

The Spiritual Guide

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IN GRECO-ROMAN ANTIQUITY the spiritual guide appears to us principally in the following forms: as educator, musician, and poet; as legislator, sage, statesman, or king; and as philosopher. According to ancient thought his work is considerably aided by two factors: authority and friendship.

The Educator, Musician, and Poet as Spiritual Guide

As the beginnings of spiritual guidance in Greco-Roman antiquity coincide with the beginnings of general education, so too the function of the spiritual guide coincides with that of the educator, insofar as we understand education (*paideia*) to include the whole of the endeavor to make a person fit for life and, consequently, the formation of a person's moral attitudes as well. The earliest sketch of the ideal educator that has come down to us appears in a myth: it is the sage of semidivine nature embodied in Chiron the Centaur, half-brother of Zeus, educator of heroes and of the children of gods, who, on the basis of this his nature, unifies every form of wisdom and knowledge in himself. He first comes to our notice as Achilles' instructor in the art of healing in the Homeric poetry of the eighth century B.C. (*Iliad* 9.831ff.), while the plastic arts depict him as Achilles' teacher on the lyre, which was at that time inseparable from instruction in singing.¹ Chiron is subsequently mentioned as the educator of Medeios, son of Jason and Medea, in Hesiod's *Theogony* (1001), in a passage whose authenticity is admittedly subject to dispute. Most of the details concerning this mythical figure are transmitted to us by Pindar in the first half of the fifth century: Chiron is the educator of the heroes Jason (*Pythian* 4.102ff.; *Nemean* 3.53f.) and Achilles (*Nemean* 3.43ff.) and of the god Asclepius, whom he instructs in the art of healing (*Pythian* 3.5f.; 45f.; *Nemean* 2.53).² Other authors

mention him as the educator of Aristeios (Apollonius Rhodius *Argonautica* 2.509f.), of Theseus (Xenophon *Cynegeticus* 1.2),³ of the Dioscuri (Xenophon *Cynegeticus* 1.2), and of Actaeon (Apollodorus *Bibliotheca* 3.4.4). Pindar celebrates Chiron as a sage (*Pythian* 3.63, *sōphrōn*); he lauds the depths of his wisdom (*Nemean* 3.53, *bathymēta*), his intelligent advice, and his prophetic gifts (*Pythian* 9.38f., 51ff.). Pindar attests Chiron's capacities as a spiritual guide through Jason, who refers to the education he enjoyed under Chiron and can claim that in the twenty years that he spent in Chiron's cave under the care of Chiron's daughters, he never spoke a word or committed a deed for which he needed to feel ashamed before the "pure" daughters of Chiron (*Pythian* 4.103ff.). Chiron, however, proves himself as a spiritual guide not only in the moral realm but also in the religious sphere. An author of the first century A.D., Ptolemaios Chennos, reports that Chiron taught the god Dionysus as a boy the bacchic rites and mystic solemnities (in Photius *Bibliotheca* 190).⁴ It is probably as a symbol of divine religious instruction that the wise centaur was given a place in the stucco relief of the Roman Neopythagorean basilica at the *Porta maiora*, which also dates from the first century.⁵ Plato, too, speaks of the "wisest" Chiron as Achilles' teacher (*Hippias minor* 371D), and for Euripides Chiron becomes a symbol of piety (*Iphigenia in Aulis* 927).

Chiron unites all the traits of an ideal educator in himself insofar as, on the basis of his semidivine nature—he is the son of Kronos and a mortal—he possesses all the means of favorably influencing both body and soul of his pupils. He is sports instructor, doctor, and spiritual guide in one. He knows how to direct his charges to suitable athletic activities (the plastic arts show him as instructor in hunting and boxing,⁶ and to nourish them in accordance with their physical disposition (the centaur feeds Achilles with the marrow and guts of lions, boars, and bears) (Euripides *Iphigenia in Aulis* 703f; Apollodorus *Bibliotheca* 3.13.6; Statius *Achilleis* 2.382ff.),⁷ and thus to help them attain health and top physical form. But he also knows how to heal sick bodies, on account of his knowledge of the art of healing. He influences the soul by means of instruction in singing and in playing the lyre or cithara—that is, through the union of poetry and music—for in the consciousness of antiquity, as we shall see, music and poetry were especially suited to affecting the emotions. By means of intelligent advice and moral guidance, and finally by initiation in religious rites and mysteries,⁸ Chiron knows how to provide the soul with all the spiritual nourishment it needs.

In contrast to the later mythical tradition, Homer knows Chiron only as Achilles' instructor in the art of healing and introduces the aged Phoenix as the educator of Achilles.⁹ The speech of advice that Phoenix gives in the

ninth book of the *Iliad* to still the wrath of Achilles was considered throughout the whole of Greco-Roman antiquity to be a model of this genus and was memorized and quoted again and again until the end of the epoch.¹⁰ The means of spiritual guidance that are employed in this speech—the use of allegory (9.502ff.), of mythical or historical examples of exemplary behavior in similar situations (9.527ff.), and the counsel of moderation, based on the correct assessment of human nature in comparison to the far superior nature of the gods (9.496–514)—remain central pieces of popular ethical and philosophical exhortation even in later centuries.

While Chiron's authority rests on his divine nature and wisdom, Phoenix's authority is derived on the one hand from his age, and on the other hand from the fact that Peleus, the father of Achilles, transfers his paternal authority to Phoenix—that is, chooses him to be the educator of his son on the basis of his human qualities and later even gives Phoenix to his grown son as an advisor and companion in the Trojan War. What particularly strengthened the authority of Phoenix's admonition, however, was its composition by a poet and the formal and religious aspect associated with this: formal, because its verse form raises it above the level of everyday speech and makes it more impressive; religious, because it comes from the mouth of a poet inspired by the Muses who, according to the view of the time—which was of influence for centuries to come—is able with their help to speak the truth (*alētheia*) and to proclaim the will of the gods.¹¹ Thus Hesiod as well in his admonitions to his brother Perseus refers to the inspiration of the Muses which enables him to proclaim to his brother the commands of Zeus (*Works and Days* 661–62). In this work the ethical instructions are not yet separated from professional information, and thus we find a colorful mixture of agricultural rules and ethical maxims.

This literary form of spiritual guidance, consisting of ethical and practical instructions presented in a succinct form and directed from a brother to his brother or from a father to his son, was already widespread in the Near East long before Hesiod.¹² The use of animal fables in this connection, too, which first appears in the Greek realm with Hesiod, had become a common property of the literary genus of admonition in the Near East.¹³ A special literary form of this paraenetic literature is the "mirror for princes," which also has a long tradition in the Near East and to which I shall return briefly below.

