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1961

NEW FRAGMENTS OF
GREEK PHILOSOPHERS I

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THEOPHRASTUS IN ARABIC
TRANSLATION

P. 3 - 18

EAST AND WEST 12



Istituto Italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente

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Source: *East and West*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March 1961), pp. 3-18

Published by: [Istituto Italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente \(IsIAO\)](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/29754354>

Accessed: 08/07/2013 11:05

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NEW FRAGMENTS OF GREEK PHILOSOPHERS

I: EMPEDOCLES, DEMOCRITUS, THEOPHRASTUS IN ARABIC TRANSLATION.

1.

Byzantium and Sasanian Iran, perennial warriors and (as it seemed) implacable enemies, were not insensible toward the merits of the opponent. Like all rivals, they knew how to learn from each other. Maurikios and Herakleios borrowed from the eastern neighbour cavalry weapons and tactics, military and baronial fiefs, military authority in the border provinces, from which all the theme organization later arose. On the other side, half-a-century earlier Khusrō I Anōšarvān had imitated the revenue organization of Diocletian and his successors. A public revenue hitherto unheard of, and not even approached by Byzantium, enabled the Sasanians to renew their struggle against Rome, and against their neighbours in general, with an intensity unknown before.

Even more surprising and, as will be shown, more important was a borrowing of another kind. The literary and religious life of Late Sasanian Iran seemed determined almost exclusively by a series of Zoroastrian works that are unrivalled in their aridity and lack of spiritual content; but now Iran once more stood forth as a meeting point of religions and philosophies. Of course, the grand epoch of Manicheism was long forgotten, the creation of the Talmud was concluded in its essentials. And yet a new approach was shaping at the beginning of the 6th century.

When we began the present investigation, we could not anticipate that the neo-Platonic patterns would stand out against the background of Mazdak's thought⁽¹⁾. It became clear that the

mōbad and commentator of the Avesta had renounced the traditional dualism. Ahriman or (from the Manichaean point of view) the Prince of Darkness found no counterpart; the Supreme Lord alone was present in the celestial world⁽²⁾. He was reached through a sequence of grade that led from light and its spiritual aspects by way of thought and action and of the satisfaction of life necessities down to their material procurement. This can be proved to go back to Neo-Platonism; and the coincidence was carried on in the solar interpretation of sovereignty and the symbolism connected with it.

Already A. Christensen tried to compare Mazdak's grade order with that of the late Sasanian feudal state⁽³⁾. We, on our side, put forward the suggestion that Khusrō I Anōšarvān in his reorganization of the state took into account the grade orders of his predecessor and adversary. The late Sasanian feudal state would then be an earthly imitation of what Mazdak taught and planned in the heaven; of course with all the manifold differences that separated the proclaimer of the Kingdom of Light from the mighty of this earth⁽⁴⁾.

This suggestion was later confirmed. Not only Mazdak, Khusrō I Anōšarvān too had made himself acquainted with Neo-Platonic thought. More than that, the king was keen to appear as a philosopher of the Greek sort⁽⁵⁾.

In the first half of the 12th century Muḥammad aš-Šahrastānī worked an enormous material into his *Kitāb al-mīlāl wa-n-niḥal*. He quoted not only the great teachers of Islam, their sects

and philosophical schools. His interest extended also to Zoroastrians and Manichaeans, Buddhists and Christians, Šabeans and Mazdakites. All their systems were described by aš-Šahrastānī in the scholastic language of Islamic dogmatics and brought into some sort of perspicuous order.

A volume on the Greek philosophers could not be missing. From an external point of view, it begins with Thales, the earliest of the pre-Socratics, and goes down to the latest period, i. e. to the last great thinkers of the Neo-Platonic school. Choice, knowledge and description are heterogeneous, since aš-Šahrastānī was dependent on his various authorities and possessed no knowledge of the Greek originals.

A canon of seven philosophers stands out in the general body of the Greek philosophy⁽⁶⁾; aš-Šahrastānī calls them the seven Wise Men. Of course they have nothing to do with those seven Wise Men, with whom the history of Greek thought used formerly to begin. They are "pillars of wisdom"; the series begins with Thales and leads through Anaxagoras, Anaximenes, Pythagoras, Empedocles, down to Socrates and Plato. The latter closes the canon, in which Aristoteles is not included.

It is hardly thinkable that aš-Šahrastānī himself should have operated this choice. It was imposed on him; and already the canon in itself gives a hint to this effect. The first centuries A.D. busied themselves, to an ever-increasing degree, with the compilation of canons of the ancient poets, orators, philosophers and of their works. An epoch that was no longer able or willing to deal with the enormously increased mass of Greek literature, felt the need of a discriminating choice. In this, the number seven played a great role.

The canon of seven philosophers, laid down by Porphyry, is particularly well known⁽⁷⁾. This Neo-Platonic thinker, a pupil and friend of Plotinus, one of the most learned and fertile writers of his time, lived in the late 3rd century. We know also that Porphyry's canon ended with Plato⁽⁸⁾. Its author dealt with it in his great chronological work, but above all in his four-volumes History of Philosophy, which is lost except for a few fragments. But these remnants allow us to establish (and some hints in aš-Šahrastānī confirm this) that the section on the seven Wise Men represents an excerpt from Porphyry's work.

Some such excerpts are preserved also by another Arab author, Abū l-Wafā' al-Mubaššir (middle of the 11th century)⁽⁹⁾. Of course neither he nor aš-Šahrastānī go back to the Greek original of Porphyry. In both cases the mediate

source seems to have been a Syriac translation. Their existence is known from the *Fihrist*, that magnificent catalogue of the book market of Baghdad, which was compiled by a connoisseur and dealer toward the end of the 10th century. The well-informed author, who lists thousands of titles, could get hold only of the fourth book of the Syriac translations of the history of philosophy⁽¹⁰⁾. It seems that the work was very rare and was no longer included in the current stock of the market.

It is, therefore, a priori unlikely that the Syriac version of Porphyry's book was a product of the great translating activity under the Abbasids. Hunain, who represents the crown and completion of the translator school of the 9th century, was a Christian and came from Hīra, the former cultural centre of the lower Euphrat country. He mostly translated Greek originals into Syriac, and these were translated into Arabic by his sons and pupils. But Hunain is not mentioned as translator of the History of Philosophy. We must look elsewhere.

Nestorian Christians had fled from the Byzantine persecutions to the enemy country nearby, Sasanian Iran. As opponents of the orthodox imperial church, they were received, allowed to set up an organization of their own, and given permission to proselitize. Nestorian communities spread far to the East, as far as Southern Siberia and China. Besides, they developed a fertile translating activity from Greek into Syriac. It concerned mostly Christian literature, but also Porphyry's famous Introduction to Aristoteles's logical works, a recognized school book and reaching manual, was translated at that time. Of course, the fact that the History of Philosophy was included was unconnected with both religious and teaching activity.

It so happened that Khusrō I Anōšarvān, a high-handed upholder of royal claims, the killer of Mazdak and an enemy of East Rome, pitiless and deaf to all lamentations, by a freak of destiny possessed an equally unconditional tendency toward Greek philosophy⁽¹¹⁾. His admirers ascribed to him a knowledge of Plato and Aristoteles down to the last subtleties; he was said to have read and understood the most difficult dialogues, such as Timaeus and Parmenides. As a matter of fact, the king gave hospitality to the Neo-Platonics who had become homeless after the closing of their school in 529; he kept this protecting hand upon them even when they turned their backs upon him in disappointment and wished to return home.

In neighbouring Byzantium, where Khusrō I was hated anyway, this philosophical ambition

met with the most spiteful mockery. He was said to have fallen into the clutches of half-philosophers; it was also maintained that a barbarian could never draw the noble style, the factual precision of Attic speech from translations in an uncultivated language (meaning Middle-Persian) ⁽¹²⁾. And yet Khusrō was an influence that was felt. We know contemporary works of philosophical content that are dedicated to him or were composed at his suggestion. A Nestorian, Paulus the Persian, compiled for the king an introduction to logic in Syriac, which has come down to us ⁽¹³⁾. We know, through one of the Neo-Platonics living at his court, on what subjects the ruler liked to dispute ⁽¹⁴⁾. The contemporary preface to the highly praised work *Kalīla wa-Dimna* alludes to philosophical efforts of the same kind ⁽¹⁵⁾.

The same attitude comes to the fore everywhere. Philosophical thought, as understood at the court of Anōšarvān, turned without further ado upon the ultimate questions of metaphysics: god, primary matter and elements, creation and end of the world. This was not, however, in order to achieve solutions, but merely to display a supercilious scepticism. They tried to justify their own position by comparing the various partly opposite solutions that had been given by the philosophers to those problems.

A book like Porphyry's history of philosophy met the requirements of this trend. Not only it submitted to the attention of the philosophers the same kind of questions, but it represented a sort of inventory of the solutions put forward, which afforded a welcome material for this scepticism. All this led to the Syriac translation of Porphyry's work; it remains unknown whether a Middle Persian version was also undertaken.

2.

Aš-Šahrastānī's explanations on the Greek philosophers enjoy no high repute. The relevant article of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* cautions against their use. Classical scholars did not concern themselves with aš-Šahrastānī, with one exception which will be discussed later. This behaviour was understandable, since it had not been shown up to now that Porphyry lies as the bottom of the Arab text. An even greater obstacle was represented by the translation of Th. Haarbrücker. When it appeared in 1850-51, it may have been a meritorious work. But it was insufficient even for those times, not only because it did not give access to the contents of aš-Šahrastānī's book, but because it contained

a large quantity of misunderstandings, obscurities, and of mistranslations deriving therefrom.

