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DECONSTRUCTING DOXOGRAPHY

In a paper recently published in this journal Leonid Ya. Zhmud¹ has criticized attempts by myself and others to revise Diels' reconstruction and interpretation of the ancient doxographical traditions. The motive prompting this polemic may be characterized as an instantiation of the well-known struggle of self-styled orthodoxy against revisionism, an orthodoxy representing a doctrine that, as it were, has been frozen solid and is defended whatever the cost, while revisionism stands for efforts to amend and reformulate this theory with regard to the data it originally was devised, or set out, to explain.

Criticism is of course most welcome, but Z.'s manner of argumentation is far from helpful. He theorizes at an ideological level situated at a considerable distance from the evidence. His erudition is largely derived from the literature he criticizes. Most of the time he argues *ad hominem* (or *homines*), availing himself moreover of the art of partial² and/or selective quotation by leaving out what would obstruct his presentation.

I shall not discuss Z.'s points contra one by one but only give a few examples (*ab illis discite omnia*), and concentrate on the few pages where he seems to present arguments in favour of what he apparently believes to be an unrevised Dielsian orthodoxy. In fact it is not so easy to discover what his own views are. Perhaps one should allow oneself to be guided by his apophthegm at p. 234: "Every theory is a lucky combination of previous ideas." Every theory!

Examples of arguments *ad hominem*: our emendations of Diels' theory are seen by Z. p. 221 as attacks on "his integrity as a scholar". Evidently one way of arguing *ad hominem* is to claim that one's opponents argue *ad hominem*. And I am admonished by Z. p. 236-237 for accepting the theory of the *Doxographi Graeci* in my Reclam

¹ Zhmud (2001). Hereafter referred to as Z. plus page number(s).

² There is a marvellous example at Z. p. 233: a remark of Runia's about "original doxographical sources" (my emphasis) is repeated as "original source" ("source" in the singular, "doxographical" suppressed), from which Z. infers that "in the course of the 20th century the term "original source" or "early source" has taken an opposite meaning and begun to denote not Anaxagoras' treatise, and not even Theophrastus' compendium, but Aetius and his epitomators". However a *vitium originis* is involved as well: Z. fails to realize that "the original sources" here means "the sources one started with", i.e. the (doxographical) sources from which the quoted texts were abstracted and copied. I too have spoken of "original sources" in this sense, see Mansfeld (1999b) 25, quoted Z. p. 232 n. 75.

*Vorsokratiker*³, and for changing my mind a number of years later. Changing one's mind clearly is not done. Z. furthermore believes that Baltussen Runia Mansfeld form what he calls a "school", members of which should toe the party line. Any putative sin committed by one of these people is to be attributed to and visited on the others⁴. On the other hand, that Runia and the present writer should disagree is seen by Z. as a serious weakness fatally undermining what he calls "the new doxography". He fails to appreciate that we are independent scholars who may or may not agree to disagree among ourselves.

An example of misunderstanding: Z. p. 221 with n. 12 reveals his lack of a sense of humour or irony by taking a remark of mine about the *Quellenforschung* in Diels' *Doxographi Graeci au pied de la lettre*⁵. Another confusion or false presentation: Z. p. 237 states that "the main thesis" of a paper published 1987⁶ is that "the doxographical tradition" offers "not Theophrastus' report on Xenophanes but Theophrastus' own view". *Quod non*: I argued that the doxographical traditions concerning Xenophanes are complicated and of diverse provenance. Z. adds that this main thesis was refuted by Runia⁷. But Runia merely argued against the attribution to Theophrastus rather than Xenophanes of one of the two tenets at Aet. 2.20.3 Diels. Z. has mistaken the detail about Aet. 2.20.3 for the argument of the paper as a whole. Quite amusing is his contention, p. 238, that to explain certain important aspects of Aëtian doxography through an appeal to the Peripatetic dialectical approach to real and possible views on a given topic advocated in the *Topics*, amounts to a form of *Einquellentheorie*⁸. Z. clearly confuses form, or rather method or approach, with content. So also at p. 229, where he posits that Theophrastus' "criticism was scientific, and not dialectical". To create an absolute opposition between (Peripatetic) dialectic and (Peripatetic) science is as absurd as to believe that science excludes logic, or conversely.