Let us return once more to the realm of the myth, which we had already left behind with Hesiod, and let us turn now to a personality who in a certain way embodies the mythical guide of souls most purely: Orpheus.¹⁴ The earliest surviving pictorial representations of the citharist Orpheus are probably a small Boeotian bowl and the metope of the treasure house of

the Syracusans in Delphi (sixth century) where he can be seen on board the Argo as a participant in the voyage of the Argonauts. The earliest literary evidence is a fragment of the poet Simonides (fr. 27). From this earliest evidence onward Orpheus is attested continuously in the plastic arts and literature until the end of antiquity. The mythical significance of the Thracian Orpheus, son of the Muse Calliope, lies on the one hand in the power of his music to give spiritual guidance—that is, in the magical effect of his singing accompanied by the playing of the lyre. Orpheus is poet and musician at the same time. A bronze hand mirror of the fifth century B.C. depicts Orpheus playing while wild animals listen attentively, and beside him is a basket of scrolls. Just as great, on the other hand, is his significance as initiator of religious movements and mysteries. Our earliest evidence for him in this capacity is to be found in the writings of the comedian Aristophanes (*Ranae* 1032; cf. Euripides *Rhesus* 943)¹⁵ and of Plato (*Protagoras* 316D). We can trace the existence of a religious literature (poems in hexameters) current under Orpheus's name from the end of the fifth century (Euripides *Hippolytus* 952; Plato *Republic* 2.364E; Aristophanes *Ranae* 1032), although it almost certainly goes back further than this. Like Chiron, but in an even more pronounced way, Orpheus is a spiritual guide in the ethical and religious sphere, and, like Chiron, he is credited with medicinal knowledge (Euripides *Alcestis* 962; *Cyclops* 646). The magical effect of his soul-guiding singing works wonders not only on human beings and animals, trees, cliffs, and entire mountain ranges but also on the powers of death and the underworld, as is demonstrated by his journey to Hades on the occasion of the death of his wife Eurydice. In addition to the commonly known myth of Orpheus's journey to Hades, I would like to add only one more example: the *Argonautica* of Apollonius of Rhodes portray Orpheus settling a dispute among the Argonauts by means of a performance of his Orphic theogony (1.494–511). Completely pacified, the men remain silent and motionless for a while after the end of the song before finally bringing a libation to Zeus and going to sleep. Somewhat later (1.916ff.), in keeping with his role as a religious spiritual guide, he persuades the Argonauts to land in Samothrace and there to have themselves initiated in the local mysteries of the Cabiri, as the founder of which he is mentioned elsewhere (Diodorus Siculus *Bibliotheca* 5.64.4 = Ephorus fragment of *Greek History* 70 fr. 104).

The myth of the magical power of the music of Orpheus can be understood only against the background of the ancient Greek doctrine of the moral effect of music, which sets out the ethical effects of music in all its aspects—word (verse), rhythm, melody, mode, sound of the instruments, and gesture (dance)—on the spiritual behavior of human beings. It is not

possible in this context to go further into this important doctrine, elements of which can also be traced in the Orient (in China in the teaching of Confucius and in Egypt). I can here only refer to pertinent articles in textbooks on the history of music.¹⁶ In any case, it should be borne in mind that, in keeping with this doctrine, music in all the forms mentioned above constitutes an important means of spiritual guidance, that the rhythmic word order (poetry, later also rhetorically structured prose), the melodies and modes, and the characteristics of the various instruments are capable of evoking deep effects in the human soul, and that accordingly rhythms and modes selected according to particular aspects have significant educational value. There is a direct and mutual correspondence between music (in the early Greek comprehensive sense) and ethical life, indeed between music and wisdom. As music can evoke certain moral dispositions, so inversely the ethical personality of the musician, of both the composing and the performing musician, has the greatest influence on the manner of writing and representation. Only the wise person is capable of creating works that have ethical value. This essential connection between wisdom and music is expressed as late as the first century A.D. by Quintilian in the following way:

For myself I should be ready to accept the verdict of antiquity. Who is ignorant of the fact that music . . . was in ancient times the object not merely of intense study but of veneration: in fact Orpheus and Linus, to mention no others, were regarded as uniting the roles of musician, inspired poet and sage (*musicus, vates, sapiens*). Both were of divine origin, while the former, because by the marvel of his music he soothed the savage breast, is recorded to have drawn after him not merely beasts of the wild, but rocks and trees. So too Tilagenes asserts that music is the oldest of the arts related to literature, a statement which is confirmed by the testimony of the greatest of poets in whose songs we read that the praise of heroes and of gods were sung to the music of the lyre at the feasts of kings. Does not Iopas, the Vergilian bard, sing "The wandering moon and labours of the Sun" (*Aeneid* 1.742) and the like? whereby the supreme poet manifests most clearly that music is united with the knowledge even of things divine. (*Institutio Oratoria* 1.10.9–11; trans. H. E. Butler)¹⁷

This doctrine of the ethical effect of music and poetry accounts for the prominent place that, as we shall see, verses, maxims, and admonitory speeches or spiritual exercises structured according to rhetorical rules occupied in spiritual guidance until the end of antiquity. Beside Hesiod, in archaic Greece early lyrical poetry provides examples of exhortations of a moral and political nature,¹⁸ and we find the expression of a centuries-old aristocratic ethic at the center of Theognis's collection of elegies (sixth century B.C.), a handbook of practical morality: "Because I mean well to you,

Kynos, I will pass on to you such advice as I myself learned as a child from good (*agathoi*)¹⁹ men (*Elegies* 27–28, Carrière [Budé]). Thus Theognis justifies his undertaking, which, in the midst of the confusions of political and social upheavals, had as its aim to keep alive and strengthen the consciousness of noble birth in Kynos and with it the quality of the innate disposition. This disposition, according to the archaic outlook, was the only guarantee of heroic courage in war as well as of the steadfast and noble endurance of all misfortune, whereas the man of lower birth breaks down under the blows of fate (*Elegies* 319–22, Carrière). It should be mentioned briefly here that the first beginnings of the ideal of the Stoic sage who is able to maintain his spiritual calm in all the storms of fate are to be found in the archaic aristocratic ethos, which even underwent an intensification of its values in Theognis's time, on account of the disappearance of the external power and wealth of the Megarian nobility.²⁰

The Spiritual Guide of a Collective

Archaic Greek lyric poetry leads up to our second section, on the legislator and wise statesman as spiritual guide. The Athenian statesman Solon, who lived at the turn of the seventh and sixth centuries, author of exemplary laws aimed at social balance, gave his political ideas extremely effective expression in his elegies. They are urgent exhortations to his fellow citizens in the sense of paraeneses or admonitions to return to moderation and the just mean in all actions and demands and to hold to these henceforth. A clear, if simple, ethic is therefore what he considered to be the necessary basis of his politics, and politics is essentially the moral education of the citizens. In his elegy *Eunomia* ("good order") Solon emphasizes the importance of good laws for the ethical and economic well-being of the citizens:

Obedience to the law (*eunomia*) shows forth all things in order and harmony and at the same time sets shackles on the unjust. It smooths what is rough, checks greed, dims arrogance, withers the opening blooms of ruinous folly, makes straight the crooked judgement, tames the deeds of insolence, puts a stop to the works of civil dissension, and ends the wrath of bitter strife. Under its rule all things among mankind are sane and wise. (fr. 3, 32–39, Diehl p. 29)²¹

This conviction of the importance of laws for the moral education of the citizens remained valid throughout the whole of Greco-Roman antiquity. With the founding of the Greek schools of philosophy in Athens, philosophy took up the relevant questions, always with the expressed goal of spiritual guidance. The philosophical discussion of these themes found expression in countless tractates about the state and the laws, which have

for the most part been lost. Politics remained part of philosophical ethics until the end of antiquity.

Solon had his laws carved on wooden steles and set up in public. Similarly, in archaic Rome the first laws codified in writing—which were, incidentally, regarded by later tradition as an adaptation of Solon's laws to Roman conditions (Augustine *City of God* 2.16)—were engraved on twelve bronze tablets (hence the name “the Twelve Tables”) and were set up in front of the curia so that they were visible to all citizens as a constant admonition. Into the time of Cicero's youth, Roman boys were required to memorize these laws *ut carmen necessarium*, “like a necessary poem” (Cicero *De legibus* 2.23.59). (The translation of *carmen* as “poem” reflects only part of the meaning of the Latin word; it omits the sacral, magical-incantatory aspect.)

Solon was one of the seven sages whose maxims were used for centuries in the moral education of the Greeks. The seven sages were not warlike heroes, as the Homeric epic portrays them, nor, with the exception of Thales, were they philosophers. Rather, literary tradition depicts them as statesmen and legislators, judges and counselors.²² With the exception of Solon, historical testimony for the individual representatives is very sparse, not to say nonexistent. The seven sages—Plato mentions Thales of Miletus, Pittakos of Mytilene, Bias of Priene, Solon, Kreobulos of Lindos, Myson of Chen, and the Lacedaemonian Chilon (*Protagoras* 343A)²³—are regarded as contemporaries and as authors of archaic rules of life that are still closely associated with the wisdom of the gods and are consequently valid for all times. Set in relation to the cult of Apollo in Delphi at an early stage, the pronouncements of the seven sages profit from the cultural and political radiation of this cult.²⁴ As we know with certainty only since recent times, two series of pronouncements of the seven sages were set up in the temple at Delphi: a short series of five sayings, which Plato mentions in the *Protagoras* (343B1ff.),²⁵ and a long series of some 140 maxims, which latter were carved into a stone column or stele before the beginning of the third century B.C. and displayed either in front of the temple or in the porch.²⁶ It was there that Clearchus of Soli, a student of Aristotle, subsequently “carefully copied”²⁷ them and, at the outermost reaches of the Greek East, in a Greek city situated on the Oxus in Bactria (in modern Afghanistan), had them carved on a stele and set up in a central place visible to all inhabitants.²⁸ Other archaeological finds indicate that the long series of maxims of the seven sages was likewise carved on a stele in Miletropolis in Mysia at about the same time.²⁹ The short series had already found a place in the gymnasium of Thera in the fourth century B.C.³⁰ These are only individual examples that have come down to us of a practice, which was widespread in antiquity, of using inscriptions as a means of collective

spiritual guidance. And the fact that cities or individual patrons found it worthwhile to establish such monuments at great cost attests to the belief in the efficacy of such an enterprise. Thus, too, according to the pseudo-Platonic dialogue *Hipparchus*, the son of the Athenian tyrant Peisistratus (sixth century) is supposed to have had short verse inscriptions of his own creation carved into the herms that were set up along the streets leading from Athens to the various demes, so as to educate morally the rural population as well. In this way, he believed, his fellow citizens would no longer simply have to admire the wise inscriptions of the temple at Delphi, such as “Know thyself” and “Nothing too much.” By reading these precepts at every coming and going they would find pleasure in them and allow themselves to be stimulated to further self-education. The place name is supposed to have stood on the one side of each herm, and on the other side, for example: “This is a monument of Hipparchus: Follow the paths of righteousness” or “This is a monument of Hipparchus: Thou shalt not deceive thy friend” (Pseudo-Plato *Hipparchus* 228D–229B). Yet even the public decrees of honor which were set up in the form of inscriptions served as a means of civic spiritual guidance: they served as examples of good civic behavior and as an incentive and exhortation to imitation.

A further initiative of civic governments that was similarly aimed at the moral good behavior of its citizens consisted in collecting oracles on important subjects—for example, the nature of God—as well as the consequences of the oracular response for the relation of both the individual and the whole populace to the divinity and for the cultic rites. These oracles were then carved in stone and set up in appropriate places, such as the city wall or the market.³¹ As in the Middle Ages the frescoes and paintings in the churches could be regarded as a kind of Bible for the people, so the public inscriptions in the cities of Greco-Roman antiquity represented an important means of ethical, religious, and civic education.

Like the cities, so too the kings made use of inscriptions as a means of spiritual guidance—for example, the inscriptions that the Indian king Asoka erected in the third century B.C., in what is now Afghanistan, for his Greek subjects. Part is carved in stone,³² and part engraved in stone blocks belonging to buildings.³³ In these texts, translated into a Greek of a philosophical stamp, the king speaks personally. He preaches a moral code of tolerance and of brotherly love and expresses his conviction that compliance with this moral code will lead humanity to happiness.

Finally, the theory of kingship that was developed on a philosophical basis primarily in the Hellenistic age defined the ideal king as the spiritual guide of his subjects. The numerous “mirrors of princes” never tire of asserting that the shortest and surest way to the ethical regeneration of the

populace is to ensure that a single individual, the king, achieves virtue. The ideal king embodies virtue in himself and by his behavior as a living model makes it visible and desirable to all.³⁴ For this reason the admonitory genre of the "mirror of princes" is of particular importance in the ancient view: it is a question of educating the educator of the people.

The Philosopher as Spiritual Guide

With the emergence of the philosophical schools in Athens in the fourth and third centuries B.C., a new type of spiritual guidance developed, that of the philosopher. However, the types of individual or collective spiritual guidance that were discussed above continued to exist. Philosophical spiritual guidance also made considerable use, at least in its initial stages, of maxims of all kinds, whether in the form of aphorisms or in verses.

It must be pointed out here that philosophy meant something entirely different in Greco-Roman antiquity from what it means today. It was not a systematic thought structure *à la Hegel* intended to serve as the theoretical explanation of the world and the events of the world; philosophy was, above all, an education toward a happy life—happy life here and not only in some hypothetical life after death, even if the latter was not always left entirely out of consideration.

All Hellenistic and Imperial schools of philosophy, including the Cynics and Skeptics, regarded guidance toward a happy life as the most important goal of their philosophy. What was understood by happy life could vary considerably in theory,³⁵ but in all cases it had the practical end of strengthening the individual inwardly against all the vicissitudes of fate and, as far as possible, of making the person self-sufficient. Ancient philosophy was, above all, help with life's problems and spiritual guidance, and the ancient philosopher was, above all, a spiritual guide.³⁶ Only secondarily—namely, insofar as this was considered essential to spiritual guidance—was ancient philosophy a theoretical explanation of the world.³⁷ Cynics and Skeptics refrained completely from this theoretical aspect, regarding themselves as true followers of Socrates in this. For as Socrates, without expounding a definite philosophical doctrine, thrust his interlocutors into great confusion by means of skillful questioning alone—so that they became conscious of their ignorance and were eventually brought to the point of reflecting on themselves and of questioning their entire previous life³⁸—so the Cynics confined themselves to exercising a salutary moral shock on their fellow human beings through their sermons and their way of life. The Skeptics, on the other hand, carried Socrates' aporetic approach to extremes.³⁹

This subordination of the theoretical side of philosophy, as far as this side

existed, to the ethical-practical side finds perhaps its purest expression in the Epicurean school. Epistemology and the explanation of the world (physics) are, according to Epicurus, only the necessary intellectual conditions for a happy life because they free one from superstition and fear of the beyond. They can never become ends in themselves. A life free of want, lived in retirement in the narrowest circle of friends, under the direction of a common teacher and spiritual guide, constitutes the external prerequisite. In the Stoic school as well, however, which was not fundamentally opposed to political activity, the daily living together of the students with the teacher-spiritual guide was the ideal situation. The same had been the case formerly for the Pythagoreans, for the Platonic Academy, and for the school of Aristotle and would also be the case later for the Neoplatonists.

The Greek term for the philosopher-spiritual guide was *kathēgemōn* or *hēgemōn*, that is, "the one who leads, who shows the way," which corresponds almost exactly to our modern term "spiritual guide." The Neoplatonist Proclus, for example, says of his teacher Syrianus that, after the gods, Syrianus had been for him "the guide to all goodness and beauty" (*Platonic Theology* 1.1, Saffrey-Westerink). By the time of Philodemus at the very latest,⁴⁰ that is, in the first century B.C., the Epicurean philosophical teachers and leaders were also called *kathēgemones*, and this term was still common among the Epicureans in the time of Hadrian.⁴¹ In the Neoplatonic tradition it was used from the school of Plotinus up to the last heathen Neoplatonists of Athens and Alexandria known to us.⁴² We have no information about the usual term for the philosopher-spiritual guide, but we can assume that it was identical to the term current among the Epicureans and Neoplatonists.

The Qualities Necessary in the Spiritual Guide

Understood as spiritual guidance, philosophical instruction was necessarily most effective when it was based on personal and friendly intercourse between student and teacher. After Plato and the founding of the Academy in the fourth century B.C., all philosophical schools had regarded the written word, the book, only as a temporary measure in place of personal instruction.⁴³ For Plato the only valid form of philosophical instruction was a dialogue, which consists of questions and answers—dialectic (*Phaedrus* 276A–277A). This form of instruction actually presupposes the active participation of the student, because the dialectical dialogue can only proceed when the respondent gives critical approval at every stage of the dialogue—that is, when questioner and respondent, teacher and student, reach agreement at every stage of thought. For the student as well, it is

therefore a case of actively thinking and not simply of pure memory work. Even this lively instruction, however, can achieve success only when mutual affection unites teacher and student. Plato expresses this clearly in the *Symposium* (209BD), where he makes the affectionate attachment of the teacher to the student a prerequisite for the philosophical activity of the teacher as well. With justification, L. Robin has related this passage to the Platonic Academy:

It [the Academy] represents for him [Plato] that "correct understanding of the love of youths" of which he later speaks (211B), an organized work of love. It was born of that ardent feeling of educator and legislator which had always animated him. . . . It lived from the attachment of the students to the initial pact and from the loving fidelity of their voluntary devotion to the Master's thought.⁴⁴

Robin furthermore relates this passage in the *Symposium* to a text from the *Phaedrus* on which he comments as follows:

The image which this passage of the *Phaedrus* evokes seems to me to be that of an association between the master and his students for the common pursuit of the truth, in which the master is only a guide. How should such a community not be founded on love, love of that truth which is its principle and object, love of the master for the souls he has chosen to improve, love of the chosen souls for him who guides and oversees their blossoming, and love of all together for that which is the imperishable fruit of their mutual love?⁴⁵

Plato's albeit sublimated pederastic tendency is replaced by Aristotle with a more neutral theory of friendship, which was taken up and developed with minimal changes by all the schools of philosophy and which was to play a great role in ancient spiritual guidance. The view, supported by all the Hellenistic schools of philosophy, that moral and ontological self-knowledge must precede all moral progress and all other philosophical knowledge soon led to the question whether self-knowledge, even in the limited degree to which we are capable of it, can be realized only with the help of a friend, in whom we can contemplate, as in a mirror, our alter ego.⁴⁶ It is therefore revealing that for the purposes of spiritual guidance the combination of spiritual doctor and friend in a single individual was regarded as almost ideal. But the philosophical discovery of the truth as well, proceeding from the ontological recognition of one's own human existence requires a friend or, even better, friends. As long as it is a case not of sages but of those still in need of progress—and this is the usual situation—ideal conditions exist whenever one of the friends has advanced further along the path of progress than the others and can serve as leader—when he can give the others a hand and draw them upward.⁴⁷ In general, the instructors of



32. Stone Relief of Daedalus and Icarus. Greek. 4th century B.C.

all the Hellenistic schools of philosophy would have liked to regard themselves as being in the position of the advanced friend as against those friends desirous of advance. It is in this position that the Stoic philosopher and statesman Seneca saw himself in relation to Lucilius, the recipient of a course of spiritual guidance in epistolary form. Seneca regretted, however, that he could only correspond with Lucilius by means of letters: community of life would have been more advantageous to both (*Epistulae Morales* 6.5–6).⁴⁸ The Stoic philosopher Cornutus also regarded himself in this position of teacher-friend in relation to his pupil, the poet Persius,⁴⁹ and the same holds true for the Christian Augustine in relation to his pupils during his stay in Cassiciacum, and to his fellow brothers in the monastery that he founded in Thagaste.⁵⁰ During this period the teachings of the Neoplatonists still played an important role for Augustine, and the organization of the monastery in Thagaste, of life in Cassiciacum, and, somewhat earlier, of the project conceived in Milan with nine of his acquaintances of a friendly common life based on community of goods and devoted exclusively to study (*Confessions* 6.14.24) rests entirely on heathen philosophical—more precisely, Neoplatonic—conceptions.⁵¹

The Neoplatonists had actually caught up, as if in a reservoir, all the different streams that justified this ideal: Plato's skepticism with regard to the ability of the written word to transmit philosophical teachings and the importance that he attached to a dialectic that makes demands on the partner; Aristotle's doctrine of friendship; the more or less mythical tradition of the Pythagorean communities; the general conviction of the dogmatic schools of philosophy that only he can study philosophy who has the necessary leisure to occupy himself with it his whole life long and that the necessary means thereto could best be found through the frugal way of life peculiar to philosophers and through community of goods among friends; that hardly anyone is able to achieve virtue or become godlike by himself, but that for this he needs the help of friends striving toward the same goal and the guidance of the teacher-friend. A résumé of these theses is to be found some one hundred years after Augustine in the writings of the Neoplatonist Simplicius.⁵² An example of this, in addition to the school of Epicurus in Athens, is the Neoplatonic school of Athens, which after being closed by Justinian at the beginning of the sixth century was to find its continuation in Harran (Carrhae), not far from the Persian border.⁵³

Not just anyone can be a friend in the ancient philosophical sense, but only he who devotes himself to a virtuous life. Even being a philosopher, however, means above all striving for a morally exemplary life: teaching and life must not diverge from each other. He who does not live his teaching is not only no philosopher, but neither does he possess the

necessary authority to make his philosophical teachings credible. It is a mark of genuine authority that it can find credibility and obedience of its own power without proofs. It is the function of proof by living example that the authority of the spiritual guide has to fulfill, proof for the soundness of doctrines whose validity the student in the first phase of spiritual guidance—that is, of philosophical instruction—is not yet capable of understanding and judging. Even if the demand for authority must have fallen on particularly favorable ground among the Romans,⁵⁴ this aspect is nevertheless by no means lacking among the Greeks. The very thought of such an authoritative personality can do much. The Stoic Seneca cites Epicurus when he advises Lucilius to choose some virtuous man and keep him always in view, in order that he may live and act as if that man were watching (*Epistulae Morales* 11.8–9=Epicurus fr. 210, Usener). That Seneca is conscious of representing such an authority for Lucilius follows from his words in the thirty-second letter: "Live," he addresses Lucilius, as if everything that you did came to my ears, no far more, as if I saw it" (*Epistulae Morales* 32.1). Epicurus writes to one of his students: "Carry out all your actions as if Epicurus were watching" (Seneca *Epistulae Morales* 25.5=Epicurus fr. 211, Usener). Augustine, too, in the second book of his dialogue *De ordine*, under Neoplatonic influence,⁵⁵ emphasizes the role of authority:

Because no one has yet come to knowledge without previously being ignorant, and because one who is ignorant knows neither what condition he must be in if he wishes to go to teachers to study nor what form of life can make him capable of learning, it follows, that it is authority alone which can open the door for those who wish to master the Good in its greatness and in its mysteries. (2.9.26)

Only after the student, Augustine continues, has, so to speak, blindly obeyed the rules set up by the authority for the attainment of a perfect life, does he subsequently learn their justification.

Selection of the Students

The role of friendship in philosophical spiritual guidance and the fact that the ancient philosophical theories of friendship consider the latter to be realizable only among morally worthy people have the necessary result that the philosopher and spiritual guide does not in general admit anyone and everyone as his student—at any rate, not into the narrower circle of students. Plato and Aristotle repeatedly express themselves very clearly on this point.⁵⁶ The close community in Epicurus's Garden likewise had to be careful to exclude any elements that could not be assimilated on account

of character. The Stoic Seneca also expressly emphasizes that the philosopher must not waste his efforts on unsuitable students, which in no way contradicts the Stoic theory that all persons are by nature equally capable of realizing virtue. The individual effort—that is, the personal will of every person to develop the innate disposition to virtue—remains decisive. Where this will is absent and where the readiness to recognize one's own faults is lacking, every pastoral effort is condemned to failure from the outset. Seneca explicitly refuses—and in this he agrees with the Epicureans, Peripatetics, and Academicians or Platonists—to speak publicly, in the manner of the Cynics, in the marketplace to the masses, to all, whether they wish to hear or not (*Epistulae Morales* 29.1). Seneca writes:

This very thing, my dear Lucilius, is, I believe, exactly what a great-souled man ought not to do; his influence is weakened; it has too little effect upon those whom it might have set right if it had not grown so stale. The archer ought not to hit the mark only sometimes; he ought to miss it only sometimes. That which takes effect by chance is not an art. Now wisdom is an art; it should have a definite aim, choosing only those who will make progress, but withdrawing from those whom it has come to regard as hopeless. (*Epistulae Morales* 29.3)

Exercises

The content to which the spiritual guidance of the Hellenistic schools of philosophy refers, which I have already described briefly above, can be characterized by two formulas: "learning to live" and "learning to die," where the latter formula can be regarded as the logical presupposition of the former.⁵⁷ To accustom oneself to not regarding death—one's own as well as that of relatives and friends—as an evil is the necessary precondition for the attainment of that inner freedom that allows one to follow only one's own conscience in all circumstances and to maintain peace of mind in every situation. Every philosophical tradition of antiquity wishes to teach its adherents how to die and how to overcome the fear of dying. The Stoic Seneca cites two statements of Epicurus in this connection: "Think on death" and "it is a wonderful thing to learn thoroughly how to die," on which he comments as follows:

In saying this, he bids us think on freedom. He who has learned to die has unlearned slavery; he is above any external power, or at any rate, he is beyond it. What terrors have prisons and bonds and bars for him? His way out is clear. There is only one chain which binds us to life, and that is the love of life. The chain may not be cast off, but it may be rubbed away, so that, when necessity shall demand, nothing may retard or hinder us from

being ready to do at once that which at some time we are bound to do. (*Epistulae Morales* 26.8–9)

"Learning how to live," on the other hand, means freeing oneself from one's usual irrational fears and passions without whose elimination a happy life is not possible. The greatest fear, and that which is the greatest obstacle to a happy life, is, in the ancient view, the fear of death, but all other strong irrational emotions and ambitions are also to be eliminated—such as, for example, wrath, striving for wealth and power, and fear for their loss.

The dogmatic foundations for overcoming the fear of death as well as other fears and passions may vary greatly, but the methods employed by the spiritual guide to achieve this end are almost always the same. The spiritual guide prescribes a frugal way of life—some philosophical tendencies prescribe vegetarianism⁵⁸—in order to harden the body and, to a certain extent, remove its susceptibility to suffering, but also to maintain the body's health so that it will not represent an obstacle to spiritual activity. In fighting the fear of death and the various other fears and passions, dogmas no doubt play an important role in the Epicurean, Stoic, and Neoplatonic schools, but the spiritual guide not only expounds his philosophical dogmas in lectures but also applies himself to their practice, using the power of suggestion in its various forms. Above all, he does not immediately confront the beginner with all of the philosophical problems, but presents the beginner with a résumé (*epitomē*) in the form of individual maxims—for example, the *Fourfold Medicine* (*Tetrapharmakos*) and the *Principal Propositions* (*kyriai doxai*) among the Epicureans, and the *Little Handbook* of Epictetus among the Stoics, which was even used, along with the Pythagorean *Golden Poem*, by the Neoplatonists in elementary education.⁵⁹ The *Little Handbook* of Epictetus also found favor among the Christians.⁶⁰ In the field of ethics one also begins with traditional worldly wisdom, preferably in the form of maxims or verses. Collections of maxims and verses were very popular in antiquity, because they were regarded as particularly effective in the first stages of spiritual guidance, since they are particularly able to move the listener on account of their terse form (Seneca *Epistulae Morales* 108.9ff). When the fundamental doctrines have been memorized, it is a question of gradually extending the student's knowledge. Epicurus, for example, begins specific instruction in physics with the Small Epitome, that is, the *Letter to Herodotus*, which he then augments with the Great Epitome, in order finally to conclude the course of instruction with his thirty-seven-book *Physics*. As I have argued elsewhere regarding the Epicurean *Letter to Herodotus* in comparison with Seneca's method, the widening of knowledge occurs very gradually, and the fundamental dogmas have to be memorized

again and again after, or simultaneously with, every advance in knowledge.⁶¹ For what is desired is not knowledge, but rather knowledge as *habitus*, the transformation of the individual through knowledge. The heterodox Stoic Ariston, who, in the statement cited here, agrees with all ancient philosophers except the Sceptics, states:

Philosophy is divided into knowledge and state of mind. For one who has learned and understood what he should do and avoid is not a wise man until his mind is metamorphosed into the shape of that which he has learned. (Ariston in Seneca *Epistulae Morales* 94.48)

First of all, the elements of knowledge must be appropriated, which is a purely intellectual process. Then, knowledge must be impressed upon the mind in such a way that it is always at hand and that it cannot be limited or lost on account of any external circumstances—in other words, in such a way that it becomes one with the individual and a constituent part of the person's being. This second stage can be attained only through practice and habituation with the incorporation of one's emotional components. Let us take as an example the dogma "Death is not an evil," which was professed by all the ancient schools of philosophy. The philosopher-spiritual guide knows that it is not sufficient to know this and to be familiar with and to have grasped intellectually the philosophical proofs that are the foundation for this statement; one must be convinced to such a degree that one's whole inner nature is penetrated by it. In order to achieve this transformation, the spiritual guide employs various pedagogical methods that are supposed to appeal to the emotional part of the soul. If he is a Stoic or Platonist, he will, for example, use historical examples of people who have sacrificed their lives either for the fatherland or for some other great cause, who in other words value their own lives less than the good that they defend with the sacrifice of their lives. He will, moreover, strive to develop these examples according to all the rules of rhetoric, so as to produce the greatest possible emotional effect through beauty of delivery as well as through beauty of subject matter. In the Imperial age rhetoric becomes the necessary aid of almost every philosopher, including the Epicureans.⁶² Furthermore, the spiritual guide uses instruction in one of the three main branches of philosophy—namely, physics—again and again to bring the organization of the universe before the student's eyes (depending on the doctrine either as a product of chance or as a product of rationality) and to make clear to the student in relation to this the insignificance of the individual human fate. The vision of the universal leads to the experience of the smallness of human affairs. Thus, Marcus Aurelius writes with reference to a passage in Plato's *Republic*:

"Do you really imagine that an intelligence endowed with greatness of heart and a vision of all time and all reality thinks this mortal life to be a great thing?" "Impossible," was his answer. "Then such a man as that will consider even death not a thing to be dreaded, will he not?" "Most assuredly." (*Meditations* 7.35)

Theoretical instruction is thus always—the *Quaestiones naturales* of Seneca are a good example of this—interspersed with implementations that have an emotional basis themselves as well as exercise an emotional effect on the listener or reader, and whose frequent occurrence, finally, was intended to produce a very specific and permanent spiritual condition, which was called "greatness of soul." These and similar exercises in meditation, such as the Stoic practice of looking ahead to or intellectually anticipating all possible evils with their own peculiar method or "analysis,"⁶³ the spiritual guide himself undertakes together with his student, as well as urging the latter to undertake them himself, orally or in writing, several times a day. The *Meditations* of Marcus Aurelius are a good example of the practice of such intensive exercises in meditation.

Next to the transmission of knowledge and above all the realization of this knowledge with the help of the power of suggestion, the other great task of the spiritual guide consists in leading the student to the recognition of his faults, that is, to critical self-analysis, and to teach him to keep an exact diary of his spiritual illnesses. "Therefore, as far as possible, prove yourself guilty," Seneca advises Lucilius (*Epistulae Morales* 28.10), "hunt up charges against yourself; play the part, first of accuser, then of judge, last of intercessor. At times be harsh with yourself." And Epictetus advises his students to ask themselves the following questions:

How do I conduct myself? Do I behave like a wise man, like a man who can control himself? Can I really say of myself that I have learned to be prepared for everything? Am I, as one who knows nothing, also really conscious of my ignorance? Do I go to my teacher prepared to obey him like an oracle? Or am I not also one of those, who in their folly only go to school in order to learn the history of philosophy, to understand books which they did not understand before and to explain them to others should the occasion arise? (*Discourses* 2.21.9–10)

This self-examination, common to almost all of the philosophical schools of antiquity and in general derived from Pythagorean practice, is usually undertaken in the evening and in the morning. Thus, Porphyry writes of Pythagoras, that he especially recommended two times of day for self-examination, the time of going to bed and the time of getting up (*Life of Pythagoras* 40, des Places p. 54). At both times one was supposed to examine what one had done and what was to be done now, to account to oneself

for what had been done and to reflect with care on one's future actions. For this reason everyone was supposed to sing the following verses to himself (here given in prose) before going to bed: "Sleep shall not descend upon your soft lids until you have considered your every activity of the day in threefold manner: Wherein did I err? What did I do? What duty did I neglect?" (Pythagorean *Carmen aureum* 40-42). And before rising the following: "First of all, when you awake from sweet sleep, consider carefully the coming work of the day" (*Carmen aureum* 43-44). We have many witnesses in ancient philosophical literature for the use of morning and evening self-examinations,⁶⁴ of which I would like to mention only a few lines of Seneca:

Can anything be more excellent than this practice of thoroughly sifting the whole day? And how delightful the sleep that follows this self-examination—how tranquil it is, how deep and untroubled, when the soul has either praised or admonished itself, and when this secret examiner and critic of self has given report of its own character! I avail myself of this privilege, and every day I plead my cause before the bar of self. When the light has been removed from sight, and my wife, long aware of my habit, has become silent, I scan the whole of my day and retrace all my deeds and words. I conceal nothing from myself, I omit nothing. (*De ira* 3.36.1-3)⁶⁵

The goal of such a twofold practice is obvious: extreme attentiveness and consciousness were desired. Not a single moment of daily life was to pass by without rational control, and, beyond this, the comparison between what had been planned and what had been achieved was supposed to enable the examination of ethical progress. For the examination of progress written notes are also necessary. With regard to this or that emotion which has been recognized as a particular individual fault through self-examination, the student is encouraged to keep a sort of diary, in which he records the frequency of his lapses:

If you wish to stop being irascible, then do not give your habit any further nourishment, do not give it any opportunity of growing. Suppress the first outburst and count the days in which you did not lose your temper: "I used to lose my temper every day, now only every second day, and so forth: every three days, every four days." If you have been able to control yourself for thirty days, bring a thank offering to God. At first the habit of losing your temper will be weakened; in the end it will be completely overcome. "Today I did not give in to melancholy, nor the following day, nor after that for two or three months, but I kept a close watch on myself whenever an inclination that way arose." (*Epictetus Discourses* 2.18.12-14)

We even possess a work by the middle Platonist Plutarch with the title "How one can ascertain that one is progressing in virtue," which represents a catalogue of the various signs of progress.⁶⁶

The result of self-examination naturally had to be communicated to the spiritual guide, a practice that we know from the Christian sphere under the name of "confession." From the school of Epicurus we possess extracts from a course in which detailed instructions are given to the Epicurean spiritual guide as to how he is to bring the student to confession and how he can formulate the discussion in an individual and considerate way: The spiritual guide must never speak in a tone despairing of the sinner. Even if the sinner is himself without hope or lets his dissatisfaction be very noticeable, the spiritual guide must never forget what is kind and beneficial. The spiritual guide must not make himself disagreeable to the student. The spiritual guide may choose the way of indirect reprimand by censuring the same fault in another or even by transferring it to himself and saying that he committed it in unbridled youth. The spiritual guide must not let himself be carried away to abuse, mockery, and humiliation. He must not hurt the student; neither must he employ flattery. He should determine whether the student is sensitive or somewhat sturdier or so recalcitrant that he will hardly mend his ways even if shouted at. The spiritual guide must note what sort of family the student comes from and what education he has had the benefit of, and so forth.⁶⁷ A further task of the spiritual guide was to encourage the student to analyze his dreams: the last flaring up of sensual desire manifests itself in dreams.⁶⁸

This highly developed practice of spiritual guidance was completely adopted by the Christians, albeit with different premises. Paul Rabbow has demonstrated this with regard to the *Exercitia spiritualia* of Ignatius Loyola,⁶⁹ and Pierre Hadot with regard to monasticism from the fourth century on.⁷⁰ The figure of the philosopher as spiritual guide with the philosophical schools as the center of his activity is now replaced by the person of the clerical spiritual guide in the Christian orders. An albeit weaker, yet no less effective, reflection of this practice is to be found in the secular priest's practice of confession.

In conclusion I would be so bold as to ask, Has modern spiritual guidance or contemporary psychology, which is so proud of its scientific researches, brought the slightest advance over the millennia-old practice of spiritual guidance?

Translated by Margaret Kirby

Notes

1. See the collected examples in the *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae (LIMC)*: Figures *Achilleus* nos. 50-62 in volume 1/2 (1981); commentaries with literary references volume 11/1(1981), pp. 40-42, 48, 198.

2. See also Apollodorus, *Bibliotheca* 3.10.3. According to Pseudo-Justinian (*De monarch.* 6), besides Asclepius Apollo took part in Chiron's medical instruction.
3. Xenophon mentions twenty-one students of Chiron.
4. Vol. 3, p. 61 Henry (Budé; Paris: Les Belles Lettres). See also R. Turcan, "Chiron le mystagogue," in *Mélanges offerts à J. Carcopino* (Paris: Hatchette, 1966) 927-939.
5. See figure *Achilleus* no. 79 in the *LIMC*, vol. 1/2. Cf. J. Carcopino, *La basilique pythagoricienne de la Porte Majeure* (Paris: L'artisan du livre, 1926) 126ff. The attribution "Neopythagorean" is uncertain.
6. See, for example, figures *Achilleus* nos. 64-72 and 77-79 in the *LIMC*, vol. 1/2 as well as *Catalogue*, vol. 1/1, pp. 50-51.
7. See figures *Achilleus* nos. 21 and 81 in *LIMC* vol. 1/2 as well as *Catalogue*, vol. 1/1, pp. 45, 51f.
8. We have only late evidence for this tendency, from the first and second centuries A.D.; see nn. 4 and 5.
9. It is not possible to assume, with Friedrich Pfister (*Götter und Heldensagen der Griechen* [Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1956] 127), that in Homer's view Chiron was responsible for the education of Achilles until he was six years old and that only his later education in Phthia fell to Phoenix. The admonition makes it clear that Phoenix already had Achilles with him as a small child (*Iliad* 9.485-91). On the various mythical traditions relating to Achilles' childhood, see *LIMC*, vol. 1/1, pp. 40-42.
10. Last of all probably by Simplicius, *In Enchiridion Epicteti*, p. 70, 47-48 Dübner.
11. See M. Detienne, *Crise agraire et attitude religieuse chez Hésiode* (Coll. Latomus 68; Brussels: Latomus, 1963) 43.
12. See P. Walcot, "Hesiod and the Didactic Literature of the Near East," in *Revue des études grecques* 75 (1962) 13-36.
13. *Ibid.*, 17-20.
14. On this question, see K. Ziegler, "Orpheus und Orphische Dichtung," *Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* vol. 18, cols. 1200-1320, 1341-1417.
15. See F. Graf, *Eleusis und die orphische Dichtung* (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1974) chap. 1: "Die orphische Dichtung und Eleusis."
16. E.g., the article "Ethos" by W. Vetter in *Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, vol. 3, cols. 1581-91.
17. This is the Loeb Classical Library edition, with minimal changes.
18. E.g., Kallinos fr. 1, Diehl; Tyrtaios fr. 7, Diehl, beginning; Solon *Eunomia* and fr. 10, Diehl; Phocylides frs. 57-60.
19. There is an untranslatable union of social and ethical superiority in this concept.
20. See F. Wehrli, who has convincingly demonstrated "the organic growth of philosophical ethics among the Greeks from their original estimation of things" (*LATHE BIOSAS* [Leipzig: Teubner, 1931] introduction).
21. Quoted in the translation by Kathleen Freeman, *The Work and Life of Solon: With a Translation of His Poems* (Cardiff and London: University of Wales Press, 1926; reprint New York: Arno Press, 1976) 208.
22. Aristotle *De philosophia* fr. 8, Rose (= Philopon *In Nicomachi Isagoge Commentaria* 1.1; Cicero *De republica* 1.12; *De oratore* 3.137).
23. There are various catalogues of the seven sages; see Barkowski, "Sieben Weise" in the *Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, vol. 3, cols. 2243-47.
24. See Barkowski, "Sieben Weise," cols. 2251-52; Plato relates that the seven wise men met in Delphi and set up their gnomic maxims "Know thyself," "Nothing too much," etc. as a consecration gift for Apollo in his temple (*Protagoras* 343A8-B7).

25. See L. Robert, "De Delphes à l'Oxus: Inscriptions grecques nouvelles de la Bactriane," *Comptes rendus de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres* (1968), 438.
26. Robert, "De Delphos," 421-57, esp. 438ff.
27. See the epigram of Clearchus of Soli to be found on the base of the stele (Robert, "De Delphos," 422-24).
28. Robert, "De Delphos," 438-54.
29. See W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum* (3rd ed.; Leipzig: S. Hirzelium, 1920) 3:392-97; and Robert, "De Delphos," 440f. See also O. Hense, "Die Kyzikener Spruchsammlung," *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift*, June 15, 1907, cols. 765-768. This series is also known to us through Stobaeus *Anthologium* 3.1783, Hense p. 125 (under the title "Sosiades' maxims of the seven sages").
30. *Inscriptiones Graecae* XII 3, 1020.
31. See L. Robert, "Un oracle gravé à Oinanda," *Comptes rendus de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres* (1971) 597-619.
32. D. Schlumberger, L. Robert, A. Dupont-Sommer, and E. Benveniste, "Une bilingue gréco-araméenne d'Asoka," *Journal Asiatique* 246 (1958) 1-48.
33. D. Schlumberger, "Une nouvelle inscription grecque d'Açoka," *Comptes rendus de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles lettres* (1964) 1-14.
34. See P. Hadot, "Fürstenspiegel" in *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1950) 8:555-632.
35. In spite of their different theoretical foundations, happy life and virtuous life were identical or almost identical for most schools of philosophy. Even the so-called ethics of pleasure of the Epicureans boils down, in practical terms, to a virtuous life.
36. See Seneca *Epistulae Morales* 16.3: "Philosophy is no trick to catch the public: it is not devised for show. It is a matter, not of words, but of facts. It is not pursued in order that the day may yield some amusement before it is spent, or that our leisure may be relieved of a tedium that irks us. It moulds and constructs the soul: it orders our life, guides our conduct, shows us what we should do and what we should leave undone; it sits at the helm and directs our course as we waver amid uncertainties. Without it, no one can live fearlessly or in peace of mind (Seneca *Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales*, trans. Richard M. Gummere [Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970-71] 1:105).
37. The Peripatetics are an exception here. For them scientific research constituted an essential element of the happy life. See Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.7.1177a121ff.; see also I. Hadot, *Arts libéraux et philosophie dans la pensée antique* (Paris: Etudes augustiniennes, 1984) 18-23, 34-36.
38. See P. Hadot, *Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique* (Paris: Etudes augustiniennes, 1981) the chapter "La figure de Socrate."
39. Because for the Skeptics nothing can be perceived or known, the development of dogmatics is not applicable to them.
40. Philodemus *De libertate dicendi* (*Peri parrēias*) fr. 41.5, Olivieri. The term *kathēgētēs* is also common; see fr. 45.5, Olivieri.
41. *Corpus inscriptionum latinarum* 3, 12283 and 14203: Letter from Plotina to Hadrian with Hadrian's reply.
42. See Porphyry *Life of Plotinus* 17.42; Julian *Orationes* 9 [6] 202d (the cynic Crates referred to as *hēgemōn* of the Stoic Zenon); Damaskios *Vita Isadori* Zintzen p. 10, 5 (Damaskios refers to Isidor as his *hēgemōn*); Simplicius *In Aristotelis Physica Commentaria* 642.17, Diels, and 774.28, Diels: (Simplicius mentions Damaskios as his *hēgemōn*); Simplicius *In Aristotelis De Caelo Commentaria* 271.19, Heiberg. If the teacher's

activity as commentator on Plato or Aristotle is rather to be emphasized, then the term *exēgētēs* is used.

43. See Plato *Phaedrus* 276CD and the disputed Seventh Letter.

44. L. Robin, *Platon, Le Banquet* (Budé; Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1929) XCI.

45. L. Robin, *Platon, Phèdre* (Budé; Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1933) LIV.

46. See, e.g., Aristotle *Magna Moralia* 2.1213a13ff.; *Eudemian Ethics* 7.12.1245a35.

47. *Manus (dextram) porrigere (dare)*: it is a matter of a *terminus technicus* of spiritual guidance; see Seneca *Epistulae Morales* 55.2; 29.4; see also Augustine *De beata vita* 1.5; *Epist.*, 26 (*Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum* 34:89, 4).

48. On the significance of friendship for Seneca's spiritual guidance, see I. Hadot, *Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1969) 164ff.

49. See the *Vita Auli Persi Flacci* from the Probus commentary, which reveals the close friendship of Persius and his teacher, the Stoic Cornutus: "When he (Persius) was sixteen years old, he entered into a relation of friendship with Annaeus Cornutus, such that he never left his side" (§4).

50. See I. Hadot, "amicitia" in *Augustinus Lexikon* (Basel and Stuttgart, 1985) vol. 1.

51. I. Hadot, "amicitia."

52. In *Enchiridion Epicteti* p. 87, 51-88,8; p. 88, 20-21; p. 89, 11-14, Dübner.

53. See Michel Tardieu, "Témoins orientaux du Premier Alcibiade à Harran et à Nag Hammadi," *Journal Asiatique* (1985).

54. In this connection, see I. Hadot, *Seneca*, 173-76.

55. See my interpretation of the second book of the dialogue *De ordine* in *Arts libéraux*, 101-31.

56. See the theory of education that Plato develops in the *Republic*: only an elite, in the moral and intellectual sense, is capable of concerning itself with philosophy. For Aristotle, see the theory of friendship he develops in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and, above all, the last chapter, where the pedagogical possibilities of the philosopher are discussed (10.9.1179b7-15; see also Aristotle *Politics* 7.13.1332a40-42).

57. On exercises, see P. Rabbow's fundamental book *Seelenführung: Methodik der Exerzitien in der Antike* (Munich: Kösel, 1954); and P. Hadot *Exercices*.

58. E.g., the Pythagoreans, the Neoplatonists, Sextius (on the latter, see Seneca *Epistulae Morales* 108.17).

59. On this, see I. Hadot, *Le problème du néoplatonisme alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius* (Paris: Etudes augustiniennes, 1978) 160-64.

60. We possess several Christian adaptations of the *Little Handbook (Enchiridion)*.

61. See I. Hadot, "Epicure et l'enseignement philosophique hellénistique et romain," in *Actes du VIIIe Congrès de l'Association Guillaume Budé (Paris 1968)* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1969) 347-54.

62. *Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas Pertinens* IV, 99: Inscription from Samos in honor of the Epicurean Gaius Iulius Sosigenes with the nickname "Isokrates," which can only refer to his rhetorical accomplishments. On the important role of rhetoric in the Academy from Philon of Larissa (first century B.C.) on, see I. Hadot, *Arts libéraux*, passim.

63. For more on this method, see P. Rabbow, *Seelenführung*, 42ff.

64. E.g., Seneca *Epistulae Morales* 28.10; Epictetus *Discourses* 4.6.33; 3.13.8; 2.21.9; 2.18.13-17; Hierocles *In Carmen aureum* 9, Köhler p. 80-84.

65. Seneca, *Moral Essays*, trans. John W. Basore (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1928) 3:341).

66. See also Plutarch *De ira cohibenda* 464BC.

67. Philodemus *De libertate dicendi* = a summary of lectures by the Epicurean Zenon. See Rabbow, *Seelenführung*, 269. On the Epicurean practice of confession, see W. Schmid, "Epikur" in *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*, vol. 5, cols. 741ff.

68. Zenon the Stoic in Plutarch *Quomodo quis sent. prof. virt.* 12.82f. = (SVF 1:234, von Armim p. 56).

69. Rabbow, *Seelenführung*, 151-59, 189-214.

70. P. Hadot, *Exercices*, chapter "Exercices spirituels antiques et 'philosophie chrétienne'."

IN: CLASSICAL MEDITERRANEAN SPIRITUALITY