of flute music in song: the reverse, then, of what Athena did in inventing the *aulos* itself.

The third Pindaric example is still more interesting. Frag. 107a Snell, from a hyporcheme: Πελασγὸν ἵππον ἢ κύνα Ἀμυκλαίαν ἀγωνίῳ ἐλελιζόμενος ποδὶ μίμεο καμπύλον μέλος διώκων. Koller (p. 38) sets great store by this passage also, as referring to a "tänzerische Darstellung unter Begleitung von Gesang und Musik." So far there can be no quarrel with his interpretation. But again he neglects the mimetic idea, although it is clearly expressed in the passage; for the chorus goes on to specify that the *mimēsis* is to be performed οἷ' ἀνὰ Δώτιον ἀνθεμέεν πεδίον πέταται κτλ, "the way it [*sc.* the hound] flies over the Dotian plain [in pursuit of a deer]." Moreover the imitation is to include the dog's quarry (ll. 6–7): τὰν [*sc.* ἔλαφον] δ' ἐπ' αὐχένι στρέφοισαν κάρα πάντ' ἐπ' οἶμον..., where likewise we must supply μίμεο. Here we have the scenario for a complete hunting scene: a "mime" of the hunt. The solo dancer²⁵ is to mimic the actions of the bitch and her prey, including the tossing of the latter's head. We may add that the tone of the passage, like the meter, is lively and not oppressively dignified.

At this point we will interrupt our pursuit of *mimeisthai* to consider the two earliest examples of *mimēma*; for these complete the list of occurrences of *mimos* and its derivatives down to the middle of the fifth century. *Mimēma* appears in two fragments of Aeschylus, in both cases denoting a *replica*, an object made to resemble something

else. Frag. 364 Nauck²: Λιβυρνικῆς μίμημα μανδύης χιτῶν, a shirt that copies or simulates the appearance of a Liburnian cloak. The other fragment is even more revealing. *P Oxy.* 2162, almost certainly belonging to Aeschylus' satyr play *Θεωροὶ ἢ Ἰσθμιασταί*,²⁶ shows us the chorus approaching a shrine, undoubtedly the temple of Poseidon at the Isthmus. They are carrying painted images or portraits of themselves which they greatly admire: (vs. 1): ὁρῶντες εἰκοῦ[ς] οὐ κατ' ἀνθρώπους; (vss. 6–7): εἶδωλον εἶναι τοῦτ' ἐμῇ μορφῇ πλέον, τὸ Δαιδάλου μ(ε)[ι]μῆμα· φωνῆς δεῖ μόνον. Although the precise course of the action is not certain in every detail, the point of these remarks is unmistakable and curious. The images the satyrs are carrying are of themselves, but they are lost in astonishment at them. "[Consider whether] this image could be more [like] my looks, this Daedalus reproduction; all it lacks is a voice."²⁷ It is the savage gaping at the wonders of photography: *mimēma* denotes an exact copying of nature.

The two Aeschylean passages prove beyond any argument that *mimēma* very early had or took on the meaning "replica," "effigy," "image." The extension is a natural one, from animate to inanimate reproduction of physical traits. For on the basis of the evidence we must conclude that the root sense of *mimos*²⁸ was a miming or mimicking of the external appearance, utterances, and/or movements of an animal or a human being by a human being: in short, precisely the kind of mimetic performance we associate with the Sicilian "mime." It can hardly be a coincidence that in almost all the cases we have examined particular emphasis is laid on the realism or lifelikeness of the reproduction. That too comports well with what we know of the mime.

Further, the very scattered representation of our word family in Ionic and Attic before 450 B.C., and its total absence from Homer, Hesiod, elegy, iambic, and early melic, except for the two cases in the *Delian Hymn* and *Theognis*, makes it almost certain that *mimos* and its progeny came into the Ionic-Attic sphere from a Dorian source. And then, as Reich suggested, the source was probably Sicily.²⁹ Or is it a pure coincidence that Pindar and Aeschylus, the first poets to take up these words, had especially close connections with Sicily?³⁰

Several of the passages we have cited do indeed, as Koller maintains, show *mimēsis* linked with music and dancing; but not all. On the other hand the mimetic connotation, which Koller denies, is unmistakable, in fact prominent, almost everywhere. What we can infer with some confidence is that the original sphere of *mimēsis*—or rather of *mimos* and *mimeisthai*—was the imitation of animate beings, animal and human, by the body and the voice (not necessarily the singing voice), rather than by artefacts such as statues or pictures. In other words, these terms originally denoted a *dramatic* or quasi-dramatic representation, and their extension to nondramatic forms like painting and sculpture must have been a secondary development. But, as we have seen, this extension had taken place by Aeschylus' time at the latest.

Above all, so far as the early evidence is concerned, there is no warrant for limiting *mimēsis* to cult or ritual dances, or even to choral performances. The further evidence cited by Koller to this effect (pp. 25–36: Pl. *Laws* 2; pp. 40–45: *pyrrichē*, dance of the *Kourêtes* in Crete, *geranos* at Delos, mystery-cult dances, *hieros gamos*) is all, with one exception, from Plato or later writers

(Strabo, Plutarch, Athenaeus, Harpocration, etc.) to whom the Platonic and Aristotelian developments of the idea were a commonplace, and so proves nothing for the fifth century. The exception is Xenophon *An.* 6. 1. 5-13 (not "VI 5ff.," as cited by Koller, p. 40). Here Xenophon describes a series of mimetic dances performed at a banquet (N.B.: not a religious festival) by Thracians and others; but he uses the word *mimeisthai* only once, and then precisely in connection with a *solo* battle-dance by a certain Mysian (noted with some embarrassment by Koller, *loc. cit.*). We need not doubt that many early choral dances were mimetic, and the hyporcheme was certainly both mimetic and choral;³¹ but in the Pindaric hyporcheme cited above the mimetic part seems to be taken by a soloist (μῦμεο). In any case there is no solid basis for Koller's allegation that *mimêsis* (*mimeisthai*) was originally the presentation of a cult legend or *drômenon*. We may add that in none of the examples we have cited is the tone solemn or hieratic, that is, marked by a strong religious flavor.

To sum up: By 450 B.C., judging from the evidence, *mîmos* was still a very rare word in the Ionic-Attic sphere, but its derivative *mimeisthai*, and to a lesser extent *mimêma*, were beginning to be naturalized. It will be useful, before we go on, to list the meanings we have found so far.

1. "Miming": direct representation of the looks, actions, and/or utterances of animals or men through speech, song, and/or dancing (dramatic or protodramatic sense): Arist. *Poet.* 1 [1447b10] and Frag. 72 R.; *h. Hom. Apoll.* 163; Aesch. *Cho.* 564; Pind. *Pyth.* 12. 21; *idem* Frag. 94b Sn.; *idem* Frag. 107a Sn.

2. "Imitation" of the actions of one person by another, in a general sense,

without actual miming (ethical sense): Theog. 370 (date perhaps doubtful).

3. "Replication": an image or effigy of a person or thing in material form (*mimêma* only): Aesch. Frag. 364 N².; *idem*, *P Oxy.* 2162.

Aeschylus Frag. 57 Nauck (the bull-roarer) offers an apparent, but only an apparent, minor problem in classification; for although the bull-roarer is a manufactured object its "voice" operates like that of a sentient being, so that the case belongs under our No. 1.

I do not claim any absolute value for this classification. It is simply a convenient way of bringing out what I take to be (1) the basic meaning of these terms ("miming") and two natural extensions, (2) imitation of persons by persons, but without direct physical mimicry, and (3) imitation of persons or things in an *inanimate* medium.³² Sense (2) is an easy step from sense (1), since miming, though accomplished by physical means, gains its point and piquancy from the rendering of *characteristic* facial expression, gesture, movement, tone of voice, that is, is "ethical" and not merely physical;³³ while (3) represents an equally natural transference from animate to inanimate media. We shall find examples of all three meanings in the later fifth century. The interest of the study will be to see whether the center of gravity remains in the root sense or shifts to one or both of the derived senses. The bulk of the examples comes from three authors, Aristophanes, Euripides, and Herodotus, of whom Aristophanes shows senses (1) and (2), Euripides all three, Herodotus only (2) and (3). The richest haul of specimens is from Euripides.

We begin with two passages from *Aristophanes* which Koller has seized on as especially significant (pp. 11-12, 46-47). *Thesm.* 850 (Mnesilochus, caught

by the women and in desperate straits, wonders how he can bring Euripides back to the rescue): ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν καινὴν Ἑλένην μιμήσομαι, "I know: I'll perform, act, his new Helen." Koller is quite right in saying that Mnesilochus proposes to *enact the role* of Helen: a moment later (855ff.) he actually does so. But his portrayal is not merely a performance ("Ich werde die neue Helena *aufführen*"), it is a *parody* of the Helen whom the Athenians had recently seen in Euripides' play. So at line 851 Mnesilochus reassures himself that he is at least dressed for his mimic role: he can at least *look* like a woman. *Plut.* 291 (Cario, with Plutus safely ensconced in the house, announces to the overjoyed chorus, which is ready to dance with delight): καὶ μὴν ἐγὼ βουλῆσομαι (θρεττανελέ!) τὸν Κύκλωπα μιμούμενος καὶ τοῖν ποδοῖν ὧδ' παρενσαλεύων ὕμῳ ἄγειν, "Yes, and I'll undertake to lead you—thrum thrum—mimicking the Cyclops [i.e., the Cyclops of Philoxenus' well-known dithyramb] and stamping like this with my feet." Again we have a performance; but again the point of μιμήσομαι is the parody, the mimicry of a figure currently in the public eye. Similarly 302ff.: ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν Κίρκην . . . μιμήσομαι πάντας τρόπους, "I'll mimic the [new] Circe,³⁴ all her turns [tricks]." And at 312ff. the chorus goes Cario one better by announcing that they, μιμούμενοι τὸν Λαρτίου (i.e., imitating the act of Odysseus in stringing up the unfaithful maidservants), will hang him up by his ———. Here is a shift, in terms of our classification, from sense (1) to sense (2); but the transition is eminently natural and presupposes as a common denominator the idea of closely following a model.

It takes no particular divination to see in these two passages a close ap-

proximation to the "mime" in the proper sense, especially the variety which went in for mythological burlesque. In fact we could well render μιμήσομαι "I will mime [the Cyclops, or Circe]." It may or may not be a coincidence that this usage does not appear in Aristophanes' earliest plays. The nearest thing to it elsewhere in his work is *Eccl.* 278: Praxagora instructs the women how to dress and walk like men, τὸν τρόπον μιμούμεναι τὸν τῶν ἀγροίκων, clumping with their sticks and singing some "old man's tune"; (vs. 545) she tells her husband how she stole his slippers and imitated his gait when she left the house. Here we have aping of gesture, etc., and a kind of quasi-dramatic performance, though not miming in the technical sense. But this after all is very like *Clouds* 1430, where Strepsiades, after being lectured by his son on how the birds treat their fathers, says, "If you're imitating (μιμεῖ) the cocks in everything, why don't you eat dung and sleep on a perch?"; or *Birds* 1285, where the herald reports that on Earth everybody is bird mad and doing everything the birds do, ἐκμιμούμενοι. This seems to fall within the orbit of our general sense (2), "do as somebody else does"; but the list of antics which follows still has something of the mimic spirit about it. Two other (and, as it happens, earlier) passages show more clearly the generalized sense. *Clouds* 559 (parabasis): "The other poets have been heaping abuse on Hyperbolus and his mother, imitating my comparisons [figures, εἰκούς] of eels"; *Wasps* 1019 (parabasis): "I have put many of my comic ideas into other men's mouths [lit., bellies], imitating the mantic skill of Eurycles [a ventriloquist]."

One piquant passage is hard to classify, *Lysistrata* 159. Calonice, think-

ing of objections to Lysistrata's plan: "What if the men simply go away and leave us?" Lys.: "Then you'll have to use Pherecrates' dodge and 'flay a flayed dog'"—obviously a reference to some form of satisfaction that does not require a man's assistance. Cal.: φλυαρία ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ μεμιμημένα, "Oh, that secondhand stuff is all twaddle."³⁵ The special interest of the remark is that it so clearly refers to the inadequacy of the "imitation" as compared with the original, an implication which Koller does not find anywhere before Plato *Republic* 10.

Mimēsis appears twice in Aristophanes. At *Thesm.* 147ff. Agathon is explaining to Mnesilochus that a poet has to adapt his nature and habits to the play he is writing. If the drama is "male," he has everything he needs ready at hand in (on) his own person; but if it is female, μετουσίαν δεῖ τῶν τρόπων τὸ σῶμ' ἔχειν, which in turn is paraphrased (155–56) by ἃ δ' οὐ κεκτήμεθα, μίμησις ἤδη ταῦτα συνθρεύεται. Concretely, this means female (a) dress and (b) behavior, and in fact Agathon is presented throughout the scene as a γύναις. Once more, as in the *Plutus*, we are close to the mimic sphere.³⁶ The other instance has a similar flavor. *Frogs* 109 (Dionysus to Herakles): "I have come κατὰ σὴν μίμησιν, to get your costume, your approved list of inns, etc., for my trip to Hades"; and this is followed by the outfitting and further adventures of Dionysus as the mimic Herakles.

Thus it is noteworthy how often in Aristophanes, the comedian, *mimēsthai* and *mimēsis* (he never uses *mimēma*) seem to bring us a whiff from the world of the mime. In Euripides we naturally find nothing of the sort.³⁷ There is in fact only one certain instance of either word referring directly to sensuous

mimicry, *Iph. Aul.* 578 (chorus): Paris, as a shepherd boy on Ida, blew Φρυγίων αὐλῶν μιμήματα on his pipes. *Iph. Taur.* 294 would be interesting if we could be sure of the text. The shepherd says, describing Orestes' fit of madness: παρῇν δ' ὄρᾱν οὐκ αὐτὰ μορφῆς σχήματ', ἀλλ' ἡλλάσσετο φοβηγὰς τε μόσχων καὶ κυνῶν ὕλάγματα, ἴδων φασ' Ἑρινῶς ἰέναι μιμήματα, "and there were no actual bodily shapes [for us] to see, but he kept shifting [to? i.e., uttering in turn?] bawlings of calves and howlings of dogs, mimickings of the [creatures, visions?] they say the Furies send."³⁸

Sense (2) is much commoner, for example, *Hel.* 940 (Helen to Theonoë): "imitate the ways (μιμοῦ τρόπους) of your righteous father."³⁹ *Hipp.* 114 (the old servant, scandalized by H.'s disrespect for Aphrodite): "we must not imitate the young when they think such thoughts." *El.* 1037 (Clytemnestra, justifying her adultery by the example of Agamemnon): when a husband does such things, μιμεῖσθαι θέλει γυνή τὸν ἄνδρα. *Ion* 451 (Ion, at the story of Apollo's rape of Creusa): "we human beings should not be blamed εἰ τὰ τῶν θεῶν κακὰ μιμούμεθ'."⁴⁰ Similarly *mimēma*, *Herc. Fur.* 294 (Megara, resolving to emulate her husband's valor): ἐμοί τε μίμημ' ἀνδρὸς οὐκ ἀπωστέον.

Finally, *mimēma* in our sense (3). In the *Helen* (875) it denotes the wraith or image of Helen that went to Troy; conversely, in line 74, the astonished Teucer takes Helen for an *eikón* or *mimēma* of herself. *Tro.* 922: Helen refers to Alexander as a *mimēma* of the burning brand which his mother dreamed about before his birth—a curious inversion. *Ion* 1429: *mimēmata* of Erichthonius, referring to the figures in Creusa's web representing the ancient story. *Frag.* 25 Nauck: "we old men

are nothing but *δνεύρων μιμήματα*." See also *Herc. Fur.* 992.

With Herodotus we can be briefer. He has *mimēsis* just once (counted by Powell as the earliest occurrence in Greek),⁴¹ and in sense (3): 3. 37. 2, the statuette of "Hephaestus" at Memphis is a *πυγμαίου ἀνδρὸς μίμησις*. *Mimeisthai* always in the colorless, generalized form of sense (2), "imitate someone else, do as he does." Thus 4. 166. 1: Aryandes, seeing that Darius was winning a great name by coining purer money, *ἐμιμέετο τοῦτον*; 5. 67. 1 (cf. 69. 1): Herodotus gives it as his opinion that Cleisthenes of Athens, in his attack on the old Attic tribes, was following the example of (*ἐμιμέετο*) his maternal grandfather, Cleisthenes of Sicyon, who suppressed the cult of Adrastus there. Similarly 1. 176. 2; 2. 104. 4; 3. 32. 4; 4. 170; 9. 34. 1. We find sense (3) also, but only with perfect passives of *mimeisthai*; for example, 2. 78: at Egyptian banquets a realistic wooden image of a corpse, *μεμιμημένον ἐς τὰ μάλιστα καὶ γραφῇ καὶ ἔργῳ*, was carried about and shown to the guests to remind them of mortality; 2. 86. 2 (mummy models in stock sizes); 2. 132. 1; 2. 169. 2. *Mimēma* is not used at all by Herodotus.

Finally, there are just two cases of *mimēsis* and one of *mimeisthai* in Thucydides, all showing our generalized sense (2). Closest, perhaps, to the old "mimic" sense is 1. 95. 3: Pausanias' generalship appeared rather an "imitation" of a tyranny; but what we learn about his royal style and dress gives the word a flavor of "aping," something like Agathon's imitation of women in the *Thesmophoriazusae*. 7. 63. 3: Nicias appeals to the men in the ship crews who, although not Athenians, are generally considered so "and by your command of our dialect and

your imitation of our ways [*tropoi*: cf. Eur. *Hel.* 940, above] have won admiration throughout Greece." Pericles in 2. 37. 1: "we have a form of government which does not emulate the institutions of our neighbors; we are a model (*paradeigma*) for others rather than imitators of them."

It seems fairly evident that as we move from Aristophanes to Euripides and Herodotus we are moving away from the original center of gravity of *mimeisthai*, that is, away from "live" imitation, in the style of the mime, toward a more abstract and colorless range of meaning. One feels this in the Ionian particularly. The word now begins to belong to the general vocabulary; it reeks less of the mime, so to speak. But *mimos* itself is still taboo. This dissociation of the two words is of importance for the later history of *mimēsis*.

Koller (p. 58) ascribes the concept of art as an imitation of nature to Heraclitus, on the strength of [Aristotle] *De mundo* 5 [396b7ff.]. But the phrase *ἡ τέχνη τὴν φύσιν μιμουμένη* belongs to the text of the treatise, not to the quotation from Heraclitus, which begins several lines below and is clearly marked off from the rest.⁴² Thus the remark on art is at best an interpretation of Heraclitus and proves nothing for the philosopher himself. But actually, in all probability, it is just the familiar Aristotelian apothegm, which the writer of the *De mundo* has here brought into proximity with Heraclitus.

The same applies with even greater force to the confused and sometimes foolish lucubrations on the same theme in the pseudo-Hippocratic treatise *De victu*, which are conscientiously cited and analyzed by Koller (pp. 59-62). Even according to the dating which prevailed until recently (*ca.* 400 B.C.),

the work would not tell us much about fifth-century usage. But the most recent reliable judgments date it to the middle of the fourth century or even later.⁴³

"Imitation" does appear three times in the fragments of Democritus. Frag. 39 Diels: ἀγαθὸν ἢ εἶναι χρεῶν ἢ μιμεῖσθαι; Frag. 79: χαλεπὸν μιμεῖσθαι μὲν τοὺς κακοὺς, μηδὲ ἐθέλειν δὲ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς. Both cases show the generalized sense (2), which in fact appears to be the standard one in writers belonging to the Ionic tradition (Theognis?, Herodotus, Democritus). The first one carries in addition an interesting implication, that of the contrast between being and seeming.⁴⁴ There is perhaps a more direct echo of the old "mimic" sense in Frag. 154 (Plut. *De sollert. an.* 20 [974A]): (τῶν ζώων) μαθητάς ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις γεγονότας ἡμᾶς· ἀράχνης ἐν ὑφαντικῇ καὶ ἀκροστικῇ, χελιδόνος ἐν οἰκοδομίᾳ, καὶ τῶν λιγυρῶν, κύκνου καὶ ἀηδόνης, ἐν ᾧδῇ κατὰ μίμησιν. On first reading, κατὰ μίμησιν seems to apply to all the examples, and Koller takes it so (p. 58). But closer reading brings out that it probably belongs to the last one only, that is, that the reference is specific, to *musical* mimicry or imitation.⁴⁵ Imitating a bird in singing is a different kind of thing from imitating a swallow in housebuilding. Bird song and song are genuinely similar processes, physiologically and psychologically, on both the producing and the receiving (listening) side, while nest building and housebuilding are only *analogous* ones. Considering the very limited use of the word *mimēsis* in our period, and the fact that in both the other examples it referred to actual mimicry, it is more likely that Democritus meant to denote by it the genuinely mimetic act of singing.

This completes the certainly attested

list of occurrences of *mîmos*, *mimeisthai*, *mimēma*, *mimēsis* in the fifth century. The important and difficult task remains of considering the evidence for the "Pythagorean-Damonian theory of imitation" which Koller finds to be such a massive factor in the whole development. It is a little difficult even to determine where to take hold of this theory, just because Koller finds it *un peu partout*. However, on his showing the key passage is Plato's discussion of *mimēsis* in the third book of the *Republic*. Hence it will be necessary to examine certain features of that passage, even though I am reserving Plato's doctrine of "imitation" as such for later treatment.

In these pages Plato deals with the topic of poetic expression, first by means of words (*lexis*, often mistranslated "diction": 392C–398B), then by means of melody and rhythm (398C–402D), that is, spoken verses and song respectively. In the first part, according to Koller, Plato operates deliberately with two quite different meanings of *mimēsis*, namely (1) "Persönliches Auftreten und Handeln der in der Dichtung vorkommenden Gestalten" and (2) the musical representation of states of soul.⁴⁶ According to Koller again, this second meaning stems from Damon (who is mentioned later, at 400B), and it brings into the discussion an idea of *ethical evaluation* that is wholly alien to the first. In other words, a concept of "imitation" which was originally intended only for *music* (and dancing) has been smuggled into a purely technical analysis of poetry in general, where it does not properly belong, and Plato has done this because otherwise he could not achieve the ethical condemnation of certain kinds of poetry. Koller finds the new musical concept obscurely but unmistakably implied

at 396B ff. ("imitation" of horses neighing, bulls bellowing, thunder, etc.) and 397A ff. These passages, he says, anticipate 399D (condemnation of the *aulos*) and already breathe the spirit of Damon, even though the latter is not mentioned by name until 400B.

It can be said at once that 396B ff. and 397A ff. imply nothing of the kind. In both places Plato is still talking about imitation through speech (*lexis*), or at least through the voice, without song.⁴⁷ The mimetic stunts alluded to in both passages (mimicking of horses, bulls, winds, musical instruments, etc.) are simply imitations *per vocem et gestus*, such as have always captivated simple people and used to ornament the stage in the palmy days of American vaudeville, along with the jugglers, the ventriloquists, and the song-and-dance men.⁴⁸ It is true that melody and rhythm are mentioned at 397B, in anticipation of 398C where they officially come up for discussion. And this anticipation is indeed an important clue to the relation between 392C–398B (*lexis*) and 398C ff. (*melos*), but not in Koller's sense. Plato has been characterizing the indiscriminate kind of spoken *mimēsis*, which is ready to mimic anything and everything. He now points out that if such a *mimēsis* is set to music, that is, if melody and rhythm are added to it, the melody and rhythm also will have to be indiscriminate, *παντοδαπαί*, whereas we want only the simplest and most uniform kind of imitation, that of a good man. And that is precisely the point that is made, and made emphatically, in the discussion of "song" which begins at 398C. Only two "harmonies" will be needed in our state, and a limited number of rhythms—which ones, we will leave to Damon—because song is to be judged by the same *typoi* ("stamps," "patterns") as speech, that

is, the two modes of presentation which were defined in 396BC as (1) the pattern that would be used by a good man and (2) the one that would be used by his opposite.

Thus the two parts of the discussion, that on *lexis* and that on *melos*, are treated in exactly the same ethical spirit, according to identical principles; and Koller's assertion that a purely technical, ethically neutral concept of "imitation" is succeeded by a quite different, ethically oriented one, is incorrect.

Nevertheless Koller is right in thinking that the aura of Damon's influence extends some distance back from the explicit mention of his name at 400B. From the other testimonia about him, sparse though they are, we cannot fail to recognize that Damon's theory about the relation between music and the soul included "harmonies" as well as rhythms. We can therefore carry the "Damonian" orbit back at least to 399A, where Socrates asks Glaucon to name two harmonies which will "fittingly imitate" the utterances of a good man in war and in peace.⁴⁹ And here we find *mimeisthai*, A7 and C3, not to mention 400AB, where it is said that Damon will rule on the question ποῖα [*sc.* εἶδη ἐξ ὧν αἱ βάσεις πλέκονται] ὁποίου βίου μιμήματα [*sc.* ἐστίν]. It would appear, therefore, that Damon did have a theory of "imitation," namely, that certain kinds of melody and rhythm "imitate" certain modes of life. And since Plato is engaged precisely in determining what kinds of imitation in speech, melody, and rhythm are appropriate to the life of his Guardians, it would further appear that the whole passage 392C–402D is Damonian in inspiration. I believe that this inference is correct, in one sense, and yet that Koller is wrong in attributing a

theory of "imitation" to Damon. Let us see how this paradox can be maintained.

Not even Koller has asserted that the concept of imitation which is expounded in 392Dff. (*mimêsis* = dramatic impersonation) is Damonian. There is in fact no evidence that Damon had anything in particular to say about the drama, or that he tried to extend his musical theories to the dramatic side (dialogue parts) of tragedy. Moreover, by the elaborateness of his explanation of *mimêsis* in 392D-394C, Plato makes it as clear as he well could that the application of the word to epic and drama is something new and unfamiliar; whereas at 400Bff. it is equally evident that Glaucon at least is fully conversant with Damon's theories. On the other hand, as we have said, the new application of *mimêsis* is used as the basis of an ethical evaluation of poetry; and this ethical evaluation is continued along exactly the same lines in the section on melodies and rhythms, where we have admitted Damon's influence. The key to the puzzle, it seems to me, is the psychological premise which underlies the whole passage. The thing which dramatic imitation (in Plato's sense, i.e., impersonation) and musical imitation have in common is *assimilation of one's soul to the character of the person or "life" which is imitated*. And this principle was undoubtedly enunciated—for music—by Damon.⁵⁰ But he need not have enunciated it in terms of "imitation," and the passage before us makes it very unlikely that he did. According to Koller, Plato's procedure here was to extend Damon's musical conception of *mimêsis* to cover poetry in general. The actual course of events seems to me very different, namely that Plato brought together *mimêsis*, with

its *dramatic* connotations, and the concept of assimilation which was at home in music. The terms employed by Damon for the latter were presumably those that appear in close proximity to his name in the *Republic*: *homoiôsis* or *homoiotês* (*homoiousthai*) and (*to*) *prepon* (*prepontôs*, *prepousai*).⁵¹

It may be said that after all we have ended by leaving Damon almost everything that Koller claims for him—everything, in fact, except the particular term *mimêsis*. But I would argue that much more than a term is involved: that "imitation" as a description of the nature of poetry and music as a whole is in fact a complex idea and that complex idea was the invention of Plato, not Damon. The full justification of this argument will have to wait for our later study of Plato.

As for the extensive evidence which Koller claims to find for the "Damonian" theory of imitation in the second book of Aristides Quintilianus, I must avow that the whole hypothesis seems to me very shaky.⁵² Schäfke, upon whose *Quellenuntersuchungen* Koller leans heavily, is much more guarded, claiming only that certain parts of the second book go back to a writer somewhere between Damon and Heraclides Ponticus.⁵³ The source may be pre-Aristoxenian, then, as both Schäfke and Koller insist, but not necessarily pre-Platonic; and it remains to be demonstrated that Aristides' remarks on imitation are from that source in particular. Aristides has much to say about pedagogical and cathartic uses of music, but little about imitation, and then mainly in passages which according to Schäfke are *not* Damonian.⁵⁴ Most, if not all, of the references can perfectly well be accounted for as echoes of Plato or Aristotle. Hence I cannot admit that Aristides offers us

any enlightenment on the subject of a Damonian theory of imitation.

The second component of the alleged Damonian-Pythagorean theory⁵⁵ is even harder to pin down than the first. We may grant to Koller at once that the early Pythagoreans were obsessed by the importance of music; that they found musical (i.e., musical-mathematical) principles embodied both in the cosmos and in human life; that they had a developed body of practice, if not of theory, for the ethical and cathartic use of music; and that some—not all—of these attitudes have a close parallel in Damon. But all this, and it is a good deal, does not prove that they had a concept of “imitation.” The only piece of relatively good evidence pointing in that direction is a well-known remark of Aristotle (*Metaph.* A. 5 [987b11–15]). Aristotle is speaking of Plato’s use of “participation” to describe the relation between particulars and Ideas; then he adds that all Plato had done was to change the term: οἱ μὲν γὰρ Πυθαγόρειοι μιμήσει τὰ ὄντα φασὶν εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν, Πλάτων δὲ μεθεξεί. The statement is famous, indeed notorious, just because it is so problematical. On it hangs the prolonged controversy over one cardinal point of Pythagorean cosmology, namely whether they maintained that things *are* numbers or merely “imitations” of numbers. It is of course impossible to rehearse the problem at length here. Suffice it to say that while Cornford took the two views as incompatible and belonging to two quite different stages of Pythagorean theory in the fifth century,⁵⁶ others insist that they can be reconciled or at any rate were held simultaneously by the school from an early period.⁵⁷ But there is still another possible solution, suggested by the almost total isolation of

Aristotle’s statement: that the latter can be accounted for by special motives or circumstances attaching to this particular passage⁵⁸ and therefore cannot be thrown in the scale against the mass of evidence which speaks for the Pythagoreans having identified things with numbers. This solution, which seems to me highly plausible, would destroy the only explicit ascription of a *mimēsis* doctrine to the Pythagoreans, at least by a good source.

We can perhaps add a further consideration on the basis of our study of *mimēsthai* and company. All the meanings we have found implied the conscious following of a model, either in one’s own speech, movement, or moral action, or in a material medium (images, replicas, etc.). It follows that if the fifth-century Pythagoreans did speak of things “imitating” numbers, then they must have believed either (1) that things tried to make themselves resemble numbers—mimed them, so to speak—or (2) that they were made by somebody in such a way as to resemble numbers. The first doctrine would involve something like Aristotle’s doctrine of the *orexis* of all things toward the Prime Mover, the other something like Plato’s *demiurgus*. But we can be fairly sure that the Pythagoreans held neither of these views. Again, so far as *mimēsis* itself is concerned, the actual term cited by Aristotle, we have seen that the word is very rare in the fifth century and appears only in its second half (Herodotus, Democritus, Aristophanes). It would seem to be specifically Ionic, or Ionic-Attic. Undoubtedly it belongs to the great flood of coinages in *-sis* which flowed from Ionian philosophy and science.⁵⁹ So we may be reasonably confident that it does not belong in the Pythagorean sphere. I believe we can be equally

confident that there was no such thing as a Pythagorean theory of *mimēsis*.⁶⁰

We need not rest the case on the particular noun *mimēsis*. It is surely no accident that Koller can bring no Pythagorean evidence for *mimeisthai* or any other word belonging to the family, except from the second book of Aristides Quintilianus which we have already discussed. But—and let us emphasize the importance of this "but"—there can be no doubt that the Pythagoreans, as they found "likenesses," *homoiotētes* or *homoiomata*, of numbers in both the natural and the human world,⁶¹ also found a likeness or affinity between music and the soul.⁶² This was the solid basis of their pedagogical and cathartic uses of music (which I do not in any way dispute), and one of the bases of the new concept of "imitation" which was forged by Plato.

Let us make it clear, then, what we have against Koller's thesis. To the argument which is, or ought to be, his main concern, namely the existence of a fifth-century doctrine which affirmed a likeness or kinship between music and the soul, there can be no serious objection. Such views are unmistakably attested for Damon and for the Pythagoreans (though the connection between the two is not clear). Still more, this view did exercise a powerful influence on Plato. But in calling it a doctrine of "imitation" Koller has introduced a serious distortion, one which makes it impossible to understand the subsequent development of *mimēsis* in the hands of Plato and Aristotle.⁶³ This is not simply a question of terminology. In Koller's exposition Plato, at least the Plato of the *Republic*, necessarily figures in the role of villain, one who wilfully twisted the true "tänzerisch-musikalische" theory of imitation into a new shape to fit a more or less accidental purpose. That

is a serious misreading. "Imitation" could not have become the master concept of the drama, and then of literature in general, if it had come to Plato already hallmarked as a specifically musical concept.

What we have found in the fifth century is not a theory⁶⁴ but a bundle of interrelated, concrete word-usages. True to its parentage, *mimeisthai* seems to denote originally a "miming" or mimicking of a person or animal by means of voice and/or gesture. Often, but not invariably, the medium is music and dancing; in any case the essential idea is the rendering of characteristic look, action, or sound through human means. There is reason to believe that this usage came into old Greece from the home of the mime, Sicily, and that the whole word group gained ground only gradually in the Ionic-Attic sphere, not becoming fully naturalized there until the latter third of the fifth century (*mimos* not even then). Out of this primary idiom, whose vigor we find still unimpaired in Aristophanes, there developed a second, more colorless one: to "imitate" another person in general, to do as or what he does. At the same time or not much later, and particularly in the secondary derivative *mimēma*, the concept of mimicry was transferred to material "images": pictures, statues, and the like. *Mimēsis* appears late in the fifth century, specifically in the Ionic-Attic orbit. It is sparsely exemplified and seems to be an Ionic coinage, but can take on any of the three senses. In any case all three were in current use when Plato was born.⁶⁵ Out of these three strands of meaning, in combination with other ideas of different provenance, came the complex Platonic idea of *mimēsis*, whose development I propose to investigate in another article.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

NOTES

1. *Die Mimesis in der Antike* ("Diss. Bern." ser. 1, fasc. 5; Berne, 1954). In my "A Survey of Work on Aristotle's *Poetics*, 1940-1954," *CW*, XLVIII (1954-55), 78, on the basis of a rather hasty and partial reading, I indicated a favorable judgment of Koller's (hereafter K.) general thesis. Further and more intensive reading has developed some minor misgivings into major ones.

2. E.g., p. 25: "Ihre [sc. der Mimesis] Mittel sind λόγος, μέλος, ῥυθμός, ihr Resultat: Ausdruck, Formwerdung der ῥήθη, πάθη, πράξεις der menschlichen Seele." Cf. pp. 31, 34, 45, 56, 66, 130, and *passim*.

3. P. 119: "Sein Bedeutungszentrum liegt im Tanz. μιμεῖσθαι heißt primär: 'durch Tanz zur Darstellung bringen.'" And see esp. pp. 37-48, "Mimesis des Tanzes."

4. P. 63, on Pl. *Rep.* 595E ff.: "Was hier definiert wird, ist die alltägliche, abgebläste Bedeutung von Mimesis, wie wir sie schon oft angetroffen haben ... Ganz natürlich ergibt sich für Platon, daß er hier (596c) in erster Linie mit der Mimesis des *Malers* operiert (dagegen im dritten Buch nie)." This "everyday, watered-down" meaning has indeed been noticed in the preceding pages, but its origin, i.e., its derivation from the primary meaning "darstellen," is nowhere explained.

5. H. Deiters, *De Aristidis Quintiliani doctrinae harmonicae fontibus* (Programm; Düren, 1870); R. Schäfke, *Aristides Quintilianus "Von der Musik"* (Berlin, 1937).

6. The etymology of *mimos* is quite uncertain, as K. rightly says (p. 13, against J. B. Hofmann, *Etymol. Wörterb. d. Griech.* [Munich, 1950], s.v.; Hofmann connects *mimos* with Skr. *māyā*, root *māi-*, *mī-*, with the basic meaning "transformation," "deception"; E. Schwyzler, on the other hand, *Gr. Grammatik*, I [Munich, 1939], 423, takes *mi-* as a reduplicative syllable). But there K. leaves the matter. The mime, that is, the *mimos* proper, is fobbed off as a later ("μίμος im späteren Sinne," p. 120), secondary development out of cult dances (see pp. 39, 45), and no further attention is paid to it.

7. 10. 16 [470F] = Aesch. Frag. 57 Nauck².

8. Strabo is out to prove that the Dionysiac rites are essentially the same as the Thracian and Phrygian. Τῆς μὲν οὖν Κοτυτοῦς [ita Nauck pro κότυος τῆς] ἐν τοῖς Ἡδωνοῖς Αἰσχύλος μέμνηται καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὴν ὀργάνων. εἰπὼν γὰρ 'σμενὰ Κοτυτοῦς ὄργαν' ἔχοντες, τοὺς περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον εὐθέως ἐπιφέρει· ὁ μὲν ἐν χερσὶν βόμβυκας ἔχων, κτλ. For ὄργαν' (ὄρια δ' ὄργαν' codd. Strab.) Nauck wrote ὄργι', taking ὄρια and ὄργαν' as "ditto-graphiae oblitterati vocabuli ὄργια." But the whole passage is about instruments (cf. §15, just before it), and surely the point of Strabo's quotation, with the interjected remark about the followers of Dionysus, is that they use the same instruments as the devotees of Cotyto. In fact there is no reason for the lacuna which is usually indicated between the two parts of the quotation (note Strabo's εὐθέως ἐπιφέρει!). The chorus of Edoni is then reporting (from observation, obviously, not participation) that the newcomers are "holding the sacred instruments of Cotyto." Hence I have restored ὄργαν' to the text, and the latter should be printed continuously.

9. J. E. Harrison, *Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion* (Cambridge, 1912), pp. 61-67; also (independently, it appears) A. S. F. Gow, *JHS*, LIV (1934), 7, n. 16. Gow cites Archytas, Frag. B1 Diels (I^a, p. 435), who characterizes the *rhomboi* as used ἐν ταῖς τελεταῖς, and Eur. *Hel.* 1361; he also gives a picture (Fig. 7) of bull-roarers. On the bull-roarer see further R. R. Marett, *The Threshold of Religion* (London, 1929), chap. vi, pp. 145-68 ("Savage Supreme Beings and the Bull-Roarers"); A. Lang, *Custom and Myth* (London, 1884), pp. 29-44; *idem* in *Hastings Encycl. of Rel. and Eth.*, s.v.; Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, vii ("Spirits of the Corn and the Wild," Vol. I), p. 110, n. 4; *ibid.*, xi ("Balder the Beautiful," Vol. II), pp. 227-35, esp. p. 228, n. 2; W. Ridgeway, *The Dramas and Dramatic Dances of Non-European Races* (Cambridge,

1915), pp. 344-47. M. P. Nilsson, *Gesch. d. gr. Rel.*, I (Munich, 1941), 539, n. 3, takes no notice of this interpretation but assumes, like K., that the ταυρόρρογοι μῖμοι are masked dancers.

10. Schol. Clem. Alex. *Cohort.*, p. 5; cited by Harrison, *op. cit.*, p. 61, n. 3.

11. The Australian natives often use a number of bull-roarers, up to as many as 16: Marett, *loc. cit.*

12. Cf. τυράνου εἰκὼν (if correct: εἰχὼν codd.), which certainly does not refer to the drummers.

13. See L. Séchan, *Études sur la tragédie grecque* (Paris, 1926), pp. 63-79. The complete fragments of the tetralogy now in H. J. Mette, *Supplementum Aeschyleum* (*Kleine Texte* ... No. 169; Berlin, 1939), pp. 9-18.

14. A. W. Verrall, *The Bacchants of Euripides and Other Essays* (Cambridge, 1910), esp. pp. 71ff.; G. Norwood, *The Riddle of the Bacchae* (Manchester, 1908).

15. Note these expressions, all from Pentheus: II. 218, πλασταῖσι βακχίαισιν; 224, πτόφρασιν; 234, γόης ἐπωδός; 238, τελετάς προτείνων; 245, γάμους ἐψέαστο (sc. Semele; = I. 31); 475, εὐ τοῦτ' ἐκιδέηλευσας; 489, σοφισμάτων κακῶν; and cf. the thematic advice of Cadmus, 334: κατὰψεύδου καλῶς.

16. E. R. Dodds, *Bacchae* (Oxford, 1944), p. xxviii: "It looks as if the first scene between Pentheus and Dionysus in the *Bacchae* followed the older poet's model pretty closely."

17. Certainly it is plain from Frags. 59-62 N. that Lycurgus was contemptuous of the womanish appearance of Dionysus (ὁ γύνως, Frag. 61; χλούνης, Frag. 62), as Pentheus is, and that the exotic traits of the god and his cult (exotic, that is, from the point of view of Aeschylus and his Athenian audience) were heavily underlined.

18. The weakness of this argument is of course that if the Edoni were already familiar with the bull-roarer as one of the "sacred instruments of Cotyto," it would be strange for them to impute trickery to the votaries of Dionysus because they used it. But we know too little about Aeschylus' play to rule the suggestion out of court entirely, and it is compatible with the lines themselves.

19. For the later evidence see Choricus, p. 42, 3 Graux, and cf. the testimonia on Sophron, p. 152 Kaibel. J. Vendryes, *Traité d'Accentuation Grecque* (Paris, 1929 [1945]), p. 150, distinguishes μῖμος "imitation" from μιμῶς "imitator," I do not know on what authority (the principle, however, is well known; cf. τόμος, τομός; τόρος, τορός, etc., and see Ch. Bally, *Manuel d'Accent. Gr.* [Berne, 1945], pp. 59, 66).

20. Its total absence in Plato is striking also, in view of his known fondness for Sophron, the affinities of some of his own early work with the mime (somewhat exaggerated by H. Reich, *Der Mimos*, I: 1 [Berlin, 1903], 380-413; see also J. M. S. McDonald, *Character-Portraiture in Epicharmus, Sophron, and Plato* [Columbia diss.; Sewanee, Tenn., 1931], pp. 142-58), and his massive and significant use of *mimēisthai*.

21. The low position and repute of the mime throughout antiquity is too well known to need documentation, but note the sneer of Democritus at Philip, mentioned above, and the story of Laberius and Caesar.

22. Jacoby, in *Sitz. Berl. Akad.*, 1931, p. 152, refers to vss. 367-70 as clearly not Theognidean. *Sed res adhuc incerta est*.

23. Cf. Pl. *Rep.* 399D.

24. See Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* (Berlin, 1922), p. 435, n. 2. "Irresistible [like the Sirens] clangor"?

25. There is no suggestion of "imitation" by the chorus. It sings and the dancer dances, following (διδάσκων) the song. On hyporchemes accompanied by (or rather accompanying): *hyporchema* [a song sung] to [accompany the] dancing) solo dancing see E. Diehl (cited below, n. 31).

26. *P. Oxy.*, XVIII (1942), pp. 14-22 = Frag. 190 Mettē (*op. cit.* [n. 13 above], pp. 27-31).

27. See Lobel's notes, *op. cit.*; E. Fraenkel, *Proc. Brit. Acad.*, 1942, pp. 244-45; A. Setti, *Ann. d. Scuola Norm. di Pisa*, ser. 2, XXI (1952), 205-44. The theme is spun out at length in ll. 13-17: "It would give my own mother a turn: if she saw it she'd take it right in, thinking it was me, it's so like me."

28. I.e., in Greek. See above, n. 6, on the uncertainty as to its ultimate derivation and meaning.

29. *Op. cit.*, p. 259, n. 3. Reich suggests that Theognis may have borrowed the word from his native dialect. We may add, for what it is worth, the ancient tradition (Pl. *Laws* 630A) that Theognis was a native or at least a citizen of the Sicilian Megara—this merely to suggest that Sicilian influence in some of the poems in the collection is not inconceivable. H. T. Wade-Gery, in *Greek Poetry and Life* (Oxford, 1936), pp. 76-77, thinks that the text of Theognis passed to Alexandria via Sicily.

30. For possible "Sicilianisms" in Aeschylus see W. B. Stanford, *Proc. Ir. Acad.*, XLIV (1938), sec. C, pp. 229-40. Setti, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 214-15, 228-32, argues plausibly that the *Θεωροί*, from which we noted the phrase τὸ Δαιδάλου μίμημα, was based on Epicharmus' *Θετροί*, and goes on to speak of an "idyllic realism" in Aeschylus' satyr plays which has affinities with the mime. Λιθουρικῆς, in Frag. 364, also points to the West rather than old Greece, and this fragment too could be from a satyr play.

31. E. Diehl, s.v. "Hyporchema," *RE*, IX, 338-43.

32. K. nowhere gives us a clear distinction between these senses, or a clear idea of how, when, and where the "secondary" meaning "imitation" (which would presumably include all three) grew out of the alleged primary meaning ("musikalisch-tänzerische") Darstellung, Ausdruck." All we learn is that in Plato, whenever a definite object is specified for the "representation," the secondary meaning has somehow cropped up; e.g., *Rep.* 395B (see K., p. 17); *ibid.* 595E ff. (see pp. 63 ff.); *Crat.* 423B (see pp. 49-50). Where it came from is not stated.

33. Cf. the later synonym for *mimos*: *ēthologos*.

34. I.e., Lais, the famous Corinthian *hetaira*; see schol. *ad loc.*

35. May the perfect participle refer to some kind of *Ersatz* erotic methods as actually "mimed" in the mime?

36. In Agathon's "male" and "female" δράματα (note the term) it is tempting to hear an echo of Sophron's μῖμοι ἀνδρῶν καὶ μῖμοι γυναικῶν (Suidas, s.v. Σώφρων). K. Ziegler, *RE*, VIA, 2018-19, takes the *Thesm.* passage as proof that a Sophistic theory of *mimēsis* was in existence by 411, an inference for which I see no sufficient warrant.

37. The *Rhesus*, where Dolon's *mimos* of a wolf falls something short of tragic dignity, was noticed above under *mimos*.

38. The widely accepted emendation *μυκήματα* (for *μυήματα*) seems incongruously direct ("bawlings such as the Furies send"?), and ἡλλάσσετο can hardly mean "confused" (i.e., took one for another). Ὦν φασ' is my very hesitant essay at mending ὧς φασ'. One would like to get in a τε somehow ("and imitations of...").

39. Cf. I. 943.

40. κακά Steph.: καλά codd.

41. Jens Holt, *Les noms d'action en -σις (-τις)* (Aarhus, 1940), p. 110, gives the priority to Democritus (cited below).

42. Heraclitus, Frag. B10 Diels*. See G. S. Kirk, *Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments* (Cambridge, 1954), pp. 167, 169.

43. W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, III (New York, 1944), 36-40; Kirk, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-29, 169, n. 1.

44. Cf. the famous characterization of Amphiaras, Aesch. *Sept.* 592: οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος ἄλλ' εἶναι θέλει; but Democritus' apothegm shows the heightened awareness of the discrepancy between reality and appearance, which is the hallmark of the latter part of the fifth century.

45. So taken by C. Bailey, *Lucretius* (Oxford, 1947), III, 1540.

46. K., pp. 15-21. Actually there are three meanings: (1) "Persönliches Auftreten," etc., (2) "ethical" imitation of one person by another, and (3) the alleged Damonian type of imitation, through music. But K. does not distinguish them clearly and therefore does not take proper account of (2) as the link between dramatic and musical *mimēsis*.

47. Cf. 397B: λέξις . . . διὰ μιμήσεως φωνᾶς τε καὶ σχήμασιν with 393C: τὸ γε ὁμοιοῦν ἑαυτὸν ἄλλω, ἢ κατὰ φωνὴν ἢ κατὰ σχήμα, μιμῆσθα ἔστιν ἐκείνων ὥ ἄν τις ὁμοιοῖ.

48. And the female impersonators (cf. *Rep.* 395D). Does anybody now alive remember Julian Eltinge?

49. The objection to the *aulos* is probably his; cf. Frag. B4 Diels, where only *kitharizein* is mentioned.

50. See Frags. B7, B10 Diels.

51. Frag. B7, δι' ὁμοιότητος; perhaps also πλάττουσι, *ibid.*: cf. K., p. 82.

52. See the doubts and reservations expressed by I. Düring in *Gnomon*, XXVII (1955), 432-33, with regard to the similar claims made for Damon by F. Lasserre in the introduction to his edition of *Plutarque: "De la musique"* (Olten and Lausanne, 1954). Düring even casts doubt on the whole tradition about Damon's *Areopagiticus*, which is the only evidence we have that Damon himself ever wrote anything.

53. *Op. cit.* (see n. 5 above), p. 110. Even this claim is made only for one section of book 2, namely chaps. 7-16 (pp. 76-102 Meibom), which Schäfer (p. 105) characterizes as on the whole (for even here some summaries, pp. 80-88 Meibom, belong to Aristides himself) "die mehr oder weniger originalgetreue, wenn auch vielleicht gekürzte Wiedergabe einer einzigen Quelle." Curiously enough, this is precisely the section which on the whole does not interest K. (p. 87: "Die Einzelheiten der in den folgenden Kapiteln [sc. VII ff.] dargelegten Psychologie sind wohl Werk des Aristides"); while on the other hand he hails (pp. 90-92) as indubitably Pythagorean parts of chaps. 18 and 19 (pp. 107-10 Meibom), which according to Schäfer (p. 111) belong to Aristides himself, not the "old source." Again, K. (pp. 82-83) finds rich Damonian-Pythagorean material in chap. 4 (pp. 63-65 Meibom), which is precisely one of the passages pointed out by Schäfer (pp. 100-101) as representing Aristides' more normal, eclectic method and being full of Platonic and Aristotelian terms and ideas (cf., e.g., διαγωγῇ, p. 65 Meibom). The fact is that K.'s use of A. Q. as a source for Damon does not follow any discernible method, certainly not that of Schäfer, who warns (p. 104), "daß man, wenigstens für das 2. Buch, durchaus nicht . . . das, was Ar. von den παλαιὸί berichtet, ohne weiteres Damon zurechnen darf." Jeanne Croissant (*Aristote et les mystères* [Liège-Paris, 1932], pp. 117-25) finds considerable traces not only of Aristotle but of Theophrastus in passages of A. Q., where K. sees only Damon or the Pythagoreans—a finding which K. of course combats vigorously (n. 47, pp. 219-21). Aside from all this, the style, vocabulary, and mode of argumentation even of the long passage singled out by Schäfer as stemming from the old source are such that to take it as a more or less faithful transcript of a fifth-century text is fantastic. Such Greek was not written before the middle of the fourth century at the earliest. Heraclides Ponticus is perhaps possible, but then Platonic, perhaps even Aristotelian, influence is to be expected.

54. Particularly chap. 4 (pp. 63-64 Meibom), which as we said above is full of Platonic and Aristotelian echoes, and chap. 16 (pp. 100-102 Meibom), which is on *hypokrisis* and has no likely connection with either Damon or the Pythagoreans: it gives rhetorical doctrine.

55. And its connection with Damon, which is nowhere clarified so far as I can see. K. appears to assume that Damon was a Pythagorean, but I know of no evidence for this except the obviously apocryphal *diadochē* in schol. [Pl.?] *Alc.* 118C, which gives the succession Pythocleides (allegedly a Pythagorean), Agathocles, Lamprocles, Damon.

56. F. M. Cornford, *CQ*, XVI (1922), 137–50; on *mimēsis* and its alleged origin in cult see esp. p. 143. According to Cornford the “imitation” doctrine was the original one, whereas the assertion that “things are numbers” belongs to a “number-atomism” theory developed by certain Pythagoreans in the later fifth century to answer the objections of Parmenides. But as Raven (see next note) points out, Cornford modified this view considerably, though without abandoning it, in *Plato and Parmenides* (London, 1939), Introd.; see esp. p. xiii. See also Ross on *Metaph.* A. 5, [986a16 and 17] and A. 6 [987b10 and 11].

57. E. Zeller, *Phil. d. Griechen*, I:1 (ed. [6]7; Leipzig, 1923), 446–54 (see esp. p. 449 with n. 2); J. E. Raven, *Pythagoreans and Eleatics* (Cambridge, 1948), pp. 3–6, 43–65 (chap. iv, “Pythagoreanism Before Parmenides”), esp. 62–63.

58. H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Crit. of Presocr. Philos.* (Baltimore, 1935), p. 392; *idem*, *Aristotle's Crit. of Pl. and the Acad.*, I (Baltimore, 1944), 109 with n. 65, 190–94, and 475, n. 426. In the former place Cherniss suggests that Aristotle borrowed this otherwise unsupported assertion from Aristoxenus, simply in order to slight Plato's originality; in the later book he cites convincing evidence to show that the remark belongs to a later addition by Aristotle to his own earlier account of Platonism, with which it is inconsistent.

59. See Holt, *op. cit.* (above, n. 41), pp. 109–17, 140, 171. Holt also documents the obvious fact that in the fifth century as well as later *-sis* is predominantly a *prose* suffix.

60. The parallels adduced for the *Metaphysics* passage by O. Gilbert, *Archiv. f. Gesch. d. Philos.*, XXII (N.F., XV) (1909), 40, are irrelevant or inapplicable except Aristoxenus, 58B2 Diels (Stob. *Ecl.* 1. 16, p. 20 Wachsm.): Pythagoras especially honored and developed the study of numbers, πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἀπεικάζων τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς; but ἀπεικάζειν is a characteristically Platonic word in this very sense. K.'s idea was anticipated *in nuce* by A. Rostagni, *SIFC*, N.S., II (1922), 62, and E. Frank, *Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer* (Halle, 1923), n. 18, p. 338. E. Howald, “Eine vorplatonische Kunsttheorie,” *Hermes*, LIV (1919), 187–207, derived the Aristotelian *catharsis* from the Pythagoreans, as K. does (pp. 98–99), but made no such claim for *mimēsis*.

61. Arist. *Metaph.* A. 5 [985b27–986a7].

62. *Idem Pol.* 8. 5 [1340a18–b19]; cf. b17: καὶ τις ἔοικε συγγένεια [sc. τῆς ψυχῆς] ταῖς ἀρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς ὁυθμοῖς εἶναι.

63. Aristotle is as decisive a test as Plato. K.'s attempt (pp. 104–18) to find the old musical *mimēsis* lurking in the *Poetics* leads again and again to strained interpretations or misinterpretations. Unfortunately this criticism cannot be documented here.

64. The nearest thing to it is the fragment (154) of Democritus on men as pupils of the animals in the arts. But we saw that there, in all probability, *mimēsis* denoted only musical mimicry, in song: it was one mode of *mathēsis*. There is no sign of a *general* theory of “imitation.” I have passed over Gorgias, to whom K. devotes a section (pp. 157–62, because we have no utterance from him on *mimēsis*. But his concept of *apatē* (see esp. his well-known remark on the *apatē* of tragedy, Frag. B23 Diels = Plut. *De glor. Ath.* 5 [348C]) does, I think, have something to do with the subject, or in any case has contributed to Plato's conception of *mimēsis*. (On Gorgias and *apatē* see most recently T. G. Rosenmeyer, *AJP*, LXXVI [1955], 225–60, where however no connection is made with *mimēsis*.) Ziegler's suggestion (see above, n. 36) that a *mimēsis* theory was put forward sometime before 411 by a Sophist, as a counterblast to Gorgias's *apatē*, has no basis in the evidence and seems to me highly implausible. Finally, the theory of a “Mimesis der Sprache” which K. (pp. 48–57) attributes to Cratylus on the basis of the Platonic *Cratylus*, 423ff., is a pure figment. The concept of *mimēsis* is introduced into the discussion by Socrates, not Cratylus, and the latter merely accepts it (430A), only to find himself involved in insoluble difficulties. There is not the slightest reason to believe that the historical Cratylus talked about a “Mimesis der Sprache.” But Plato did, and this question, like that of Gorgias, will be dealt with in my study of *mimēsis* in Plato.

65. The positive part of this study was restricted to authors who wrote, or at least began writing, before 425—this in order to get a clear view of the semantic situation *before Plato*. Hence, for example, Xenophon and the orators, even the oldest ones, were excluded.