Enough of this. Let us turn to Z.'s own position. He states (I quote from p. 229–230) that Aristotle "initiated" "a historiographic project", to which "Theophrastus' physical and Menon's medical doxographies" belong, as well as "three histories of science,

written by Eudemos, that were arranged according to the chronology of the mathematicians and astronomers". Also included was "Eudemos' *History of Theology* that discusses the doctrines of the θεολόγοι in chronological sequence"⁹. "(I)t is history and not dialectic that unites various parts of the project into the one meaningful whole."

The idea of such a project is not new, but there is no ancient evidence to support it. It is a modern hypothesis¹⁰. Much depends moreover on what is understood by "historiographic" and "history"¹¹. Z. is regrettably far from clear on this point, but what he seems to view as a defining characteristic of history, or rather of this kind of historiography, is the treatment of individual members of a given profession in chronological order (see also below). He states, p. 227, that the "more important" issue is "whether Theophrastus' approach to the Presocratic *doxai* was more historical or more systematic". In my view this particular disjunction of "historical" and "systematic" is misleading. The terminology itself is obfuscating, since what is meant is an odd contrast between chronology and content.

That what we have here is indeed history (in whatever vague sense) is concluded by Z. from the titles of Eudemos' works quoted in ancient sources: Γεωμετρική ιστορία, Αστρολογική ιστορία, Αριθμητική ιστορία¹². He therefore believes that Theophrastus' treatise may be referred to as Φυσική ιστορία, or 'Ιστορία *iout count*. Its full title he says is Φυσικῶν δόξαι as Usener and Diels assumed, not (as others have stated or argued) Φυσικαὶ δόξαι, that is to say: "Tenets (Views, Opinions) of the Physicists", not "Tenets Pertaining to Physics".

Z. p. 228 with n. 46 adds that "(m)y search with TLG in the entire corpus of Greek literature brought only one example of φυσικὴ δόξα (Olymp. in Meteor. 138.29)"¹³. The suggestion seems to be that this evidence may be discounted as being late, and the implication that φυσικὴ δόξα is bad Greek. In fact the following parallels for the combination φυσικὴ δόξα (or the plural) are found as well: Philo Leg. all. 1.59, ἀλλ'

⁹ Note that this title is not attested for Eudemos but for Theophrastus in the catalogue ap. Diog. Laert. 5.48 = fr. 251.1 FHS&G (acknowledged by Z. p. 230 n. 58, who of course posits that nevertheless it should be attributed to Eudemos not Theophrastus. Cf. below, n. 12).

¹⁰ See Wehrli (1969) 113, with references to earlier literature (add e.g. von Fritz (1972) 318–9); in Flashar (1983) 531 Wehrli is more cautious. The existence of this particular project and division of labour has been inferred from the 158 *Constitutions* and similar collections (for which see Moraux (1951) 122–133, and Flashar (1983) 286–287) on the one hand, and the works of Theophrastus, Eudemos, and Meno(?) cited in the text on the other.

¹¹ Weil (1977) 202 aptly distinguishes between "what may be called in a broad sense 'historical' research" and "the narrowest sense of 'historical', the modern one".

¹² Note that these titles are also found in the catalogue of Theophrastus ap. Diog. Laert. 5.48, 'Ιστορικῶν γεωμετρικῶν α' β' γ' δ' (= fr. 264.3 FHS&G), 5.50 'Αστρολογικῆς ιστορίας α' β' γ' δ' ε' (= fr. 137.43 FHS&G) and 'Αριθμητικῶν ιστοριῶν περὶ αἰξήσεως α' (= fr. 264.2 FHS&G). The usual assumption is that Eudemean titles have strayed into Theophrastus' catalogue. Yet titles such as *Analytics Topics Physics* Περί λέξεως are attested for both Theophrastus and Eudemos. – Cf. also below, n. 25.

¹³ To his quotation add τὴν λέγουσαν ἐκ τῆς ἀτιμίας τρέφεσθαι τὸν ἥλιον. For the tenet cf. Aet. 2.20.4 Diels: Olympiodorus' example of a *physikê doxa* is attested in the *Placita* literature.

³ Vol. 1 first published Stuttgart 1983. Naturally I had been working on the little books for several years before that date.

⁴ Z. p. 226, referring to Runia (1999), an essay he does not like: "It seems hardly possible that Mansfeld was unaware of the conclusion reached by Runia (...)"

⁵ Also see Z. p. 233 n. 77. Moreover he has failed – notwithstanding his references to other aspects of these publications elsewhere – to take my views on *Quellenforschung* into account, for which see Mansfeld (1998), or Mansfeld (1999a) 13–16, 29–30.

⁶ Mansfeld (1987).

⁷ Runia (1992).

⁸ "(...) the new doxography substitutes its own *Einquellentheorie* with Aristotle's *Topics* as *fons et origo* of the entire doxography". Apart from the bizarre use of the term *Einquellentheorie* this contention really is as false as can be. Of course Top. 1.11 and 1.14 are not the only passages appealed to, and Peripatetic dialectic is not the only approach mentioned (nor is the *Topics* the only treatise cited), and the argument is that with regard to content a plurality of sources is to be taken into account. For this plurality see e.g. also Mansfeld (2000a), a paper not mentioned by Z.

οὔτοι Ιατρικὴν δόξαν ἐκτιθέμενοι μᾶλλον ἢ φυσικὴν, "the tenet propounded by these exegetes belongs to medicine rather than to physics" (note that this seems to be the only instance of Ιατρικὴ δόξα in preserved Greek literature). Further Gal. in Hippocr. Nat. hom. 15.50.5–8 K., ... ἐπιδέδεικται διὰ τοῦ Περί τῶν καθ' Ἱπποκράτην στοιχείων ὑπομνήματος, ἔνθα καὶ πασῶν σχεδὸν τῶν φυσικῶν δοξῶν ἐμνημονεύσαμεν¹⁴, ὅσαι περὶ τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν ἢ στοιχείων γεγόναι, Nicom. Excerpt. 5.3, ἀκολουθῶς τῇ φυσικῇ τοῦ Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πλάτωνος δόξῃ, Eus. Pr. Ev. 2.6.16, τὴν ... φυσικώτεραν τῆς περὶ θεῶν ἱστορίας δόξαν, and Philop. in Gen. corr. 25.13ff., δόξαν ... , ... πολλῶ καὶ πιθανώτερα καὶ φυσικώτερα. The majority of these parallel passages are early enough, and show that φυσικὴ δόξα is entirely unproblematic from an idiomatic point of view¹⁵.

Aristotle uses δόγμα and δόξα interchangeably in the sense of "tenet", or "view"¹⁶, though the latter is found more often. But in this sense Theophrastus only uses δόξα¹⁷. The combination of φυσικός with δόγμα in the sense of "view" or "tenet" is also found, though not, as we see, in Theophrastus. Interestingly enough the title of Ps.-Plutarch's *Placita* at Eus. Pr. Ev. 14.13.9 and in most mss.¹⁸ is Περί τῶν ἀρεσκόντων τοῖς φιλοσόφοις φυσικῶν δογμάτων. Here φυσικῶν δογμάτων can only be the genitive of φυσικά δόγματα¹⁹. Even so I do not claim that φυσικῶν δοξῶν is always unambiguously the genitive of φυσικαὶ δόξαι. One cannot be absolutely certain, but what I do say and have said is that in references to a work by Theophrastus this is not only a possible option²⁰, but also a very probable one. It puts this work firmly in the context of Peripatetic dialectic and helps to explain the *Sitz im Leben*

¹⁴ A glance at the *De elementis ex Hippocrate* shows that Galen indeed means "practically all the physical doxai" pertaining to the principles or elements: he starts with the theory that there are smallest parts (Democritus Epicurus Asclepiades) and only later describes the (various versions of the) theory that there are four elements. He claims that his overview is complete and that the full diacresis shows that there are four and only four main possible theories (1.427.2ff. K., τέτταρες μὲν γὰρ αἱ πᾶσαι δόξαι κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν εὐρίσκονται κτλ.).

¹⁵ The combination is not more strange than φυσικός τόπος (i.e. the physical part of philosophy, S. Emp. M. 9.4), φυσικός ὄρος (Porph. Abst. 1.54, 129.12 N.), φυσικός ὀρισμός (Philop. in de An. 44.4), φυσικαὶ ἀπορίαι (Simpl. in Phys. 148.27), φυσικαὶ ἀποδείξεις (ibid. 290.21) and φυσικὴ μέθοδος (ibid. 1196.4).

¹⁶ See Bonitz, Index Aristot. s.v. δόγμα.

¹⁷ At Phys. op. fr. 6a Diels = fr. 227 FHS&G ap. Diog. Laert. 9.22 δόγματα belongs to Diogenes or his source not Theophrastus.

¹⁸ Eus. Pr. Ev. 14.13.9, ὁ Πλούταρχος ἐν οἷς ἐπέγραψε "Περὶ τῶν ἀρεσκόντων τοῖς φιλοσόφοις φυσικῶν δογμάτων". See apparatus at Diels DG, 273. Confirmed by Qusta ibn Luqa's translation which Diels did not have.

¹⁹ Parallels for this combination: Phil. Virt. 8, Albinus Prol. 151.1–2 H., Iambli. Epist. ad Sop. de dialectica ap. Stob. 2.2.6, 19.28 W., Procl. in Ti. 2.41.14–5, Olympiod. in Meteo. 18.4–6.

²⁰ As is now definitively proved by the parallels cited in the text (when I first thought and wrote about these matters the TLG was not available to me). And Phys. op. fr. 11 Diels, 1st text = fr. 241A FHS&G – cf. 137.6b FHS&G and the comment of Sharples (1998) 10 –, ἐν τῷ Περί τῶν φυσικῶν δοξῶν can only mean "in the *On the Physical Tenets*", not "in the *On the Tenets of the Physicists*" which would require another article before τῶν.

of later doxographies. It is the job of the historian to provide not only descriptions or to tell stories, but also and especially to attempt to provide an explanation of what happened. The "why" is at least as important as the "what" and the "how"²¹. But though Z. presents a travesty of my position, that is to say of the explanation concerned with doxography, dialectic, and scientific investigation, I do not want to repeat here what I have argued several times elsewhere on this subject²². I merely note that at p. 239 Z. regrettably writes that "any detailed analysis of 'dialectical doxography' would go beyond the limits of this paper, so I have to be apodictic here". I would indeed have preferred arguments to the snap impressions and apodictic utterances which constitute the bulk of Z.'s indictment. Moreover what in my view constitutes an important ingredient of the revision of the history of ancient doxography, viz. the impact of Aristotle (whose dialectical overviews in the *pragmateiai* we have)²³ on later doxographies, and not merely that of Theophrastus (whose contribution, for lack of evidence, is a bit harder to assess) is entirely left out by Z., who writes as if the position of Theophrastus is all that matters.

Z. in fact follows Diels' succinct account of Theophrastus' doxographical work in the *Doxographi Graeci*²⁴ but cites what is to be found there as selectively as he treats what he calls "the new doxography". To be sure, Diels too argues that references to περὶ φυσικῶν, το περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν, το ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, το φυσικῆς ἱστορίας all pertain to the *Physicorum opinioniones*, or Φυσικῶν δόξαι, as he calls the treatise. Certainly, Diels too²⁵ cites as parallels the three Eudemean titles where the word ἱστορία(ι) occurs. But Diels, though apodictically plumping for the attribution of all these references to a sort of historical work treating the "*philosophorum a Thalete ad Platonem turba*", naturally was too good a scholar to omit the evidence pointing in another direction. This evidence is left out by Z.²⁶

Should one defend Diels against his defender? At *Doxographi Graeci*, 192, Diels quotes the title of Theophrastus' (!) *History of Plants*, Ἱστορία τῶν φυτῶν (as at Hist. plant. 1.1.4, 1.4.3)²⁷ – not a "historical" treatise dealing with the evolution of plant

²¹ Or think of the distinction between story and plot attributed to E. M. Forster: "The king died, and then the queen died" is a story. "The king died, and then the queen died of grief" is a plot.

²² Easily accessible short accounts are at Mansfeld (1999b) 28–32, and Mansfeld (2000b) 347–348. For a longer and more detailed argument see Mansfeld (1992) esp. 67–76, 92–11 (revised and amplified Mansfeld (1993)). No reference to the relevant arguments of 1992–3 in Z. See also Sharples (1998) 7–13, and Sedley (1998) 179–185.

²³ See e.g. Mansfeld (1992) 94–109. The argument about Aristotle and later doxography is continued in a forthcoming paper entitled "Aëtius, Aristotle and Others on Coming to Be and Passing Away".

²⁴ DG 102f.

²⁵ Z.'s contention p. 231 that Diels failed to "adduce all the possible evidence", viz. the Eudemean titles, in favour of his (and Usener's) interpretation of what they called the Φυσικῶν δόξαι, is mistaken: Diels does quote the titles DG 102.

²⁶ Of course this evidence is also cited by Steinmetz (1964) 334–351, whose arguments are summarily rejected by Z.

²⁷ Cf. the references in the C. plant.: 1.1.1, τῶν φυτῶν αἱ γενέσεις ὅτι μὲν εἰσι πλείους καὶ πόσαι καὶ τίνες ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις εἰρηται πρότερον (the first sentence of the work), 1.1.2, 1.2.5, etc. Compare the references in

species, since *ιστορία* here is used *alio sensu* and means *scrutatio*, i.e. enquiry, investigation, factification, as he conscientiously points out. And in the footnote to this section he appositely refers to the so-called autobiography where Socrates speaks of his passionate interest in natural philosophy as a young man (Plat. Phaed. 96a, τῆς σοφίας ἦν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν)²⁸. He also takes notice of several parallels for this meaning, quoting Aristot. Cael. 298b1–3, φανερόν ὅτι τὴν πλείστην συμβαίνει τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίας περὶ σωμάτων εἶναι²⁹, and quoting περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίας at Theophr. Phys. op. frs. 1 and 9 Diels³⁰. One may add περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίας as at Phys. op. fr. 5 Diels = 224 FHS&G³¹. Diels also refers to Aristotle's designation of the investigations of the *De anima* in the opening lines of this treatise as τὴν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἱστορίαν.

In Phys. op. fr. 1 Diels Theophrastus (amending Aristotle) says that though it is recorded that Thales was the first to bring the περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν to the Greeks, he in fact had numerous predecessors. It is beyond doubt that περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία here means "enquiry concerning nature" not "history of natural philosophy" in the sense advocated by Z.³² Thales was not on record as the first historian of natural philosophy. At fr. 5 Diels Theophrastus (following Aristotle) says that Xenophanes' "doxa belongs to another enquiry rather than to that concerning nature" (ἐτέρας εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίας τὴν μνήμην τῆς τοῦτου δόξης). And at fr. 9 Diels Theophrastus says that though Plato "concerned himself mostly with first philosophy he also devoted himself to the phenomena, taking up the enquiry concerning nature" (ἐπέδωκεν αὐτὸν καὶ τοῖς φαινόμενοις ἀψάμενος τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίας, viz. in the *Timaeus*). Plato in the *Timaeus* is not a historian of physics.

Diels moreover argued that Theophrastus' sequence is determined by both (relative) chronology and content³³. To judge from the fragments in Simplicius attributed by Diels to what he calls the *Physicorum opiniones* this is correct³⁴. Aristotle too in his

Aristotle's systematic zoological works to the *History of Animals* (Part. an. 646a9–10, Gen. an. 716b30–1, διώριται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἀκριβέστερον ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις ταῖς περὶ τῶν ζώων, 717a34, 719a10, 728b13–4, γέγραπται ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὰ ζῷα ἱστορίαις). See also Gothelf (1988).

²⁸ Also compare Eur. Fr. 910 N. ap. Clem. Al. Stromat. 4.25.155, ὁλβιος ὅστις τῆς ἱστορίας / ἔσχε μάθησιν, [...] / ἄλλ' ἀθανάτων καθορῶν φύσεως κτλ.

²⁹ Cf. Part. an. 639a12–13, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσιν ἱστορίας δεῖ τινὰς ὑπάρχειν ὄρους, where again περὶ φύσιν ἱστορίας pertains to the study of or enquiry concerning nature.

³⁰ = frs. 225 and 230 FHS&G.

³¹ In Simplicius the formula περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία only occurs at in Cael. 552.27 and 553.12 (where he quotes Aristot. Part. an. 639a12–13, see note 29), and in the three Theophrastean passages cited in the *Physics Commentary*. One therefore need not doubt that the usage in these Theophrastean passages in the *Commentary* derives from Theophrastus himself.

³² "History of physics", Z. p. 230. The correct translation is rejected out of hand, *ibid.* 231.

³³ DG 104ff. I cannot resist quoting, from page 104: *angustiae mentis erat neglecta dogmatum necessitudine exteriorem temporum continuationem quasi principem legem custodire*.

³⁴ Z. is also silent about Phys. op. fr. 8 = 229 FHS&G ap. Simpl. in Phys. 28.30–31, αὕτη μὲν ἡ σύντομος περιλήψις τῶν ἱστορημένων περὶ ἀρχῶν οὐ κατὰ χρόνους ἀναγραφείσα, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς δόξης συγγένειαν ("This is the summary account of what has been ascertained about the principles, recorded not in a chronological

overview in *Metaph.* A combined content and relative chronology. It is to be regretted that Z. fails to take this more complex structure seriously into account³⁵. At p. 228 he denies that this combination holds for Theophrastus' even more complicated *De sensibus*³⁶, apparently believing that a relative chronological sequence is *ipso facto* person-oriented and "historical". But there is also something like a relative chronology of views, or doctrines, allowing an author moreover to mention in one breath earlier and later persons subscribing to the same tenet (e.g. Thales plus Hippo: water as the principle; Anaximenes plus Diogenes of Apollonia: air as the principle). The theory of causes, or principles, as described in the first book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* develops and grows, and in this sense has a history the phases of which can be, and are, determined. But as Aristotle shows this development (or evolution) need not be linear. Some further order is introduced by counting: the philosophers of nature added causes (finding they needed two not one as their earliest predecessors did, and then three or even four instead of two), similar to the way the great tragedians as described in Aristotle's *Poetics* (1449a14–19) increased the number of actors from one via two to three³⁷. It is of course well known that Aristotle viewed cultural developments as analogous to biological developments, viz. as teleologically determined³⁸. This teleological approach imparts a biographical undertone to his description of the quasi-personal development of the theory of causes/principles in *Metaph.* A³⁹, or of tragedy in the *Poetics* – which suggests that one should not speak in contexts such as these of genres in any strong sense. In view of Aristotle's famous distinction between history (*ιστορία*, with reference to Herodotus) and poetry (esp. tragedy) at *Poet.* 1451a36–b32 it may even be doubted that he would have used the term *ιστορία* for his account of the evolution of the doctrine of causes/principles⁴⁰. The developments from the positing of a single cause/principle to that of pluralities of causes/

arrangement, but according to affinities of doctrine", transl. FHS&G). Not in *Sperrdruck* in the DG, but Diels 104 n. 4 admitted that these words *non solum Simplicii sed etiam Theophrasti rationem describere possunt*.

³⁵ I note a subdued reference, Z. p. 228, to a "combination of topic- and person-oriented approach" which should characterize "Meno"s (or "Aristotle"s) *Iatrikē Synagōgē*. Also cf. Z. p. 238, "a Peripatetic history of philosophy, systematic and critical". But these incidental remarks do not carry the same weight as Z.'s sustained musings concerned with chronology.

³⁶ "The DS was obviously more person-oriented and historical [i.e. in presenting a chronological sequence JM] than later doxography". True enough as to the relative chronology. But the a-chronological sequence Parmenides – Plato – Empedocles for instance is determined by content (escalating number of senses assumed: none-two-four). No argument is given for Z.'s rejection (p. 228 n. 51) of a paper of mine on the *De sensibus* as being "not convincing".

³⁷ Cf. previous n., on counting senses in the *De sensibus*.

³⁸ von Fritz (1972) 319, 323–326; Weil (1977) 209–217.

³⁹ Compare Dicaearchus' *Kulturgeschichte*, entitled Βίος 'Ελλάδος (frs. 1 and 47–66 Wehrli); see von Fritz (1972) 324.

⁴⁰ Alexander of Aphrodisias did so a number of centuries later, in Phys. 9.5–6, καὶ τὴν ἱστορίαν τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ τι περὶ αἰτιῶν εἰρηκότων παρατίθεται εὐλόγως. See below, n. 44 *ad finem*.

principles, he argues, are inevitable – a qualification remarkably similar to the “probability or necessity” characterizing what is at issue in poetry⁴¹.

As to the sequence itself of the persons positing the principles, both Diels and Z. believe that Theophrastus began with Thales, just like Aristotle in *Metaph. A*. But this is not certain: the order of the fragments in Simplicius is first Xenophanes *cum suis*, then Thales, etc.⁴² In Aristotle's *Physics* too the Eleatics are discussed first. In an arrangement of views according to content it makes sense to eliminate, or at least determine at the beginning, doctrines which arguably do not belong with the topic at issue.

The fragments on the *archai* in Simplicius which Diels, followed by Z., ascribes to a Φυσικῶν δόξαι are moreover limited, as far as the themes dealt with are concerned, to the principles or elements, and cosmogony. In Diels' view other subjects were treated in other sections of the treatise. This may be the case. At any rate these fragments demonstrate that the point of view is topic-oriented, however much (several of) the contributions to the development of the topic may have been listed in relative chronological order.

This topic-oriented approach also appears to be valid for Eudemus⁴³. See fr. 139–40 W.: the themes are squaring the circle and the construction of moonlets, the persons are Antiphon and Hippocrates (of Chios). Proclus cites a title Περί γωνίας (fr. 30 W.), which clearly suggests systematic treatment of various theories concerned with angles. This may or may not have been a section of Eudemus' *Geometrical Enquiries*. Z. tells us a paper of his on Eudemus is in the press. One is intrigued. Will he reinterpret the evidence and prove that Eudemus' approach is different from Theophrastus'?

Z.'s view of the historical nature of Theophrastus' dialectic, mainly based on his interpretation of the term ἱστορία⁴⁴ in a number of references and quotations is untenable, as I believe to have shown. Baltussen Runia Mansfeld, in calling attention to the dialectical aspects of Aristotle's and Theophrastus' overviews and accounts of *doxai*, never implied that these men failed to engage in some way in what we may call the history of philosophy from Thales (or Xenophanes) to Plato⁴⁵. The point is that they

⁴¹ *Metaph.* 984a16–17, προϊόντων δ' οὕτως, αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὡδοποίησεν αὐτοῖς καὶ συνηνάγκασε ζητεῖν, cf. 984b9–10, 986b31; *Poet.* 1451a38 and b9, τὸ εὖδὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. See further D. Frede (1992).

⁴² The sequence in FHS&G of the first three fragments (224–226A) follows Simplicius' order.

⁴³ Wehrli (1969) 113; 116 ad fr. 139–40.

⁴⁴ A good account of the semantic history of the term ἱστορία is to be found in Press (1982); on Peripatetic titles see *ibid.* 33, 37 (not entirely satisfactory). Huxley (1972) 158 translates “empirical investigation” and *ibid.* 165 speaks of Aristotle's “systematic enquiry into facts and events (τὰ συμβεβηκότα) past and present” (note that this paper is not concerned with the historiography of philosophy). For Herodotus' *Enquiry* see e.g. Calame (1995) 80–81 and the literature there cited. The meaning “enquiry” did not become obsolete, see e.g. the final sentence at *Plut. Mor.* 253E, οὐδὲν οἰόμενοι τῆς κατὰ χρόνον τάξεως δεῖσθαι τὴν ἱστορικὴν ἱστορίαν. An account of the use of ἱστορία in the late commentators would be rewarding but cannot be provided here.

⁴⁵ See e.g. Mansfeld (2000b) 348.

are not doing history of philosophy our way. I do not claim that the idea, or concept, of “history” is unambiguous, but today's ideal of impartiality and objectivity⁴⁶ differs from the Peripatetic inclination to regard the tenets of other philosophers as materials to be used for a specific purpose, and to view reflections on philosophy's past simply as ingredients of doing philosophy. One should be wary of imposing terms with modern connotations upon ancient realities, or at least when doing so be very much aware of the fact that this precisely is what one is doing. I do not claim that Z. applies the h.-word with its modern connotation, or has really thought out its implications; quite the contrary. But “history” is a suggestive word and its use may well mislead the reader.

There is nothing about the above demonstration that is particularly new, but the publication of Z.'s piece obliges one to make a few noises. For the purposes of the present paper it is not necessary to discuss at length and to explain the various forms of the titles for or references to Theophrastean works or passages therein concerned with the treatment of earlier doctrines. Naturally these matters will be tackled in a forthcoming volume of *Aëtiana*. And I have not dealt with rebukes specifically addressed to Baltussen or Runia either: *amicorum iniuriae amicis curae*!

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⁴⁶ Nipperdey (1986).

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Abstract

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