Today Haarbrücker's translation can no longer be utilized. After we have solved the problem of the sources of our section, it goes without saying that the passages under examination have every time to be translated and interpreted anew. The further question, what can the excerpt from Porphyry's work teach us on the pre-Socratic philosophy, must remain for the present without even an attempt at an answer; it would widely overstep the limits of our enquiry. The following discussion is limited to the section dedicated to Empedocles.

It begins, in accordance with the scheme of aš-Šahrastānī, with the creator and the first element. Then follows reason as something due to the creator; lastly the composition of the primary elements out of love (*Φιλία*) and struggle (*Νεῖκος*) ⁽¹⁶⁾. All this means no novelty to us. But then it goes on to say: "The teaching (*kalām*) of Empedocles has, however, yet another start (*masāq*)". And here we meet with something which was not yet there: a theory of the soul.

"He said that the growing soul is the bark (*qišr*) ⁽¹⁷⁾ of the animal ⁽¹⁸⁾ soul, and the animal soul the bark of the logical soul ⁽¹⁹⁾, and the logical soul the bark of the rational soul ⁽²⁰⁾. And everything inferior is the bark to what is superior, and what is superior is its pith (*lubb*). And sometimes he employs for bark and pith the terms body and spirit; he posits the growing soul as body for the animal soul, and the latter as the spirit of the former, and so on, till he reaches the Reason" ⁽²¹⁾.

We recognize here a gradation of four souls. The two superior ones, the logical and the rational soul, belong to man; the third one to the animals. Thus, we shall attribute the growing soul to the plants, and indeed it is termed as such later on ⁽²²⁾. The passage here translated is the only statement of aš-Šahrastānī which is quoted (through the translation of Th. Haarbrücker) in Diels-Kranz's edition of the pre-Socratics ⁽²³⁾, where it is compared with fr. 117: "Because I became already once a boy, a girl, a plant, a man, and a dumb fish that rises from the waves". The comparison is justified through the assertion that the speculations of the "Arabs" are "very fanciful", but that in this particular case we have "a core of truth, viz. the gradation: plant, animal, man, god". To this we may answer that aš-Šahrastānī was no Arab, but a Persian; that he was born in Khorāsān and studied in Jurjāniya and Nīšāpūr; that it still remains to be seen whether his speculations are fanciful. The decisive point is that fr. 117 deals with the entrance of the soul in cer-

tain bodies, while aš-Šahrastānī speaks of a succession of souls as such. The two passages, therefore, have nothing to do directly with each other, but show the same gradation, because the rational soul would correspond to the νοῦς, i.e. to God, and the logical soul to man. U. v. Wilamowitz⁽²⁴⁾ has cited fr. 127 in the same connection.

But is this really Empedocles? P. Moraux points out that the distinction between the three souls — θρεπτική or φυτική ψυχή of the plants, αἰσθητική or ζωική ψυχή of the animals, λογική ψυχή of man — as well as the theory that the lower forms are contained in the upper ones, are Aristotelian. The Neoplatonics added as supreme form a νοητική ψυχή. This is, therefore, not Empedocles, but Porphyry. The latter felt impelled by Empedocles's theory of the μετενσωμάτωσις to discover in him the theory of the four souls. The circumstances in another case are similar.

The conception of bark-pith and body-spirit, in which bark and body enclose pith or spirit, is known to be Empedoclean⁽²⁵⁾. Fr. 126 speaks of a Daimon, who clothes the souls with the extraneous robe of the flesh. "Robe" (χιτών) corresponds to the bark and indicates the body. The eye too is said to have an interior of fiery substance, but water, earth and air enclose it⁽²⁶⁾. Once more the fine, superior, is surrounded with the coarse; and accordingly we are told in fr. 84 that on the creation of the eye primeval fire, enclosed in skins and in thin clothes, concealed itself behind the round-eyed girl (the pupil). Also with the "heavy-backed shells of the water dwellers", the sea snails and the stone-skinned tortoises, the earth lies on the surface of the skin (fr. 76). Accordingly, the body, which encloses the soul, is called "man-surrounding earth" (fr. 148)⁽²⁷⁾.

And yet the true Empedocles differentiates himself from aš-Šahrastānī and Porphyry. With the former, "bark-pith" refer exclusively to the couple body-soul and the like, but a soul never constitutes the bark of another. This transformation, as shown by the underlying theory of the four souls, could be undertaken by a Neoplatonic only, i.e. by Porphyry.

"And he said: after the primeval element caused whatever of the rational spiritual forms (*aš-suwar*) was with him to be shaped in reason, and after reason had caused whatever it had taken over from the primeval element to be shaped in the (universal) soul, then the universal soul caused whatever it had taken over from reason to be shaped in the universal nature"⁽²⁸⁾.

What we have translated as "primeval element" (*al-unṣur al-awwal*), stands in opposition to the two ἀρχαί, that rise from him, Φύλλα and

Νεῖκος⁽²⁹⁾; aš-Šahrastānī explains this shortly before⁽³⁰⁾. According to him, Empedocles said that "the Creator did not cease to be He⁽³¹⁾ alone. He is pure knowledge, pure will, liberality, strength, power, justice, goodness and truth. Not in the sense that forces exist which are called by this name, but they (the forces) are He, and he is synonymous with them all, creator (*mubdi'*) only⁽³²⁾; not in the sense that he created out of something⁽³³⁾, and not in the sense that something had existed outside him; he created the simple something, which is the first simple νοητόν⁽³⁴⁾ (*ma'qūl*) and the first 'unṣur⁽³⁵⁾'".

This renders the passage capable of interpretation. We recognize a formative process, which starts from the creator and the primeval element and includes successively the intelligible, reason, universal soul and universal nature. Each step utilizes what has come over from the preceding for the formation of a new one. We have thus again a gradation, with the only difference that this time it proceeds from the higher to the lower.

The series ἐν — νοητόν — νοῦς — ψυχή — φύσις is Neoplatonic. According to Plotinus the differentiation of νοητόν and νοῦς is of a purely conceptual kind: the νοητόν does not stand outside the νοῦς⁽³⁶⁾. He thus opposes the view of the younger Porphyry, who wanted to separate νοητόν and νοῦς⁽³⁷⁾. The series found with aš-Šahrastānī is therefore purely Porphyrian. The starting point for such an interpretation may have been Empedocles's word on the σφαῖρος, which rejoices of the solitude prevailing all around⁽³⁸⁾. It was equated with the ἐν, and thus with aš-Šahrastānī's 'unṣur.

"In the (universal) nature barks (= bodies) came into existence, which were not similar to it (in their real essence)⁽³⁹⁾, nor were they similar to the spiritual, subtle reason". What the universal soul had received from reason, had become form in the universal nature. Thus the universal nature, in its origin and essence, is connected with reason. The bodies, which now come into being in the universal nature, are dissimilar from the real essence of universal nature, because they are unconnected with reason.

We cannot conceal the fact that another, and probably more correct interpretation is possible: *-hā* in *tušbihuhā* might be referred to the subject of the preceding sentence, viz. to the universal soul. It then would mean: the barks = bodies, that arise in the universal nature, resemble neither the universal soul nor the reason.

"But after reason had looked upon it (the universal nature)⁽⁴⁰⁾ and has seen the spirit and the pith within the bodies and the barks, a number of fine, noble and splendid forms flowed down

upon it (the universal nature) ⁽⁴¹⁾; and these are the forms of the souls that resemble the rational, fine and spiritual forms, so that they (the souls) govern it (the universal nature) and freely rule over it thanks to the distinction between barks and pith, and in the last instance let the pith ascend to their (the souls') world ''.

Reason sees through what had taken place in universal nature. It sees the arising bodies, which do not resemble it and the original essence of universal nature. But it sees also that the bodies enclose spiritual contents. These contents are witness to the real essence of universal nature, which is connected with reason; but, being imprisoned in bodies, need refinement and liberation. They obtain both through the insight of reason: forms that resemble the forms of reason (once more a Neoplatonic conception), unite with the universal nature. They permeate the spiritual contents, refine them and give them immediate access to the universal nature. Of course "pith" in the last sentence indicates the spiritual contents, which are embellished by the flowing down of the forms of the soul.

"And the partial souls were parts of the universal soul like the parts of the sun rising over the openings of the house, and the universal nature is caused by the (universal) soul. And he (Empedocles) distinguished between part and what is caused; the part is one thing and what is caused another" ⁽⁴²⁾.

With the individual souls as parts of the universal soul, we find ourselves once more within the compass of Plotinian and Porphyrian thought ⁽⁴³⁾. While the universal nature stands in a more exterior relationship to the universal soul on account of its being caused ⁽⁴⁴⁾, the essence of the part is explained by a comparison with the sun. Once more Plotinus employs the simile of the light, above all when he has to explain the relationship between a higher and a lower hypostasis (1, 1, 12, 26f.; 1, 1, 8, 15; 2, 9, 2-3; 6, 4, 15 in the middle). Here too the starting point can be recognized. According to Empedocles fr. 22 the radiating sun (*ἡλέκτωρ*), like all cosmic powers, is harmoniously united with its parts, although the latter are widely scattered in the mortal world.

"He said further: the peculiarity of the universal soul is love. After it (the universal soul) had looked upon reason and its beauty and splendour, it loved it, as the lover the object of his love. And it tried to unite with it and moved toward it. And the peculiarity of universal nature is fight, because, after it arose, it had no vision, through which it could perceive and love the (universal) soul and reason. Rather, opposite forces arose from it (the universal nature). On

the side of its (the universal nature's) simple component parts were the opposite (forces) of the elements, on the side of its compounded parts were the mutually opposite temperamental (*mizājī*), structural (*tabī'ī*) ⁽⁴⁵⁾, vegetal (*nabātī*) and animal (*hayawānī*) forces. And they (the forces) stood up against it (the universal soul) because of the distance from its (the universal soul's) whole, and there agreed with them (with the forces) the soul-parts, who were led astray by its (the universal nature's) deceptive world" ⁽⁴⁶⁾.

Φιλία and *Νεῖκος*, familiar conceptions of the Empedoclean theory of nature, appear here in a new version. In the *Περὶ φύσεως* nature is permeated with *Both*: "... now everything unites into one in love, now the single elements separate in the hatred of fight" ⁽⁴⁷⁾. Now love alone suits the universal soul. Nature is incapable of love. Its essence is fight. Both the simple components of nature and the compounded ones fight against each other. On the one side the elements fight each other, on the other side the living beings do the same; in the *Περὶ φύσεως* fighting lays hold of the elements too: "Now One grows out of Many into sole Being, now it separates again, to be Many out of One: fire and water and earth and the infinite height of air, then fight separate from them, equally strong everywhere" ⁽⁴⁸⁾. But *Νεῖκος* seizes the elements no more, when *Φιλία* too does it. Both permeate nature as union and separation, life and death. In our passage too love is union: fight is, if not death, at least separation, entanglement, estrangement. But while in the *Περὶ φύσεως* the antithesis operates horizontally, in our passage it does so vertically. Love comes from above and aspires upward, fight operates downward and drags downward. Since love corresponds to the universal soul and fight to nature, the whole of the world arranges itself in superimposed order: above the universal soul, below the universal nature. Reason adheres to the universal soul, while the elements and their blends belong to universal nature; thus they belong to the world of *Νεῖκος* and are withdrawn from *Φιλία*, become the opposite pole of *Φιλία*.

Once more we can recognize the size of the transformation that Porphyry has permitted himself. For Empedocles, Cypris was the primeval goddess, who reigned even before Kronos (fr. 128), and Porphyry equated her expressly with *Φιλία* (*de abst.* 2. 20). But what he arranged in superimposed order, was for Empedocles a chronological sequence: a golden age, to be followed by other ages. This will find confirmation later on.

In the details, we find again contacts with the original Empedocles. We are told about the souls that *Νεῖκος* drags them away from the

One⁽⁴⁹⁾. And when universal soul and reason cannot see the universal nature *Νεῖκος* but only what corresponds to their own essence, we may recall fr. 119, according to which love can be recognized only by love, hatred only by sorrowful hatred.

“They (the soul parts) inclined toward sensual pleasure, such as healthy food, wholesome drink, fresh clothing, radiant aspect and longed-for love connexion. And they forgot what of that splendour, of that beauty and perfection, spiritual moral and rational, was inherent to their own essence”⁽⁵⁰⁾.

Here we must recall first of all the warning of Empedocles, who laid upon his disciples to avoid intercourse with women, so that “they do not cooperate and do not become concerned with works carried out by *Νεῖκος*, thus dissolving and clearing asunder the work of love”⁽⁵¹⁾. Above all, in this instance too we may best compare Porphyry. We are involuntarily reminded of a description like in *de abst.* I, 33-34, which renders the sensual perceptions in a richer way and with a luxuriant visualization. Here too they chain the souls to the nether world. A transition to the following is represented by the liberation happening when the soul is reminded of what it has forgotten and is purified of what stains it (*de abst.* I, 30).

“When the universal soul saw their (the soul parts) inveighing and their ensnarement, she sent down to them one of her (the universal soul’s) parts, which was more penetrating⁽⁵²⁾, finer and nobler than both these souls, the animal and the vegetal ones, and than those souls ensnared in them, in order that it should prevent both souls from inveighing, and should teach the ensnared souls to love her (the universal soul’s) world, and should remind them of what they had forgotten, and should instruct them in what they did not know, and should purify them of that with which they had stained themselves, and should cleanse them of that with which they had made themselves unclean”⁽⁵³⁾.

We learn here for the first time that not only parts of the universal soul in general, but the animal and vegetal in particular belong to the souls ensnared in the universal nature and *Νεῖκος*. The animal and vegetal souls stand one step lower than the remaining parts of the soul that are ensnared in the universal nature, so that they are separated from these.

With Empedocles, the ensnarement of the animal soul in the world of *Νεῖκος* is shown above all by the killing and eating of the animal. Fr. 128, 8f. tells of the Golden Age, in which, contrary, to the present, no altar was sprinkled with bull blood;

among men, to tear away life and to swallow up noble limbs was deemed the greatest defilement of all. Accordingly, fr. 139 mentions the *σχέτλι’ ἔργα βορᾶς*; also *χαλκῶ ἀπὸ ψυχῆν ἀρούσας* of fr. 138 belongs in this context. Empedocles reinforces the indictment by quoting the myth of the *μετενσωμάτωνσις* to the effect that the father slaughters his son, the son his father, the mother her children in order to swallow their own flesh and blood (fr. 137). We should place in the same connexion the admonition to abstain from laurel leaves and beans (fr. 140-141). Trees alone bore once fruits the whole year and could therefore give of them to man (fr. 77-78)⁽⁵⁴⁾. As the former referred to the animal soul, so the latter to the vegetal. Accordingly we find in fr. 117 a sequence of boy, girl, animal and plant that traverses the soul, and in fr. 127 the transformation of former men in lions and laurels, i.e. again in animal and plant.

The peculiarity of our text stands out once more⁽⁵⁵⁾. Empedocles referred to the Golden Age, an ideal primitive condition in which men, knowing of *μετενσωμάτωνσις*, abstained from meat. Here on the contrary there is question neither of the Golden Age nor of the *μετενσωμάτωνσις*, but the lower forms of the soul, being ensnared in the world of *Νεῖκος*, are led back home by a finer and nobler part of the soul. What was a chronological sequence with Empedocles — Golden Age followed by others, worse ones —, is again decomposed for Porphyry into an above and a below, into spiritual and rational world in opposition to the material one.

“And this noble part (of the universal soul) is the prophet (*an-nabī*), who is sent out in each rotation of rotations. He walks in the rules of reason and of the first primitive element, in what concerns the observance of *Φιλία* and *Νεῖκος*. He treats some of the souls as a friend with wisdom and kind admonition, with others he deals sharply with force and through *Νεῖκος*⁽⁵⁶⁾. And sometimes he summons⁽⁵⁷⁾ by his tongue on behalf of *Φιλία* in a kind way, and sometimes by the sword on behalf of *Νεῖκος* in a violent way, in order to liberate the noble partial souls that are ensnared in the temptations of both the temperamental souls (the animal and the vegetal), by the empty temptation and the vain delusion”⁽⁵⁸⁾.

First of all, it is clear that Porphyry was reminded of a Platonian formulation⁽⁵⁹⁾. In Phaedon 94 B the mastery over everything in man is ascribed to the rational part of the soul. This mastery over the soul *τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ’ ἀλγηδόνων... τὰ δὲ πραότερον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ ρουθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὀργαῖς καὶ φόβοις ὡς ἄλλη οὔσα ἄλλῳ πράγματι*

διαλεγομένη (94 D); cf. Rep. 617 D. This agrees with the picture hitherto obtained.

What does “that rotation of rotations” mean? Apparently it is the κύκλος, the καθόλου μεταβολή. Aristoteles speaks even of the περίοδος by Empedocles⁽⁶⁰⁾; only it is not a cosmic revolution, but one of the soul; a revolving by “rejection and redemption”⁽⁶¹⁾, more correctly perhaps by ensnarement and liberation. The Golden Age, described by Empedocles as an ideal primitive state, must be followed by others; and it can be had in the mention of a number of “rotations” which as a matter of principle is illimited. These ages do not fit with Porphyry’s interpretation, who recognized no course, but only an above and a below, and no Golden Age, and therefore could not recognize any following age. But this very fact shows that we have stumbled upon something truly Empedoclean.

It still remains to be explained what is concealed under this “prophet”. We could think of fr. 146, where the sentence τῶν σοφῶν τὰς ψυχὰς θεοὺς γίνεσθαι is quoted as Empedocles’s teaching, whereupon the μάντις are mentioned as the first of those “who grow up as gods, richest in honours”. Empedocles also says of himself that he goes about as an immortal god (fr. 112,4), and men come to him μαντοσυνέων κεχρημένοι (l. c. 10). And yet it would be absurd to see in aš-Šahrastānī’s “prophet” simply an Empedoclean μάντις. Wherever Empedocles paraphrases a corresponding conception, he does not do it by an unequivocal term. Ἱητροὶ ὑμνοπόλοι and the like stand at the side of the μάντις. There is always a multiplicity of words and conceptions, as plurality of names lies near to his heart⁽⁶²⁾. The “prophet” would rather suit aš-Šahrastānī, with whom this idea plays a certain role⁽⁶³⁾. Or does it lead to Porphyry himself?

Granted, he speaks of προφήται of the Egyptians (*de abst.* 4, 8), and Iamblichus does the same in his reply to Porphyry’s letter to Anebo (*de myst.* 1, 1). The corporeal must be first eliminated, so that the προφήτης may be prepared εἰς ὑποδοχὴν θεοῦ. The soul must become the pure seat of the divine ἐπίπνοια, which radiates upon it; so we are told in another passage (*de myst.* 3, 11). But this too has nothing to do with the “prophet” as described by aš-Šahrastānī.

