The political philosophy of hellenistic kingship

Fe, DENDUEA (a RB. THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HELLENISTIC KINGSHIP | V ate the close of the fifth century before Christ the city state began to fail to satisfy the political needs of the Greeks, and the sense of failure forced men to seek some other basis of government than democracy. In practical politics aristocratic Sparta was able to overthrow the badly disciplined armies of the democratic states, and the hatred she won thereby was tempered by the keenest admiration and envy. Oligarchies and tyrannies were springing up on every hand. At the same time political theorists searched for remedies in the study of various state forms and of the fundamental character of man. Whatever the solution proposed or implied, nearly all agreed that democracy would never be the ideal outcome. No passage of Plato’s almost fatalistic discussion of the degeneration of states is written with deeper feeling than his description of the inevitable chaos that must succeed any attempt to regulate society on a democratic principle. Years later Dio Chrysostom looked back upon Greek democracy and said that it was the ideal organization of society, but of all forms the one the least possible of realization. For it was based upon the hope of founding an equitable and legal constitution upon self-control and virtue in the mob, so that while democracy was a fair word and gentle, the thing itself withal was impossible.” The solutions offered by political philosophers in the century preceding Alexander are too familiar to need detailed description. Many turned wistful eyes to the great king of Persia, not aspiring. to be his subjects, but longing for the unity and order which his absolutism and broad sway guaranteed to his subjects. Bven froni the time of Herodotus the deepest sympathy was expressed with the Persian point of view that if only the king is virtuous, monarchy is the ideal polity.? The highest idealization of the Persian monarchy is, of course, that of Xenophon in the Cyropaedia. With his eyes on Cyrus and Sparta alike, his ideal state is clearly that dominated by an absolute ruler who surpasses his subjects in every way, physically, mentally, and morally. Plato and Aristotle followed the Socratic tradition, 1 Dio, III, 47 (ed. Budé, I, 52). 2 Herod., III, 82.

for they recognized that the ideal government is that of the philosopher king, but clung at the same time to two outworn phases of Greek politics, the conception of the city state as the unit of government, and the hope of educating enough people so that official titles justifying the right of rulership. Isoerates, however, there could be a true aristocracy, with a large ruling class of high integrity. These conservative and idealistic solutions wete all reached from a socialistic approach to the problem. Over against them were the philosophers whose criterion and unit in all things was the individual. The Cynics and Cyrenaics turned into themselves, either contemning or tolerating the actual organization, but directing men to find their kingdom in themselves, and their citizenship in the cosmos, for local politics and laws must always be absurd. The Sophists expressed their individualism by glorifying the potentialities and achievements of the man who is able to master his fellows by the sheer force of his personal power. True predecessors of Nietzsche, they invited him who could to dominate his weakling fellows, while they described all constituted law as simply the frightened attempt of the inferior herd to put shackles upon the naturally superior individual. Natural equality was to them the greatest of absurdities. As Plato and Aristotle in the name of natural law desired to establish a state balance with philosophers, or a supreme philosopher, in power, the Sophists appealed to natural law for the right of the strong to enslave the weak.® During Philip’s reign it is familiar that the Greeks took two characteristic attitudes toward the threat of his domination. There were the fierce defenders of the autonomy of the city state, and of democratic institutions; another group, however, looked by no means with dismay at the possibility of Philip’s conquest.‘ Aeschines and Isocrates, who come at once to mind, represented 57 mpaörgres, words which are to have increasing importance as hes not only Philip to commend. He is pleased with every tyrant or king who rules his subjects well.’ At the same time he has many passages where he turns back with regret to the government of Athens when democracy was at its best. Which of these represents Isccrates’ true attitude? Was he sincere in his protests of love for democracy and at the same time in his exhortations to kings and tyrants to do their best in ruling their cities or countries? With this question we need not be concerned. The important point is that in his writings the theorizing of Socrates, Plato, and Xenophon about kings is applied to practical politics. His appeal to Philip is accompanied by exalted descriptions of the true use of absolute power, addressed to Nicocles. Here he recognizes the popular belief that kings are equal to the gods, at least in their powers, if not in person (c. 5). But the man who is king ought to be supreme personally. He is to be a model to others in virtue (e. 81), to guide his conduct alike by the theory of philosophy and the practical sagacity of experience (c. 35), and the recognition that true kingliness consists in ruling over oneself (e. 29). In relation to the existing law, the king must not live lawlessly (ec, 31), and must so modify and improve the laws that they will be just, consistent, and capable of direct and speedy application, while the king’s own judgments are to be as fixed and just os the best of laws (c. 18). Isocrates praises Evagoras as being such a monarch. Of Nicocles he ig not so sure, and therefore recommends him, if he cannot be a philosopher himself, to learn to take counsel from the philosophers in his kingdom (e. 50 f£.). In allthis it is notable that Isocrates, the pupil of Gorgias, does not once approach the problem of royalty or tyranny from the point of view of the Sophists, The right of the strong to assert himself is never hinted. The sanction of monarchy is the a school of Greek thinkers who were trying to harmonize many of the current theories. It is Isocrates’ repeatedly expressed convietion that the rivalries of the cities had run their course. In Philip he saw the saving principle, and hailed him as having a * legal, moral, and philosophical character of the ruler and his right to dominate all Greece, karà rò rijs Yuxñs flos Kal rv pularOpwrlav nal rijv eivory, fv elxev els robs "EAAnvas.® To this he shortly adds that he is urging Philip &rì ras edepyerlas ras rv 'EAAyvav xat opened to oriental and Egyptian political and religious concep- 8 See especially Plato’s Gorgiaa, 482 ¢ ff. + Besides Polybius’ testimony it will be recailed that Demosthenes says that the people of Thessaly and Thebes plor, ebepyérnr, owrfjpa rèr BlAurmov hyoûrro- wärr dreîvos Zr aÔrois. Seo Paul Wendland, Zwrip, in Zeitsch. f. d. neutest. Wissenschaft, V (1904), 838. s Philip., 114. actions. Then came Alexander, and the floodgates of Greece were tions. Unfortunately, reliable and datable evidence becomes more rare as these new elements make the problem complex. On the religious syneretism of the Hellenistic royalty much interesting new light is being thrown every year. But what of the king and his subjects from the point of view of political philosophy What 6 Philip., 116. 7 Like Xonophon’s Hiero,

was the sanction of his tulership? What tight had he to override the laws of the Greek city states? As Professor Rostovtzeff hus remarked, we know increasingly how the king made his peace - : with the religious systems of Greece, but how did he satisfy the political philosopher? | The problem has been very much confused by the generalizations of Kaerst, the only man who has investigated the problein with any degree of thoroughness. It is his well-known thesis that , the monarehy in its philosophical aspects, aside from its religious N HELLENISTIC KINGSHIP 59 be found until in Cicero and Athenaeus, which gives ample time fot a work by some other Theopompus to have become associated with the historian. In any ease, the work which Cicero had was clearly a Hellenistic production. The same conclusion is to be drawn about the mpös ‘AAdardpov ascribed to Aristotle. It is probably identical with the wepl BactAetis attributed to Aristotle by Diogenes Laertius and others,!? and though the ascription to Aristotle is dubious, the fact that Cicero had the work witnesses to cosmic rulership of Zeus or of the Stoic natural law, But ah its existence in Hellenistic times. Still another treatise on the subject is ascribed to Theophrastus, of which a single fragment is preserved by Dionysius of Halicarnassus.'* These last three may represent a lost Peripatetic tradition on kingship, A Stoic treatise, to the references in the 1926 edition of his Geschichte des Hellen- Zeno, in the court of Antigonus! significance, rested upon two primary teachings of Stoieism: first, the right of the man who is superior in virtue to rule over his fellows; second, the value of a world motiarchy to éokrespond to the examination of Kaerst’s evidence, from that in his earlier articles ismus, reveals the fact that the bulk of his evidence is very late, while most of the earlier citations prove to have little reference to the subject. It is beyond the scope of this essay to review or refute his work, There is need for a study de novo of the conception of royalty in Greek civilization. My immediate purpose is only to point out a body of evidence of which Kaerst takes no account, | and which heretofore has not been discussed at all for ita bear- : ing on the subject. There is good reason for thinking that during the Hellenistic period there was much philosophical discussion of the kingly office. For example, Demetrius Phalereus is reported to have said to Ptolemy the king that he ought to prize and tead the books sept Baodtlas, was written by Persaeus of Citium, a disciple of _ It is my opinion that material is available which can properly be regarded as records of this Hellenistic speculation. First, there is the material ascribed to Archytas of Tarentum, from a treatise wepì vópov «al Sixaootvys.1° The fragment is too long to reproduce entire, but I give its most important statements from the point of view of royalty. The unwritten laws of the gods which are opposed by the laws of wicked customs, inflict an evil lot and punishment upon those who do not obey them, and aro the fathers and guides of the written laws and teachings which men enact. Law bears the same relation to the human soul and life aa harmony to hearing and speech. For as law educates the soul and organizes the life, so harmony makes hearing intelligent and speech sept Baorhelas Kai Fyeyovlas. ‘For what friends do-not dare to say to consistent./And 1 say that every community consists of the ruling elekings they write in books.’ Cicero wrote to Atticus of certain ment, the ruled, and a third element, the laws. Now laws are of two } kinds, the animate [&upvyos] law, which is the king, and the inanimate, their advice was ‘“‘quod ad laudem sempiternam valeret.’” In ‘is lawful (vémuos], the rulership is fitting [dxdAovôos], the ruled are men who sent letters of counsel to Alexander, a youth who had intense desire for glory. Alexander had asked for advice, atid another letter Cicero identifies two, at least; of these mer as Theopoinpus and Aristotle, whose evytBovAevrixà irpds ‘AAdgavBpod he had at hand.!° Of their contents he tells ús nothing. The first of these is in all probability the one listed in a recotitly discovered catalogue of the library of Rhodes, with the title @comdpmou dAdov wept Baoidelas,'t for references to the mpòs "AAdfavdpov are not to . 8 Btob., TV, vil, 27 (ed. Wachsmuth and Henge, IV, 255). o Epis. ad Att., XIII, 28. 10 Ibid, XII, 40. 11 Gaetano de Sanctie in Revista di Filologia e di Istrusione Classica, LIV (1926), 70. the written law. So law is primary; for with reference to it the king free, and the whole community happy. But when tho law is transgressed the king is a tyrant, the rulership unflt, the ruled are slaves, and the entirg community wretched. For action is a combination of the elements f of ruling, being ruled, and third, of efficiency [xparé]. So it is proper for the better to rule, for the worse to be ruled, but for both to have efligiency. For renson [73 Adyov Zyov] should rule the soul, and the irrational should be ruled; but both should be efficient as over against the passions. For virtue arises out of a harmony of each of these, and virtue 12 Seo Rose, V., Aristotelis Fragmenta, ed, 1, sees, XIV, XV, LX. 18 Antig, Rom., V, 73. , 14 Diog. Laert., VIT, 36. 15 Stob., IV, i, 132, 135, 180, 137, 188 (IV, 79, 82-88), IV, v, 61 (IV, 218).

in turn leads the soul out of pleasure and pair into câlmtiess and free- But whether the fragments dre pre-Platonic, or are third or second century, their survival is highly important as marking dom from the passions [drdden). The fragment goes on further to discuss the place of law in 80ciety, but has no more to sey of the king until the following: And the true ruler must not only be understanding arid powerful it ruling well, but he must also be a lover of men, fof it would be strange for a shepherd to be a hater of sheep and ill disposed toward his own flock. And he must be lawful as well, for so he will have understanding . of rulership. For by his knowledge he will be able to judge correctly; by his power, to punish; by his excellence, to benefit; and by the laws, to do all these with reference to reason. And the bést tuler would be the one who is closest to the law; but he would do hothing in his own interest, but only for the sake of his subjects, just as law exists not for its own sake but only for those subject to it. The fragments attributed to Archytas have recently been discussed at length by Delatte,!® whose work in turn is carefully reviewed by Theiler,’’ go that, important as the fragments are, they can be treated briefly here. Delatte tries to substantiate the genuineness of their ascription to Archytas, and in doitig so has collected an extraordinary amount of material to show that the conceptions are all to be paralleled by writers contemporary with or closely following Archytas, especially Plato and Aristotle, accompanied by an interesting demonstration of the Pythagorean character of much of the political theory of both Plato and Aristotle. His conclusion, then, is that in these Archytas fragments we have a sample of the gort of pre-Platonie, Pythagorean politi: eal thinking which went into Platonie and Aristotelian philosophy as well as into the thought of Isocrates and the Stoics. Theiler is unconvinced that the influence was from Archytas, but thinks conversely that the similarity of phraseology indicates that … the fragments were composed under the influence of Platonic- - 61 . the existence of a Pythagorean interest in the kingly office.!* Here appears again the old Greek theory that no state law is truly such which does not conform to the eternal principles of morality, whether these be conceived of as natural law with Heracleitus, or in more popular statements as the will of the gods. The political onis on which Sophocles founded his Antigone are here re. stated. Whatever the form of organization, a state needs three elements: the ruling machinery of government, its subjects, and, as an independent entity behind both, the law. So far the fragment reproduces classical Greek thought perfectly. But the problem is, Whence comes the law of cities? The lawmakers, Solon and his ilk, were popularly conceived as trying to reduce to writing the unwritten law, by which was meant the ancestral customs of the people, or the will of the gods, or both at the same time. But here an additional form of unwritten law is suggested, that of the monarch, who is himself not only a law, but the vivid reptesentation to tiet of the law, that will of the gods to which all local state law must conform. He seems to have this unique quality by virtue of his office, at the same time that he has it by virtue of his own motal character, which itself must be réupos, that is, in accordance with the higher law, not necessarily obedient to the . local laws. One feels at once the similarity and difference in the matter of the relation of the king to law between this statement and a passage of Socrates. Xenophon represents Socrates as distinguishing between a king and a tyrant by the fact that a king rules according to the laws, a tyrant not according to the laws, but according to his own wishes.'® But the laws which Socrates’ king must follow are the laws rüv réAeur, That is, the king, like all citizens, is bound by the code. But the writer of this Archytas Aristotelian writings. Yet he recognizes that they ate free of any . fragment has in mind a king who produces law for his subjects seidonius, when Platonism and Aristotelianism had learhed to live together but had not yet been influenced by Stoicism. While legality is tested not by them, but by his conformity to higher Stoic influence, and so inclines to date them shortly before Po-\ out of his own nature, He is so superior to the local code that his natural law, and thus by his power to represent it to men. As any decision between the two hangs ultimately upon a matter of such, the king must be wise, kindly to his subjects, a good shepfragments are Hellenistic. ments, opinion, my own inclination is to agree with Theiler that the 14 Delatte, A., ‘‘ Essai sur Ja Politique : hagoricienne.** Liège, Paris, 3922. (Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et lottres de l'Université de Liège. Fascicule XXIX.) 1? Gnomon, II (1926), 147-156, See especially pp. 160 ff. veDelatte unfortunately has little to say about this aspect of tho frag10 Mem, IV, vi, 12. Tho conception of the true king na one who rules according to the law or laws may well bave beon Persian in origin, ‘I ruled according to laws,’’ is tho boast of Darlus the Great. Seo Sculpture and Inscriptions of Darius the Great, British Museum, 1907, $52, p. 203, Professor Dougherty showed me this passage,

herd to his flock,2° and thereby stand to the rest of the state as . he goes on, ‘‘as a politician in a democracy must court the people, human constitution. So will he be very close (dyxóratos) to the law, that is, to the Supreme Law, and as such be a law to his subjects, _ u existing not for his own sake, but for theirs. rean vdpos éépuxos, but since Aeschines speaks of the tpéra of olithe Skeptics, and, of course, later the Stoics are fond of desctibrates. cause he looks for guidance to the ideal law. Such a man both Chiefly there is the famous passage? where he has proved that 62 the rational principle stands to the two lower principles in the The conception has some familiar aspects. Plato,*t Aristotle, ing the truly virtuous man as independent of written code, be- 63 80 likewise the one who lives in a monarchy must be in awe of the king.” That is, in a monarchy the mightiest law is the rpéros of the king?’ The conception is certainly very close to the Pythagogarchs in the same way,”* we cannot stress the statement of Isoc- Aristotle again makes several statements which sound similar. Plato and Aristotle, and the Stoics after them, tell tis must be the usual claims to rulership are not justified, and then turns to is best, says Plato, not when the laws govern, but solne royal pass their fellow citizens in virtue. It is injustice to group him in with the others. As virtuous, such a man may truly be regarded as a god among men, Far from being subject to legislation, he himhunted out by all means to lead the state and give it laws, It man with épées, who gives out law adapted individually to each case, rather than dealing with the inaccurate approximations ‘of the code.” Plato says further that the réxry* of thé king sup: plants the codes of law, just as the ré of a skilied pilot throws: - make exception in the case of a man or men who completely surideal ruler who knows the law lies in the fact that he can disperse correct commands to others, while in the Pythagorean fragment “golf is a law: Aristotle, like Plato in the Politicus, has little hope that such men will ever really be at hand, and dismisses royalty as an impossibility on that account. Yet later he says that if a people is capable by nature of producing a race superior in virtue and political talent, it is fitted for kingly rule.*° He does not describe his king ag vépos Zupuxos, but only as being Law, Yet that morality, the king is the source of human statutes, but he is more from his calling the judge olov Sxaoy épyuyor, ‘‘a sort of animate all rule-of-thumb instruction books to the winds. Aristotle ex: pressed the same ideo in his own way.” Thus fat the value of the the king himself ís law. Incidentally, like the divine ideal code of than an ideal maker of laws, for he is himself Law. ‘The best ruler is the man in whom this identification is most complete. — A much clearer parallel to the conception is fotind in Isocrates. Aristotle may have been familiar with the term is made possible justice.’ For while the use there is figurative, and is not in- Deldov pay xat rois vdpors rots bd rôv Barth éwv kerpevors; loxupéraror pévrot vépor jyoù rév éxelvwv rpôrov,*® which is plain in medhing, except tended as a statement of the actual nature of a judge, still it suggests that Aristotle may have known the term in a literal sense. Whence had Aristotle this iden of a people who produced unique men for their kings, men who became themselves a law to their is the kings’ disposition. ”* ‘For,’ in mind that the mightiest law _ whole conception as visionary, It may be that he got it, as Delatte which kings lay down, but beat for the last word. ‘Obey the laws ry 20 On the king as a good shepherd see below, p. 84. 21 E.g., Politieus, 500 e., where the ideal lawgiver, who understands the ideal law and writes approximations of it for the mob, need not obey even. his own approximation if his knowledge of tho higher law ledds him beyond his own written code in any given place. Cf. Laws, 8756, where Pinto say’ that the man with divine power to rule over himself needs ito tats to rule him} tmiorhuns yap ore véuos obre rétis odBenla kpelrriiv, ob8t Bets dartv vi0v obdends bari koop 0888 Bokor ddd oderwr Apxorra elvar, édrres dhyOvdt dhetdepdt TE Syrut À kard, dts, | 22 Polit, 1288 a, b. ‘subjects? Certainly it is not of his own thinking, for he rejects the inight have argued, from these Archytas fragments. But the general impression of the fragments continues to be that they are “ late; and so either earlier, probably Pythagorean, teachers of the doctrine must be supposed, or we must seek a people who actually claimed to be ruled by such supermen. It will appear that the latter is the more likely solution.°? 27 On the rpéros of the king, ef. Epist. of Ps.-Aristaens, 200. | 28 III; 6. Cf. P. Wendland, ‘‘ Anaximenes von Lampsakos,’' in Hermes, 28 Ibid., 2940, Stalbaum in loco and Proleg., p. 82, mistakes this for & XXXIX (1904), 501, n. 1. 24 Polit., 296 e ff. True government is thus card réxon as contrasted withletter to Aléxander. See below, p. 92. parallel to the Pythagorean doctrine. all actual governments, which are xard ovyypdppara, Ibid. 299. 26 Ibid, 1287 a, b. 28 Ad Demonicum, 36. zo Polit, 12848, The conception is restated in the pseudo-Aristotelian 80 Polit:, 1288 a. st Eth. Nie, V, 1182 a, 20.2, 82 Sea below, pp. 78 ff.

By the time of Isoerates and Aristotle, then, there had developed a conception that the true kitig was petsotidlly of unique significance as a lawmaker, or even as Lai itself. In the Arcliytas fragment this conception is explained as resting on the fact that the king is personally a representation and revelation of divinenatural law in the kingdom. That this conception Was not stillborn could have been written and received with perfect propriety in aiiy of the democratic cities of Greece. Its Platonic-Pythagorean is witnessed by other material. The first witness to call is Diotogenes, of whom nothing is known beyond the fact that Stobaeus calls him a Pythagorean. Stobaeus has preserved from two writings of Diotogeties five fragments in all, three from a treatise On Piety, and two from a work On Kingship. Two of the fragments from the essay On Piety need not be considered. They throw little light upon his general philosophy or his date, though they are thoroughly Pythagorean. Both are very corrupt textually. One®? falls into two parts,—remarks on the propriety of grace before ineat, and a discussion of four cosmic causes, dvots, bépos, teen, And ru - The other ia a practical bit of advice, that one who is truly lawful (véptpos) will use the law coutts aa little as possible, and pay more heed to another’s rights than his own. The third fragment from the treatise On Piety discusses the proper educa: tion of the young which will lead them into true morality. For as laws are ultimately the motal standards of citizens (8a), so the dpx of waAırela is the education of the young. Certainly it would seem that children should be trained with the same care, at least, as young plants or horses, and yet the author complains that more attention and money are paid to get a good groom or gardener than for a suitable tutor for children, The proper education of the child’s $60: will be found in nitsic and dancing for their training in rhythmic fellowship with others, as well as for their softening effect upon minds inclined to drunkenness and gormandizing. As a supplement to these, games will give training in coöperation, as well as in truth and alertness." This third fragment presents a picture of a city-state consciousness apparently undisturbed by any conception of a higher source of law than the will and conduct of the people as a whole, It #8 Stob., IV, I, 133 (IV, 79). 84 Ibid, III, 1, 100 (III, 60). ss Ibid., IV, 3, 96 (IV, 36). #9 On the Pythagorean use of music and gymnasties in education, see references in Zeller, Phil. d. Gr., I, à (Sth ed.), 406, 407, English translation, Pre-Socraties, I, 348, 349. This fragment is, of course, strongly suggestive of Plato, 65 character is just as plain as its whole feeling is early. The two fragments from the treatise On Kingship quoted by Stobaeus from the same Diotogenes present in some respects an interesting contrast. The first fragment reads as follows :** The most just man would be king, and the most lawful would be most just. For without justice no one would be king, and without law [there would bé no] justice. For justice is in the law, and the law is the source [afrios] of justice. But the king is Animate Law [vépos Qufpoxos], or is à legal ruler [vdypos dpyuv]. So for this reason he is most just and most lawful. Of itself the first sentence would seem to be a Cynic or Stoic statement of the kingly chatacter of every virtuous man. But since in the part to follow, the king is treated as a state official, “… no such sense can be made of it. Indeed, the paragraph is actually a demonatration that the king as an official is the most just man in the kingdom. Kingliness, says the first sentence, is inseparable from justice. This is a conception long familiar to the Greeks, Says Xenophon's Socrates, ‘‘They are not kings or rulers who hold the scepter merely, or are chosen by fellows out of the street, ot are appointed by tot, or have stepped into office by violence or fraud; but those who have the speciaf knowledge of how to rule.’’® Similarly, Socrates has been quoted as distinguishing between the terms king and tyrant on the basis of legality, which was in the school of Socrates and elsewhere a synonym for justice. *'I say,’’ says Socrates, ‘that the lawful is identical with the just," and this Xenophon applies to the king in his state. ment that the king is S:xa:éraros «al voptpdraros.“ But what seems to lie behind Diotogenes’ statement here is the question, how may we know that our sovereign in Alexandria, or Antioch, or wherever he may be, is actually king by these standards? Diotogenes answers by the following reasoning. If justice is a product or function of Law, where there is true law, there is always justice. But the king is himself Animate Law officially; hence, since he is Law itself, he must also be Justice itself, So he is the most just man in the kingdom, for his character is most in accordance with 81 Stob., IV, vii, 61 (IV, 263 ff.), 88 Afem., III, ix, 10, rods drisrapdvous Apxeır. 89 Ibid., IV, iv, 12. brul yap dyad rd vönıo» Blxatoy elves. to Cyrop., I, vi, 24 ff. (27).

Animate Law, but only assumes it, in a mannet impossible except the law, The statement, it is clear, does not explain the term getterals and physiciasis similarly control and save by projecting their voôs into the senses of their armies or patients. In like manfer a true statesman is such by virtue of his supreme voÿs, which whether from a lost part of the present treatise, or, he is more saves the city.** It is clear that Diotogenes las taken these Plalikely, from common usage. Dictogenes continues: them to the king. But in doing so he has added the figure of the 66 in the case of readers already familiar with the expression The duties of the king are threefold, military leadership; the dispensa. tion of justice, and the cult of the gods. So then he will be able to lead well in arms if he thoroughly understands the art of war} and to dis: pense justice and to hear out his subjects if he has atitdied well the nature of justice and law; and to worship the gods In & pious and holy” manner if he has reasoned out [dxAcytodpevos] the natutd of deity and virtue. Accordingly the perfect king must be a good coniniditder, Judge, . and priest; for these are fitting and proper to the king's kipremaoy . and virtue alike. For the task of a pilot is to save [oylér) the ship, of a charioteer to save the chariot, of a physician to save those who ate ill, while the task of the king and captain is to save those who ard in dangef “in war. For each of these is overseer and fashioner [öypzovpyós] of thd organization [ovornpa) of which he is the dictator. In the matter of the threefold duties of the king—war, justice, and religion—the functions of the Greek state back to Homérie ‘days are recognized. But for the rest the passage is an interesting development of Platonic conceptions, Néuos and voîs, Plato says, in the Laws,‘* are intimately connected, He speaks of the procession from the Fates of en undeviating Shams which seems intel. lectual in character, and which must enter itito the laws if they are to have health and eernpla, just as it must enter into souls if they are to have ebvopla. In a word, this Sivas is the salvation of the laws,*? as it is of men. Plato goes on to suggest that this higher force can be put into the laws by a council of ten elders, who by their character and profound study could act os a supergovern- 67 tonic instances of the universal saving power of voûs, and applied charioteer guiding his horses, a figure which shows that he was combining this passage in the Laws with the opening discussion of Plato's Politicus, where Plato describes the ideal king, who because of his aot drtorijun surpasses all men, and should be given the reins of the city, that he may be charioteer of the state, as well as its shepherd.“ Plato does not call his king cwrip, but the materials were at hand for the easy blending of the two passages which Diotogenes has effected. The conception will reappear in Bephantus, but here it is of interest to point out that Plato in the Politicus shortly says that 80 supreme an individual would be a god rather than a man, and 50 ig not to be taken into account as a practical possibility. Diotogenes, however, is apparently describing the actual king, and - it is interesting to see that Plato’s dilemma presented the Pythagorean with no awkward choice. For to Plato’s objection that such 4 king would be divine rather than human, Diotogenes goes on to reply, ‘‘Of course. That is exactly what he is.” ~ ‘ The fragment continues: In judging and in distributing justice, whether as a whole in Publie Law [€vrg], or to individuals in Private Law [têlg], it is right for the king to act as does God in his leadership and command of the universe, On the one hand, in public matters the king is to bring the whole kingdom into harmony with his single rule and leadership, while private niatters of detail must be brought into accord with this same harmony and leadership. The king is also occupied in doing well to and benefiting [ebepyerév} his subjects, although in doing so he does not depart from ment in the state, a suggestion extraordinarily similar to some of the functions of our own Supreme Court. The vurnpla of every». justice and law. or vois. So every animal has a sort of soul and head, whose virtue is the saving principle of the animal. But the active principle of salvation in the soul is mind (vots), so that all salvation ultimately comes from veis. As vos in an animal expfesses itself through the senses of the animal, so on a ship the voös of the pilot acts through the senses of the sailors to savé the ship, while has been a familiar one since Aristotle, But in Aristotle vénos xowds thing depends upon the presence of this intellectual principle, 41 957 e. 42 960 e, a. The distinction between the vépos kowós or Evvds" and tho vépos tdio¢ is natural law as contrasted with the law of the city, whether that 40 962; cf. 298 a fl. dé Polit, 266 e. The Basıkıch éreorhuy is compared to the ektil of the pilot, doctor, farmer, athletic trainer, Xenoph., Afem., LIT, Iz, 11. Cf. Cyrop., I, vi, 21-23, The conception of the king as saviour might have come to Plato also from Socrates. See Mem., III, ii, 1-4, 48 The ube of the oldor Evrés for koers would appear as ono of the archaisms artificially introduced into the style.

eivil law is unwritten custom or equity, or is the written code, sort of source, we may fairly infer, as the harmony of the universe. . At this point it is illuminating to refer to the conception of the relation of God to Ilis universe in another pseudepigraphie which, for example, the Ptolemies kept harmony in Egypt. In Philolaus. Here the universe, eternal as a whole, is divided into 68 But under Hellenistic monarchies the vópos xowds caine to be the king-made law which formed the constitution of the kingdom, while the tos vépos or lios Adyos was the private law usually fol: lowing local tradition. This was the convenient distinction by all ordinary matters, Egyptian and Greek communities might have each their own laws, providing that these were kept always subservient to any decree of general policy or organization which the king cared to institute. Similarly, the different cities of Greece still felt as a result of keeping their private law that they had not lost their personalities in the larger kingdoms, Diotogenes’ use of the terms is obviously Hellenistic. It is interesting that * here the king emerges as imitator of God and as ébipyérys, both . conceptions which will soon reappear: Yet the Pythagorean character of the ideal polity is guaranteed by its being based upon, and culminating in, a harmony which is ultimately attuned to the harmony of the universe. The passage closes as follows: The third duty, that is, the worship of the gods, is no less fitting for a king. For the Best must be honored by the best man, and the Governing Principle by one who is a governor. So just as God is the Best of those things which are most honorable by nature, likewise the king is best in the earthly and human realm. Now the king bears the same relation to the state [xdéAw} as God to the world; und the state is in the same ratio to the world as the king is to God. For the state, made as it ‚ is by a harmonizing together of many different elemients, is an imitation of the order and harmony of the world, while the king who has an absolute rulership, and is himself Animate Law, has been metamorphosed into a deity among men.‘ 69 fragment from Pythagoreanism, that aseribed by Stobaeus to two parts, the fixed and unchangeable realm above the moon, the Changeable and moving realm beneath the moon. But this changeable part is, by its conformity to the unchangeable, or to God, a part of the cosmos which as a whole can bo deseribed as an eternal activity of God. In the same way the state here is a product of the character of the king. The whole conception is of course postAristotelian. The nature of God is the creative law of tho universe. The nature of the king: is the creative law of the state. So is the king at once God and Animate Law. And such exactly was the Hellenistic king. Kaerst has brilliantly described the personal choracter of each Hellenistic kingdom. There were no recognized boundaries between them. At various points in Alexander’s great empire individuals set themselves up as kings, ruling each of them aa much as he was able to hold from the attneks of others. Nothing bound the Syrians, Aramaeans, Phoenicians, and Palestinians together except the person of the king at Antioch. He was the animate constitution, and the only constitution which brought any harmony: or cohesiveness into his heterogeneous realm. The illustration of God as holding and shaping matter into the cosmos was vividly accurate. Exactly that is what the king, as an official personality, had to do for his kingdom. In the second fragment,” Diotogenes turns from the king as a publie official to discuss the king’s own character; if he is the Comment is hardly necessary to bring out the Pythagorean . character of this section.” Insistence upon harmony as the basis Animate Law, he ought to be personally of the proper sort, as the universe, is coupled with explicit statement of the mathematical ratio of the state to the universe, The fragment thus givés self conquer it. He must not resemble the multitude (indeed, he should be far different from them), and he must regard not pleasure but manly virtue [dvöpayadla) ns his proper objective. At the same time it is proper that one who desires to rule over others should first be able ' to rule over his own passions, of state organization, a harmony that reproduces the harmony of a fairly complete picture of the king in the state. He is metamorphosed into deity, and transcends his subjects as. God transcends his creations. And this is all summed up in the fact that he is Animate Law. Whence comes the harmony of the states which makes an entity out of divergent elements? From the same 46 Geds dr deOpdwors wapesxandrısran, «In Plato’s Laws, V, 735 d, It Is pointed out that a virtuous tyrant is of great valuo to a city in that he can more readily apply purificatory rites to the city than any other sort of legislator. well as to look and act the part. Wherefore the king must not be conquered by pleasure, but must him- 43 Stob., I, xx, 2 (I, 172). Diels, Fragm. d. Vorsok, (3d ed.), 82 B. 21. On this fragment ace Zeller, Phil, d. Gr., I, 1 (6th ed.), 476, note, English transIntion, Pre-Socratics, I, 399, n. 1. Cf. Ocellus Lucanus, $19 (ed. R. Harder, Berlin, 1926). Zeller, ITI, if, 149, n. 5. 49 Geschichte des Hellenismus, II (1926), 826 ft, vo Stob., IV, vil, 62 (IV, 266 f.).

The conception that one who cannot rule hithself cannot rule others is common in Greek thought from Socrates on. Stobaous has preserved a striking parallel in the fragmieiiti *'Boorates said that the superior king would be one who could rule over his own passions.’ ‘AvSpaya6ia is held up as a virtue for kings as far back pleasure or love of honor as their incentive, the king should have as Herodotus (1, 99). Diotogenes continues: edge is driven by curiosity, a desire for learning, and what Diois rational interests, which are, Diotogenes asserts, by nature avaricious and desirous. No more shocking breach of Greek philosophic decorum could be imagined than this identification of Aoyuoÿ and értfupla.S There is a sense, to be sure, in which knowltogenes says may possibly be explained on that ground. If so, it Further, this is the rationale of his avarice, It is tight for hitn to poswould seem that the king is being recommended to express his sess goods enough to benefit {etepyerév] his friends aid sitpport the avarice in intellectual greed, as he should manifest his preémihence in moral superiority. But unless the text is completely corrupt, the impression is unmistakable that the author has much needy, and also to avenge himself upon his enemies with petialties. For the enjoyment of good fortune is most pleasänt when joined with ' . virtue. Similarly about his pre-eminehee [daepoxy} |! fot he imist excel the rest in virtue and on that aceotnt be judged wotthy to rule, but not on account of his wealth, or power, or military strength, For the knowledge of how these great kings really act, a fact which increases ‘the probability that the document is a product of the Hellenistic age, as well as its importance for the subject being discussed. first of these qualities he has in common with all sorta of people [ +a» ruxóvruv], the second with irrational animals, the third with tyrants, while virtue alone is peculiar to good men. So that what king is selfcontrolled in pleasure, given to sharing his possessions, and is prudent and powerful in virtue, that man would be king in very truth. And thé In the section which follows, Diotogenes is explaining how the king should act in view of his character as Animate Law. Justice is to be his fundamental characteristic, for this is the supreme people have the same proportion of goods and evils as the parts of the virtue which includes all others. As in Plato,®* who probably got human soul. For avarice concerns the ledding part‘? of the soul, sincé desire [¢xtOupla} is a rational thing [Acyix#]} and love of honor and brutality®® have to do with the spirited element [Ôvpoetête], for this is the conception from Pythagoreans, justice is represented in individual and state alike as the virtue of virtues, because it is a harmony in which each component part performs its own functions, and also because it is a binding and harmonizing force compelling them to do so. Now as the king has this justice in himthe living and dynamic part of the soul; while love of pleasure concerns the desirous element, for this is the female and damp part of the soul. The author is getting rather involved, He has begun with aii self, he is able to infuse it inio the entire state, and so make the astonishing rationalization of the avarice of the king, a word which was as ugly in the author’s day as now but a fact which state a harmony out of its various parts. Diotogenes continues: Injustice is the uttermost sin, and, by its compounded nature, involves the whole soul. Whence the king should harmonize together the well lawed city like a lyre. Knowing that the harmonya the multitude was all too obviously an outstanding characteristic of many Hellenistic rulers. Diotogenes is making an effort to justify them. Avarice, he says, brings the king power to benefit and injure, and that is pleasant. Furthermore, it is like his preéminence (trepoxy); | which is universally conceded as a necessary prerogative of kings, But royal preöminence ought to be expressed chiefly in the realm whose leadership God has given him ought to be attun to himself, the king would begin by fixing in his own life the most just limitations and order of law. And besides issuing publie decrees the good king should present to the state proper attitudes in body and mind. He should im: of virtue if the king is to be king in the highest sense, Similatly . . sa For Pythogorean use of this tripartite division of the soul see Metopud the Pythagorean, in Stob., III, i, 115 (III, 66), where tilso the énpbras 18 associated with @uuoedés. Cf. Ariat., Nie, Eth, VII, 1, À 54 See Ps,-Aristaeas, Epist., 270, 277. Em ee 63 yeuomxér: cf. Plato, Tim., 41 ¢, 70 b. personate the statesman and have an appearance of practicality so aa not to seem to the mob as either harsh or despieablo, but at once rl in the matter of avarice, for the king is to his subjects (here Diotogenes introduces more Platonism) as reason is to the spirited and desirous parts of the human soul. So, as his subjects have — 81 Stob,, IV, vil, 26 (IV, 266). Cf. IT, vill, 29 (IL, 169): © 71 88 Desiro is interestingly discussed by Aristoxenua tho Pythagorean, in Stob., III, x, 66 (III, 424), where desires are suggested which are not sensuous. But nothing is made of it in this small fragment. va Bep, 443 cf. Cf. Polua the Pythagorean in Stob., III, ix, 51 (III, 362) and Hippodnmus apud Delatte, p. 145, fr. 4, ST edxaragpéryros. Tore the government Is to appear neither harsh nor an easy mark, The term is twico used by Xenophon as a thing which true kingly rule will avoid. In Hellen., VI, iv, 28, it is the highest point in praise of Jason, Tagos of Thessaly, that his rule waa not despised. So in Cyrop., VIII,

pleasant and yet watchful from every angle.” And he will succeed in this if first he make an impreasion of majesty by his appearance and utterances, and by his looking the part of the ruler; if secondly, he bé softening the harshness of the injury, the other giving indulgence to 12 those suffering from some delinquency. And the good king must be gracious both in conversation and in appearance, and in actual bene]; and third, if he inspire fear in his subjects by factions [ebepyeotas his hatred of evil and by his punishments, by his speed of action’? and in general by his skill and industry in kingly duties. For majesty, à godlike thing, can make him admired and honored by the multitude; aciousness will make him popular and beloved} while the ability to inspire fear will make him terrible and uticontuerable in his dealings with enemies, but magnanimous and tristworthy toward his friends: And majesty must be one of his fixed attributes} he intist do nothing base or worthy of the mob, but only things worthy of those who are admired, and to whom leadership and thé power of the scepter belong; he must vie not with his inferiors or equals, but with his süperiors. He must think, in the spirit of the greatness of his leadership, that thé . greatest pleasures are those which consist in good and great deeds rather than in enjoyment. He must separate himself from the humait noble 78 passions, and draw himself up close to the gods,°° not in arrogante, but in high-mindedness and in the exceeding greatness of his virtue. He must wrap/himself about with such distinction and superiority in his appearance, in his thought life and reflections, and in the character of his soul, as well as in the actions, movements, and attitudes of his body: So will he succeed in putting into order those who look upon him, amazed at his majesty, at his self-control, and his fitness for distinction. For to look upon the good king ought to affect the souls of those who see him no less than a flute or harmony. Enough bas been said about majesty; now I will try to diseuss graciousness. Any king will be gracious who is generally just, equitable and merciful. For justice is the binding and holding together of the community [of the soul], and such a state of the soul is the only basis for helpful to those who are in need, be grateful and not burdensome. And he must give his aid not in some ene way, but in any way possible; and he must be grateful in proportion not to the size of the present of honor which is made to him, but to the manner snd purpose of the one who is thus honoring him; and he must not be burdensome to any man, particularly not to the lowly and those in misfortune; for these, like men ill in body, are unable to bear a heavy load. For the gods, and especially Zeus, the ruler of all things, have such attributes. He also is majestic and awe-inspiring both by his preéminence and by the greatnéss of his virtue; and he is gracious in his benefactions and generosity, so that he is called by the Ionic poet, “Father of gods and men”; änd he inspires fear by the fact that he punishes evil doers, and controls and rules all things, and has the thunderbolt in his hand as a symbol of fearfulness, In all these respects, it must be borne in mind, ‚ royalty is an imitation of divinity. Fragmentary as are the survivals of Diotogenes’ writings, his philosophy of royalty is sufficiently evident. It begins and ends in the conception of the animate law. It is the king as an official ‚f who is the constitution of his realm. As such he is recommended to be a good constitution, to bring the state into harmony by first harmonizing himself and then introducing that harmony into his kingdom. Such is the activity of God, and so likewise should be the activity of the king.** But more, the virtues, the propriety, and the excellent character of the king have the effect of drawing into inner harmony the character of men who only gaze upon him. It is in Ecphantus that this astonishing statement will find an explanation. : . A short fragment from a document on Kingship is also preharmony with one’s neighbors. For justice bears thé same relation to communion®? as rhythm to motion and harmony to the voice; for justice is a good shared in common between the rulers and the ruled served, asctibed to Sthenidas of Lokri, the Pythagorean.®* The imunity. And equity and mercy share the throne of justice, the one spelled ‘'Sthenonidas,’’ though there is no reason for thinking and is accordingly the harmonizing principle in the political comiii, 1, Cyrus is very careful not to be despicable in hid great procession of sacrifice. 8 dupiorpagth, said of a thres-hended dragon in Iliad, xi, 40, : érirdyvers, a hapaz legomenon. © qureyritw, compare above, the fragment of Archytas where the king is closest to the law, p. 60, A Sinddor TG rept ray érixpéryar. 7 7 ' & worvorla, which I am consistently transtating ‘‘communion’) here and in Ecphantus, as the only English word which is even approxiinately intelligible in the various uses of tho Greek term, Thé word really means ‘ireciprocal relationship. !? work was undoubtedly a pseudonymous ascription to a Pythagorean of Lokri, who is mentioned by Iamblichus with the name the fragtient genuine.° The fragment reads: The king must be a wise man,® for so he will be a copy and imitator 68 On the imitation of God see below, p. 74. 4 Btob., IV, vii, 63 (IV, 270). 65 Jambl., Vit. Porph., 267. Porphyry (Vit. Pyth., 56) narrates that elders of Lokri prevented Pythagoras from entering tho city, on the grounds that their laws wore already perfectly good. But of other connection of Pythagoreanieni with Lokri nothing is known. 68 The elders of Lokri who forestailed the visit of Pythagoras are reported to have said to him, fées, 3 IEvOayôpa, copèr pr Avdpa ce kat Secvdv dxodoper. Porph., Vit. Pyth., 56,

of the first God. For God is the first king and ruler.by nature, while the other is so only by birth and imitation. The one rules in the entire uni: verse, the other upon earth; and the one lives and rules all things foras a moral existence ruling a world objective to himself. If God is the all, as in Stoic pantheism, one may live in conformity with has only understanding {émtorypn]. And he would best imitite God by then might suggest a pre-Poseidonian date for the fragment, and in any case does not imply essential Stoic influence. 75 God’s legal nature but can hardly imitate Him. The use of vodés ever and possesses wisdom (cogfa} in himself, the other is temporal and ‚keeping himself great-minded, merciful, and lacking in few things, and by evincing a fatherly disposition to those beneath hit: For it is ik _ As it stands the fragment betrays a less competent author than Diotogenes. Particularly is the thought blurred by his confusion this way that the first God is recognized as father of gods aiid men, by the fact that he is merciful to everything which is subject to him, and never relinquishes his hold of the leadership; nor is he satisfled at being the maker of all things alone, but he is the supporter atid teicher of all that is beautiful, and the lawgiver equally to alt, Such a leader upon of copia and émorÿun. At first vople is ascribed to God, and dorien, the word used for royal science by Socrates and Plato, la properly ascribed to the king.” But then shortly both oopéa and érioriun are applied to the earthly ruler alone. In a source as corrupt as the text of Stobaeus the confusion may well have been earth and among men ought he also to be who aspires to be king. And nothing which lacks a king or ruler is good; and without wisdom and understanding it is impossible to be eithera king or ruler. Indeed he who made by the copyists. Another group of fragments from a work on Kingship is preserved by Stobaeus as from Ecphantus the Pythagorean." is both king and wise wilt be a lawful imitator and servant of God. So short a fragment is dated with great difficulty, even ap- But they are also pseudonymous. Eephantus was a contemporary proximately. At first sight it would appear that it is chiefly be contrasted with the remains of Archytas and Diotogenes in of Archytas, and wrote in Attic Greek. The fragments on Kingship are Doric, and appear to belong to the Hellenistic period. But if they are pseudonymous they are none the less interesting for their testimony on the philosophy of royalty. Unfortunately that the oopés here implies clear Stoic influence. But a second glance reveals that the only Stoic element in the entire fragment is the use of the term cos, which was, of course, not an invenword text is in particularly bad condition. The first fragment egins: tion of the Stoics at all. Indeed, the explanation that cedés is one who imitates God is definitely at variance with Stoicism. The conception of the imitation of God in Greek philosophy is clarified by a paragraph in Stobaeus which begins with the statement: “Socrates and Plato agreed with Pythagoras that the end of It seems to me to be cleap from many bits of evidence that the nature of every animal is in h with the cosmos and the things in the cosmos. For inasmuch thes along with the universo and is closely bound in that s life is to achieve a likeness to God.’’** Plato indeed. went further it follows in the sweep of and, like Sthenidas, said that when the true statesman (the king) ich is at once the best and inovitable, and is led about in accordance rules with knowledge, harmonizes the state, brings together the with the universal [kourú} good Order, and with the duration proper to diverse elements of the good and rejects the bad, he hot merely imitates but reproduces the divine image. The likeness is so close that Campbell long ago thought that Plato’s conception was deperfect of living beings. And in its parts, which are many and of diverse nature, some one living being rules which is most suitable in ite origin, each individual thing. Whence it has its name Cosmos, and is the most and in the fact that it has a greater share in divinity. And in the nature of the eternal God those things which havo the first and highest conrived from the Pythagorean idea which lay behind these fragments. But whether that is true or not, the conception of imitating God is a bit of Pythagoreat-Platohié mysticisi which is essentially foreign to tho nature of Stoltinid, For finitation of: God could be imagined only by philosophers who eonsidered God formity [dxoAovdla] to divinity desire . . . and the planets"? And in the region of the moon, beneath where bodies travel in à straight line,t# demonic tiüturé achieves its development, but in otir environment on the to Bee above, n. 44, 72 Stob,, IV, vii, 64, 65, 66 (IV, 271 ff.). On Ecphantus, see Diels, Fragm. d. Vorsok., I, 340, n.; Priichter in Uberweg, Gesch. Phil, T aaa) 250, Zet: 8 &Aryoëeéa. Philo goes further: à ptr Bedt odderdı Setray, à Bactheds 82 prob 0600. R. Harrie, Fragments of Philo Judaeus, p. 104, En ! for, Phil. d, Gr, I, 1 (6th ed), 604-607 (for Bibl, seo p. 600, n. 3); Welt- 68 Stob., II, vit, 8 £, (LI, 49). Cf. Zeller, Phil. d. Gry I, 1, 606, n. 5; English mann in Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encycl., V, 2216, translation, I, 490, n. 1. 12 The text breaks down here completely. 69 Louis Campbell, The Sophistus and Politicus of Plato, Oxford, 1867, pp. xxv fl. of the Politicus. 18 Reading rür. . . lérrwr supdrwy, .

earth man has achieved the highest development; white it is the king a light, the light of royalty. For he is judged and approved by this 17 who is most divine. light, as is the mightiest of winged creatures, the eagle, set face to face Here again there might seem to be a Stoic influence in the whirling of the universe, but the universal harmony ie still Pythagorean, while the universe as a whitling animal is tecog: nizably Platonic." The section breaks down in text at a passage which was most clearly Pythagorean, It would seem to have been a division of the universe, not as in Diotogenes into the sublünar with the sun. Thus royalty is explained in the fact that by its divine character and excessive brilliance it is hard to behold, except for those who have a legitimate claim. For bastard usurpers are confuted by complete bedazzlement, and by such vertigo ns assails those who climb to a lofty height. But royalty is something with which people can live, if those who aspire to it are properly attuned to it, and are able to use it. Royalty is then a sure and incorruptible thing, very hard for a human and supralunar worlds, but into a series of worlds in each of which was a group of proper inhabitants, ruled over by a pe: culiarly superior member who represented divitiity to them. Buch a description will appear shortly in & Hermetic fraginent, and it being to achieve by reason of its exceeding divinity. And he who stands in it [£e, the king] must be pure and radiant in nature, so that he may not tarnish its exceeding brightness by his own blemishes, even as some people defile even the most sacred places, and some of those whom one meets are 4 pollution to those who meet them. And the one who thus lives fills the need here perfectly. The Bephantus frigment goes oti td explain the peculiar divinity of the king among imeti+ in royalty ought to share in its immaculate nature, ond to understand He claims the lion’s share of the better elements in oùt commo tiatute. He is like the rest [of mankind] indeed in his earthly tabernacle how much nore divine he is than the rest, and how much more divine than he is are those others (the gods] by likening himself to whom he [oxävos], inasmuch as he is formed out of the same material; but he ia fashioned by the supreme Artifleer, who in making the king used himself as an Archetype. would do the best for himself and his subjeets.\And in the case of ordinary [dAAovs} men, if they sin, their most holy purification is to make themselves like the rulers, whether it be law or king who orders affairs where they are. . . .* For no one would ever doubt the existence of the Extraordinary as is this statement, there is good reason for his own master who himself ruled over others. The greatness of cosmic order consists in the fact that nothing unworld who was in it and part of it, nor would anyone be insensible of thinking it was a current Pythagorean way of expressing the superiority of the king over his subjects. Burysus, a Pythagorean, ruled can be found, and that it is in a sense the teacher of rulership. For is quoted by Clement of Alexandria as using the same words ezactly,"* though we would not be sure he had the king in mind its beauty is revealed straightway if the one [the king] who imitates [God] in his virtue is beloved at once by him whom he is imitating and if it were not for a passage quoted by Stobaeus from the same work." Bephantus continues: by his subjects. For no one who is beloved by God would be hated by men, since neither the stars nor the whole cosmos are at enmity with . God, but rather if they hated the leader they would not obediently fol- Accordingly the king, as a copy of the higher king, is a single and unique creation, for hels on the one hand always intimate with the one low him. But it is the very fact that God rules well which causes good rulership to apply to both the king and his subjects. So then I suppose that the earthly king can fall short in no particular of the virtue of the heavenly king; but just as the king is an alien and foreign thing which who made him,* while to his subjects he appears as though he were in té The Cosmos is an animal (for) with some power to move itself in a great whirling motion in Politicus, 260 4. Hariiotiy ls here also émphaslzed, has come down from heaven’ to man, so anyone would suppose that abr@ xpdperoy trapadelypast retfoat ròv Aréparror, 73 ókâvok rois Adurots Gyieish, td yeyords dx rs abräs Das, td rexstra 88 elpyanpıdvor Aÿora, ôt drezdlrevaer adrd upon themselves the punishment of Ben through 6fp:s, but do what is pleasing 15 Clem, Alez. Strom., V, v (ed. Stiihiin, II, 344, lihes 181), Tör drjgiiovpydr to and in accordance with God, are like God, and since they are like God they bro friendly with God. Still more strikingly does Plato deseribo Minoa (Bftnos, 819 aff.) as able to give good laws because he was constantly in communion with God by virtue of his being like God. 1e The Greek of this omitted sentence is unintelligible without such extensive emendation that its value would be destroyed for our purpose. I should guess from the contoxt that the author meant to say here that purifldpxeréry xpéperés daurg. Soo Diels, Vorsok, p. 269, The sinful carthly tabarnacle of tho soul which is good appears strikingly in päeudo-Plato, Aziochus, 866e ff. Cf. Clem. Alex, Strom, V, xiv (ed, Stäh., II, 888, lines 9 It.) 16 Stob., I, vi, 19 (I, 89), at end. The Ariochus shows that the conception fragment is obviously roferring. The two fragments of Eurysus seem to have closo connection with each other, m of oxfvos was the basis of complete dualism of soul and body, to which this entlon for the king was a matter of making himself resemblo the cosmic rulership. Breider, referring to xar’ dparéy In provious line. 17 An interesting parallel is to bo found in Plato's Laws, 7164 ff., where those who are very well ordered, and obey the spor befos, and do not bring

his virtues were the work of God, and have become the king's throtigh God. 1 break off this remarkable exposition before the author tuts to another aspect of his subject to seek some explanation of what has already been said, for here is clearly ait admixture to & Pythagorean-Platonic base af oriental or Egyptian sun symbol ism. It would appear here that royalty is a stream of light whic goes out from deity lighting one high point in each order of existence, Among men it touches the king alone. It seems not so much to illuminate some individual and make him royal, as to bring the king down along with it from heaven, made of flesh and blood in his tabernacle, but actually of a different sort from men altogether in what is truly the man, to use the word of Axiochus, the HELLENISTIC KINGSHIP 79 tical side of this conception is amusingly described by Xenophon. The Persian king, in order to cast a spell on his subjects, dressed in a way to conceal any personal defects, wore padded shoes to make himself appear taller, used cosmetics extensively to make the complexion more brilliant, while he was careful not to spit, wipe his nose, or turn to stare at anything, lest by appearing corporeal or cutious he spoil his impression of divinity and omniscience.*4 It was the same idea which suggested Diotogenes’ description of the overpowering effect of the mere spectacle of a true king. It is interesting to note that it was in Egypt that the Hermetic literature was worked out, literature which much enlightens the statements of Ecphantus, Horus, in one passage,” Yoxy. None but a man with such an origin can bear to live in this asks his mother Isis to describe the origin of kingly souls. Isis replies that there are four regions of the universe subject to law which cannot be transgressed, and to presidency, viz., heaven, the Roman, though its assumption of a single king of humanity would Maker of all things; in the aether the stars, ruled by the sun; in heavenly illumination. Ordinary men, bastards, ‚as Ecphantus calls them, are blinded, and prostrated with vertigo if they try to usurp royal prerogatives. The conception is certainly not at first suggest a Roman date; nor is it Greek. But both Persia and Egypt regarded the king as hedged thus by a luminous solar : divinity. In Persia, as witnessed by the Zend-Avesta, there was a divine . ly glory made by Mazda which shone upon true kings, but win Sur pers were unable to seize. Of stich an attempt it is said that the Touranian ruffian Frangrasyan tried to beize it in the Sea Vouru-Kasha. ‘‘He stripped himself naked, wishing to seize the glory that belongs to the Aryan nations. But the glory escaped, the glory fled away.’ But of those on whom it came it is said, ‘‘It clave unto king Vistäspa, so that he thought accord. ing to the Law, spoke according to the Law, and did according to the Law; so that he professed that Law, destroying his foes and causing the Daévas to retire.” It comes on the king (who 3a identified with Lake Kâsava) in the mountain streams, and flowing into him, bringing power, wealth, physical strength, all designed to help the faithful and the law of the worshipers of Mazda? That this sun symbolism of Persia early affected the, Hellenistic cult of royalty has long been recognized.®* The prac80 Sirózah, II, xix, 66 (tr. Darmest., IT, 300). st Ibid,, Bec. 84 (p. 208). 83 Ibid, Sec. 67-69 (p. . 82 Soo especially Puchstein in K. Humann and A. Puchstein, Reisen in Kleinasien und Nordsyrien, Berlin, 1800, pp. 886 ff.; B, Kornemann, ‘‘Zur aether, air, and the earth. In heaven dwell the gods ruled by the the air are souls, under the moon; and on earth men, ruled by the person who is king for the time being, one of whom is always provided by the gods. All the three lower rulers are effluxes of the king in heaven, grading down to the king, who, vastly as he is superior to men, can hardly be called true deity while on earth. Yet he has a unique quality which is like a god, for his soul is sent down into him from a higher stratum than the souls of ordinary men. Kingly souls are thus sent down for two reasons, They may be souls who in the process of metempsychosis are just ready for apotheosis, but are given one last incarnation as kings to train them for the divine rulership they are soon to assume in heaven. Or they may already have been such divinities who had come-to deserve some slight punishment for a peccadillo, and so were incarnated, though not in ordinary human form. All such kingly souls are alike in virtue at the outset, but are escorted to Geschichte der antiken Herrscherkulte,’’ in Elio, I (1901), 90 ff., with reterences én loco. Tho présence of tho ancient Mesopotamian and Persian royal symbol in the form of a rosette on the coins of many Hollonistic rulers scoms to bo additional evidence of this influence. See Fr. Kampers, Vom Werdegange der abendländischen Katsermystik, 1024, Tafel I, numbers 1, 2, 6, 14. + I hope shortly to attempt to skotch the history of this interesting symbol. 84 Cyrop., VIII, i, 40-42, A remarkable parallel is to be found in Ammianu s Mareollinus, the description of Constantius, XVI, x, 10, 85 See above, p. 72, 30 Stob., I, xlix, 45 (I, 407 ff.). Seo Walter Scott, Hermetica,

the body by demons ot angels who impart their own characters of warrior, lover of peace, philosopher, of the like, to their charges who have lost all memory and characteristics of their And again: He (Aton) begets his august son Wanre (Ikhnaton) Like himself without ceasing, own in losing their heavenly abode. But while in the body they must obey the divine law, and live worthily of their own divine maker, or, instead of returning to deity, they will have to take . Son of Re, wearing his beauty, Nefer-Khepru-Re, Wanre (Ikhnaton), Even me, thy son, in whom thou art satisfled. another incarnation as ordinary men, or even lower.f? Who bears thy name, ‘The Hermetic literature is probably post-Christiäti in composi- Thy strength and thy might abide in my heart. tion, but the date of its composition does not of course certify thé date of all of its ideas. It is known that froin remotest times the king was regarded in Egypt as the ‘‘living image of the Sin God’’ and that the crown, nimbus, and scepter were all solar It is this process which is vividly represented in the accompany- | ing illustration. . symbols. The subject is much too complicated for detailed de.scription here, but the striking use to which Aiienhotep IV = hs a (Ikhnaton) put the conception cannot be passed over. In his substituting Aton, the single solar deity of the world, for Ammon-Re, the solar chief of the company of Egyptian gods, the wre significance of the relation of the king to the sun was at once enhanced. For as Aton was the source of life to all the earth, he was uniquely related to the king, who was thought to have "come forth from his rays,’’ and to have been fashioned ‘out of Aton’s rays,’’ which were represented as dynamic emanations from the sun, each equipped with a hatid as betokehing ita power. The king sings to Aton: Thou art in my heart, There is no other that knoweth thee Save thy son Ikhnaton; Thou hast made him wise In thy designs and in thy might. Thou didst establish the world, And raise them up for thy son, Who came forth from thy limbs, ù The king of upper and lower Egypt, Living in Truth, Lord of the Two Lands, Nefer-Khepru-Re, Wan Re (Ikhnaton), Son of Re, living in Truth, lord of diadeti, Ikhnaton, whose life is long; (And for) the chief royal wife, his beloved, Amenhotep IV and his queet receiving life from the rays of the solar dise Aton. Mistress of the Two Lands, Nefer-nefru-Aton, Nofretete, Living and flourishing for ever and ever. er Btob., I, xlix, 69 (I, 403). Scott, op. eft., I, 514, 81 & (From Morat, Du caractère religieux de la royauté pharaonique, p. 46.)

thinks it was influenced from the Hast, Breasted où the contiary that Ikhnaton’s Egyptian ideas influenced Asië, But whichevet The source of Ikhuaton’s reform is not established. Cuinont derös] was his meeting ita rays without blinking.’’® So Aristotle says that the sun eagle is the keenest sighted of the eagles, and compels its offspring when yet unfeathered to look at the sun. Those who are able to do so are then nourished, the others cast out of the hest as bastards. For Lucian goes on to say that those an Oriental Sun-God, sol invictus, the process wus ih large mensable to see the sun are royally made, the others are rejected as + bastards,” using thus Bephantus’s own term for a royal usurper. 82 of these two points of view is correct, Breasted seins certainly right in his assertion that “when the Rotitin Hmperot became ure due to the influence of the Asiatic Solar religion rather than to the Solar Pharaoh.’** The same statement, it beets, inay be carried back to the solar aspects of the Hellenistic king. For the distinctive aspect of the Hellenistic philosophy of royalty is the fact that the king’s sharing in the Solar Power made him the Animate Law of his realm, a coriception which Ì have sotight in vain in Egyptian records. In ancient Egypt the king’s command was the ultimate law of the land, but hot his person. Only in the Hast is this latter to be adequately paralleled. Still there 83 Keller thinks this is an Enstern story, because in Syria and Egypt the bird is connected with the Sun God. His feeling that it is Hastern is in some measure justified, as the connection of the legend with royalty is illuminated by representations on coins of the crown of Tigranes I, king of Armenia. Here on the crown is represented most clearly the testing of two royal eagles, who are evineing their royalty by their ability to gaze directly at the . Sun, seems to have been some influence upon the Hellenistié king front Egyptian solar symbolism, for some of the titles of the Pharaohs were carried over to the Ptolemies, For example on the Rosetta Stone Ptolemy Epiphanes is spoken of aa peydhoödtov, and élkóvos {dons rod Atds, viod rod “ElAlov, and the horns frequently represented on coins adorning the brows of Hellenistic kings appear to symbolize solar effulgence. = ' ¢ ei a It is of course no argument for a Roman date of the Ecphantus fragments that he speaks of a single and wnigtte king of the human race, In such a form would the.traditiott. have come from both Persian and Egyptian mythology, and too great nicety _ in the court of the Ptolemies or Seleucids in providing for the legitimacy of their rivals is not to be demanded. The unique power of the king to bear the royal light Bephantus illustrates by the legend of the eagle. There was an old story - about the eagle, that it was, in Lucian’s words, the ‘strongest eyed of all living things, the only one that could look straight at the sun; the test of the true royal eagle [à Bacteds kad yrjotos 88 Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt, N. ¥., 1912, : En Ecphantus has thus sketched the transcendental character of the king. He now continues to discuss his relations with his subjects: On careful examination the foundation truth will appear to be as follows! For the first and most necessary of all things for the human race is that communion shared in by the king over men as well as by the master who rules all things in the universe. For apart from love and communion existence is impossible, as may be seen also in the case of bodies politic, leaving out of account what is ordinarily called comtnunion. For such ordinary communion (mutual dependence) is beneath the nature of God and King, since they stand in no such need of each other as to be compelled to labor together to satisfy their wants and p. 367. Sce Cumont, Astrology and Religion among the Greeks and Romand, N. Y., 1912, pp. 73-77. Tho quotations are taken from Breasted, op. cit, pp. 828, 331. Cf. the hymn to Aton and the King in Broasted, Ancient Records so render mutual assistance; for both God and King are perfect in virtue, But the love which shares in a common purpose in a city is a copy of the unanimity [ôpévotar] of the universe. Now without the regi- N. Y., 1905, pp. 355 ff. See also Kampers, op. cit., pp. 13 #f., with references in the notes. The best work on Egyptian royalty is Alex, Moret, Du caraction to this story and its sources. of Egypt, Chicago, 1908, II, 415, no. 1010; and {bid., A History of Egypt, tare religieux de la Royauté Pharaonîque, Paris, 1909 (Annales du Musée Guimet, Bibliothèque d'Études, vol, 15), On the crown ag a divine symbol, ees Rohde, Psyche, I, 220, n. 2 (English translation, p, 189, n. 40); K. Fr. Hetmann, Gottesdienstl. Alt, Bec. 24, 113 Plutarch, Atistides, pp. 21 tr, 89 Lucian, Icaromenippus, 14. Professor Harmon kindly called my atten99 Aristotle, Hist, