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PLATO, PYTHAGORAS, ARISTOTLE,
THE PERIPATETICS, THE STOICS, AND THALES
AND HIS FOLLOWERS "ON CAUSES"
(Ps.-Plutarchus *Placita* I 11 and Stobaeus *Anthologium* I 13)

I. Introduction

Aëtius *placit.* I 11 Diels¹ "On Causes" (Περὶ αἰτίων) is based the usual way on a chapter in the *Placita* of ps.-Plutarch (I 11, Περὶ αἰτίων) and one in Stobaeus' *Anthologium*, viz. in book one, also known as *Eclogae physicae* (I 13, Περὶ αἰτίων)². No

¹ All references to Aëtius with the *siglum* AËT. will be to Diels' edition in the *Doxographi Graeci*, Berlin 1879 and later repr., pp. 268-444. For the *Placita* of ps.-Plutarch I have consulted G. LACHENAUD (éd.), *Plutarque. Œuvres morales*, XII 1: *Opinions des Philosophes*, Paris 1993, and H. DAIBER (Hrsg.), *Aëtius Arabus. Die Vorsokratiker in arabischer Überlieferung* ("Akademie der Wissenschaften und Literatur. Veröffentlichungen der orientalischen Kommission", XXXIII), Wiesbaden 1980. Stobaeus is quoted from C. WACHSMUTH (ed.), *Ioannis Stobaei Anthologii libri duo priores qui inscribi solent Eclogae physicae et ethicae*, Bd. 1-2, Berlin 1884, repr. Zürich 1974.

² A treatise entitled Περὶ αἰτίων is attributed to Theophrastus (DIOG. LAERT. V 49). Perhaps STOB. *anthol.* I 6, 17^c (in the chapter Περὶ τύχης ἢ ταῦτομάτου) = THEOPHR. fr. 503 FHS&G belongs with this work (see *infra*, note 96 *ad fin.*) Diels attributed this Stobaeian lemma to Aëtius (I 29, 4), followed by e.g. H. DÖRRIE, *Präpositionen und Metaphysik. Wechselwirkung zweier Prinzipienreihen*, «Museum Hel-

parallels from Theodoret or other such sources for Aëtius are available this time'. Diels' reconstruction is questionable. In the first part of the present paper I shall argue in favour of a different reconstruction and attempt to explain the rationale behind it'. In the second part some comments on Aëtian lemmas in ps.-

veticum», xxvi (1969) pp. 217-28, repr. in Id., *Platonica Minora*, München 1976, pp. 124-36, esp. p. 217 = p. 124. But it is a fragment of Arius Didymus, see D.T. RUNIA, *Additional Fragments of Arius Didymus on Physics*, in K.A. ALGRA-P.W. VAN DER HORST-D.T. RUNIA (eds.), *Polyhistor. Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy* ("Philosophia Antiqua", lxxii), Leiden-New York-Köln 1996, pp. 363-81, esp. p. 376, and J. MANSFELD-D.T. RUNIA, *Aëtiana: The Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer*, I: *The Sources* ("Philosophia Antiqua", lxxiii), Leiden-New York-Köln 1997, p. 254; cfr. further *infra*, note 7, and text after note 12. Works with the title Περὶ αἰτίων are also attributed to Strato (DIOG. LAERT. v 35) and the Herophilean physician Hêgêtor (APOLLON. in Hippocr. de articul. p. 23.19). Galen quotes a book of his as ἐν τοῖς Περὶ αἰτίων λόγοις (xviii B p. 171, 9-10 K.). For the Cyrenaics the περὶ αἰτίων τόπος was a part of physics according to SEXT. EMP. *adv. math* vii 11 = S.S.R. fr. iv A 168. For the formula περὶ αἰτίων τόπος cfr. CIC. *top.* 65: *toto igitur loco causarum explicato*, and GALEN. *de diff. puls.* viii p. 664, 3-6 K., πρὸς τῷ καὶ ἀκαίρως ὑπερθεῖν κοινῆς θεωρίας, τοῦ τε περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς σφυγμοῖς αἰτίων τόπου καὶ τοῦ περὶ τῆς δι' αὐτῶν προγνώσεως.

¹ Diels' reconstruction is at *Dox. Graec. cit.*, pp. 309-10. It is reprinted here in the Appendix, together with the text of the sources for this chapter (which now include the Arabic translation of ps.-Plutarch by Qusta ibn Luqa).

² The first example of such a reconstruction is brilliantly provided by D.T. RUNIA, *Xenophanes on the Moon: A 'doxographicum' in Aëtius*, «Phronesis», xxxiv (1989) pp. 245-69. See also e.g. Id., *The 'Placita' Ascribed to Doctors in Aëtius' Doxography on Physics*, in PH. J. VAN DER EIJK (ed.), *Ancient Histories of Medicine. Essays in Medical Doxography and Historiography in Classical Antiquity* ("Studies in Ancient Medicine", xx), Leiden-New York-Köln 1999, pp. 189-250, esp. pp. 199-204; A. LARIS, *Du témoignage comme fragment*, in G.W. MOST (ed.), *Collecting Fragments - Fragmente sammeln* ("Aporemata", i), Göttingen 1997, pp. 237-72, and J. MANSFELD-D.T. RUNIA, *Aëtiana cit.*, pp. 226-8. On Diels' methodology, the sources for Aëtius, and the working-methods of ps.-

Plutarch and Stobaeus and in the third and last part some on exclusively Stobaeian lemmas will be provided, but I shall deal only in passing with the passage from the *Timaeus* quoted by Stobaeus, and shall not comment on his "Ocellus" quotation.

Commenting on these lemmas is not so easy, and I can here only reconnoitre the field to some extent. A more serious study should have to take all the *Placita* chapters and individual lemmas into account both as to their interrelations and as to their antecedents, but each time one has to begin somewhere'. Most of the time, naturally, the situation one finds

Plutarch and Stobaeus see now J. MANSFELD-D.T. RUNIA, *Aëtiana cit.* On the sources of Aëtius see my preliminary papers *Gibt es Spuren von Theophrasts 'Phys. op.' bei Cicero?*, in W.W. FORTENBAUGH-P. STEINMETZ (eds.), *Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos* ("Rutgers Studies in Classical Humanities", iv), New Brunswick N. J.-London 1989, pp. 133-58 (repr. in my *Studies in the Historiography of Greek Philosophy*, Assen-Maastricht 1990, pp. 238-63); *'Physikai Doxai' e 'Problemata Physica' da Aristotele ad Aezio (ed oltre)*, in A.M. BATTEGAZZORE (a cura di), *Dimostrazione, argomentazione dialettica e argomentazione retorica nel pensiero antico*, Genova 1993, pp. 311-82 (revised and amplified version of *'Physikai Doxai' and 'Problemata Physica' from Aristotle to Aëtius (and beyond)*, in W.W. FORTENBAUGH-D. GUTAS (eds.), *Theophrastus: His Psychological, Doxographical and Scientific Writings* ("Rutgers Studies in Classical Humanities", v), New Brunswick N. J.-London 1992, pp. 63-111), and *Cosmic Distances: Aëtius 2.31 Diels and Some Related Texts*, «Phronesis», xlv (2000) pp. 175-204. On doxography in general (apart from the literature cited *supra*) see my papers *Chrysippus and the 'Placita'*, «Phronesis», xxxiv (1989) pp. 311-42; *Doxography and Dialectic: The 'Sitz im Leben' of the 'Placita'*, in ANRW, 36.4 (1990) pp. 3076-229, and *Doxographical Studies, Quellenforschung, Tabular Presentation and Other Varieties of Comparativism*, in W. BURKERT-L. GEMELLI MARCIANO-E. MATELLI-L. ORELLI (Hrsg.), *Fragmentsammlung philosophischer Texte der Antike - Le Raccolte dei Frammenti di Filosofi Antichi* ("Aporemata", iii), Göttingen 1998, pp. 16-40; also see the overview of D.T. RUNIA, *What is Doxography?*, in PH. J. VAN DER EIJK, *Ancient Histories cit.*, pp. 33-55.

³ For other attempts in this direction see my papers *Doxography and Dialectic cit.*, *'Physikai Doxai' cit.*, and *Cosmic Distances cit.*

oneself in may be compared to that of noticing a stick of which one only sees one end, or (more rarely) of which one is able to see both ends while the long middle section remains invisible.

II. *Reconstructing a Chapter in Aëtius*

Stobaeus has the following lemmas: first (*anthol.* I 13, 1^a) a general definition of “cause” (αἰτιον), followed by what is usually seen as the well-known Middle Platonist triad of principles attributed to Plato. This section corresponds to the first two lemmas of ps.-Plutarch’s chapter (*placit.* I 13, 1-2). To the Plato lemma Stobaeus in his usual way appends a slightly normalized but otherwise verbatim quotation from Plato, viz. *Tim.* 28 A-B, introduced by the formula λέγει γοῦν ἐν Τιμαίῳ. This is followed by a snippet from Arius Didymus⁶ on Aristotle’s four types of cause (*anthol.* I 13, 1^b). This Aristotle lemma which has no counterpart in ps.-Plutarch was wrongly attributed to Aëtius (*placit.* I 13, 4) by Diels⁷. The third Stobaeus lemma (I 13, 1^c) is a fragment of, or presumably rather abstract from Arius Didymus (fr. 18 Diels)⁸ concerning the Stoics; it lists the tenets of Zeno Chrysippus Posidonius in that order, and naturally there is no correspon-

⁶ Not to be identified, *pace* Meineke and Diels, with the emperor Augustus’ court philosopher, see T. GÖRANSSON, *Albinus, Alcinous, Arius Didymus* (“*Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia*”, LXI), Göteborg 1995, esp. pp. 203-18. His *t.a.q.* is 233 CE, the date of arrival of Origen at Caesarea, who took his splendid library with him. See D.T. RUNIA, *Caesarea Maritima and the Survival of Hellenistic-Jewish Literature*, in A. RABAN-K.G. HOLM (eds.), *Caesarea Maritima. A Retrospective after Two Millennia*, Leiden-New York-Köln 1998, pp. 476-95, esp. p. 490.

⁷ See already Wachsmuth *ad loc.*: «fort. rectius ad Didymum referas». Cfr. D.T. RUNIA, *Additional Fragments cit.*, pp. 372-3, J. MANSFELD-D.T. RUNIA, *Aëtiana cit.*, pp. 250-1, and *infra*, note 87 and text thereto.

⁸ *Dox. Graec. cit.*, p. 457.

ding lemma in ps.-Plutarch. At *anthol.* I 13, 1^d we have three further Aëtian lemmas (= Aët. *placit.* I 11, 6-8), not paralleled in ps.-Plutarch. Ps.-Plutarch at Aët. *placit.* I 11, 5 on the other hand has a lemma on the Stoics in general which is not paralleled in Stobaeus, because it has been replaced by the far more informative and longer abstract from Arius Didymus. The last Stobaeus lemma is a pseudo-Pythagorean fragment, “Ocellus” fr. 3 Harder at *anthol.* I 13, 1^e. Hermetic and “Pythagorean” texts and relatively faithful verbatim quotations from Plato are among Stobaeus’ favourites. The “Ocellus” fragment, with its Platonizing contents and religious overtones, fits in well both with the quotation of the *Timaeus* passage and with Stobaeus’ predilections. There are no poetic quotations to be found in this short chapter, but otherwise the medley is typical for the first book of the *Anthologium*: Aëtius – Plato – Aëtius again – Arius Didymus – Aëtius for the third time – the “Pythagorean Ocellus”.

It is clear that the Aëtian chapter provides the framework for this Stobaeus chapter. For the moment I shall for the most part ignore the extras inserted by the anthologist, that is to say the quotation from the *Timaeus*, the two fragments of Arius Didymus (the first of which is Aët. *placit.* I 13, 4 Diels), and the “Ocellus” fragment. In translating the text of ps.-Plutarch I indicate where it differs from that of Stobaeus (the differences are small). We then have, in Diels’ order (for the Greek texts see *infra*, p. 65 ff. Appendix):

(1) [A descriptive general definition of cause:] «Cause is that owing to which the effect (occurs) or something takes place». Stobaeus adds⁹ the words «for this is sufficient in a descriptive way».

(2) «Plato (described) cause in a threefold manner; for he says [“for he says” omitted by Stobaeus] by what from what with a view to what. He considers the by what to be more

⁹ Cfr. J. MANSFELD-D.T. RUNIA, *Aëtiana cit.*, p. 223.

potent [“most potent” Stobaeus], and this is that which acts, which is intellect». [“which is intellect” not in Stobaeus].

(3) «Pythagoras Aristotle [“Aristotle” not in Stobaeus] (hold) that the first causes are incorporeal, and that others are [this “are” not in ps.-Plutarch] according to participation in or by way of attribute of the corporeal substructure». [Final clause not in Stobaeus¹⁰:] «So that the cosmos is a body».

(5) «The Stoics (held) that all causes are corporeal; for (they are) *pneumas*». [Lacking in Stobaeus].

(6) «Thales and those who come after him¹¹ stated the first cause to be immobile». [Lacking in ps.-Plutarch].

(7) «<The> Stoics defined the first cause as mobile». [Lacking in ps.-Plutarch].

(8) «The Peripatetics (held) that of the causes some are sensible, others intelligible». [Lacking in ps.-Plutarch].

Diels’ order mechanically combines the sequences of ps.-Plutarch and Stobaeus. He naturally omits the latter’s quotation from the *Timaeus* and the Didymus fragment he recognized as well as the “Ocellus” fragment, but as we have seen inserted the Didymus fragment dealing with the four Aristotelian causes as his fourth lemma (at Aët. *placit.* I 13, 4). His fifth lemma, in the left column containing the text of ps.-Plutarch, occupies the position held in Stobaeus by the Didymus fragment on the three great Stoics. His lemmas six to eight are found in Stobaeus only.

We now are in a position to inquire about the rationale of the Aëtius chapter. This is threefold. The issues on which the authorities which are represented by name-labels differ (*diaeresis*), or disagree (*diaphonia*), are (a) the number of causes, (b) the incorporeality *versus* the corporeality of causes, and (c) the mobility *versus* the immobility of the first cause. In some cases more than one such issue is concerned in a combination of lemmas.

We may look first at the issue of the number of causes.

¹⁰ Delevit Diels.

¹¹ Viz., in the Ionian succession.

According to (2) Plato there are *three* kinds of causes, according to (3) Pythagoras and Aristotle *two* kinds, and according to (5) the Stoics only *one* kind. The *diaeresis* (division) and ordering, then, are according to number: 3 – 2 – 1¹². This is a bit unusual, because in the majority of cases an ordering according to number starts with the lowest number. Still, there it is (we shall see shortly why the usual order is inverted in this case), and it provides supplementary proof for the attribution of the Stobaeian lemma on Aristotle’s four kinds of cause to Arius Didymus and not, *pace* Diels, to Aëtius, for in the latter it would disturb or even destroy the sequence.

The incorporeality *versus* the corporeality of causes is next¹³. (3) Pythagoras and Aristotle hold that first causes are incorporeal and that the others participate in or are attributes of the corporeal substructure. These “others” therefore are not, in themselves, fully corporeal. Aristotle and Pythagoras do not differ as to the incorporeal causes, but as to the semi-corporeal others. I take it that “participation” has to be linked to Pythagoras and “attribute” to Aristotle (see *infra*, section III at subsection (3)). (5) The Stoics hold that all causes are corporeal,

¹² For ordering according to number see my papers *Doxography and Dialectic cit.*, pp. 3157-61, and *Aristote et la Structure du ‘De sensibus’ de Théophraste*, «Phronesis», xli (1996) pp. 158-88; also D.T. RUNIA, *The ‘Placita’ Ascribed cit.*, p. 203 (on Aët. I 23), and D. MANETTI, “Aristotle” and the Role of Doxography in the *Anonymus Londinensis* (PBrLibr Inv. 137), in Ph.J. VAN DER EIJK, *Ancient Histories cit.*, pp. 95-142, esp. pp. 115-20. It is to be remembered that the earliest list of principles (here called “things that are”, ὄντα) starts with the largest number: ISOCR. *antidor.* 268: infinitely many, four, three, two, one, none; for this list and similar early ones see my paper *Aristotle, Plato and the Preplatonic Doxography and Chronography*, in C. CAMBIANO (a cura di), *Storiografia e Dosografia nella Filosofia Antica*, Torino 1986, pp. 1-56, esp. pp. 32-9 (repr. with same pagination in my *Studies in the Historiography cit.*).

¹³ Cfr. J. MANSFELD-D.T. RUNIA, *Aëtiana cit.*, p. 251; for another example of this type of *diaphonia* see e.g. Aët. IV 2-3, with my comments at *Doxography and Dialectic cit.*, pp. 3065-85.

while (8) the Peripatetics, whose tenet is expressed in epistemic terms, said that some causes are sensible (*i.e.* are corporeal) and others intelligible (*i.e.* are incorporeal). Here a *diaphonia* is clearly involved, but the order of the lemmas is not good. My belief is that Stobaeus, who inserted other material to replace the name-labels Aristotle and Stoics, while copying out the rest of the Aëtian chapter overlooked the Peripatetics lemma and so decided to add it at the end. It does not make Aëtian sense after lemmas (7) on Thales *c.s.* and (8) on the Stoics, which are concerned with a different theme, but belongs with lemmas (3) and (5). Stobaeus is not concerned with Aëtius' diaeretic and diaphonic rationale, as the passages he inserted into the Aëtian framework already prove. To restore Aëtius' purposive original sequence we therefore have to correct Stobaeus' ordering (or rather lack of it). The diaphonic Aëtian order is (3) – (8) – (5): (3) Pythagoras and Aristotle hold that of the *two* kinds of causes some are incorporeal and the others semi-corporeal; (8) the Peripatetics hold that of the *two* kinds of causes some are incorporeal and the others corporeal, while (3) the Stoics hold that there is only *one* kind, all causes being corporeal.

It follows that lemma (8), on the Peripatetics, has to be inserted between (3) Pythagoras and Aristotle, and (5), the Stoics. The fuller Aëtian sequence therefore is (1) the descriptive general definition; (2) Plato; (3) Pythagoras and Aristotle; (8) the Peripatetics; and (5) the Stoics. From (3), Pythagoras and Aristotle, to (5), the Stoics, the *diaphonia* as to corporeality and incorporeality is neatly bound up with the sequence according to number. This *diaphonia* even explains why the numerical order as a whole begins with the number *three* (Plato). The sequence (3) Pythagoras and Aristotle (*two* + incorporeal/quasi-corporeal) – (8) the Peripatetics (*two* + sensible/intelligible) – and (5) the Stoics (*one* + bodies) is determined both by the number of causes and by the opposition corporeal *versus* incorporeal, but happens to begin with the number *two*. Logically, Plato's *triad* of causes had to constitute the beginning of a sequence arranged

from a numerical point of view, though nothing is said about the corporeal or incorporeal nature of his causes.

Two lemmas remain, viz. (6) Thales *c.s.* on the immobility of the first cause, and (7) the Stoics on its mobility. A clear *diaphonia*¹⁴. Mobility *versus* immobility is not an issue in the preceding lemmas of the chapter. In fact, this pair of lemmas form a sort of appendix. They may be, or not be (one cannot be sure¹⁵), the remains of a separate Aëtian or perhaps rather proto-Aëtian chapter entitled "On the First Cause" *vel sim.* However this may be, there is one undeniable link with what comes before. In a single earlier lemma, (2) on Pythagoras and Aristotle, "first" causes (*plural*) are explicitly mentioned. In (6) Thales *c.s.* and (7) the Stoics there is only a *single* first cause. This *diaphonia* as to the number of first causes assumed and the fact that *first* causes are involved nicely connects the first part of the chapter with its second part. How many kinds of causes Thales *c.s.* posited is not revealed. But we also have (7) the Stoics on the single first cause, and know from lemma (5) that they only assumed one kind of causes. We may therefore, I believe, assume that it is implied that also Thales *c.s.* posited only one kind of cause. This fits in with the sequence from the numerical point of view: the chapter then ends with (5) the Stoics, *one* kind; (6) Thales *c.s.*, *one* kind but from a different perspective; and (7) the Stoics again, *one* kind, from the same different perspective.

I have not yet said, but it naturally goes without saying that the Aëtian lemmas as to their actual contents (the *doxai*) are at best pale, modified and simplified versions of the views of the authorities that serve as name-labels. The attribution of the *doxa* to Pythagoras (Pythagoras himself, no less), who is said to share it with Aristotle is an interesting fiction for

¹⁴ For another example of this kind of *diaphonia* cfr. e.g. AET. IV 6, with my comment at *Doxography and Dialectic cit.*, p. 3089.

¹⁵ See e.g. my papers *Doxography and Dialectic cit.*, p. 3181 and *Cosmic Distances cit.*, and J. MANSFELD-D.T. RUNIA, *Aëtiana cit.*, p. 232.

which see *infra*, section III at subsection (3). The tenets have been flattened out and adapted the better to fit in with the diaphonic and diaeretic Aëtian rationale.

I append my argued reconstruction of the original Aëtian chapter. It will be noted that it very much resembles Diels' mechanical reconstruction, the only visible differences (apart from minor ones as to the *constitutio* of individual lemmas) being the elimination of his fourth lemma (Arius Didymus on Aristotle's four types of cause) and its replacement in a new fourth position by his eighth lemma, on the Peripatetics:

Περὶ αἰτίων

- (1) αἰτιόν ἐστι δι' ὃ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα ἢ δι' ὃ συμβαίνει τι.
- (2) Πλάτων τριχῶς τὸ αἶτιον· φησὶ γάρ, ὕφ' οὗ ἐξ οὗ πρὸς ὃ· κυριώτερον δ' ἡγεῖται τὸ ὕφ' οὗ· τοῦτο δὲ ἦν τὸ ποιοῦν, ὃ ἐστὶ νοῦς.
- (3) Πυθαγόρας Ἀριστοτέλης τὰ μὲν πρῶτα αἷτια ἀσώματα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ μετοχὴν ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τῆς σωματικῆς ὑποστάσεως, ὥστ' εἶναι τὸν κόσμον σῶμα.
- (4) [= (8) Diels] οἱ Περιπατητικοὶ τῶν αἰτίων εἶναι τὰ μὲν αἰσθητά, τὰ δὲ νοητά.
- (5) οἱ Στωικοὶ πάντα τὰ αἷτια σωματικά· πνεύματα γάρ.
- (6) Θαλῆς καὶ οἱ ἐφεξῆς τὸ πρῶτον αἶτιον ἀκίνητον ἀπεφάναντο.
- (7) <οἱ> Στωικοὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἶτιον ὥρισαντο κινήτόν.

As is the rule in the *Placita* literature this time too the order of the lemmas is determined by content, not by the chronology of the authorities that serve as name-labels. "Pythagoras" comes after Plato, and "Thales and his immediate followers", in the sixth position, are wedged in between two lemmas bearing on the Stoics.

III. Some Comments on Individual Lemmas of Aëtius

Though these lemmas, as pointed out, provide at best only partial and pale information when considered from a modern

historical point of view, it is not true to say that there are no links at all between name-labels and contents. In what follows some observations about these sometimes quite tortuous connections will be submitted.

(1) αἰτιόν ἐστι <δι' ὃ> "τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα ἢ δι' ὃ συμβαίνει τι. The supplement <δι' ὃ> in ps.-Plutarch is unavoidable and vouched for by the Stobæan lemma. Note the *Verschlimmberung* in Qusta ibn Luqa, (the ancestor of) whose text of ps.-Plutarch lacked the second δι' ὃ as well.

The descriptive definition¹⁷ is originally and basically Stoic. For δι' ὃ in its rôle as a Stoic technical term see for instance the definitions at Stob. *anthol.* I 13, 1^c, printed *infra*, Appendix. It should, however, be acknowledged that δι' ὃ is a perfectly common expression: it occurs for instance four times in Thucydides, once in the *corpus Lysiacum*, thirteen times in the *corpus Platonium*¹⁸, three in Xenophon, nine in Demosthenes, and twenty in the *corpus Aristotelicum*¹⁹, in various causal meanings. ἀποτέλεσμα is found for the first time in Polybius, viz. at II 39, 11 and IV 78, 5; here it is not yet a technical term. It cannot be paralleled in early Stoic fragments, but as a technical term, viz. meaning the *effect* of a *cause*, it is indeed and certainly Stoic. See for instance the ninth chapter of book eight of the *Stromata* of Clemens Ale-

¹⁶ Supplevit Diels ex Stobæo; deest in Qusta ibn Luqa.

¹⁷ PS.-PLUTARCH. *placit.* I 9-12 and I 14-5 (9 Περὶ ὕλης, 10 Περὶ ἰδέας, 11 Περὶ αἰτίων, 12 Περὶ σωμάτων, 14 Περὶ σχημάτων, 15 Περὶ χρωμάτων) all begin with a general definition. Virtually the same definitions are to be found at the beginning of STOB. *anthol.* I 11 Περὶ ὕλης, I 12 Περὶ ἰδεῶν, I 13 Περὶ αἰτίων, I 14 Περὶ σωμάτων κτλ., in third position at I 15 Περὶ σχημάτων, and again at the beginning of I 16 Περὶ χρωμάτων.

¹⁸ E.g. *Tim.* 46 E 8 in the sense of what came to be called a final cause, *Men.* 72 c 7-8 in that of a formal cause.

¹⁹ E.g. *eth. eud.* B 10. 1227 a 14: τὸ δι' ὃ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἐνεκα (final cause), *metaph.* A 9. 992 a 30-1: αἶτιον, δι' ὃ καὶ πᾶς νοῦς καὶ πᾶσα φύσις ποιεῖ (efficient cause).

xandrinus, an interesting medley of Stoic and other ingredients, where it is frequently found in undeniably Stoicizing passages²⁰. The formula συμβαίνει τι pertains to the effect as actualized according to Stoic doctrine²¹. It is of course well-known that the Stoics held that cause is a body which produces an incorporeal effect in another body²²; this incorporeality is expressed by the use of τι²³.

²⁰ CLEM. ALEX. *strom.* viii 9, 27, 3-4 = CHRYS. fr. 347 S.V.F. ii p. 120; *ibid.* 32, 33-9 = CHRYS. fr. 351 S.V.F. ii pp. 121-2. Cfr. SEXT. EMP. *adv. math.* ix 196-201 = CHRYS. fr. 337 S.V.F. ii p. 118. Also see SEXT. EMP. *pyrh. hyp.* iii 21: τότε γὰρ καὶ ὅτι ἀποτέλεσμα ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ γινώσκειν δοκοῦμεν, ὅταν τὸ αἴτιον αὐτοῦ ὡς αἴτιον αὐτοῦ καταλάβωμεν, and CLEM. ALEX. *strom.* viii 9, 29, 1: πᾶν αἴτιον ὡς αἴτιον <διπλῇ> διανοίᾳ ληπτὸν τυγχάνει, ἐπεὶ τινὸς καὶ πρὸς τινι [cfr. *infra*, text to note 82] νοεῖται: τινὸς μὲν, τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος, καθάπερ ἡ μάχαιρα τοῦ τέμνειν, πρὸς τινι δέ, [καθάπερ] τῷ ἐπιτηδεύειν ἔχοντι, καθάπερ τὸ πῦρ τῷ ξύλῳ· τὸν ἀδάμαντα γὰρ οὐ καύσει, both absent from S.V.F. For αἴτιου ὡς αἴτιου see CHRYS. fr. 336 S.V.F. ii p. 118 *apud* STOB. *anthol.* i 11, 1^c (printed *infra*, Appendix) λόγον τὸν περὶ τοῦ αἰτίου ὡς αἰτίου.

²¹ Cfr. ZEN. fr. 89 S.V.F. i p. 25 and POSID. fr. 95 E.-K. *apud* Arius Didymus (printed *infra*, Appendix) on συμβεβηκός and κατηγορημα. For συμβεβηκός ("actualized predicate") see A.A. LONG-D.N. SEDLEY, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, ii, Cambridge *et al.* 1987, p. 333, and S. BOBZIEN, *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy*, Oxford 1998, pp. 23-7. γίνεται would perhaps be more in line with Stoic usage (see S. BOBZIEN, *Determinism cit.*, pp. 19-27), but cfr. e.g. SEXT. EMP. *adv. math.* xi 22-7 and 33-4 = CHRYS. fr. 75 S.V.F. ii pp. 18-9.

²² E.g. SEXT. EMP. *adv. math.* ix 211 = CHRYS. fr. 341 S.V.F. ii p. 119, and the views of Zeno Chrysippus Posidonius *apud* STOB. *anthol.* i 11, 1^c, printed *infra*, Appendix. See for instance A.A. LONG-D.N. SEDLEY, *op. cit.*, i, Cambridge *et al.* 1987, p. 199, and cfr. *supra*, note 20, *infra*, text to note 82. SENECA. *ep. Luc.* 95, 13 states that *decreta* (e.g. definitions of virtues) are the causes of precepts (*praecepta*) and everything else (*et horum causae sunt et omnium*). I assume that the *decreta* here are not "sayables" (λεκτά) but in order to function as causes have been interiorized, that is to say have been integrated in the regent part of the soul.

²³ Cfr. POSID. fr. 95 E.-K. *apud* STOB. *anthol.* i 11, 1^c (printed *infra*, Appendix): αἴτιον δ' ἐστὶ τινός, δι' ὃ ἐκείνο, and ZEN. fr. 90 S.V.F. i p. 25 *apud* CIC. *ac. post.* i 39, *quicquam* and *aliquid*.

The phrase ἀρκεῖ γὰρ ὑπογραφικῶς has been added by Stobaeus²⁴. The word ὑπογραφικῶς is only found here and at Olympiod. *in Aristot. cat.* p. 44.1, and ps.-Simpl. *in Aristot. de an.* pp. 15.15 and 97.32. The adjective ὑπογραφικός too is late and rare. For ὑπογραφή as the Stoic term for a simpler or preliminary sort of definition see for instance Antipater fr. 23 S.V.F. iii p. 247 *apud* Diog. Laert. vii 60.

(2) Πλάτων τριχῶς τὸ αἴτιον· φησὶ γάρ²⁵, ὅφ' οὐ ἐξ οὐ πρὸς δ'· κυριώτερον δ' ἡγεῖται τὸ ὅφ' οὐ· τοῦτο δὲ ἦν τὸ ποιοῦν, ὃ ἐστὶ νοῦς. For the various strings of causes attributed to Plato see the texts collected and commented upon in the *opus magnum* of Dörrie and Baltes²⁶. The Platonic triad is attested for the first time in the first century BCE, in Varro's explanation of the mysteries of Samothrace²⁷. We do not

²⁴ See J. MANSFELD-D.T. RUNIA, *Aëtiana cit.*, p. 223.

²⁵ φησὶ γάρ is omitted by Stobaeus, presumably because he appends a quotation from Plato (to which we shall revert several times) introduced by the phrase λέγει γοῦν ἐν Τιμαίῳ. φησὶ occurs 37 times in ps.-Plutarch's *Placita* and so is Aëtian. As so often it does not introduce a *verbatim* quotation.

²⁶ [H. DÖRRIE †]-M. BALTES, *Der Platonismus in der Antike*, Bd. iv, *Die philosophische Lehre des Platonismus. Einige grundlegende Axiome/Platonische Physik (im antiken Verständnis) I, Bausteine 101-124*, Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt 1996, pp. 118-201 and 387-538. For the triad see also J. PÉPIN, *Théologie Cosmique et Théologie Chrétienne (Ambroise, Exam. I 1, 14)*, Paris 1964, pp. 17-34, and D.T. RUNIA, *Philo of Alexandria and the 'Timaeus' of Plato* ("Philosophia Antiqua", XLIV), Leiden-New York-Köln 1986, pp. 171-4. For the attribution of principles to Plato in numerous sources see the evidence collected in R.W. SHARPLES, *Counting Plato's Principles*, in L. AYRES (ed.), *The Passionate Intellect*, Festschrift I.C. Kidd ("Rutgers Studies in Classical Humanities", vii), New Brunswick-London 1995, pp. 76-82 (to whose suggestions concerning Aët. i 11, 2 and Aëtius in general, at pp. 77-8, I cannot subscribe).

²⁷ VARRO *antiq. rer. div.* fr. 206 Cardauns *apud* AUGUST. *de civ. Dei* vii 28 = [H. DÖRRIE †]-M. BALTES, *Platonismus cit.*, iv, p. 118, *Baust.* 113.1: *in simulacris aliud significare caelum, aliud terram, aliud exempla re-*

know what was his source for the original triad he used for this allegorical exegesis (it may have been a *Timaeus* commentary, supposing one to have been available which dealt with Plato's principles²⁹), but we do know that (like Cicero) he knew and used a predecessor of Aëtius²⁹, who possibly (but see next paragraph) may have been dependent on such a commentary too. There is a not so insignificant difference: in Aëtius the formal cause is rendered, as it usually is, by the Platonizing formula πρὸς ὅ, in Varro by the Latin equivalent of Greek καθ' ὅ, which is more Aristotelian.

It is however far more probable that the triad of causes is of Peripatetic³⁰ and doxographical origin. Aristotle, discussing the *agrapha dogmata* and the theory of Forms, had argued that Plato only knew *two* causes, viz. the formal and the material cause³¹ (note that he does not use the prepositional formulas

rum quas Plato appellat ideas: caelum Iovem, terram Iunonem, ideas Minervam vulgi [scil. Varro] intellegi; caelum a quo [ὑφ' οὗ] fiat aliquid, terram de qua [ἐξ οὗ] fiat, exemplum secundum [καθ' ὅ - not πρὸς ὅ] quod fiat. See also R.W. SHARPLES, *Counting cit.*, pp. 79-82.

²⁹ See Baltes at [H. DÖRRIE †J.M. BALTES, *Der Platonismus in der Antike*, Bd. III, *Der Platonismus im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert nach Christus*, *Bausteine 73-100*, Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt 1993, pp. 162-6, who dates the first scholastic uses of the *fortlaufende Kommentar* to (at the latest?) the first century BCE.

³⁰ Thus already H. DIELS, *Dox. Graec. cit.*, p. 199 ff.

³¹ Cfr. J. PÉPIN, *Théologie cit.*, p. 33, who writes that the triad «doit provenir en dernière analyse d'une présentation aristotélicienne de Platon», and goes on to argue that this "présentation" must be later than Theophrastus.

³² ARISTOT. *metaph.* A 6. 988 a 7-10: Πλάτων μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ζητούμενων οὕτω διώρισεν· φανερόν δ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι δυοῖν αἰτίαι μόνον κέχρηται, τῇ τε τοῦ τί ἐστὶ καὶ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην κτλ. In his *De philosophia* (PHILO DE AETERN. MUND. 39-43 = ARISTOT. fr. 21 R³, 19 c Ross - provided the attribution is correct) however he discussed and rejected Plato's Demiurge, probably introduced in the discussion for dialectical reasons; see my paper *Providence and the Destruction of the Universe in Early Stoic Thought*, in M.J. VERMASEREN (ed.), *Studies in*

ἐξ οὗ and πρὸς ὅ). Theophrastus concurred as to the number of causes to be attributed to Plato, but disagreed as to what these are. He pointed out that Plato for the most part had dealt with first philosophy (Aristotle's theme in *metaph.* A), but that, as to physics (viz. in the *Timaeus*, from which Theophrastus quotes significant terminology) he had introduced two causes, viz. the material and the efficient cause (note that he does not use the prepositional formulas ἐξ οὗ and πρὸς ὅ). The latter according to Theophrastus he connected with «the power of the god and the good»³². An interpretation of the nature and number of the principles, or causes, in the *Timaeus* accordingly is not a privilege of the commentary literature, but already to be found in Theophrastus' account of the principles of Aristotle's predecessors from Thales to Plato,

Hellenistic Religions ("Études Préliminaires aux Religions Orientales dans l'Empire Romain", LXXVIII), Leiden-New York-Köln 1979, pp. 129-88, esp. p. 142 (repr. with same pagination as Study 1 in my *Studies in Later Greek Philosophy and Gnosticism* ("Collected Studies Series", CCXCII), London 1989). Also cfr. *infra*, note 75 and text thereto.

³² THEOPHR. *phys. opin.* fr. 9 Diels = fr. 230 FHS&G *apud* SIMPL. in *Aristot. phys.* p. 26.11-3: οὗτο τὰς ἀρχὰς βούλεται ποιεῖν, τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὡς ὕλην ὃ προσαγορεύει "πανδεχέξ" [*Tim.* 51 A 7], τὸ δ' ὡς αἰτίον [*Tim.* 29 A 6] καὶ κινεῖν ὃ περιάπτεται τῇ τοῦ "θεοῦ" [e.g. *Tim.* 30 A 2] καὶ τῇ "ἀγαθοῦ" [e.g. *Tim.* 29 E 1, 30 A 2] δυνάμει. The "good" more properly is the final cause, but according to Theophrastus this final cause works as a moving cause (cfr. already Aristotle on Anaxagoras and others at *metaph.* A 3. 984 b 20-2: οἱ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἅμα τοῦ καλῶς τὴν αἰτίαν ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων ἔθεσαν καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ὑπάρχει τοῖς ὄσιν). The doubts concerning the authenticity of this fragment expressed by D.T. RUNIA, *Philo cit.*, p. 482 note 37, are unjustified. See also THEOPHR. *phys. opin.* fr. 20 Diels = fr. 242 FHS&G *apud* PROCL. in *Plat. Tim.* I p. 456.16-7 (apparently *verbatim*), ἡ γὰρ μόνος ἢ μάλιστα Πλάτων («Plato was the only or the principal person») τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ προνοοῦντος [*scil.* the Demiurge] αἰτίᾳ κατεχρήσατο, φησὶν ὁ Θεόφραστος. Cfr. also another quotation (*verbatim*) THEOPHR. fr. 320 A FHS&G *apud* THEMIST. in *Aristot. de an.* p. 108.19-21, «ἐκείνο» φησὶν «ἐπισκεπτόν, ὃ δὲ φαιμεν ἐν πάσῃ φύσει το μὲν ὡς ὕλην καὶ δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ αἰτίον καὶ ποιητικόν».

an account generally believed, also by the present writer, to be one of the sources of physical doxography of the Aëtian type.

If now we combine the accounts of Aristotle and Theophrastus and notice what they share, viz. the material cause, we get the Platonic triad of efficient cause (Theophrastus), material cause (both Aristotle and Theophrastus), and formal cause (Aristotle). To the best of my knowledge this has not been observed before. What I like to call "retrograde contamination" of doxographical literature, for instance with material deriving from Aristotle's school writings or from Plato, is a not uncommon phenomenon³³. And Aristotle's writings may well have been more accessible in Hellenistic times than has been believed on the basis of the story of their being hid in the cellar at Scepsis³⁴. A Platonic triad of causes as expressed by prepositional formulas, attested as we have seen by Varro, is anyhow earlier than Aëtius. Whoever was the first to employ these formulas it is impossible to say³⁵. We shall

³³ H. DIELS, *Dox. Graec. cit.*, pp. 215-7, believed that Aëtius himself is responsible for contamination with Aristotle's esoteric writings. For various examples see J.N.M. BALTUSSEN, *Theophrastus on Theories of Perception: Argument and Purpose in the 'De sensibus'* ("Quaestiones In-finitae", vi), diss. Utrecht 1993, pp. 195-250 (chapter not to be found in the revised version, H. BALTUSSEN, *Theophrastus against the Presocratics and Plato: Peripatetic Dialectic in the 'De sensibus'* ("Philosophia Antiqua", LXXXVI), Leiden-New York-Köln 2000) and my papers *Doxography and Dialectic cit.*, pp. 3090-1, *Doxographical Studies cit.*, pp. 24 and 31, and *Physicai 'Doxai' in the 'Phaedo'*, in M. KARDAUN-J. SPRUYT (eds.), *The Winged Chariot. Collected Essays on Plato and Platonism in Honour of L.M. de Rijk* ("Brill's Studies in Intellectual History", c), Leiden-New York-Köln 2000, pp. 1-17, esp. p. 2 note 7.

³⁴ See J. BARNES, *Roman Aristotle*, in J. BARNES-M. GRIFFIN (eds.), *Philosophia Togata II. Plato and Aristotle at Rome*, Oxford et al. 1997, repr. 1999, pp. 1-69.

³⁵ Note that ALEX. APPIOD. in *Aristot. metaph.* p. 59.28 ff. (= ARISTOT. *de bono* fr. 30 R³, fr. 4 Ross, Test. 22 Gaisler), who criticizes Aristotle's statement at *metaph.* A 6. 988 a 7-10 that Plato only knew two

however find that such evidence as is available indeed points to the Hellenistic period, even later, presumably, than Strato of Lampsacus³⁶.

This triad is consistently paralleled elsewhere in Aëtius, viz. in the chapter "On Principles"; one should be aware of the impact of the originally Aristotelian equivalence of "principles" and "causes" revealed by this parallel³⁷. See Stob. *anthol.* I 10, 16^a at Aët. I 3, 21³⁸, Πλάτων Ἀρίστωνος τρεῖς ἀρχάς, τὸν θεὸν τὴν ὕλην τὴν ἰδέαν, ὅφ' οὐ ἐξ οὐ πρὸς ὃ, ὃ δὲ θεὸς νοῦς ἐστὶ τοῦ κόσμου³⁹, ἡ δὲ ὕλη τὸ ὑποκείμενον γενέσει

causes, does not use the prepositional formulas but standard Aristotelian terminology: ζητήσαι δ' ἂν τις πῶς λέγοντος Πλάτωνος καὶ ποιητικὸν αἰτίον [efficient cause] ἐν οἷς λέγει «τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦ παντὸς εὐρεῖν τε καὶ δεῖξαι ἔργον» [PLAT. *Tim.* 28 c], ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκεν καὶ τέλος [final cause] δι' ὧν πάλιν λέγει «περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλέα πάντα ἐστὶ κάκεινον ἔνεκα πάντα» [PS.-PLAT. *epist.* II 312 E] οὐδετέρου τούτων τῶν αἰτίων ἐμνημόνευσεν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ δόξῃ τῇ Πλάτωνος;

³⁶ Cfr. *infra*, note 93 and text thereto.

³⁷ ARISTOT. *metaph.* Δ 1. 1013 a 16-7: ἰσαχῶς δὲ καὶ τὰ αἰτία λέγεται· πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἰτία ἀρχαί. A 2. 982 a 4-6, A 3. 983 a 24: τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτίων (next the four causes are listed), A 3. 983 b 6-8. See further J. PÉPIN, *Théologie cit.*, pp. 60-7; *Aristotle's De Generatione et Corruptione*, Translated with Notes by C.J.F. WILLIAMS ("Clarendon Aristotle Series"), Oxford 1982, p. 86, and [H. DÖRRIE †]-M. BALTES, *Platonismus cit.*, IV, pp. 378-9.

³⁸ [H. DÖRRIE †]-M. BALTES, *ibid.*, pp. 118-20, *Baust.* 113.2, print the ms. text of ps.-Plutarch (see also *infra*). Diels believed that in this text the words Σωκράτης Σωφρονίσκου Ἀθηναῖος, a second Ἀθηναῖος after Ἀρίστωνος, and αἱ γὰρ αὐταὶ περὶ παντὸς ἑκατέρου δόξαι (which are confirmed by Qusta ibn Luqa) have been interpolated, but they may also have been abridged away by Stobaeus (ethnicon and father's name are frequently found in the lemmas of this chapter). Baltès, at pp. 392-33, who points this out, also reminds us that the three principles doctrine, the definition of matter, and that of God as the intellect of the cosmos belong with the «übliche Lehre des Mittelplatonismus».

³⁹ *Doxa* anachronistically attributed to Thales at Aët. I 7, 11 (the chapter Τίς ἐστὶν ὁ θεός), presumably because he is the archegete of

καὶ φθορᾷ⁴⁰, ἰδέα δὲ οὐσία ἀσώματος ἐν τοῖς νοήμασι καὶ ταῖς φαντασίαις τοῦ θεοῦ⁴¹. God as the intellect of the universe is not, of course, Peripatetic, but Stoic⁴² and Middle Platonist. The positioning of the ideas in the divine intellect is Middle Platonist as well. The description of matter is compatible with Aristotle's views on the subject. The parallels cited in footnotes 39-41 moreover show to what extent lemmas in the *Placita* may be coherent. It should however be pointed out that the parallel text at ps.-Plutarch. *placit.* 897 B lacks the prepositional formulas which accordingly have been abridged away here by the epitomator⁴³.

As to the causes themselves Aëtius posits a distinction: «Plato believes the ὑφ' οὗ, the efficient cause, to be the more potent» of the three (ps.-Plutarch; Stobaeus has "most potent"⁴⁴). The verbal difference between ps.-Plutarch and Sto-

the Ionian succession which has Anaxagoras as a member. Cfr. also I 7, 31 (Plato lemma) νοῦς οὖν ὁ θεός.

⁴⁰ Cfr. the general definition of matter at Aët. I 9, 1.

⁴¹ Cfr. the first part of the general definition of ἰδέα at Aët. I 10, 1.

⁴² See e.g. the abstract from Zeno's Περὶ τοῦ ὅλου *apud* Diog. LAERT. VII 135-6 = ZEN. fr. 102 S.V.F. I p. 28, and CHRYS. fr. 580 S.V.F. II p. 179; further the abstract from Chrysippus' Περὶ προνοίας and Posidonius' Περὶ θεῶν book three *apud* Diog. LAERT. VII 138 = CHRYS. fr. 634 S.V.F. II p. 192 and POSID. fr. 21 E.-K. For the *Placita* see STOB. *anthol.* I 1, 29^b (p. 35.9 W.) at Aët. I 7, 23 = ZEN. fr. 157 S.V.F. I p. 42: Ζήνων ὁ Στωικός νοῦν κόσμου πύρινον (*scil.* τὸν θεὸν ἀπεφώνητο), and Aët. I 7, 33 = CHRYS. fr. 1027 S.V.F. II p. 306: οἱ Στωικοὶ [...] τὸν τ' ἀνωτάτω [*scil.* θεὸν] πάντων νοῦν ἐν αἰθέρι (ps.-PLUTARCH. *placit.* 882 A); STOB. *anthol.* I 1, 29^b (p. 38.3 W.) has νοῦν ἐναυ-θέριον εἶναι θεόν.

⁴³ Ps.-Plutarch's text (again confirmed by Qusta ibn Luqa) also lacks τοῦ κόσμου after ὁ δὲ θεὸς νοῦς ἐστὶ, and adds ὁ δὲ θεὸς νοῦς ἐστὶ τοῦ κόσμου *ad finem* (the latter deleted by Diels, followed by Mau, Lachenaud, and Baltes). Possibly the epitomator first scrapped τοῦ κόσμου, then repented by supplying a clause at the end. There is no difference between ps.-Plutarch and Stobaeus *ad sententiam* here.

⁴⁴ Or, less likely: «he holds that the "by which" is said to be the

baeus is minimal and may be accidental. What is in ps.-Plutarch is sufficiently clear: "more than the other two" is logically equivalent to "most of the three". Yet an explanation of Stobaeus' superlative is perhaps possible. Since the triad of causes is a sort of stenographic rendering of the foundations of the *Timaeus*, the efficient cause, naturally, represents the Demiurge. Plato at *Tim.* 29 A 6 calls the Demiurge «the best of causes (ἄριστος τῶν αἰτιῶν)». Compared to this elative characterization ps.-Plutarch's expression is on the modest side, and Stobaeus' more in tune⁴⁵. This does not prove, however, that Stobaeus' version is what Aëtius wrote, since he may well have introduced a slight but in his view significant change. After the Aëtian Plato lemma (in which as we shall see he made another change too) he appends *Tim.* 28 A-B (see below), from the proem of *Timaeus*' virtual monologue in the dialogue, and 29 A is not so far away.

Furthermore, the statement concerning Plato's view on causality *in general* in Aëtius is also interesting in that it represents an (interpretative) effort to modernize Plato by making him fully concur with the primary importance the efficient cause acquired in the Hellenistic period⁴⁶.

cause more strictly (/properly speaking) than the others» – i.e. *de dicto* rather than *de re*.

⁴⁵ On the striking use of superlatives in the *Timaeus* see D.T. RU-NIA, *Philo cit.*, pp. 104 and 144, and ID., *The Language of Excellence in Plato's 'Timaeus' and Later Platonism*, in S. GERSH-C. KANNENGIESSER (eds.), *Platonism in Late Antiquity* ("Christianity and Judaism in Antiquity", VIII), Notre Dame 1992, pp. 11-37. The formula κυριωτέρων αἰτιῶν occurs once in Aristotle (*de gen. et corr.* B 9. 335 b 35-6), where however it pertains to the formal cause; no parallel in Plato.

⁴⁶ Cfr. M. FREDE, *The Original Notion of Cause*, in his *Essays in Ancient Philosophy*, New York 1987, pp. 125-50. For Plato's not infrequent use of "cause" in the sense of an efficient cause or responsible agent see C. NATALI, *Le Cause del 'Timeo' e la Teoria delle Quattro Cause*, in T. CALVO-L. BRISSON (eds.), *Interpreting the 'Timaeus' - Critias* ("International Plato Studies", IX), Sankt Augustin 1997, pp. 207-13. A useful ana-

The terms ὑφ' οὐ, ἐξ οὐ, πρὸς ὅ, in this sense can hardly be paralleled in Plato's own works, and they never occur in combination. ἐξ οὐ, for instance, as a rule has a temporal meaning⁴⁷. ἐξ οὐ is however quite often found in Aristotle as a *siglum* for matter *tout court* (also for matter *qua* cause, and for proximate matter)⁴⁸, sometimes combined with ὑφ' οὐ as *siglum* for the efficient cause⁴⁹. There are also a few more or less coincidental instances of πρὸς ὅ in a teleological sense in Aristotle⁵⁰, but this too is not standard terminology and πρὸς ὅ is not, as far as I have been able to see, combined anywhere in Aristotle with either ὑφ' οὐ or ἐξ οὐ. Even so, Aristotle's occasional combination ἐξ οὐ plus ὑφ' οὐ may well have been one of the points of departure of the prepositional string as applied to Plato, and should be seen in relation to the attributions of causes to Plato by Aristotle and Theophrastus analyzed above. We may further quote the interesting triad of material, efficient and formal causes as expressed in part by propositional formulas (one of which however is different from its "Platonic" equivalent, viz. with εἰς instead of πρὸς), to be found at *metaph.* A 3. 1069 b 36-1070 a 2 πᾶν γὰρ μεταβάλλει τι [material cause] καὶ ὑπό τινος [efficient cause] καὶ εἷς τι⁵¹ [formal cause]: ὑφ' οὐ [efficient cause]

lysis of Plato's causal doctrine is provided by D. SEDLEY, *Platonic Causes*, «Phronesis», XLIII (1998) pp. 114-32, but Plato's more important points and arguments are not an issue in the *Placita* lemma. – Galen's view is different from that of the *Placita* lemma, see *infra*, note 90.

⁴⁷ At PLAT. *Crat.* 398 c, and *Tim.* 36 b 5-6 and 54 a 7 ἐξ οὐ does not pertain to the "matter" of the *Timaeus*.

⁴⁸ E.g. ARISTOT. *phys.* B 3. 194 b 23-195 a 3; *pol.* A 8. 1256 a 8-11; *de cael.* Γ 1. 298 b 31; *metaph.* Γ 5. 1010 a 20-1, Δ 2. 1013 a 24; *de gen. anim.* B 1. 733 b 31-2.

⁴⁹ ARISTOT. *metaph.* Γ 5. 1010 a 20-1; *de gen. anim.* B 1. 733 b 31-2.

⁵⁰ ARISTOT. *eth. nic.* H 11. 1152 b 1-3; *metaph.* Θ 3. 1046 b 37-1047 a 1.

⁵¹ εἷς τι is moreover standardly used by Aristotle for the change or development from *a* to *b* or conversely, e.g. *de cael.* A 8. 277 a 14-5: ὅλως γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον ἐκ τινος εἰς τι μεταβάλλει, καὶ ταῦτα ἐξ οὐ

μέν, τοῦ πρώτου κινούντος· ὁ [material cause] δέ, ἡ ὕλη· εἰς ὁ [formal cause] δέ, τὸ εἶδος. Aristotle's terminology is not always the same⁵².

Stobaeus is of some help in our present context, moreover, for in the *Timaeus* proof-text he usefully appends to the Lëtian Plato lemma (see also above) he succeeds in finding parallels for the prepositions ὑπό and πρὸς: *Tim.* 28 A-B, πᾶν δὲ αὐτὸ γινόμενον ὑπ' αἰτίου τινός [efficient cause⁵³] ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεσθαι· παντὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γένεσιν σχεῖν, ὅταν οὖν ὁ δημιουργὸς [efficient cause] πρὸς [formal cause⁵⁴] τὸ κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχον βλέπων αἰεὶ κτλ. What is more,

καὶ εἰς ὁ εἶδει διαφέρει, and the standard formula found at *metaph.* A 3. 983 b 8-9: ἐξ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅπαντα τὰ ὄντα καὶ ἐξ οὐ γίγνεται πρῶτου καὶ εἰς ὁ φθείρεται τελευταῖον, cfr. K 10. 1066 b 36-7; *eth. nic.* K 3. 1173 b 5-6; *phys.* Γ 5. 204 b 33-4 and Θ 3. 254 a 11-4, and *de gen. et corr.* A 3. 317 b 24-5. So also Theophrastus, e.g. *phys. opin.* fr. 2 Diels *apud* SIMPL. in *Aristot. phys.* p. 24.18-9 (= fr. 226A FHS&G): ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσις ἔστι τοῖς οὐσί, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι. D. FEHLING, *Die Wiederholungsfiguren und ihr Gebrauch bei den Griechen vor Gorgias*, Berlin 1969, p. 217, points out that such balanced formulas must have been quite common; apart from Aristotle and Theophrastus he cites XENOPH. 21 B 27 D.-K. and the final sentence of DIOG. APOLL. 64 B 2 D.-K. = fr. 4 Laks. See further *infra*, note 96 and text thereto. Interesting echo at PLUTARCH. *sept. sapient. conviv.* 159 c: ἀπόλλυται γὰρ ἐξ οὐ πέφυκε τὸ μεταβάλλον εἰς ἄλλο.

⁵² Cfr. also the somewhat different series ὑφ' οὐ [efficient cause] – τι or καὶ ὁ [formal cause] – ἐξ οὐ [material cause] at *metaph.* Z 6. 1032 a 15-25 (on various senses of φύσις). At Δ 18. 1022 a 14-26 καὶ ὁ is explicitly said to be used in four senses, viz. in the same four as αἰτίον (see further *infra*, section IV at subsection (a)). For εἷς τι see previous note.

⁵³ Cfr. D.T. RUNIA, *Philo. cit.*, p. 104.

⁵⁴ This passage from the *Timaeus* is the first of the selection of passages from the dialogue printed [H. DÖRRIE †]-M. BALTES, *Platonismus cit.*, IV, pp. 110-3, *Baust.* 111.0, where the proposition πρὸς occurs several times. Baltes at pp. 379-81 points out that *de facto* four types of cause (*efficiens*, *exemplaris*, *finalis* and *materialis*) are to be discerned here, so that perhaps these Timaeian passages were where later exegetes found them.

at *anthol.* 1 11, 3 in his chapter “On Matter” he likewise helpfully appends a quotation from the *Timaeus* to the Aëtian Plato lemma (Aët. 1 9, 5), viz. 50 bd on the ἐκμαγεῖον – though no verbal parallel for the formula ἐξ οὐ is to be found there. These two quotations help us to understand in what way some Platonists in retrospect may have looked for proof-texts pertaining to the prepositional triad of Platonic causes in the master’s own oeuvre, but this is by the way.

The final part of the Aëtian Plato lemma has it that the ὑφ’ οὐ is the more (or most) potent cause, and adds (ps.-Plutarch’s text, who *qua* epitomator is not likely to have added anything here): τοῦτο δ’ ἦν τὸ ποιοῦν, ὃ ἐστι νοῦς³⁵. Stobaeus omits the words ὃ ἐστι νοῦς. The reason for this omission, we may believe, is that the explanatory *Timaeus* quotation he appends mentions the Demiurge (called ποιητής by Plato at *Tim.* 28 c 3, a passage not cited by Stobaeus). The first thing to be pointed out is that the Aëtian formula τὸ ποιοῦν meaning the efficient cause can be paralleled from Theophrastus, in a passage where we also find νοῦς in combination with the prepositional formula ὑφ’ οὐ. In the fragment from the *Physikai Doxai* dealing with Plato³⁶ the term is not ποιοῦν but κινουῦν (just as in Eudemus’ formulation of Aristotle’s four types of cause *apud* Simpl. in *Aristot. phys.* p. 332.6 = fr. 52 Wehrli, *verbatim*). But in other fragments of the same work we find the term ποιοῦν. See *phys. opin.* fr. 6 Diels = Theophr. fr. 227 C FHS&G (on Parmenides) *apud* Alex. Aphrod. in *Aristot. metaph.* p. 31.14-5, *verbatim*: δύο ποιῶν τὰς ἀρχάς, πῦρ καὶ γῆν, τὸ μὲν ὡς ὕλην τὸ δὲ ὡς αἴτιον καὶ ποιοῦν. Also compare *phys. opin.* fr. 4 Diels = Theophr. fr. 228 A FHS&G (on Anaxagoras)³⁷ *apud*

³⁵ Note that after νοῦς the words τοῦ κόσμου, found in the parallel passage quoted *supra*, text to note 39, are absent. So is the god, also found in the parallel passage.

³⁶ Quoted *supra*, note 32.

³⁷ Theophrastus here revises Aristotle’s view, according to which Anaxagoras (and Hermotimus?) were the first to introduce Intellect as

Simpl. in *Aristot. phys.* p. 27.4 + 15-6 + 21-2: τὴν ἐλλείπουσαν αἰτίαν ἀνεπλήρωσε [...] τῆς δὲ κινήσεως καὶ τῆς γενέσεως αἰτίον ἐπέστησε τὸν νοῦν ὁ Ἀναξαγόρας, ὑφ’ οὗ κτλ. [...], accordingly συμβαίνει δύο τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτὸν λέγειν τὴν τε τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν. As a matter of fact τὸ ποιοῦν indicating the efficient cause can already be found in Aristotle³⁸, while ποιητικὸν αἴτιον for the efficient cause occurs quite often, e.g. *Aristot. de gen. et corr.* A 7. 324 b 13-4, and is also used by Theophrastus³⁹.

There is no lack of parallels for this phraseology in Aëtius. Anaximander is criticized (ps.-Plutarch. *placit.* 876 A, a criticism absent from the parallel lemma in Stobaeus) because he spoke of matter only and left out the ποιοῦν αἴτιον (Aët. 1 3, 3). So is his follower Anaximenes (in both sources) at Aët. 1 3, 4⁴⁰. Further see ps.-Plutarch. *placit.* 876 D at Aët. 1 3, 24, where Anaxagoras (as in Aristotle and Theophrastus) is made to introduce τὸ [...] ποιοῦν αἴτιον τὸν νοῦν. Also compare Aët. 1 3, 8 (both sources; Pythagoras lemma), τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον καὶ εἰδικόν [ps.-Plutarch; ἰδίον Stobaeus], ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοῦς ὁ θεός (ps.-Plutarch’s Arabic translator Qusta ibn Luqa has, in Daiber’s rendering: «... die wirkende, spezielle

the cause of what is good and of motion (*metaph.* A 3. 984 b 15-22). The fact that Anaxagoras himself spoke of *Nous* is irrelevant insofar as Aristotle’s and Theophrastus’ impact on later doxography is concerned.

³⁸ *ARISTOT. metaph.* Δ 2. 1013 b 23-5: τὸ δὲ σπέρμα καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς καὶ ὁ βουλευσας καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν, πάντα ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἢ στάσεως, *phys.* B 3. 194 b 29-32: ἐτι ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἢ πρώτη ἢ τῆς ἡρεμῆσεως, οἷον ὁ βουλευσας αἴτιος, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ τέκνου, καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιουμένου καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον τοῦ μεταβαλλομένου, *de gen. et corr.* B 9. 335 b 27. Cfr. already PLAT.(?) *Hipp. ma.* 296 E: τὸ ποιοῦν δὲ γ’ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ αἴτιον, and the *Cratylus* passages quoted *infra*, section IV at subsection (b), and in note 109.

³⁹ Cfr. *ARISTOT. de an.* Γ 5. 430 a 11-3; for Theophrastus see *supra*, note 32 *ad fin.*

⁴⁰ See also *infra*, note 85.

Ursache ..., nämlich Gott {- mächtig und erhaben ist er -} ⁶¹ und der Verstand» ⁶².

Accordingly what in the present lemma may at first glance look like Stoic or Middle Platonist terminology in Aëtius – and so would be acceptable, even normal, in a Stoicizing or Middle Platonist context where it would not stand out – has most of its roots in the early Peripatos. The πρὸς ὃ, more difficult to parallel in Aristotle, looks like the addition of specifically Timaeian material. This is of some importance for understanding the continuity characterizing the doxographic tradition that is at issue here. And as a shorthand rendering of the foundations of Plato's account in the *Timaeus* the *Propositionsreihe* is not bad at all, in fact can hardly be bettered although, naturally, it fails to preserve Plato's finer points ⁶³.

A final remark. The Platonic triad of causes, or principles, has been interpreted as having a specifically metaphysical colouring, metaphysical in the old-fashioned sense of the word. But on the one hand the prepositional formulas themselves are quite ordinary, even colloquial Greek, and on the other one should take the existence of strings of prepositional formulas into account which have no metaphysical purport at all. The Platonic string is not “metaphysical” in itself, but *became* metaphysical because of its extension, viz. because of the Timaeian entitles these formulas refer to ⁶⁴.

⁶¹ Added by the pious translator, or a gloss by a pious reader.

⁶² Cfr. SENECA, *ep. Luc.* 65.12: *quaerimus, quid sit causa? ratio scilicet faciens, id est deus.*

⁶³ For the deformations see J. PÉPIN, *Théologie cit.*, pp. 18-25.

⁶⁴ For these metaphysics see e.g. H. DÖRRIE, *Präpositionen cit.* For other strings see *infra* at III (4) on Aristotle, note 75 and text thereto for “the Peripatetics” and a string in Sextus Empiricus, and note 102 for a Stoic doctrine. Strings of prepositions also occur in the *New Testament: epist. Roman.* 11:36, ὅτι ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ δι’ αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα, cfr. *1 epist. Corinth.* 8:6, *epist. Coloss.* 1:16, *epist. Hebr.* 2:10. For the relation to Greek philosophy see the account of G.H. VAN KOOTEN, *The Pauline Debate on the Cosmos*, Leiden 2001, pp. 111-3.

(3) Πυθαγόρας Ἀριστοτέλης τὰ μὲν πρῶτα αἷτια ἀσώματα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ μετοχὴν ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τῆς σωματικῆς ὑποστάσεως, ὥστ’ εἶναι τὸν κόσμον σῶμα. A complicated lemma ⁶⁵. For the Aëtian combination Pythagoras plus Aristotle compare Aët. II 23, 6 (ps.-Plutarch. 890 E only) Πλάτων Πυθαγόρας Ἀριστοτέλης, IV 20, 1 and V 4, 2 (ps.-Plutarch. 902 F and 905 B only) and II 10, 1 (both sources) Πυθαγόρας Πλάτων Ἀριστοτέλης. We have noticed above that Stobaeus omitted the name-label Aristotle because he inserted a lemma on Aristotle taken from Arius Didymus.

Pythagoras – Plato – Aristotle, or, more briefly (in the present chapter Plato has his own lemma) Pythagoras – Aristotle. What I believe is that what we have in these Aëtian passages is one of earliest surviving explicit attestations of the constructed Pythagorean *diadoche*, or succession, later also found in Nicomachus of Gerasa and Hippolytus ⁶⁶. In a way this construction has its roots in Aristotle himself, who in his critical historical overview at *metaph.* A 6 links Plato not only with Socrates and Heraclitus but also and even especially with the Pythagoreans (not: Pythagoras), though he emphasizes the differences ⁶⁷. The most important of these differences

⁶⁵ Useful comments at W. BURKERT, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism*, Cambridge MA 1972, pp. 59-60.

⁶⁶ For Nicomachus see my *Prolegomena Mathematica from Apollonius of Perga to the Late Neoplatonists* (“Philosophia Antiqua”, LXXX), Leiden-New York-Köln 1998, pp. 86-7, 118. Especially note NICOMACH. *intr. arithm.* II 28, 1 at p. 140.14-6 Hoche: Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle. For Hippolytus see my *Heresiography in Context: Hippolytus’ ‘Elenchos’ as a Source for Greek Philosophy* (“Philosophia Antiqua”, LVI), Leiden-New York-Köln 1992, pp. xv-xvii and *passim*.

⁶⁷ For the less cautious contribution of the early Academy and Theophrastus see W. BURKERT, *Lore cit.*, pp. 62-6, and, for its influence on the later traditions, pp. 53-83. But *pace* Burkert the inclusion of Aristotle in several Aëtian lemmas (cited *supra*, text after note 65) makes the derivation of these lemmas from Theophrastus most unlikely.

is that Plato according to Aristotle was the first to introduce the distinction between what is corporeal and what is incorporeal⁶⁸.

The construction of a *diadoche* of the kind mentioned above leaves ample room for the attribution of tenets to a particular member, or members, of the succession, or *hairesis*: Platonic doctrine may with a clear conscience be attributed to the purported *archegetes* Pythagoras, or even to Plato's pupil Aristotle. Conversely, Peripatetic doctrines may be attributed to an early Pythagorean, as in the pseudo-Pythagorean tract *On the Nature of the All* published as if written by "Ocellus", presumably to be dated to the second century BCE, or in the *Περὶ τῶν καθόλου λόγων* of "Archytas" based on Aristotle's *Categories*, to be dated not later than the first century CE. To a remarkable degree this is the case also here. Timaeus, Plato's fictional spokesperson in the dialogue, is represented as (or was believed to be) a Pythagorean⁶⁹, and the dogmatic pseudo-Pythagorean tract *On the Nature of Cosmos and Soul* by "Timaeus Locrus" was written to prove that Plato had taken over the main doctrines of the *Timaeus* from the Pythagoreans, or at the very least written by someone who sincerely believed (just as the early Academics and Theophrastus as well as, to a considerable extent, Aristotle) that Plato belongs with the tradition of Pythagorean philosophy. As Franco Ferrari pointed out to me during the discussion following the oral presentation at Rome, the present lemma has as its background Plato's distinction between *two* kinds of causes at *Tim.* 46 c-e (which has no counterpart in "Timaeus Locrus"). The *Timaeus*, I have come to believe, really was a

⁶⁸ See W. BURKERT, *Lore cit.*, pp. 30-2.

⁶⁹ See M. BALTES, *Timaios Lokros. Über die Natur des Kosmos und der Seele* ("Philosophia Antiqua", xxi), Leiden-New York-Köln 1972, pp. 1-4, and W. MARG (ed.), *Timaeus Locrus. De Natura Mundi et Animae* ("Philosophia Antiqua", xxiv), Leiden-New York-Köln 1972, pp. 83-5.

kind of super-market for ancient exegetes, who managed to find there all and whatever they wanted or needed.

At *Tim.* 46 c-e "Timaeus" (*i.e.* Plato) states that there is one type of causes that are primary (αἰτίας πρώτας) because they belong with intelligent nature and the soul, which is invisible (ἀόρατον) in contrast to the four elements, all of which are visible bodies (σώματα πάντα ὁρατά). The soul and intelligence, we may infer, are incorporeal, and so are the primary causes. The other type of causes, called auxiliary (συναίτια) and secondary (δευτέρας) by Plato – though people in general, he says, consider them to be primary – , are moved by others and move others through the force of necessity (κατὰ ἀνάγκης). The term ἀνάγκη is suggestive: in some passages it is one of Plato's names for what later came to be called the material principle⁷⁰. The secondary causes belong with the elements which are bound up with the material principle Plato elsewhere calls «the errant kind of cause» (τὸ τῆς πλανωμένης εἶδος αἰτίας, *Tim.* 48 A 6-7).

In the Aëtian lemma this doctrine of the *Timaeus* is summarized as τὰ μὲν πρῶτα αἴτια ἀσώματα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ μετοχὴν ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τῆς σωματικῆς ὑποστάσεως. We observe that πρῶτα αἴτια corresponds to Plato's αἰτίας πρώτας and in fact is directly derived therefrom, and that their attribute ἀσώματα represents his ἀόρατον. The peculiar formula σωματική ὑπόστασις ("corporeal substructure") corresponds to

⁷⁰ E.g. *Tim.* 47 E 5-48 A 2: μεμειγμένη γὰρ οὖν ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις ἐξ Ἀνάγκης τε καὶ Νοῦ συστάσεως ἐγεννήθη. See further F.M. CORNFORD, *Plato's Cosmology. The 'Timaeus' of Plato Translated with a Running Commentary*, London 1948 and later repr., pp. 159-77, on "Reason and Necessity".

⁷¹ No parallels earlier than a number of Christian writers (Basil, Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, Epiphanius), and the late Platonists Proclus, Simplicius, and Philoponus. The term ὑπόστασις occurs several times in Aëtius, in the sense of "material" (STOB. *anthol.* I 12, 1^a at AËT. I 10, 1; PS.-PLUTARCH. *placit.* 910 D at AËT. V 27, 1), or in opposition to ἐμφασις

Plato's σώματα and ἀνάγκη (or rather Ἀνάγκη). The (Platonic) relation of these causes to the material principle is expressed by the originally Platonic concept of participation (μετοχή). I believe this pertains in the first place to "Pythagoras". "Aristotle" is brought in by means of Aristotle's technical term συμβεβηκός, used a shade καταχρηστικῶς. It has to be acknowledged that (like "Pythagoras") he posited the existence of primary incorporeal causal entities, viz. the First Mover or First Movers; though these apparently are final rather than efficient causes, *qua* "First" they may indeed be called "first causes". κατὰ συμβεβηκός seems to embrace all the Aristotelian causal factors which are bound up with matter. What is interesting is that "matter" itself is not presented as a cause here (quite un-Aristotelian!), but as something in which the causal factors inhere. Stobaeus really was on the right track when he deleted "Aristotle" from the Aëtius lemma and substituted the abstract from Arius Didymus on the four Aristotelian types of cause.

If the above analysis is correct, we have also found an explanation for the final phrase ὥστ' εἶναι τὸν κόσμον σῶμα, found in ps.-Plutarch only. Diels considered this to have been interpolated⁷². But a *non sequitur* it is not: the cosmos would not be produced as *apotelesma* in the form of body if the corporeal qualities (resulting from participation) were not present in "matter". This is good Platonic doctrine, set out in the *Timaeus*. See *Tim.* 32 B 8-C 2, where τὸ τοῦ κόσμου σῶμα (for which cfr. also 28 B 8) comes into being as a whole consisting of the four elements⁷³; as we are to learn shortly

(STOB. I 26, 5 at Aët. II 31, 5; Aët. III 5, 1, both sources; ps.-PLUTARCH. 894 F-895 A at Aët. III 6) or to νόημα (STOB. I 8, 14 at Aët. I 22, 6, and once in its original sense (ps.-PLUTARCH. 895 D at Aët. III 9, 5). ps.-PLUTARCH. 901 B at Aët. IV 14, 2 is corrupt.

⁷² *Dox. Graec. cit.*, pp. 61, 65: "inepta additamenta". He blamed Aëtius himself, or a dumb *scriba*.

⁷³ Apparently a well-known passage, discussed by PLUTARCH. *de an.*

(*Tim.* 53 C-55 C, 55 D-E, 56 C) these elements themselves are constituted of the prime material factor and the incorporeal triangles and polyedra which determine their respective characters. One may add by the way that the doctrine that the cosmos is a body is also Stoic, see e.g. Chrys. fr. 550 S.V.F. II p. 173 *apud* Plutarch. *de stoic. rep.* 1054 E-F, a *verbatim* quotation from the second book of Chrysippus' *On Motion*: τέλεον μὲν ὁ κόσμος σῶμά ἐστιν. And ps.-Plutarch. 886 E at Aët. II 4, 1-2 (which actually in this author is a single lemma, not two), summarizing no less than three Aëtian lemmas (cfr. Stob. *anthol.* I 21, 6^c; 20, 1^a, and 20, 1^f at Aët. II 4, 1; 4, 2 and 4, 7), states that according to Pythagoras, Plato, and the Stoics the cosmos is corporeal, a statement that is consistent with the ὥστ' εἶναι τὸν κόσμον σῶμα in the other lemma.

Aristotle himself once makes a distinction between two types of causes similar to that found in Plato's *Timaeus*. In chapters nine and ten of the second book of the *De generatione et corruptione* he discusses the causes of coming to be and passing away in general. He naturally argues that the material as well as the formal cause are involved; note that the latter is explicitly said to include the final cause (*de gen. et corr.* B 9. 335 b 7: ὥς δὲ τὸ οὐ ἐνεκεν ἢ μορφῇ καὶ τὸ εἶδος). But he insists that we also need a third cause of continuous coming to be and passing away. This turns out to be the cause of motion and change, or the efficient cause, specified in chapter ten as the «motion along the inclined circle» (B 10. 336 a 32)⁷⁴. Now Aristotle argues that his predecessors only dreamed of this third type of cause and were never explicit about it⁷⁵. He

procr. 1016 D-E, 1017 A; quoted EUS. *praep. evang.* XI 32, 2 and XIII 18, 4 and STOB. *anthol.* I 20, 9^c. Also cfr. Aët. I 6, 4.

⁷⁴ Passage discussed by J. PÉPIN, *Théologie cit.*, pp. 24, 65-7, but not in relation to the present Aëtian lemma.

⁷⁵ This is somewhat surprising in view of what he says about Anaxagoras Hesiod Parmenides Empedocles at *metaph.* A 3. 984 b 8-4. 985 b 3, though we should take his rider into account (985 a 10-8: «They

then gives two examples (B 9. 335 b 9-336 a 12), viz. Socrates in the *Phaedo*, who argues that the Forms are causes of coming to be and passing away, and others (viz., the early materialists, whose view is to be preferred to that of "Socrates") who believed that matter itself, e.g. the hot, or fire, is the cause of motion. Both these options, naturally, are argued against and rejected. It is not entirely to be precluded that Aristotle has *Tim.* 46 c-e in mind, since he stands Plato's hierarchic order on its head and in this dialectical context prefers the point of view of those who according to the *Timaeus* passage call those causes primary which according to Plato are secondary. We notice anyway to what extent the Aëtian lemma distorts Aristotle's view by attributing to him the exact reverse of what he believed. And we also see that this lemma attributes to "Pythagoras" the Platonic distinction between corporeal and incorporeal entities which according to Aristotle (*metaph.* A 6, see above) the Pythagoreans did not make⁷⁶.

(4) οἱ Περιπατητικοὶ τῶν αἰτίων εἶναι τὰ μὲν αἰσθητά, τὰ δὲ νοητά. Several chapters in Aëtius feature "Aristotle" as well as "the Peripatetic(s)", in separate lemmas⁷⁷, so what we have in the present chapter is no exception. At Aët. *placit.* II 3 "Aristotle" (in both sources) is found in lemma three, "Heraclides and all the Peripatetics" in lemma five. Stob. *anthol.* I 49, 1^b at Aët. *placit.* IV 3, 10 has the name-label "Xenarchus

seem to have come into contact with two of the causes which we have defined in our *On Nature*, viz. the material and the moving cause, *but only vaguely so and in no way clearly*, etc.) It also is quite surprising that the Demiurge is not mentioned (see *supra*, note 31). Obviously Aristotle did not take the god of the *Timaeus* any more seriously than he did Parmenides' *Daimon* or Hesiod's *Eros*, but he could have mentioned him nevertheless.

⁷⁶ Cfr. W. BURKERT, *Lore cit.*, p. 60.

⁷⁷ I here simply follow Diels' questionable reconstruction but have checked the sources.

the Peripatetic" (Aristotle occurs in IV 2, 6, both sources again; chapters IV 2 and IV 3, on the soul *qua* incorporeal and *qua* corporeal, belong together). The other cases with the name-label "Peripatetics" derive from Stobaeus.

Stob. *anthol.* I 50, 3 at Aët. *placit.* IV 8, 4 (in the chapter "On Sense-Perception and the Senses", where "Aristotle" is at 8, 6) has an interesting lemma with prepositional formulas and a blend of Stoic and Peripatetic terminology: κατὰ τοὺς Περιπατητικοὺς τετραχῶς: ἐξ οὗ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, δι' οὗ τὸ ὄργανον καὶ αἰσθητήριον, καθ' ὃ ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ <οὐ> ἔνεκα τὸ αἰσθητόν⁷⁸. I had some doubt as to whether this lemma really is Aëtian rather than Didymean, for the introductory κατὰ τοὺς cannot be paralleled in ps.-Plutarch or, for that matter, in Aëtian lemmas found in Stobaeus only. The usual formula is οἱ (δέ). There is a single parallel for κατὰ τοὺς in Arius Didymus, viz. in the account of Stoic ethics at Stob. *anthol.* II 7, 7 p. 79, 14 W., κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς αἰρέσεως ταύτης. But this is not enough. What is more, in favour of Aëtian authorship is the fact that the lemmas at Aët. II 8, 2-4 are arranged according to a numerical sequence: Epicurus two factors, Plato three, the Peripatetics four.

⁷⁸ The δι' οὗ of this lemma for the ὄργανον is paralleled in Philo (see *infra*, note 97) and in Sextus Empiricus, see immediately below; ἐξ οὗ does not pertain to matter but apparently to the moving cause, while καθ' ὃ for the *energeia* apparently pertains to the specific effort one has to make. One is reminded of Sextus Empiricus' use of prepositional formulas in a similar context, viz. in his discussion of the criterion at *pyrrh. hyp.* II 22-84 (chapter 5: περὶ τοῦ ὑφ' οὗ, 6 περὶ τοῦ δι' οὗ, 7 περὶ τοῦ καθ' ὃ) and *adv. math.* VII 263-313, 320-34, 343-58, 370-9, 388 ff. Announced at *pyrrh. hyp.* II 16: τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον λέγοιτ' ἂν τριχῶς, τὸ ὑφ' οὗ [efficient cause] καὶ τὸ δι' οὗ [instrumental cause] καὶ τὸ καθ' ὃ [specific effort], οἷον ὑφ' οὗ μὲν ἄνθρωπος, δι' οὗ δὲ ἦτοι αἰσθησις ἢ διάνοια καθ' ὃ δὲ ἡ προσβολὴ τῆς φαντασίας, καθ' ἣν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐπιβάλλει κρίνειν διὰ τινος τῶν προειρημένων. The sense of these formulas is in some cases different, but the agreement as to the use of δι' οὗ and καθ' ὃ is noteworthy.

In the same Aëtian chapter there is another lemma with the name-label “the Peripatetics”, Stob. *anthol.* I 50, 16 at Aët. *placit.* IV 8, 14: οἱ Περιπατητικοὶ οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν συγκαταθέσεως τὰς αἰσθήσεις, οὐ μὲντοι συγκαταθέσεις. But Stob. I 50, 14-6 at Aët. IV 8, 12-4 is a sort of appendix to this chapter, listing differing tenets concerned with κατάληψις and συγκατάθεσις with (in succession) the name-labels Stoics, Academics, and Peripatetics. It may, or may not, originally have been (part of) a separate Aëtian, or even proto-Aëtian, chapter⁷⁹.

Next is Stob. *anthol.* I 50, 23 at Aët. *placit.* IV 9, 7, in the chapter “Whether the Senses are Veridical” (where Aristotle is at 9, 3; Stobaeus only): οἱ Περιπατητικοὶ παρὰ τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν αἰσθητηρίων [*scil.* τὰς κατὰ μέρος αἰσθήσεις γίνεσθαι], as opposed to the pores theory of the lemma which comes before. In this chapter too there is a second lemma with this name-label, Stob. I 50, 29 at Aët. IV 9, 12: οἱ Περιπατητικοὶ τῶν νοητῶν [*scil.* τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς λύπας εἶναι]· οὐ γὰρ πᾶσι φαίνεται τὰ αὐτὰ ἡδέα τε καὶ λυπηρὰ καθάπερ λευκά τε καὶ μέλανα. The *diaphonia* here is with Epicurus in the preceding lemma, to whom the view is ascribed that pleasures and pains derive from the perception of sensibles.

The last item to be mentioned is from ps.-Plutarch’s proem, *placit.* 874 F at Aët. *placit.* prooem. 3. Here “Aristotle and Theophrastus and all the Peripatetics” are cited for their view on the division of philosophy. No difference, let alone disagreement. This harmony puts the distinctions between Aristotle and the Peripatetics as set out in the chapters cited above into sharper relief. In some cases it clearly was of some relevance to point this out, just as throughout the *Placita* differences between the Stoics in general and individual members of the school, or between Plato and other Academics are not infrequently highlighted. Accordingly this also holds for

⁷⁹ See *supra*, note 15 and text thereto.

the causal doctrines of Aristotle (and Pythagoras ...) and the Peripatetics at Aët. *placit.* I 13, though the difference as formulated, as we have seen, is more a question of wording and perspective than of content. The reason behind the mention of both Aristotle (and Pythagoras ...) and the Peripatetics may be that in the third lemma Aristotle belongs with the platonizing Pythagorean succession, or *hairesis*, and that the Peripatetics *qua* school had to be listed too – a school which in this context, *i.e.* on the basis of the tenet attributed to it, is a branch of the Pythagorean *hairesis*.

(5) οἱ Στωικοὶ πάντα τὰ αἷτια σωματικά· πνεύματα γάρ. For the well-established fact that according to the Stoics causes are corporeal see e.g. Ar. Didym. fr. 18 Diels *apud* Stobaeum, quoted *infra*, Appendix. What may be noticed is that πάντα before τὰ αἷτια not only brings out the *diaphonia* with Pythagoras, Aristotle, and the Peripatetics, but also leaves room for distinctions between different types of causes. We know that the Stoics distinguished between antecedent and containing causes, and also spoke of perfect and supplementary causes⁸⁰. But as far as we know Aëtius was not interested in these differences; even the far more detailed Arius Didymus abstract just cited provides no information on this score. The reason for their corporeality as given in this lemma, viz. that they are “breaths”, and so parts of the divine *Pneuma* which is the ποιούν *par excellence*, pertains to their active rôle and internal strength⁸¹. Only bodies can act, for only bodies

⁸⁰ Overview at R.J. HANKINSON, *Cause and Explanation in Greek Thought*, Oxford 1998, pp. 238-52.

⁸¹ See CIC. *top.* 58: *unum* [*scil.* *genus causarum est*] *quod vi sua id quod sub eam vim subiectum est certe efficit*, on which see P.L. DONINI, *Fato e volontà umana in Crisippo*, «Atti dell’Accademia delle Scienze di Torino», CIX (1974-75) pp. 1-43, esp. pp. 3-4, and *de fat.* 42-3 on which see ID., *Fato cit.*, pp. 4-10, and M. FREDE, *Original Notion cit.*, pp. 139-40; also S. BOBZIEN, *Determinism cit.*, p. 53 note 97, and at greater

possess pneumatic force. But we should acknowledge that this lemma merely characterizes the causes *qua* corporeal, not *qua* causes; for information about the latter we have to turn for instance to the abstract from Arius Didymus *apud* Stobaeum. Assuming one may use later terminology: to be a (body with) *pneuma*, *scil.* a ὑποκείμενον ποιόν and πῶς ἔχον is a necessary condition for being a cause, but not a sufficient one. To be a cause a body also has to be a πρὸς τί (or τινί) πῶς ἔχον. And this τί or τινί must be an ἐπιτηδείως ἔχον⁸².

(6) Θαλῆς καὶ οἱ ἐφεξῆς τὸ πρῶτον αἷτιον ἀκίνητον ἀπεφώνησαν. At first glance this is odd, even if we are prepared to take Thales and his following (οἱ ἐφεξῆς) *cum grano salis*. But we should not do so. A closer look demonstrates how a doxographical lemma on Thales *c.s.* can state that these philosophers believed the First Cause to be immobile. We do know that the early Ionian monists posited a single principle (Aristotelian term) only. Aristotle criticizes them for precisely this reason at *metaph.* A 3. 983 b 6-18: they posit a single material substance as element and principle of things, which remains what and as it is because according to them nothing comes to be or perishes *simpliciter* (τοῦτο στοιχεῖον καὶ ταύτην ἀρχὴν φασιν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε γίνεσθαι οὐθὲν οἶονται οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὥς τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως ἀεὶ σφωζομένης). Even if we force ourselves to disregard the a-historical treatment of the early monists as a sort of crypto-Eleatics⁸³, the fact remains that according to Aristotle their single principle, or cause, in itself remains *unchanged* (not affected by coming to be and passing away insofar as it

length in Id., *Chrysippus' Theory of Causes*, in K. IERODIAKONOU (ed.), *Topics in Stoic Philosophy*, Oxford 1999, pp. 200-1.

⁸² Cfr. *supra*, notes 20 and 22.

⁸³ Cfr. *phys.* A 4. 187 a 27-8 on the κοινὴ δόξα τῶν φυσικῶν, and A 8. 191 a 24-33.

is water, etc.) The Greek word ἀκίνητον means “unchanged” as well as “unmoved”. The lemma in the doxography thus is a much compressed rendering of Aristotle's point, which moreover was implicitly accepted by Theophrastus who pointed out that Anaxagoras was the first to posit the efficient cause⁸⁴. We have also seen above that in Aëtius' chapter “On principles” two of Thales' purported followers, Anaximander and Anaximenes, are criticized for failing to take the moving, or efficient, cause into account⁸⁵.

Generalizing statements about the early physicists, as we see, are already found in Aristotle. In the Aëtian *Placita* this tendency is even stronger. Thales, of whom Aristotle and Theophrastus did not know very much, becomes a symbolic figure, not unlike his counterpart Pythagoras. To both these figure-heads (for Pythagoras see for instance *supra*, this section at subsection (3)) doctrines associated with their purported followers may be attributed (name-labels sometimes added, sometimes not). But the issue of the part, or rather the variety of parts played by succession (*diadoche*) and school (*hairesis*) in the *Placita* literature is too big to be treated in the present paper.

(7) <οἱ> Στωικοὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἷτιον ὥρισαντο κινητόν. The first *i.e.* most important cause of the Stoics is without doubt the God, who is not only *the* ποιοῦν and mover, but also is moved and changes throughout the cosmological-and-cosmogonic processes⁸⁶.

⁸⁴ See *supra*, text to note 57.

⁸⁵ *Supra*, text to note 60. Thales may be included *ad sententiam*, because according to Aristotle and Theophrastus (*supra*, note 57 and text thereto) Anaxagoras was the first early physicist to posit the moving cause. Note moreover that at PS.-PLUTARCH. *placit.* 873 D (part of text omitted by Stobaeus) at AËT. I 2, 2 Thales is criticized because he only spoke of matter and left out τὸ εἶδος ὃ καλοῦμεν ἐντελέχειαν, καὶ ἡ στέρησις.

⁸⁶ See Plutarch's paraphrase of what was to be found in book one of

IV. *Some Comments on Other (Stobaeus) Lemmas*

Stobaeus' chapter not only depends on the Aëtian chapter as a whole as its matrix, but is also, as to several of the passages he chose to insert, much influenced by the δι' ὃ of the general descriptive definition in its first lemma. The Didymeian lemma, *anthol.* I 13, 1^b on the three Stoics, emphasizes that all three said that the cause is a δι' ὃ. The final lemma, *anthol.* I 13, 2 on "Ocellus", is introduced by a phrase which without doubt was written by Stobaeus: Ὅκελλος ἔφησεν εἶναι αἷτιον δι' ὃ γίγνεται τι.

(a) *anthol.* I 13, 1^b, second text: Ἀριστοτέλης ἔφησε δηλοῦν ἕκαστον χρώμενον σχήμασι τῆς ἐρμηνείας τοιούτοις, τό τε ἐξ οὗ λέγοντα <τὴν ὕλην>, καὶ τὸ ὑφ' οὗ τὸ ποιοῦν, τὸ δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶδος, τὸ δὲ δι' ὃ τὸ τέλος. It has been pointed out above that this lemma is to be attributed to Arius Didymus⁸⁷. The verbal form ἔφησε is not Aëtian, but typical for Arius Didymus and occasionally used by Stobaeus himself, e.g. in the "Ocellus" lemma at the end of the chapter (see above), and he also interpolates it in an Aëtian lemma where ps.-Plutarch lacks a verb⁸⁸. Wachsmuth in apparatu states that

Chrysippus' *On Providence* at *de stoic. rep.* 1052 c = CHRYS. fr. 604 S.V.F. II p. 185, τὸν Δία φησὶν αὐξεσθαι μέχρις ἂν εἰς αὐτὸν ἅπαντα κατανυλώσῃ, and his report at *de comm. not.* 1077 D-E = CHRYS. fr. 1064 S.V.F. II p. 312.

⁸⁷ Cfr. *supra*, notes 2 and 7, text after note 12, and section III at subsection (2). Its very briefness suggests that we are dealing with an abstract from a larger context. For proof that Stobaeus abridged and modified a Didymeian text (AR. DIDYM. fr. 36 Diels) compare EUS. *praep. evang.* xv 18, 3 with STOB. *anthol.* I 20, 1^c, on which see the comment of D.T. RUNIA, *Additional Fragments cit.*, pp. 366-7.

⁸⁸ *Anthol.* I 18, 4^b at AËT. *placit.* II 9, 3. *Anthol.* I 24, 1^f at AËT. II 9, 3 has no counterpart in ps.-Plutarch, but here ἔφησεν will be a Stobaeian addition too, see J. MANSFELD-D.T. RUNIA, *Aëtiana cit.*, p. 232. Also cfr. *anthol.* I 21, 6^d at AËT. II 5, 5 (Φιλόλαος ἔφησε κτλ.), included between

δηλοῦν is intransitive, but I prefer to take it as transitive. The word ἕκαστον pertains to "each" of the four prepositional formulas that follow. The formula σχήμασι τῆς ἐρμηνείας can be paralleled⁸⁹: τῆς ἐρμηνείας σχήμα, "form of expression", pertains to (the meaning of) a metaphor or formula. So the translation of this lemma is: «Aristotle said that one makes each cause clear if one uses such figures of expression as the following, and calls the "from what" <the matter>, the "by what" what acts, the "according to what" the form, and the "owing to what" the end».

This lemma can be exactly paralleled. Porphyry *apud* Simplicius in *Aristot. phys.* pp. 10.35-11.3⁹⁰ states τετραχῶς οὖν

brackets by Diels as a "fraus Stobaei" and not even mentioned in C.A. HUFFMAN, *Philolaus of Croton. Pythagorean and Presocratic*, A Commentary on the Fragments and Testimonia with Interpretive Essays, Cambridge 1993. ἔφασαν on the other hand occurs five times in ps.-Plutarch, with two Stobaeian parallels; this form is therefore Aëtian.

⁸⁹ Cfr. GALEN, *de meth. medend.* x p. 225.4-5 K.: τὸ γὰρ φλεγμῶν ἔλκος οὕτως λεγόμενον ὁμοιον μὲν ἔχει τὸ τῆς ἐρμηνείας σχήμα τῷ μικρὸν ἔλκος, *schol. veter. in Pindar. pyth.* 4, *schol.* 318 b 3-4: τῷ δὲ τῆς ἐρμηνείας σχήματι πλειστάκις Ἀλκμῶν κέχρηται.

⁹⁰ PORPHY. fr. 122F Smith (= [H. DÖRRIE †]-M. BALTES, *Platonismus cit.*, IV, pp. 142-6, *Baust.* 117), attributed by Smith to Porphyry's *Commentary on the Physics*. SENECA. *ep. Luc.* 65, 4-11 (= [H. DÖRRIE †]-M. BALTES, *Platonismus cit.*, IV, pp. 132-5, *Baust.* 116.1) lists and discusses Aristotle's four types of cause but does not use prepositions. He goes on to say (a-historically) that Plato "added a fifth", viz. the *exemplar* or *idea*, and includes (65, 8) the following Platonic list, this time using prepositional formulas (applied to the making of a statue): *id ex quo aēs est, id a quo artifex est, id in quo forma est quae aptatur illi, id ad quod exemplar est quod imitatur is, id propter quod facientis propositum est*. There is a partial parallel in Galen's *De usu partium* (III p. 464.7-465.10 = [H. DÖRRIE †]-M. BALTES, *Platonismus cit.*, IV, pp. 138-41, *Baust.* 116.2). Galen first discusses a view he ascribes to Plato, viz. that the σκοπός (final cause, aim) τῆς ἐνεργείας is the first, or primary, cause for all things that come to be. He then formulates a doctrine he accepit (ἡμεῖς [...] συγχωρήσαντες), listing five types of cause expressed by prepositional formulas: πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μάλιστα, δι' ὃ γίγνεται τι [final

ἡ ἀρχὴ κατὰ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην· ἥ γὰρ τὸ ἐξ οὗ ὡς ἡ ὕλη ἢ τὸ καθ' ὃ ὡς τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ὑφ' οὗ ὡς τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ τὸ δι' ὃ ὡς τὸ τέλος. To be sure, the sequence is slightly different, and Porphyry uses ἀρχὴ instead of αἰτιον – but cfr. *ibid.* p. 11.4-5, where he says ὅσαχῶς δὲ ἡ ἀρχὴ λέγεται, τοσαυταχῶς καὶ τὸ αἰτιον. This paraphrases a statement of Aristotle himself⁹¹, so the substitution is entirely legitimate from an Aristotelian point of view.

I submit that Arius Didymus and Porphyry depend on the same exegetical tradition. This particular series of prepositional formulas cannot be paralleled from Aristotle's own works, though we have seen above that he occasionally provides clusters of prepositional expressions – but we have also noticed that the prepositions used by him may vary⁹². It is interesting to adduce what he has to say about the formula καθ' ὃ, which according to Arius Didymus and Porphyry pertains to the formal cause only. This formula is discussed at *metaph.* Δ 18. 1022 a 14-26; according to Aristotle it has several different meanings (λέγεται πολλαχῶς), to begin with as many meanings as there are causes (ὅλως δὲ τὸ καθ' ὃ ἰσαχῶς καὶ τὸ αἰτιον ὑπάρξει), of which the formal cause comes first and the material second. For the quartet as discussed at length by Aristotle one may further refer to *metaph.* Δ 2. 1013 a 24-b 28, where the only prepositional formula is ἐξ οὗ for the material cause, and to *phys.* B 3. 194 b 23-195 a 3, where we have the combination ἐξ οὗ plus οὗ ἔνεκα plus διὰ τί. As to the fact that there are four types of cause Aristotle is explicit, see *metaph.* A 3. 983 a 26-7: τὰ δ' αἰτία λέγεται τετραχῶς. His pupil Eudemus of Rhodes,

cause], δεύτερον δ' ὑφ' οὗ γίγνεται [efficient cause], καὶ τρίτον, ἐξ οὗ [material cause], καὶ τέταρτον, δι' οὗ [instrumental cause], καὶ πέμπτον, εἰ βούλει, τὸ καθ' ὃ [formal cause].

⁹¹ *Metaph.* Δ 1. 1013 a 16-7, quoted *supra*, note 37.

⁹² *Supra*, notes 48-52 and text thereto.

apparently referring to Aristotle's historical overview in *metaph.* A, agreed, see fr. 52 Wehrli *apud* Simpl. in *Aristot. phys.* p. 322.6-9 (= [Dörrie] and Baltes *cit.*, pp. 128-9, *Baust.* 115.1): λέγει ὁ Εὐδημος ὅτι «τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον καὶ τὸ κινεῖν πρῶτως πάντες [*scil.* all the physicists] ἡτιῶντο. τὴν δὲ μορφήν πολλοί, τὸ δὲ οὗ ἔνεκα ἐλάττονες καὶ ἐπὶ μικρόν». Note that the only prepositional formula used by Eudemus is the standard Aristotelian οὗ ἔνεκα, not found in the later strings of prepositions. Accordingly the term τετραχῶς and the identifications of the four causes as matter, form etc. we have in Arius Didymus and Porphyry derive from Aristotle, while the petrified prepositional formulas found there represent a later development⁹³.

It is not possible to say what happened between Aristotle and Arius Didymus; the situation, as already pointed out in the introductory section of the present paper, may be compared to that of having a stick of which one only sees both ends, while the long middle part remains invisible. The only evidence that Aristotle's followers the Peripatetics used a prepositional string consisting of four items is found in Aëtius, but the context is different and the prepositions (one of which is itself different, and one entirely lacking) are mostly used in a different way⁹⁴. And the only observation by an early Peripatetic I have been able to find concerning the correct use of prepositional formulas is in a fragment (not *verbatim*) of Eudemus, who argues that motions and comings into being are

⁹³ The passage *metaph.* A 3. 983 a 24-b 1 (= [H. DÖRRIE †]-M. BALTES, *Platonismus cit.*, IV, p. 128, *Baust.* 115.0) briefly discusses the four types of cause (on the possibly Academic origin of this doctrine see Baltes, at p. 407, with references). Cfr. also *phys.* Γ 7. 207 b 34-5: ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ αἰτία διήρηται τετραχῶς κτλ. See further the elaborate discussion of the four types of cause at *phys.* B 3, esp. 195 a 15-6: ἅπαντα δὲ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα αἰτία εἰς τέτταρας πίπτει τρόπους τοὺς φανερωτάτους. For Eudemus cfr. *infra*, note 96.

⁹⁴ See *supra*, text to note 78.

more properly characterized by the εἰς ὃ⁹⁵ than by the ἐξ οὗ⁹⁶. Nevertheless, the situation regarding Aristotle is not so bad when compared to that in which we find ourselves regarding lemmas on for instance the Stoics in Arius Didymus and Aëtius, where we can only see one end of the stick. Amalgams of the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Peripatetic strings are found in Philo⁹⁷, so (as was to be expected) it is certain that not only

⁹⁵ Cfr. *supra*, note 51.

⁹⁶ EUDEM. fr. 94 Wehrli *apud* SIMPL. in *Aristot. phys.* p. 863.4-5: ἐν τούτοις ὁ Εὐδήμος προστίθησιν ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ κινήσεις καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰς ὃ μᾶλλον λέγονται ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐξ οὗ κτλ. (For Eudemus' standard formulation of the four Aristotelian types of cause see *supra*, text to note 93). Strato may have disagreed, see fr. 72 Wehrli *apud* SIMPL. in *Aristot. phys.* p. 807.3-4: ὁ Στράτων τὴν κίνησιν οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ φησὶν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐξ οὗ καὶ ἐν τῷ εἰς ὃ κτλ. We should observe that both in the Eudemus and in the Strato fragment the propositional formulas are substantivated (τοῦ εἰς ὃ etc.), just as in the formulas found in Sextus Empiricus (*supra*, note 78). This indeed points to a discussion about such formulas, provided Simplicius' rendering is to be trusted. Nothing is known about the contents of Strato's Περὶ αἰτίων (*supra*, note 2). From the fragments of the *Physikai Doxai* on the principles it is already clear that Theophrastus subscribed to Aristotle's doctrine of the four types of cause. He uses ἐξ οὗ not infrequently in the sense of proximate matter, with verb forms such as ποιοῦσιν or συντιθέασιν, e.g. *hist. plant.* iv 7, 5, *de caus. plant.* iv 7, 2, and the preposition εἰς standardly with μεταβολή or μεταβάλλειν, e.g. *hist. plant.* ii 3, 1, *de caus. plant.* ii 16, 4, *de sens.* 85, εἶναι δὲ καπνὸν μὲν μεταβολὴν ἐξ ὕδατος εἰς αἶρα, ὁμίχλην δὲ τὴν ἐξ αἵματος εἰς ὕδωρ. (Also cfr. *supra*, note 51.) There are a few examples of amalgams of prepositional clusters and of causes/principles in his works, but there is no standardization: e.g. *de caus. plant.* i 11, 2: ἀνάγκη γὰρ διὰ τὸ τὰς ρίζας μὴδ' ἄμα μὴδ' ὁμοίως ἔχειν ἢ τοὺς ἀκρεμόνας μὴ δέχεσθαι μὴδ' ἐκπέττειν ἐξ ὧν ἡ πρώτη βλάστησις. ταῦτα δὲ διὰ τί καὶ τίνας ἐνεκα γένοιτ' ἂν, οὐκ εὐλόγον εἰπεῖν, *metaph.* 9 b 27-10 a 2: τούτοις κατὰλοιπον τὰ τε πρῶτα κινουόμενα καὶ τὸ τίνας ἐνεκα λέγειν καὶ τίς ἡ φύσις ἐκάστου. At fr. 503 FHS&G (see *supra*, note 2) he is said to have distinguished «four different causes (τετάρων αἰτίων ποικίλων): choice, <nature>, chance, and necessity», but there are no prepositional formulas in this passage, and the context is quite different.

⁹⁷ See PHILO *quaest. in genes.* i 58 (Greek fragment ed. Petit, exege-

the Platonic but also the Aristotelian and Peripatetic series have to be dated before Aëtius.

(b) *anthol.* i 13, 1^v, too long to quote here⁹⁸ (see *infra*, Appendix). This fragment of Arius Didymus, especially the section on Chrysippus, is discussed elsewhere⁹⁹. For the section on Posidonius and the Didymus fragment as a whole see Kidd's commentary¹⁰⁰. In the Zeno section the formula αἰτίον ἐστὶ δι' ὃ γίνεται τι echoes Plato's at *Crat.* 413 A 3-4, δι' ὃ γὰρ γίγνεται, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ αἶτιον. Whether or not this formula really derives *verbatim* from Zeno himself, and whether or not, if such were to be the case, Zeno would virtually be echoing Plato I do not know. His thesis that the presence of a virtue makes someone virtuous sounds Platonic enough, see e.g. *Plat. Theaet.* 145 D 11: σοφία δὲ γ' οἶμαι σοφοὶ οἱ σοφοὶ¹⁰¹. I am aware of the differences.

What should at any rate be observed is that Stobaeus

sis of *genes.* 4:1: εἶπεν [*scil.* Eva after the birth of Cain] ἐκτῆσάμην ἄνθρωπον διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ): ἀλλὰ τὸ <<ὕπο τινος>> καὶ <<ἐκ τινος>> καὶ <<διὰ τινος>>: τὸ μὲν <<ἐκ>> ὡς ἐξ ὕλης, τὸ δὲ <<ὕπο>> ὡς αἰτίου, τὸ δὲ <<διὰ>> ὡς ὀργάνου, and *de cherub.* 125-6 (= [H. DÖRRIE †]-M. BALTES, *Platonismus cit.*, iv, p. 130, *Baust.* 115.2), esp. 125: πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τινος γένεσιν πολλὰ δεῖ συνελθεῖν, τὸ ὑφ' οὗ, τὸ ἐξ οὗ, τὸ δι' οὗ, τὸ δι' ὃ καὶ ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ὑφ' οὗ τὸ αἶτιον, ἐξ οὗ δὲ ἡ ὕλη, δι' οὗ δὲ τὸ ἐργαλεῖον, δι' ὃ δὲ ἡ αἰτία. The two Philonic texts are studied by J. PÉPIN, *Théologie cit.*, pp. 349-51, and D.T. RUNIA, *Philo cit.*, pp. 172-4. Runia also quotes the slightly different list at *de prov.* i 23 in a new translation from the Armenian. He states: «Apparently the scheme is so well-known [*scil.* in Philo's days] that it scarcely needs explanation» (p. 172).

⁹⁸ Perhaps abridged and rewritten by Arius Didymus, see *supra*, note 87.

⁹⁹ See my paper *Chrysippus' Definition of Cause in Arius Didymus*, «*Elenchos*», xxii (2001) pp. 99-109.

¹⁰⁰ I.G. KIDD, *Posidonius*, ii: *The Commentary (i), Testimonia and Fragments 1-149* («Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries», xiv A), Cambridge 1988, pp. 380-4.

¹⁰¹ See D. SEDLEY, *Platonic cit.*, pp. 116-7 with note 6.

adopts the Zenonian formula in the phrase which introduces the "Ocellus" fragment at the end of the chapter, *anthol.* I 13, 2: Ὁκελλος ἔφησεν εἶναι αἴτιον δι' ὃ γίγνεται τι. Another, presumably coincidental link between the Didymean Zeno section and the "Ocellus" quotation is that both passages state the common-place idea that the soul is the cause of life; to Zeno the phrase διὰ τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεται τὸ ζῆν is attributed, while "Ocellus" has <ζωά>, ταῦτα δ' αἴτιον ψυχᾶ.

Furthermore, it is Zeno's view is that it is impossible for the cause to be present without the effect being realized immediately¹⁰²; according to later Stoic doctrine this holds for containing causes only.

The interchangeability of "cause" and "owing to which", here attributed not only to Zeno but also to Chrysippus and Posidonius, was criticized. The objection is found in Clement of Alexandria and Cicero; this is directed more specifically against the so-called chain (some scholars prefer to speak of "series") of antecedent causes¹⁰³, so perhaps Zeno's use of the

¹⁰² Of the three examples given in the Zeno section two concern the primary virtues wisdom and temperance, e.g. διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν γίνεται τὸ φρονεῖν. Other reports (in a different context) about the effects of virtue use different prepositions, see AR. DIDYM. *apud* STOB. *anthol.* II 7, 5^d, pp. 69.17-70.7 W. = CHRYS. fr. 74 S.V.F. III p. 18, and SEXT. *EMP. adv. math.* XI 25-6 = CHRYS. fr. 75 S.V.F. III p. 18 (various definitions of the ἀγαθόν): καθ' ἓνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ ὅφ' οὗ ἢ ὅφ' οὗ ἔστιν ὠφελεῖσθαι, ὃ δὲ ἀρχικώτατον ὅπῃρχει καὶ ἀρετῇ (*scil.* virtue as the source of utility), [...] καθ' ἕτερον δὲ τὸ καθ' ὃ συμβαίνει ὠφελεῖσθαι (*scil.* virtues and virtuous actions). Cfr. E. SPINELLI (a cura di), *Sesto Empirico. Contro gli Etici*, Introduzione, edizione, traduzione e commento ("Elenchos", XXIV), Napoli 1995, pp. 181-8, also for references to earlier literature (but there is no discussion of the prepositional formulas). What is the relation, if any, of these combined formulas to those pertaining to Plato, Aristotle, or the Peripatetics I do not know.

¹⁰³ For the chain of causes see e.g. PS.-PLUTARCH. *placit.* 885 B at AET. I 28, 4 = CHRYS. fr. 917 S.V.F. II p. 265: εἰρμόν αἰτίων (definition of fate; the earliest attestation); ALEX. APHROD. *de fat.* pp. 191.30-192.11 = CHRYS. fr. 945 S.V.F. II pp. 272-3; [ALEX. APHROD.] *quaest.*

formula δι' ὃ was restricted to the kind of causes (viz., containing causes) instantiations whereof are listed in the Didymus fragment.

It has been pointed out by scholars that effects, being incorporeals, cannot be causes so cannot be links in a causal chain¹⁰⁴. True, but the affected bodies, that is to say the bodies at which the effects do or did obtain can, so the chain is real enough. Clem. Alex. *strom.* VIII 9, 273 (= Chrys. fr. 347 S.V.F. II p. 120), καὶ εἰ μὲν τί ἐστιν αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τοῦτο πάντως ἐστὶ καὶ δι' ὃ, εἰ δὲ τί ἐστὶ δι' ὃ, οὐ πάντως τοῦτο καὶ αἴτιον κτλ., makes the point that only Medea is the cause (αἴτιον) of her offspring; the trees cut down for the Argo on mount Pelion and each intermediate "owing to which" that followed is a δι' ὃ of her having offspring, but not an αἴτιον¹⁰⁵. This really is an objection, not (in spite of the inclusion of this passage in the S.V.F.) a point of Stoic doctrine, though it may be indebted to a discussion among later Stoics about the extensions of δι' ὃ and αἴτιον, respectively. Zeno's apparently less sophisticated theory (we know very

et solut. I 4 pp. 8.29-10.30 (five times; cfr. CHRYS. fr. 962 S.V.F. II pp. 279-80); PLOT. *enn.* III 1, 4: τῶν αἰτίων τὸν εἰρμόν; PROCL. *in Plat. remp.* II p. 29.15: εἰρμόν [...] τῶν αἰτίων μερικῶν καὶ ὅλων; also see the next note. The εἰρμός (without αἰτίων, which are implied) is mentioned five times and attacked at length by the Cynic Oenomaus *apud* EUS. *praep. evang.* VI 7, 23-37 who clearly (like Alexander, ps.-Alexander and Plotinus) considers it to be the *siglum* for the Stoic theory of fate. For Oenomaus see A. BRANCACCI, *Libertà e fato in Enomao di Gadara*, in ID. (a cura di), *La filosofia in età imperiale. Le scuole e le tradizioni filosofiche*, Napoli 2000, pp. 37-67, esp. pp. 56-64.

¹⁰⁴ See R.J. HANKINSON, *Cicero's Rope*, in K. ALGRA *et al.*, *Polyhistor cit.*, pp. 185-205, and S. BOBZIEN, *Determinism cit.*, p. 50 (who observes that the εἰρμός is not attested for Chrysippus, but one should acknowledge that the term plays a conspicuous role in Oenomaus' arguments against Chrysippus; see previous note).

¹⁰⁵ See also CIC. *top.* 61, *de fat.* 34, with the comments of R.W. SHARPLES, *Cicero: On Fate (De Fato) & Boethius: The Consolation of Philosophy IV.5-7, (Philosophiae Consolationis)*, Warminster 1991, p. 184.

little about it, though) as presented here at any rate is not affected by this criticism.

The first part of the text of the Chrysippus section is corrupt. I argue elsewhere¹⁰⁶ that Wachsmuth's supplement is superfluous (as are others that have been proposed), and that the text makes perfect Stoic sense once *διά* is eliminated, as follows: Χρύσιππος αἴτιον εἶναι λέγει δι' ὃ, καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ὄν καὶ σῶμα· καὶ αἴτιον μὲν ὅτι, οὐ δὲ αἴτιον [διά] τι. This *τι* represents the incorporeal effect.

As to the Posidonian formulas αἴτιον δ' ἐστὶ τινος, δι' ὃ ἐκεῖνο, ἢ τὸ πρῶτον ποιοῦν, ἢ τὸ ἀρχηγὸν ποιήσεως Kidd argues¹⁰⁷ that ἢ – ἢ indicate equivalent alternatives, and that τὸ ἀρχηγὸν ποιήσεως is another term for the πρῶτον ποιοῦν in the sense of First Cause. For this meaning of πρῶτον ποιοῦν he refers to Stob. *anthol.* 1 11, 1^d τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, but this lemma (though in the same Stobaeian chapter) is Aëtian not Didymaeian¹⁰⁸, and Kidd admits that πρῶτον could pertain to "something more immediate". One should add that ἀρχηγὸν too may pertain to something more immediate¹⁰⁹. Even so, Kidd's interpretation of τὸ πρῶτον ποιοῦν is attractive. On the other hand, the formula δι' ὃ is much wider than "First Cause" in a theological sense, and may well embrace

¹⁰⁶ See *supra*, note 99.

¹⁰⁷ See *supra*, note 100.

¹⁰⁸ See *supra*, section III at subsection (7).

¹⁰⁹ Cfr. PLAT. *Crat.* 401 D: τὸ οὖν αἴτιον καὶ τὸ ἀρχηγὸν αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸ ὁλοῶν, POLYB. 1 66, 10.4-6: σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀρχηγὸν καὶ μόνον αἴτιον γίνεταί στάσεως, AR. DIDYM. *apud* Stob. *anthol.* 11 7, 10 (= CHRYS. fr. 378 S.V.F. III p. 92, on the Stoic *pathe*): τὰ μὲν πρῶτα εἶναι καὶ ἀρχηγά, GALEN. *de nat. fac.* 11 p. 129.1 K. (*Script. minor.* III p. 194.20-1 Helmreich = ERASISTR. fr. 131 Garofalo): τὸ δ' ἥτις πρώτη τε καὶ ἀρχηγὸς αἰτία τούτου, πῶς οὐκ ἐπεσκέψατο (*scil.* Erasistratus); *de loc. aff.* VIII p. 442.12 K.: τὴν ἀρχηγὸν αἰτίαν. On the other hand Cleanthes in the second line of his *Hymn* (fr. 537 S.V.F. 1 p. 121) addresses Zeus as φύσεως ἀρχηγέ. Kidd, *loc. cit.*, quotes [ARISTOT.] *de mund.* 399 a 26: τὴν πρώτην καὶ ἀρχέγονον [ἀρχήγονον] ? JM] αἰτίαν.

for instance what came to be called the antecedent and containing causes. Accordingly I vote for a distinction between Posidonius' general δι' ὃ and his πρῶτον ποιοῦν as referring to the Stoic god; the latter is a δι' ὃ, but the former is not identical with the latter, though it may represent the *pneuma*, in an acting body, which is a particle of this god.

The Stoic god, as is well-known, is a principle (ἀρχή), next to matter which is the other principle¹¹⁰. There is some evidence that one of the many names of this god is "cause", for according to Stob. 1 5, 15 p. 79.1-20 W. = Chrys. fr. 913 S.V.F. II pp. 264-5 (printed by Diels as Aët. *placit.* 1 28, 3 – in the chapter Περὶ εἰμαρμένης, "On fate" –, though the crucial section, from p. 79.8 ff. W. is not paralleled in ps.-Plutarch¹¹¹) Chrysippus held that one among the many appellations of God attributed from a variety of perspectives is Αἰτία¹¹². This cannot be entirely right in view of Chrysippus' distinction bet-

¹¹⁰ E.g. DIOG. LAERT. VII 134, with references to Zeno's *On Substance*, Cleanthes' *On Atoms*, book one of Chrysippus' *Physics* ("near the end"), Archedemus' *On the Elements*, and book two of Posidonius' *Physical Treatise*.

¹¹¹ Von Arnim in the S.V.F. has failed to notice Diels' attribution to Aëtius and gives Stobaeus as the source. PS.-PLUTARCH. *placit.* 885 B at Aët. 1 28, 4 = CHRYS. fr. 917 S.V.F. II p. 265 (cfr. *supra*, note 103) in this same chapter has a brief lemma defining fate, with the name-label Stoics, which is not paralleled in Stobaeus though *ad sententiam* it roughly corresponds to the second part of the Stobaeian lemma cited in the text to the present note. Therefore it is most likely that Stobaeus in his usual way replaced a brief Aëtian lemma with a larger and more informative piece taken from another source, viz. Arius Didymus again. See D.T. RUNIA, *Additional Fragments cit.*, pp. 377-8, who has the Didymus fragment begin at p. 79.12 W., Μοῖρας κτλ.

¹¹² Note that the restoration of PHILOD. *de pietat.* col. 4, 25-6 Henrichs is hypothetical (²⁵[καλεῖσθ]αι, Δ[ία] δὲ ὅτι ²⁶["πάντων αἴτιον καὶ κύ-"]²⁶[ριον *]). See A. HENRICHs, *Die Kritik der stoischen Theologie in Pflerc.* 1428, «Cronache Ercolanesi», IV (1974) p. 15 *ad loc.* But cfr. Stob. *anthol.* 1 1, 26 = CHRYS. fr. 1062 S.V.F. II p. 312, attributed to Arius Didymus (fr. 30) by Diels, attribution doubted by Wachsmuth

ween αἴτιον, “cause”, and αἰτία, “explanation” or “account” of the cause. But reports about the Stoics are not always meticulous as to terminology. Plutarch, for instance, in the *De Stoicorum repugnantiis* and *De communibus notitiis*, paraphrasing Chrysippus and arguing against him, fails to distinguish between αἴτιον and αἰτία and uses the latter more often than the former. And Latin authors, whose language only has the word *causa*, are prevented from making the distinction at all.

However this may be, it is not at all unlikely that Posidonius, as argued above, distinguished between the god, or πρῶτον ποιοῦν, as αἴτιον (still a δι’ ὃ) on one side, and the αἴτιον or δι’ ὃ in a wider sense on the other. It is even not to be precluded that πρῶτον ποιοῦν and ἀρχηγὸν ποιήσεως are ambiguous, and do not only refer to the very First Cause but may also pertain to a rather remote cause, for instance to the fateful timber hewn on Pelion.

V. Conclusion

What, hopefully, have we learned from comparing the two chapters “On Causes” in ps.-Plutarch and Stobaeus and from the study of their individual lemmas? The chief results that have been argued for may be summed up as follows:

1. The Aëtian chapter provides the framework for the Stobaeian chapter.
2. The sequence of lemmas in Aëtius is based on (a) a *diaeresis* of causes according to number, (b) a *diaphonia* according to the opposition incorporeal *versus* corporeal, and (c) another *diaphonia* according to the opposition immobile *versus* mobile.

ad loc., and by D.T. RUNIA, *Additional Fragments cit.*, p. 377: Δία δὲ αὐτὸν λέγουσιν, ὅτι πάντων ἐστὶν αἰτίος καὶ δι’ αὐτὸν πάντα.

3. The two final Aëtian lemmas form a sort of appendix, as the issue is considered from a different perspective.

4. Several Aëtian lemmas can be traced back to a Peripatetic tradition, which to some extent bridges the gap between Aristotle and Theophrastus on the one hand and Aëtius on the other:

4.1. The Aëtian lemma with the name-label Plato is a reformulated combination (somewhat influenced by an exegesis of Plato’s *Timaeus*) of the accounts by Aristotle and Theophrastus of the number and nature of the causes adopted by Plato. This is of some importance for the prehistory of the Middle Platonist triad of (Platonic) principles – cfr. *infra*, 4.2 – and that of the so-called “metaphysics of prepositions”. This “metaphysics”, we have noticed, is not a matter of these prepositions themselves but of the nature of the entities they refer to.

4.2. Comparison of the Aëtian lemma with the name-label Plato with the Stobaeian version of Aët. 3, 21 reveals the influence of Aristotle’s view that “causes” and “principles” may be used interchangeably.

4.3. The Aëtian lemma with the name-label Thales *c.s.* derives from Aristotle’s criticism of the early physicists, tacitly accepted by Theophrastus.

4.4. Though the term τὸ ποιοῦν for the efficient cause suggests a Stoic environment (and would not be noticed as something special in this environment) it can be paralleled in Theophrastus, and Aristotle (and even to some extent in Plato).

5. The tenets of the Aëtian lemma with the name-labels Pythagoras and Aristotle are ultimately driven from (the exegesis of) a passage in Plato’s *Timaeus*. The attribution to Pythagoras and Aristotle is to be explained against the backdrop of a constructed Pythagorean succession including Plato and his pupil Aristotle.

6. Stobaeus did not follow the rationale of the Aëtian chapter – he wasn’t, of course, obliged to. He had to insert the lemma with the name-label Peripatetics as his last excerpt

from Aëtius, added a quotation from the *Timaeus* to the lemma with the name-label Plato, and made minor changes in the wording of individual lemmas. He further intelligently inserted abstracts from Arius Didymus to replace the Aëtian name-label Aristotle and the lemma with the name-label Stoics (it is clear that he had made a serious study of both sources before he started making and arranging his excerpts). At the end of the chapter he piously quoted from a pseudo-Pythagorean tract ascribed to "Ocellus".

6.1. The insertion of a brief abstract from Arius Didymus on Aristotle's doctrine of the four types of cause is aimed against the presence of the name-label Aristotle in Aëtius. Though Aristotle's view is correctly represented, the string of prepositional formulas (just as that ascribed to Plato in the Aëtian lemma with his name-label) is due to later attempts at systematization. But there are several passages in Aristotle where the four types of cause are listed and discussed, and the word τετραχῶς already occurs in one of them. A precise parallel in Porphyry suggests that Arius Didymus and Porphyry depend on the same exegetical tradition.

6.2. The insertion of a substantial abstract from Arius Didymus on Zeno Chrysippus Posidonius on causes which replaces the Aëtian lemma with the name-label Stoics is more in the nature of an amplification than in that of a correction.

7. The Didymean section on Chrysippus should be emended in a simple way.

8. Our discussion of the Stoic doctrine of corporeal cause and incorporeal effect and of the chain of antecedent causes led to the conclusion that, though effects *qua* incorporeals cannot be causes, the affected bodies can so the chain is real enough¹³.

¹³ Thanks are due to Keimpe Algra, Jan van Ophuijsen, and David T. Runia for their patience in reading earlier drafts, and for their observations and criticisms. Naturally such errors as remain are my responsibility.

APPENDIX: SOURCE TEXTS

PS.-PLUTARCHUS *Placita* I 11 (882 E-F)

ια'. Περὶ αἰτίων

αἰτίον ἐστὶ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα ἢ δι' ὃ συμβαίνει τι.

Πλάτων τριχῶς τὸ αἶτιον· φησὶ γάρ ὅφ' οὐ ἐξ οὐ πρὸς ὃ· κυριώτερον δ' ἡγεῖται τὸ ὅφ' οὐ· τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ποιοῦν, ὃ ἐστὶ νοῦς.

Πυθαγόρας Ἀριστοτέλης τὰ μὲν πρῶτα αἷτια ἀσώματα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ μετοχὴν ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τῆς σωματικῆς ὑποστάσεως· ὥστ' εἶναι τὸν κόσμον σῶμα.

οἱ Στωικοὶ πάντα τὰ αἷτια σωματικά· πνεύματα γάρ. [= S.V.F. II 340 p. 119]

QUSTA IBN LUQA *Placita* I 11 Daiber

Über die Ursachen

Die Ursache ist die Vollendung, infolge derer etwas geschieht (= αἰτίον ἐστὶ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα δι' ὃ συμβαίνει τι).

Platon lehrte, daß die Ursache in drei Arten auftritt: das, wodurch (etwas wird); das, wovon (etwas wird) und das, wozu (etwas wird). Davon ist am meisten berechtigt hierfür das, wodurch (etwas wird). Das ist die wirkende Ursache, welche der Verstand ist.

Pythagoras und Aristoteles glaubten, daß die ersten Ursachen keine Körper sind, jedoch diejenigen, welche durch Teilnahme oder der Zufall (existieren), Körper sind. Auf diesem Weg ist die Welt ein Körper.

Die Stoiker glaubten, daß alle Ursachen körperlich sind; denn sie sind Pneumata.

STOBÆUS *Anthologium* I 13 (pp. 137.7-40.9 Wachsmuth)

Περὶ αἰτίων

1^a (Aët. I 11, 1-2 Diels plus PLAT. *Tim.* 28 A-B)

Αἰτίον ἐστι δι' ὃ τὸ ἀποτελεσμα. ἢ δι' ὃ συμβαίνει τι· ἀρκεί γὰρ ὑπογραφικῶς.

Πλάτων τριχῶς τὸ αἴτιον ὑφ' οὗ, ἐξ οὗ, πρὸς ὃ κυριώτατον δ' ἡγείται τὸ ὑφ' οὗ, τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ποιοῦν. λέγει γοῦν ἐν Τηταίῳ: «πᾶν δὲ αὐτὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεται· παντὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γένεσιν ἔχειν. ὅταν οὖν ὁ δημιουργὸς πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταῦτά ἔχον βλέπων αἰεὶ, τοιοῦτό τι νι χρώμενος παραδείγματα, τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἀπεργάζηται, καλὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὕτως ἀποτελεῖσθαι πᾶν· ὁπόταν δ' εἰς τὸ γέγονός, γενητῶ παραδείγματι προσχωρήμενος, οὐ κἀλόν».

1^b (Aët. I 11, 3-4, 310 Diels)

Πυθαγόρας τὰ μὲν πρῶτα αἴτια ἀσώματα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ μετοχὴν ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός τῆς σωματικῆς ὑποστάσεως εἶναι.

Ἀριστοτέλης ἔφησε δηλοῦν ἕκαστον χρώμενον σχῆμασι τῆς ἐρημνείας τοιούτοις, τὸ τε ἐξ οὗ λέγοντα <τὴν ὄλην>, καὶ τὸ ὑφ' οὗ τὸ ποιοῦν, τὸ δὲ καθ' ὃ τὸ εἶδος, τὸ δὲ δι' ὃ τὸ τέλος.

1^c (Ar. Dign. fr. 18 Diels = Zen. fr. 89 S.V.F. I p. 25 plus Chrys. fr. 336 S.V.F. II p. 118; Posid. fr. 95 E.-K.)

{Ζήνωνος. ¹¹} αἴτιον δ' ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν εἶναι δι' ὃ οὐ δὲ αἴτιον συμβεβηκός· καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον σῶμα. οὐ δὲ αἴτιον κατηγόρημα· ἀδύνατον δ' εἶναι τὸ μὲν αἴτιον παρῆναι. οὐ δὲ ἐστὶν αἴτιον μὴ ὑπάρχειν. τὸ δὲ λεγόμενον τοιοῦτην ἔχει δύναμιν· αἴτιον ἐστὶ δι' ὃ γίνεται τι, οἷον διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν γίνεται τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ διὰ τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεται τὸ ζῆν καὶ διὰ τὴν σωφροσύνην γίνεται τὸ σωφρονεῖν. ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι σωφροσύνης περὶ τινα οὐσης μὴ σωφρονεῖν, ἢ ψυχῆς μὴ ζῆν, ἢ φρονήσεως μὴ φρονεῖν.

{Χρυσαίππου}. Χρυσαίππος αἴτιον εἶναι λέγει δι' ὃ, καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ὄν καὶ σῶμα, καὶ αἴτιον μὲν ὅτι, οὐ δὲ αἴτιον διὰ τι.

¹¹ {Ζήνωνος.} {Χρυσαίππου}. {Πισειδωνίου}: bracketed because added either by Stobaeus or (in this case more probably) a redactor.

αἰτίαν δ' εἶναι λόγον αἰτίου, ἢ λόγον τὸν περὶ τοῦ αἰτίου ὡς αἴτιον.

{Πισειδωνίου}. Πισειδώνιος δὲ οὕτως αἴτιον δ' ἐστὶν τινος, δι' ὃ ἐκείνο, ἢ τὸ πρῶτον ποιοῦν, ἢ τὸ ἀρχηγὸν ποιήσεως, καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ὄν καὶ σῶμα, οὐ δὲ αἴτιον οὔτε ὄν οὔτε σῶμα, ἀλλὰ συμβεβηκός καὶ κατηγόρημα.

1^d (Aët. I 11, 6-8 Diels)

Θαλῆς καὶ οἱ ἐφεξῆς τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον αἰκίνητον ἀπεφάναντο.

Στωικοὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον ὀρίσαντο κινήτόν. (= S.V.F. II 338 p. 119)

οἱ Περιπατητικοὶ τὸν αἰτίαν εἶναι τὰ μὲν αἰσθητά, τὰ δὲ νοητά.

2 Ὁκέλλου (= fr. 1 Harder)

Ὁκέλλος ἔφησεν εἶναι αἴτιον δι' ὃ γίγνεται τι. λέγει γὰρ ἐν τῷ Περὶ νόμου οὕτως· συνέχει γὰρ τὰ μὲν σκάνεα τῶν ζώων <ζώῳ>, ταύτας δ' αἴτιος ὁ θεός· τὸν δὲ κόσμον ἄρμονια, ταύτας δ' αἴτιος ὁ θεός· τὴν δὲ οἰκῶς καὶ τὰς πόλιν ὁμόνοια, ταύτας δ' αἴτιος νόμος· τὴν δὲ ὡν αἴτια καὶ ¹² φύσις, τὸν μὲν κόσμον ἁρμόχθαι διὰ παντός καὶ μηδέποκ' ἐς ἀκοσμίαν ἐκβαίνειν, τὰς δὲ πόλιν καὶ τὴν οἰκῶς ὀλιγοχρονίως ἦμεν· ὅσα μὲν ὡν γενναῖα καὶ θνατὰ τὰν φύσιν, ἐξ ἧς συνεστακεν ὅλας, τὰν αὐτῶν αἰτίαν ἔχει τὰς διαλύσεις· συνεστακε γὰρ ἐκ μεταβαλλοῦσας καὶ ἀειπαθείας. ἂ γὰρ τῶν γεννωμένων ἀπογένεσας σωτηρία τὰς γενετήρας ὅλας, τὸ δὲ ἀεικίνητον κυβερνῇ, τὸ δ' ἀειπαθὲς κυβερνηται· καὶ τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὰ δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον· καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον καὶ λόγον ἔχον καὶ ἔμφορον, τὸ δὲ γενναῖον καὶ ἄλογον [τὸ μεταβαλλόν].

¹² ἦν Usener, followed by Wachsmuth.

Aëtius *Placita* I 11 Diels¹¹⁶

PS.-PLUTARCHUS

ια. Περὶ αἰτίων.

(1) Αἰτιόν ἐστι <δι' ὃ> τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα ἢ δι' ὃ συμβαίνει τι.

(2) Πλάτων τριχῶς τὸ αἶτιον· φησὶ γάρ, ὕφ' οὗ ἐξ οὗ πρὸς ὃ· κυριώτερον δ' ἡγεῖται τὸ ὕφ' οὗ· τοῦτο δὲ ἦν τὸ ποιοῦν, ὃ ἐστι νοῦς.

(3) Πυθαγόρας Ἀριστοτέλης τὰ μὲν πρῶτα αἷτια ἀσώματα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ μετοχὴν ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τῆς σωματικῆς ὑποστάσεως. [ὥστ' εἶναι τὸν κόσμον σῶμα].

(5) Οἱ Στωικοὶ πάντα τὰ αἷτια σωματικά· πνεύματα γάρ.

STOBÆUS

Περὶ αἰτίων.

(1) Αἰτιόν ἐστι δι' ὃ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα ἢ δι' ὃ συμβαίνει τι. ἀρκεῖ γὰρ ὑπογραφικῶς.

(2) Πλάτων τριχῶς τὸ αἶτιον, ὕφ' οὗ ἐξ οὗ πρὸς ὃ· κυριώτατον δ' ἡγεῖται τὸ ὕφ' οὗ, τοῦτο δὲ ἦν τὸ ποιοῦν.

(3) Πυθαγόρας τὰ μὲν πρῶτα αἷτια ἀσώματα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ μετοχὴν ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τῆς σωματικῆς ὑποστάσεως εἶναι.

(4) Ἀριστοτέλης ἔφησε δηλοῦν ἕκαστον χρώμενον σχήμασι τῆς ἐρμηνείας τοιούτοις, τὸ τε ἐξ οὗ λέγοντα τὴν ὕλην, καὶ τὸ ὕφ' οὗ τὸ ποιοῦν, τὸ δὲ καθ' ὃ τὸ εἶδος, τὸ δὲ δι' ὃ τὸ τέλος.

(6) Θαλῆς καὶ οἱ ἐφεξῆς τὸ πρῶτον αἷτιον ἀκίνητον ἀπεφήναντο.

(7) <Οἱ> Στωικοὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἷτιον ὥρισαντο κινήτῳ.

(8) Οἱ Περιπατητικοὶ τῶν αἰτίων εἶναι τὰ μὲν αἰσθητά, τὰ δὲ νοητά.

¹¹⁶ Underlining in individual lemmas indicates textual differences between the two sources.

IN: ANTICHI E MODERNI, NELLA
FILOSOFIA D'ETÀ IMPERIALE