“And sometimes he (the prophet) clothes both the lower souls (vegetal and animal) with the robe of the noble soul, so that the quality of lust is changed into love, which loves what is good, right and true, and the quality of anger changes into that of combat, so that what is bad, vain and mendacious is defeated, and at last the noble partial soul united with both (the

vegetal and animal souls) ascends to the world of the spiritual beings, and both are a body for it (the noble partial soul) in *that* world, as both were a body for it in *this* world. For it is said: if domination and fortune (τύχη) falls to the lot of one, then men love such ones, so that he overcomes his enemies⁽⁶⁴⁾ through their (these mens’) love to him⁽⁶⁵⁾ ».

It turns out once more that the “prophet” knows how to utilize both, Φιλία and Νεῖκος. Only, Φιλία appears now as the more important, because it not only connects the followers with their prophet, but also helps the latter, by this very fact, to victory over the enemies. Above all: a word is said, which is the key to everything that precedes. The prophet possessing the *daula* means that he is a πολιτικός, of course not an ordinary one, but one who comes from above and will once return to his divine home. In this connexion let us recall that the title πολιτικός is handed down for Empedocles⁽⁶⁶⁾.

Most of what we said above is new and, as we must confess, unexpected. And yet it is indissolubly fitted into the whole. The end turns back to the beginning, an original condition is restored. Vegetal and animal souls, created as bark of the logical and rational ones, are brought back to the upper realm and take again their seat there⁽⁶⁷⁾.

3.

A defender of the Empedoclean philosophy in Islamic times was the Spanish mystic Ibn Masarra (d. 931). M. Asín Palacios wrote a widely noticed memoir on him⁽⁶⁸⁾, and in connexion with it M. Horten⁽⁶⁹⁾ declared Ibn Masarra’s teaching to be a compilation from Philon, Plotinus and the historical Empedocles. But this judgment concerns less Ibn Masarra himself than the reconstruction given by Asín Palacios. The latter presented no original texts, but a summary of what Arabic authors, among whom aš-Šahrastānī, narrate about Empedocles. It is, however, not proved and not even likely that all this goes back to Ibn Masarra. We can show this just at the hand of aš-Šahrastānī.

It is evident from the summary given by Asín Palacios⁽⁷⁰⁾ that in some case the text of aš-Šahrastānī is close to that of aš-Šahrastānī. This is the case for a piece from what we have treated above⁽⁷¹⁾, but also for the rest of the chapter on Empedocles. Even the passage 265, 4-11, which (as shown in the preceding note) does not come from Porphyry at all, finds its counterpart in aš-Šahrastānī. Since this author died 1243 and

is therefore substantially later than aš-Šahrastānī (d. 1153), we come to the simple conclusion that aš-Šahrastānī took the above-mentioned passages from the work of aš-Šahrastānī. Nothing shows that both might go back to Ibn Masarra.

What Ibn Masarra taught and where he obtained his knowledge of Empedocles, remains at present an open question. Was it the Syriac translation of the *Φιλόσοφος ιστορία*, an Arabic adaptation or even (the last and less likely possibility) a knowledge of the originals? An answer will be given only when we shall have the extant text of Ibn Masarra ⁽⁷²⁾.

The basis of all discussion is the fact that the above-treated passage of aš-Šahrastānī goes back to Porphyry, because it is the latter who has quoted in his writings for purposes of comparison numerous fragments of Empedocles. And since Porphyry is the only one, as we shall show presently, to know some things of Empedocles, we may safely conclude that he himself still read the original Empedocles.

A survey of the fragments cited by Porphyry elicits a peculiar picture. Fr. 105 alone is taken from Empedocles's great didascalical poem on Nature. On the other side, no less than seven fragments are culled from the *Καθαρμοί*. Of these, fr. 115 is frequently cited ⁽⁷³⁾, fr. 126 occurs also in Plutarch (*de esu carn.* 2, 3 p. 998 c), but fr. 128, as well as 129, 3-6 occur with Porphyry alone. Porphyry, therefore, utilized the original *Καθαρμοί*, and indeed mentions them by name in fr. 139. This observation is of decisive import for an evaluation of the passage found in aš-Šahrastānī.

The beginning sentence, according to which Empedocles's teaching had another "start", shows that Porphyry was bringing something new in front of what was hitherto current in the doxographic literature as the opinion of Empedocles. He was conscious that he was thus proposing for discussion something unknown or forgotten: an outline of the Empedoclean doctrine of the soul, which followed that of physics. If the latter went back to the didascalical poem *Περὶ φύσεως*, then the former could not be based on anything else but the *Καθαρμοί*. This agrees with the observation that Porphyry in his extant writings quotes this poem by far more frequently than any other. As aš-Šahrastānī speaks of another, i.e. a second start, thus in the ancient editions the *Καθαρμοί* came after the two books *Περὶ φύσεως* ⁽⁷⁴⁾. Tzetzes ⁽⁷⁵⁾ could even allude to the *Καθαρμοί* as *τῶ τρίτῳ τῶν φυσικῶν* ⁽⁷⁶⁾.

The discussions on slaughter and sacrifice of animals, on partaking of meat lead back logically to Empedocles's four books on abstinence. As

was to be expected, the name of Empedocles occurs frequently in them. At the beginning he is bracketed with Pythagoras as an adversary of meat ⁽⁷⁷⁾. The following quotations from the *Καθαρμοί* are given: fr. 128 ⁽⁷⁸⁾ (with the exception of v. 9) and later one its vv. 8-10 ⁽⁷⁹⁾; further fr. 139 ⁽⁸⁰⁾ and 124,2 ⁽⁸¹⁾. To these we may add two passages ⁽⁸²⁾ of lesser importance. Empedocles is for Porphyry one of the precursors and champions of abstinence ⁽⁸³⁾.

It is unnecessary to show again the same thing for the doctrine of Soul. Of course all this implies that Porphyry, whenever he speaks of Empedocles, is only too inclined to read him with neo-Platonic eyes; the examination of our passage has supplied proof enough for this. The question remains, whether it has also yielded something for the true Empedocles. No need to tell where this may be sought for. If we leave aside the details, confirmations and coincidences contained in our passage, the novelty in it is the role of the "prophet" and *πολιτικός*, liberator of the soul ⁽⁸⁴⁾ and regulator of the world.

4.

The Aramaic version of the story of Aḥīqar, found in eleven more or less incomplete papyrus shreds from Elephantine, led down to the query about the origin of this piece of most ancient literature. From later times, the book is preserved in Syriac, neo-Syriac, Arabic, Ethiopic, Armenian, Slavonian, neo-Greek and Roumanian adaptations ⁽⁸⁵⁾. The Aramaic version was written down about 430 B.C.; was it not only the earliest, but also the original one? A. Cowley, who discussed the matter thoroughly ⁽⁸⁶⁾, after weighing all the evidence came to the conclusion that it was a translation from Old Persian into Aramaic; at least the Aramaic text came into being under a strong Old Persian Influence; but the book was originally written in Akkadian and was composed in the neo-Babylonian period about 550.

Cowley's formulation shows that it is possible to find evidence for contacts with Old Persian (at least in his opinion), but that we cannot answer with sufficient assurance the central question whether it is a translation from Old Persian, or simply one that was made in the Achaemenian period. We must add that the remarks put forward in several forms by Cowley as support to his contention do not bear close scrutiny.

According to him, 'twr appears as the name of Assyria instead of the 'šwr that was to be expected; and this reminds of Old Persian *aθurā-*.

There is no doubt that the latter form is employed in the Old Persian version of the Achaemenian inscriptions. But already R. G. Kent⁽⁸⁷⁾ registers *aθurā-* under the catchword “from the Semitic”. We have *’šwr* in Hebrew (also *’šr*), also in the Panammū inscription l. 7 and in the inscription of Bar Rakib⁽⁸⁸⁾ l. 9; further, Assy. *aš-šur*. But there also the parallel forms Jew.-Aram. *attūr*, Syr. *ātūr* and *’Aθovq* in Tobit 14, 4; *’Aθovqia* in 14, 15 (side by side with *’Aσσόριοι* 1, 3; 10; 22; 14, 4) in the Sinaiticus. If the Aramaic Aḥīqar writes regularly *’twr*, there is no reason to treat this differently from *tql* Cowley no. 10, 5 confronted with *šql* everywhere else. It is an Aramaic peculiarity, and without a doubt Old Persian *aθurā-* goes back to the Aramaic form, and not the other way round.

The second reason put forward by Cowley is the apposition of *šmh* to the personal name, corresponding to an Old Persian *N. N. nāma*. But postponed *šmh* occurs also, as already seen by Cowley⁽⁸⁹⁾, in no. 28, 4; 5; 9; 13 and no. 66, 1. We can add now Brooklyn Papyri no. 8, 3 and with feminine suffix no. 2, 3; 5, 2; 4; 6, 3; 7, 3. E. G. Kraeling remarks⁽⁹⁰⁾: “In Babylonian style the name of the servant is followed by the word ‘his name’, i. e. ‘by name’” = *šum-šu*. The same usage occurs in the Aršāma letters. Lately G. R. Driver has taken up again the derivation from Old Persian that had been eliminated by Kraeling’s remark⁽⁹¹⁾; but this is confuted by the lack of the 3. sing. suffix in Old Persian and by its presence in Babylonian.

Lastly, Cowley wants to equate the often employed *’hr* with an Old Persian *pasāva*. But the word occurs repeatedly in other Aramaic texts too. It is found in the remaining Cowley Papyri, in the Brooklyn Papyri, in the Aršāma letters and in Biblical Aramaic. The last to take position on this problem has been W. B. Henning⁽⁹²⁾.

Thus all the arguments that can be adduced in favour of a translation from Old Persian, fall to the ground. Nevertheless it remains certain that this version of the Aḥīqar story came into being in Achaemenian times. An expression like *hyl ’twr* (l. 55; 61) does not point to the “army” proper. The “wise scribe, the counsellor of all Assyria” (l. 12), the keeper of the seal (l. 3), *ὁ ἀρχαιονοχός καὶ ἐπὶ δακτυλίου καὶ διοικητῆς καὶ ἐκλογιστῆς* (Tobit 1, 22 Sin.) had nothing to do with it. Rather he was concerned with what could also be termed *hyl*, the aristocracy, the high-class people, the high officialdom, i. e. all that Old Persian *kāra-* implies^(92a). Besides, the fact that the scribe of the king employs Aramaic only, with exclusion of Akka-

dic, can be thought of only under the Achaemenians. This, however, does not imply that the text was translated from Old Persian, but only that it came into being in Achaemenian times. And both observations exclude an Akkadic original.

If the Aḥīqar story arose in Aramaic language and Achaemenian times, then everything points to this version being not only the earliest for us, but also the original one. Since the papyrus can be dated in the late 5th century, the book may have been composed not much earlier. In favour of this contention we may adduce the fact that its first literary mention belongs to this period.

The Aramaic text is divided into the story of Aḥīqar (ll. 1-78) and his wise sayings (ll. 79-223). The latter occur also with Democritus, an older contemporary of Plato⁽⁹³⁾. Clemens Alex., *strom.* 1, 15, 69 (cf. Euseb., *praep. ev.* 10, 4) says: *λέγεται... τὴν Ἀκικάρου στήλην ἐρμενευθεῖσαν τοῖς ἰδίοις συντάξαι συγγράμμασιν*. In a latter passage we are told that Democritus went to Babylonia.

F. Nau⁽⁹⁴⁾ tried to show, starting from the Syriac version, that the sayings of Democritus contained in the collection of Stobaeus agree with those of Aḥīqar. But he had to concede that “les points de contact ne sont ni aussi nombreux ni aussi frappants que nous pourrions le désirer”⁽⁹⁵⁾. Nau imputes this unsatisfactory result to the unfavourable tradition, which preserved only few sayings of Democritus and only late versions of the Aḥīqar story⁽⁹⁶⁾. But even the Aramaic text, which saw the light just in time to be known by him⁽⁹⁷⁾, did not improve the situation. The sayings of Democritus preserved in Greek show no convincing coincidences even with the original.

H. Diels declared the statement of Clemens as spurious, and W. Kranz followed him, as late as the sixth edition of the *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (1952). Clemens’s words stand as no. 299 among the spurious fragments, and the Adnotatio reproduces the arguments that decided Diels to reject it. Of the seven arguments adduced, their author calls nn. 3 and 4 “striking but not decisive”, no. 7 “at least striking”; they can, therefore, be left out of account. The reference to the non-classical *ἐγενήθην*, which Diels reckoned as “decisive”, has been eliminated by Kranz’s quotation of Archyt. B 1⁽⁹⁸⁾. As to the “wry” manner of expression (no. 6), it is based on a misunderstanding of the final sentence. *Σὺν τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐπ’ ἔτεα ὀγδώκοντα ἐπὶ ξείνης ἐγενήθην* can only mean “Together with these (including the *ἀπεδονάπται*), I was finally

80 years on foreign soil". Democritus, who according to Diod. 14, 11, 5 lived till the age of 90 and *ἔτι παῖς ὢν* listened to Mages and Chaldaeans (Diog. Laert. 9, 34), can have said this at an advanced age only. This agrees with the general import, which looks back to a past life. Clemens's sentence *ἐπῆλθε γὰρ Βαβυλωνά τε καὶ Περσίδα καὶ Αἴγυπτον τοῖς τε Μάγοις καὶ τοῖς ἱεροῦσι μαθητέων* gives the explanation.

In no case Clemens meant herewith an allusion to the work *περὶ τῶν ἐν Βαβυλῶνι ἱερῶν γραμμάτων*, because Persis and Egypt are mentioned on the side of Babylonia. That book can only have treated the cuneiform script, and Aḥīqar's sayings were not noted down in that, but in the Aramaic script. Such pillars in Aramaic script and language with edicts and religious precepts of Aśoka have now been made known by the Inscriptions of Taxila and Pul-i Darunta; the latter speaks even of what is written on the pillar or stele (*b'm[w'd']*)⁽⁹⁹⁾. Aḥīqar's wise sayings too may have been brought to the knowledge of the public in this way.

Lastly, the beginning sentence needs no alteration. *Δημόκριτος γὰρ τοὺς Βαβυλωνίους λόγους ἡθικὸν ποιεῖται* can only mean: "Democritus employed the Babylonian *λόγοι* as ethical (*λόγοι*)" ⁽¹⁰⁰⁾. This is explained by what follows: "It is indeed said that he translated the stele of Aki-karos and included it among his own writings".

It has not hitherto been noticed that, apart from the "Sayings of Democrates" (fr. 35-115) and from what Stobaeus gives (fr. 169-297), further "Wise Sayings" of Democritus are preserved in aš-Šahrastānī's *Kitāb al-milal wa-n-nihāl*.

It is peculiar that his data have been exploited for Empedocles only⁽¹⁰¹⁾. But there is no reason for limiting ourselves to one philosopher, when we have here information on other Pre-Socratics too and fragments of their works (and numerous ones at that). We can go much farther. Šahrastānī's manual has proved to be a valuable source in several ways. It has supplied a fragment of Mazdak's writings (the only extant one), which made possible the philosophical classification of that revolutionary⁽¹⁰²⁾. It has preserved for us an extract from Porphyry's *Φιλόσοφος ἱστορία*, which (beside much else that has not yet been utilized) includes the table of contents of Empedocles's *Καθαρμοί*. Lastly, the Arabic work has preserved a fragment from Porphyry's letter to Anebo, which elucidates to great extent the antecedents of Iamblichos's writing on the mysteries⁽¹⁰³⁾.

This time we are concerned with the florilegium utilized by Šahrastānī (or his predecessor),

which included the "Wise Sayings" of Zeno, Solon, Homer, Hippocrates and others⁽¹⁰⁴⁾; and chiefly with the sayings of Democritus⁽¹⁰⁵⁾. They are less numerous than those of the other philosophers; but the supply univocal, i. e. verbal coincidences with the Aḥīqar.

Already Th. Nöldeke⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ remarked that two of the sayings of Democritus there given occur also in the Syriac version of the Aḥīqar story, and a third one in the Armenian and Slavonian version. But another, much more important coincidence escaped Nöldeke⁽¹⁰⁷⁾: Aḥīqar 1. 148 *'l thly w'l[ybl']wk 'ltmr [w'lyrqwk* "Be not sweet, so that thou mayest not be devoured, be not bitter, so that thou mayest not be vomited".

Šahrastānī 305, 20 Cureton: *lā takun ḥulwan jiddan, li'allā tubla' wa-lā murran jiddan li'allā tulfaḏ* "be not too sweet, so that thou mayest not be devoured, and be not too bitter, so that thou mayest not be vomited".

The saying is of an unique vividness and pregnancy: it could hardly be invented independently, above all in this coinciding expression. Even if we remain doubtful in front of Nau's combinations, the use of Aḥīqar's wisdom is thus proved for the later versions by three instances, and for the earliest by only one instance, which however is beyond all doubt. Democritus must have come to know the sayings of Aḥīqar in the course of the late 5th century. This agrees with the time of composition of the Aramaic work, which was determined above on the basis of its form and tradition⁽¹⁰⁸⁾.

4.

In order to substantiate what we said above, we cannot avoid translating the whole of Šahrastānī's section 305, 2 - 306, 20. The attempt of Th. Haarbrücker (1850-1) has led to several mistakes in this instance too.

"The wise sayings of Democritus (*dīmoqrātīs*). He was one of the most remarkable wise men in the times of Bahman b. Isfendiyār. He and Hippocrates lived at the same time, before Plato. He had (definite) opinions in philosophy, mainly on the beginnings of being and on passing away. Aristoteles used to prefer his (Democritus's) discourses to those of his master Plato, the divine one, and he (Aristoteles) was unjust in this.

Said Democritus: External beauty is represented by the painters through colours. But as to the internal one, nobody represents it except he to whom it really belongs, i. e. its (the internal beauty's) creator and *ἐδρετής*.

He said: It is not meet for thee to consider thyself a man, while anger eliminates thy judgement and follows thy desire ⁽¹⁰⁹⁾.

He said: It is not meet for men to be tested at the time of their humiliation, but at the time of their strength and might. And as iron is tested in the furnace, thus man is tested in (the possession of) might, so that the good in him be separated from evil.

He said: It is meet for thee to begin with the sciences after thou hast cleansed thy soul of faults and accustomed it to the virtues. For, if thou dost not do it, thou shalt have no advantage from the sciences.

He said: He who gives possessions to his brother, gives him his treasures, and he who gives him his knowledge and his good advice, gives him his soul.

He said: It is not meet for thee to reckon profit, in which a great damage lies concealed, as (real) profit, and (to reckon) damage, in which a great profit lies concealed, as (real) damage, nor (is it meet), concerning a life that is not laudable, to reckon it as (real) life.

He said: He who is content with the name, is like him who is content with smell, without eating.

He said: A clever enemy is better than a stupid friend.

He said: The fruit of might is negligence, and the fruit of negligence is decay, and the fruit of decay is the appearance of idleness, and the fruit of idleness is foolishness and crime and repentance and sadness.

He said: It is necessary for man to cleanse his heart from cunning and guile, as he cleanses his body from the kinds of fornication.

He said: Wish not, with regard to another, that he today follow on thy foot and to-morrow... ⁽¹¹⁰⁾.

He said: Be not too sweet, so that thou mayest not be devoured, and not too bitter, so that thou mayest not be vomited.

He said: The tail of the dog acquires him his food, and his mouth acquires (him) beatings.

There was in Athens an untalented painter. He came to Democritus and said: Plaster thy house, that I may paint it. He (Democritus) replied: Paint it first, so that I may plaster it afterward.

He said: As knowledge is to one who does not accept it and, when he accepts it, still does not know, thus is to a sick man medicine by which he is not healed.

He was told: Look not! And he closed his eyes. He was told: Hear not! And he covered his ears. He was told: Speak not! And he placed

his hand on his lips. He was told: Know not! He replied: I cannot. He wanted to express by this that the inner things (*bawāṭin*) do not fall under the free decision. He pointed to necessity within (*sirr*) and free decision without. Because man is determined by necessity as regards his origin (*hudūt*), he is without rule over his heart, although by his heart he is more than his limbs. Therefore, as long as he cannot freely decide as regards his innermost (*aṣl*), there is no possibility for him to shape his innermost (*aṣl*).

On this saying there is a second explanation. According to it, he alluded to the difference between intelligence and senses, because, as regards intellectual cognition, a withdrawal from it is unimaginable. And once it (the intellectual cognition) is here, it is not imaginable to forget it through free will and to withdraw from it — as opposed to sensual cognition. This shows that intelligence is not of the kind of the senses and soul does not belong to the sphere of the body. It was said that free decision with man is compounded of two influences, of whom one is the influence of an imperfection, the other the influence of a perfection. To the first one man inclines through a decision of nature and temperament. And as regards the second influence, (man) is weak in it, if help does not reach him from intelligence, rational distinction and *λόγος* (*naṭq*), so that penetrating insight may be obtained and straightforward resoluteness arise and truth be loved and vanity be detested. As long as such help does not come from the capacity to distinguish, a prevalence of the second influence shows itself. And if free decision were not compounded of these two influences and were not separated in both directions, then man would get the whole of what he strives after with his free will without delay and hesitation, without reflecting for a moment and without uncertainty, without needing advice and favour.

As regards the opinion held by this wise man, I found nobody who remembers it and has refuted it, or examined it and leaned toward it".

There are 15 sayings. They are introduced by a short remark on Democritus and concluded by two extensive interpretations concerning the last saying.

Democritus is placed in the times of Bahman b. Isfendiyar. The latter is equated with Artaxerxes I (464-423) ⁽¹¹¹⁾; cf. Mirkhond's *Kitāb-i tā'rīkh*, Bombay 1271, 1, 187, 15, where he is called *dirāzdest* (*μακρόχρεια*) ⁽¹¹²⁾. This chronological determination is of some importance; because, if Democritus's *ἀρχμή*, i. e. his fortieth year, is placed still under Artaxerxes I, then the

Apollodorian birth date Ol.80 = 460-457 (FGr-Hist 244 F 36 II 1030) is out of question. Only the second date in Diog. Laert. 9, 41 comes into question, according to whom Thrasyllus⁽¹¹³⁾ in the preface to the edition of the writings (τὰ πρὸ τῆς ἀναγνώσεως τῶν Δημοκρίτου βιβλίων) placed the birth of Democritus in Ol.77, 3 = 470-469. We can therefore in all certainty lead back the above quoted sayings to Thrasyllus's edition, where they must have stood in the ὑπομνημάτων ἡθικῶν (book number missing) under the first group of writings, the Ἡθικά (Diog. Laert. 9, 46 = A 33 Diels). This agrees with what has been ascertained above. The explanations are still left.

When we are told that man is conditioned by necessity as regards his origin, this opinion of Democritus is not handed down directly. But it can be inferred from A 106 (Aristot., *de rep.* 4, 471b 30 f.), where the talk is about ζῆν and ἀποθνήσκειν. When the necessity of death is discussed (διὰ τί τότε πᾶσι μὲν ἀναγκαῖον ἀποθανεῖν κτλ.), then the contrary too, i. e. life and its origin, must be assigned the character of necessity.

Within the compass of the second explanation, the equivalence of intelligence and soul, of νοῦς and ψυχή, is common stock of the extant evidence on the doctrine of Democritus (A 101; 106; 113). For the rest, it corresponds with the contraposition of intellectual and sensual cognition, of νοῦς on the one side and αἰσθησεις and φαντασία on the other (A 113 = Philopon., *de anima* 71, 19 f.); of διάνοια and αἰσθήσεις (B 125; cf. B 9 ἀλήθεια and αἰσθήσεις). Democritus himself speaks of γνώμης... δύο... ἰδέαι, ἡ μὲν γνησίη, ἡ δὲ σκοτίη. In σκοτίη he includes ὄψις, ἀκοή, ὁδμή, γεῦσις, ψαῦσις (B 11). Lastly, also the two "influences" on the free decision of man occur in the fragments of Democritus. They are εἶδωλα which approach man (ἐμπελάζειν): καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθοποιά, τὰ δὲ κακοποιά adds the authority (B 166). Correspondingly, B 175 τὰγαθά are separated as a gift of the gods from the κακὰ καὶ βλαβερά καὶ ἀνωφελέα, which ἐμπελάουσι διὰ νοῦ τυφλότητα καὶ ἀγνωμοσύνην man.

There can be no doubt, that the explanations stand in the best of the tradition; they too must go back to Thrasyllus. And hereby the authenticity of the verbal fragments, the Wise Sayings, is guaranteed. Translations of Democritan writings into Syriac and thence into Arabic are mentioned by al-Qiftī 181, 5 f. Lippert. The context shows that physical writings were intended above all, which of course does not exclude the translation of others. The *rasā'il* cited in passing l. 7 and Fihrist 354, 23 Flügel are the spurious letters (68 C 2-6 Diels).

5.

The picture presented by the fragments of Democritus shall now be completed by a second group of these, taken from the same florilegium that was utilized by aš-Šahrastānī. They go back to Theophrastus's writing on music. We give their translation and commentary as well.

(337, 14 Cureton) "Wise Sayings of Theophrastus (*t'wfrstys*). This man belonged to Aristoteles's pupils and to the great ones among the latter's companions. He followed him (Aristoteles) (or: he [Aristoteles] appointed him [Theophrastus] as his successor) on the seat of wisdom after his death, and the lovers of philosophy used to visit him and to learn from him. He composed many commentaries and esteemed works (of his own), chiefly on music (*fī-l-musīqāz*; sic) ".

In regard to the writings of Theophrastus, Ibn al-Qiftī (*tā'rīḥ* 107, 1 Lippert) says something similar: "The books of his uncle (father's brother) were studied in his school, and he wrote great works (of his own)". For Ibn al-Qiftī, whose source in this case is unknown, Theophrastus was a nephew (brother's son) of Aristoteles (106, 17)⁽¹¹⁴⁾. That he, a native of Eresus, possessed at least real estate at Stagira, is attested in Theophrastus's will. With aš-Šahrastānī too, *šurūḥ* must mean commentaries on writings of Aristoteles.

(337, 17 Cureton) "What is quoted of him, is that he said: (1) The divine does not move, and his opinion was: it varies not and changes not, neither in essence nor in the idea of the actions ".

P. Moreaux, to whom (if there is no express mention to the contrary), all the following explanations are due, interprets: God moves the world, without being affected in the least by this act. This would be an echo of Aristot., *Metaph. A*, 7, perhaps *κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενος*.

(337, 18 Cureton) "He said: (2) Heaven is the dwelling of the stars and the earth is the dwelling of men, according to the fact that they (the men) are a likeness and image of what is in heaven. They⁽¹¹⁵⁾ (the stars) are fathers and rulers; they have souls and discriminating intelligence, but vegetal souls do not suit them. Therefore, they undergo neither increase nor diminution ".

The celestial bodies have soul and mind; this theory of the intellects of the constellations goes back in the last instance to Aristot., *Metaph. A* 8; cf. also *de caelo* B 12, 292a 18 f. The celestial body undergoes neither increase nor diminution:

de caelo A 3, 270a 12 f. B. Kytzler adds to this explanation of Moraux a reference to the expression *natura ... parente ac principe* in the fragment from Theophrastus's *περὶ μουσικῆς* in Marius Victorinus GL. 6, 159, 8 f.

If this fragment goes back to the above-mentioned writing of Theophrastus, we might suppose that a Hellenistic topos, perhaps going back to the Pythagoreans, effected the conjunction between theory of the constellations and theory of music. Harmony of the spheres (= music of the constellations) is the hymn of praise of heaven to the highest god. Music of men is an imitation of the music of the spheres, and thus a sort of glorification of God by mankind.

(337, 20 Cureton) "He said: (3) Singing is a high form (338, 1 Cureton) of language, which is difficult to understand for the soul and escapes definition of its essence. It (the soul) causes it (the high form of language) to become perceptible in the form of sounds, and arouses thereby sadness. It (the singing) causes every sort of distinction to become mute within its (the soul's) compass".

It seems to mean that singing is the highest form of language, a form however which escapes every rational interpretation. The end of the fragment could mean: singing abolishes distinctions or distinctive species within the compass of the soul. In other words: through music every discrepancy in the soul is eliminated; the soul becomes a unity.

To the explanation of Moreaux we may add that once more we find points of contacts with extant fragments of Theophrastus's *περὶ μουσικῆς* ⁽¹¹⁶⁾. Music as *τὸ γινόμενον κίνημα μελωδικῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν* (fr. 89 Wimmer), as well as its contraposition to *φωνή*, agree with what the last fragment implies. If *λύπη* comes forward as one of the three *μουσικῆς ἀρχαί* (fr. 90), this receives now its counterpart. "Ἐκστασις, corresponding to the highest and irrational enhancement of language, is found also with Plutarch, Mor. 38 A, to which we can add the comparison with rhetors and actors 623 B: *καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας ἐν τοῖς ἐπιλόγοις καὶ τοὺς ὑποκριτὰς ἐν τοῖς ὁδοῦμοις ἀτρέμα τῷ μελωδεῖν προσάγοντας ὁρῶμεν καὶ παρεπτείνοντας τὴν φωνήν*.

(338, 2 Cureton) "He said: (4) Singing is something that belongs to the soul, but in no wise to the body — it (viz. the body) turns it (the soul) away from what brings to it happiness —, as taking delight in food and drink is something that belongs to the body and in no wise to the soul".

Singing causes the soul to be for itself, i. e. free and independent of the body, exactly as rejoicing in food and drink frees the body from the influence of the soul.

(338, 4 Cureton) "He said: (5) the soul (*an-nafs* corr.; *an-nufūs* Cureton) is in regard to the sounds, when these are concealed, more attentive than she is in front of what is evident to her and whose meaning has become clear to her".

The soul reaches its climax in listening when the sounds conceal, i. e. are incomprehensible, more than when the sounds have become clear to her.

The following fragments of Theophrastus in aš-Šahrastānī belong no more to the writing *περὶ μουσικῆς*. Nevertheless, Moraux referred to yet another point of contact, viz. to the section on Pythagoras contained in aš-Šahrastānī.

There (270, 18-271, 6 Cureton) we are told that the world consists of spiritual tones, who can be counted intellectually, not sensually (harmony of the spheres). In the nether "worlds", i. e. in the lower spheres of heaven, language does not prove so simple and so perfect as in the upper ones (like harmony). With Theophrastus too music (= harmony of tones) is a higher form of language.

Then 271, 10-20 Cureton. Man as microcosmos is a likeness of macrocosmos. The good condition of the soul corresponds to the harmony of the tones. Therefore the soul is saddened or gladdened by the action of the tones. Lack of harmony, on the contrary, causes the death of the soul. This corresponds to the fragment of Theophrastus 337, 20f. Cureton.

Lastly, 277, 1-4: The harmonic associations are delights of a higher kind, praise and sanctification of god are food of the spiritual essence. We may compare Theophrastus's saying 338, 2 f. Food and drink accordingly represent the food of the body but singing, being an imitation of the harmony of the spheres and a praise of God, would be a peculiar "food" of the soul.

The musical portions of the Pythagorean writing, which in the last instance lies at the basis of aš-Šahrastānī's section, contain thought of the post-Aristotelian, or at least of the post-Platonic Pythagoreism. The more significant are the coincidences with the fragments of Theophrastus.

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NOTES

(1) ALTHEIM-STIEHL, *Ein asiatischer Staat*, I, pp. 200 f.

(2) ALTHEIM-STIEHL, *Op. cit.*, I, p. 201.

(3) A. CHRISTENSEN, *L'Iran sous les Sassanides*², p. 341 n. 2.

(4) ALTHEIM-STIEHL, *Op. cit.*, I, p. 174.

(5) For the following compare F. ALTHEIM and R. STIEHL, *Porphyrios und Empedokles*, 1954; F. ALTHEIM, in *Neue Rundschau* 1955, pp. 125 f.

(6) ALTHEIM-STIEHL, *Op. cit.*, p. 9 f.

(7) *Fihrist* I, 245, 13 f.; ALTHEIM-STIEHL, *Op. cit.*, p. 14.

(8) *Funap., vit. soph.*, p. 2 f.; ALTHEIM-STIEHL, *Op. cit.*, pp. 13 f.

(9) F. ROSENTHAL, in *Orientalia* 6, pp. 21 f.

(10) *Fihrist*, I, 253, 18.

(11) On what follows see Agathias 2, 28-31; ALTHEIM-STIEHL, *Op. cit.*, pp. 22 f.

(12) ALTHEIM-STIEHL, *Op. cit.*, p. 23.

(13) J. P. N. LAND, *Anecdota Syriaca* 4, pp. 102, 104 f.; ALTHEIM-STIEHL, *Op. cit.*, pp. 23 f.

(14) PRISCIANUS LYDUS, *Suppl. Arist.*, I, 2, 39 f. (ed. I. Bywater).

(15) P. 33 f. Cheikho; ALTHEIM-STIEHL, *Op. cit.*, pp. 24 f.

(16) aš-Šahrastānī has literally: "overpowering".

(17) The human skin (*šild*) stretched upon the flesh like a bark (*qīšra* = *cortex*), Plato Arabus I, 25 (Arab.), 4.

(18) A double term is employed: *bahīmīya hayawānīya*. Later *hayawānīya* only is usually found. *An-nafs al-bahīmīya* "anima bestialis" also in Plato Arabus I, 65 (Arab.) left, with quotations.

(19) Haarbrücker's translation of *an-nafs al-manṭiqīya* by "speaking soul" is incorrect. The *λογική ψυχή* also in Plato Arabus I, 65 (Arab.) right (repeatedly). Here the Greek term is rendered with *an-nafs an-nāṭīqa*. On *manṭiqīya* cf. R. DOZY, *Suppl. aux Dictionn. Arabes*, 2, 684 right; A.-M. GOICHON, *Lexique de la langue philosoph. d'Ibn Šīnā*, Suppl. 35.

(20) *an-nafs al-ʿaqlīya*; *ʿaql* corresponds to *νοῦς* and *νόησις*, cf. Plato Arabus I, 58 right (repeatedly).

(21) 262, 1 f.

(22) 263, 5.

(23) *Op. cit.*, 1⁶, 358 f. on p. 16. Approved by U. v. Wilamowitz in SBAW 1929, p. 641 (still haunted by the "Arab"). In the last instance, W. KRANZ, *Empedokles* 32.

(24) *Op. cit.*, p. 641.

(25) Bark and pith already with Anaximenes: aš-Šahrastānī 259, 6 f.

(26) Theophrastus, *de sensu* 7 (D. 500) = A 86, Vorsokr. 1⁶, 301, 30 f.

(27) Vorsokr. 1⁶, 501 on 362, 4 f.

(28) 262, 5 f. The gradation *ʿunṣur-ʿaql-nafs* is already hinted at 261, 2 f.

(29) The passage in Vorsokr. 3⁶, 76 right. Cf. ARISTOT., *Phys.* A 4, 187a20 = A46.

(30) 260, 8 f.

(31) A.-M. GOICHON, *Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Šīnā*, 411 f.

(32) Th. Haarbrücker translates: "... but that they are *he*, and *he* only, the totality of all these, is the creator, not that he created out of something, and not that something was with him...". An apposition *hādīhi kulluhā* to *huwa* is hardly pleasing; *mubdiʿa-qaṭ* adds something more about the creator. He is creator only.

(33) Another interpretation could be considered: "not that he is created out of something". This would agree with 260, 16-261, 2: the creator is cause, but he himself is not caused. Cause and what is caused are to be kept separate. In regard of l. 18 *wa-ʿin* and l. 20 *taḥtāhā*, Cureton's text and Haarbrücker's translation remain incomprehensible. The mistake lies in the first part of the conditional clause. Here we must delete *laisa* (l. 19, 2nd word); it is a wrong repetition from l. 18. We should translate: "But when the caused is fitter to be a caused than the cause, and the cause is not fitter to be a caused than the caused, then the caused is below the cause and after it ...". It is incredible how editor and translator did not recognize this mistake.

(34) Plato Arabus, 1, 58 (Arab.) right.

(35) Also 261, 2 f. we read that the primeval element (*al-ʿunṣur*) is simple (*basīṭ*). Same statement 261, 8, but here a restriction is made: the first *ʿunṣur* is simple in the same way as the essence of *ʿaql*; but the latter is not absolutely simple (*basīṭ muṭlaq*). This term is explained thus: it means "unique", "unmixed" (*wāḥid baḥt*) and indicates the essence of the cause (and thus of the creator). We are further told that nothing caused exists, which is not compounded (*murakkab*). Thus the *ʿunṣur* is composed of love and struggle. The conception of simplicity, therefore, ought to be divided into absolutely simple and relatively simple. Absolutely simple is only the cause, the creator. On the other side, what the creator causes immediately, viz. *ʿunṣur*, *ʿaql* and *nafs* (261, 2 f.), are only relatively simple. The use of *murakkab* agrees with this. According to 261, 3 the compound comes after the simple caused: *ʿunṣur*, *ʿaql* and *nafs*. On p. 261, 10 the simple caused, in this case the *ʿunṣur*, is himself compounded. Here too we have two different employs of one word. As different steps of the simple, so different steps of the compounded are recognized.

(36) 5, 5, 1 f. Cited by P. Moraux; the following likewise.

(37) Überweg-Praechter 1¹², 602.

(38) Cf. W. JAEGER, *Die Theologie der frühgriechischen Denker*, p. 161 f.; he interpreted *μωνῆν*.

(39) Th. Haarbrücker avoids a decision as to how to understand *-hā* in *tušbihuhā*, by leaving the personal suffix untranslated.

(40) *-hā* in *ʿalaihā* can refer also to the barks; but it makes no difference for the meaning.

(41) *-hā* in *ʿalaihā* can also indicate spirit and pith, but once more this does not change the interpretation.

(42) 262, 12 f. As the primeval element (*al-ʿunṣur*) is divided into *Φύλα* and *Νεῖκος*, so the universal soul is divided in partial souls. The universal soul, like the primeval element and everything caused, is only relatively simple. Only the "Creator" is absolutely simple and is not and cannot be divided into parts.

(43) Beutler, in RE 22, p. 310 below (cited by P. Moraux, like the following).

(44) According to Empedocles, "the caused is in no way together with the cause"; 261, 1.

(45) "Natural", as Haarbrücker translates, has no plausible meaning at the side of "temperamental". On *tabī'a* in the meaning here accepted see A.-M. GOICHON, *Op. cit.*, p. 201 no. 4 "le tempérament, la chaleur naturelle ... les mouvements, l'âme végétative"; cf. 380 no. 665.

(46) 262, 14 f.

(47) Fr. 17, 7-8.

(48) Fr. 17, 16-19.

(49) Fr. 115, Vorsokr. 1⁶, 356, 9 f.

(50) 263, 1 f.

(51) Fr. 115, Vorsokr. 1⁶, 356, 30 f.

(52) Th. Haarbrücker mistook *aghā* for *azkā*.

(53) 263, 3 f.

(54) Compared by U. v. WILAMOWITZ, *Op. cit.*, pp. 646 f. with the fragments of the *Kaθααυοι*.

(55) As pointed out by P. Moraux.

(56) *Jalaba* can also be taken in its true meaning of "overpowering".

(57) *yd'w*, as remarked by Cureton, is subj. or apoc. 3 plur. masc., which is impossible. The spelling must be *yd'w*, "he (the prophet) summons". Likewise l. 13 we have to read *yksw* instead of *yskw*.

(58) 263, 7 f.

(59) As pointed out by P. Moraux.

(60) Fr. 35 Vorsokr. 1⁶, 326, 27 f.; cf. fr. 15, Vorsokr. 1⁶, 314, 18. On the renovation of the cosmic revolution W. JAEGER, *Op. cit.*, p. 162 on fr. 30; *περίοδοι* Aristot., Phys. A 4 p. 187a 20 f. = Vorsokr. 1⁶, 291, 41. On *daur* = *περίοδοι* cf. *Plato Arabus* 1, 114, s. v. — *Kύκλος* in fr. 17, 13; 26, 1; 12; *Plato Arabus*, 1, 111 s. v.

(61) K. REINHARDT, in *Class. Philol.* 1950, p. 177.

(62) W. JAEGER, *Op. cit.*, p. 173.

(63) 252, 10 f.; cf. 394, 4 f.; 419, 2 f. from Ibn Sinā.

(64) Th. Haarbrücker: "who are like him".

(65) We can also translate: "so that through their (these mens') love to him his enemies are overcome".

(66) Vorsokr. 1⁶, 278, 22; 3⁶, 364. 1. 4 f.

(67) At the end of aš-Šahrastāni's chapter on Empedocles the soul is again spoken of: 265, 4-11. In spite of an external similarity with the passage discussed above, there are crucial differences. In the place of the recurring *Kύκλοι* we meet with a single *ma'ād*, placed at the end of time. The "prophet" is missing and his place is taken by the Creator, who accomplishes the liberation of the partial souls. Lastly, the whole is connected with a theory of light that is clearly of later origin. It cannot be made out, whence aš-Šahrastāni got this passage; certainly not from Porphyry. Rather the contrast shows clearly the rank of what we owe him.

(68) M. ASÍN PALACIOS, *Abenmassarra y su escuela*, 1914; reprinted in *Obras Escogidas* I, 1946, pp. 1-126.

(69) M. HORTEN, *Philosophie des Islam*, p. 237.

(70) M. ASÍN PALACIOS, *Op. cit.*, pp. 58 f.

(71) *Op. cit.*, p. 67, n. 14.

(72) On this see H. RITTER in W. KRANZ, *Empedokles*, pp. 89 f.

(73) On the citation by Porphyry see U. v. WILAMOWITZ, *Op. cit.*, pp. 633 and 640.

(74) U. v. WILAMOWITZ, *Op. cit.*, p. 627.

(75) Chil. 7, 522.

(76) Vorsokr. 1⁶, 365, 18 f. On the fact that the *Kaθααυοι* belong to the second place also from the chronological point of view, cf. K. REINHARDT, *Op. cit.*, pp. 171 f.

(77) 1, 3.

(78) 2, 21.

(79) 2, 27.

(80) 2, 31.

(81) 3, 27.

(82) 1, 1; 3, 6.

(83) Cf. also BEUTLER, *Op. cit.*, p. 311. It is by no means ascertained that the Empedoclean verses *de abst.* 2, 21 are taken from Theophrastus, *de pietate*. The latter is quoted 2, 20 and 2, 26, but the verses stand on another leaf. Theophrastus, moreover, cited no other verse from the *Kaθααυοι*. We may add that in 2, 20 f. the Empedoclean verses are no proof in favour of the four steps of the sacrificial custom set up by Theophrastus; first of all the *ὀδρόσπονδα* and *οἰνόσπονδα* are missing, and secondly Empedocles gives as contemporaneous what is dissected into a sequence with Theophrastus.

(84) K. REINHARDT, *Op. cit.*, p. 177.

(85) F. NAU, *Histoire et sagesse d'Aḥīqar l'Assyrien*, 1909, pp. 74 f.

(86) *Aramaic Papyri*, pp. 205 f.

(87) *Old Persian*², p. 8 § 6.

(88) This is the correct reading: J. FRIEDRICH, in *Orientalia* N. F. 26 (1957), pp. 345 f.

(89) On Aḥīqar l. 1: p. 226.

(90) On 8, 3: p. 229; cf. on 2, 3: p. 145.

(91) On l. 3, 1: *Aramaic Documents of the fifth Century B. C.*, 1957, p. 45.

(92) In BSOS 13 (1949), p. 84.

(92a) ALTHEIM-STIEHLS, *Die aramäische Sprache unter den Achämeniden* 1 (1959), 92 f.

(93) DIELS-KRANZ, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* 2⁶, pp. 83 f. gives the information, above all Diog. Laert. 9, 41 f. and the Suda.

(94) *Op. cit.*, pp. 35 f.

(95) *Op. cit.*, p. 39.

(96) *Op. cit.*, p. 39.

(97) *Op. cit.*, pp. 288 f. Th. NÖLDEKE, in *Abhandl. Gött. Ges. Wiss.* N. F. 14, 4 (1913), p. 22, took the same position.

(98) *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 1⁶, p. 431, 1.

(99) W. B. HENNING, in BSOS 13, p. 83.

(100) Incorrect also with Ed. MEYER, *Der Papyrusfund von Elephantine*, 1912, p. 123 n. 1.

(101) In the last instance by W. KRANZ, *Empedokles*, p. 32; cf. U. v. WILAMOWITZ, in *SBAW* 1929, p. 641.

(102) ALTHEIM-STIEHL, *Ein asiatischer Staat*, I, 1954, pp. 193 f.

(¹⁰³) ALTHEIM-STIEHL, *Philologia sacra*, 1958, p. 100 f.; *Geschichte der Hünner* 3 (1961), 126 f.

(¹⁰⁴) ALTHEIM-STIEHL, *Porphyrios und Empedokles*, p. 10.

(¹⁰⁵) 305, 2 f. Cureton.

(¹⁰⁶) *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

(¹⁰⁷) He remarked only the agreement with the Syriac, Armenian and Slavonian versions: *Op. cit.*, p. 36 n. 10.

(¹⁰⁸) Although we repeatedly drew attention to Šahrastānī, no scholar of Greek philosophy (among whom we do not count ourselves) has hitherto come forward to carry on, by learning Arabic, the work we have begun. A reference to fragments of Aeschines with Sphettos (*Porphyrios und Empedocles*, pp. 16 f.) seduced nobody. Perhaps the hope of finding further Democritean fragments will prove efficacious; the whole of the section 305, 2-306, 20 seems to be valuable.

(¹⁰⁹) We owe the correct translation to a private letter of G. Levi Della Vida.

(¹¹⁰) *yṯ'wk*. The first thought is of *ṯā'a* (*a*) "to go away, to with-draw". Also *yaṯā'uka* "he withdraws from you". This would give: it should not be expected that one should follow somebody, and the next day should the contrary. But a use of the accusative of the person, from which one withdraws, is not documented. We would expect *yaṯā'u 'anka*.

A famous Arabic scholar, whom we asked for advice, thought of a mistake for *yaṯā'uka* (*yṯ'wk* for *yṯwk*), thus an imperfect of *waṯi'a*. But the interpretation becomes difficult. The verb with an Acc. personae means "maltraiter, piller", which makes no sense. Be it added that we would have the same verbal form (even if with changed suffixes) as in the first part of the sentence. It is unlikely that two different spelling of the same form should occur so closely near to each other, unless the scribe misunderstood the text. But how would he have interpreted it?

Th. Haarbrücker translates: "he does the same", without us being able to follow the trend of his thought.

(¹¹¹) PARKER-DUBBERSTEIN, *Babylonian Chronology*, p. 17 f.

(¹¹²) The data with F. IUSTI, *Iranisches Namenbuch*, 1895, 374 l. under 2.

(¹¹³) On him see W. VETTER in *RE* 6 A, 581 f.

(¹¹⁴) This remark was unnoticed by the author of the article on Theophrastus in the *RE*.

(¹¹⁵) Peculiarly striking is the alternance of *-hum* (*fa-hum*, *la-hum* l. 17) and *-hā* (*la-hā* l. 18). In itself, we would apply *-hum* rather to men and *-hā* to the stars.

(¹¹⁶) In the last instance Regenbogen in *RE*. Suppl. 7. 1532 f.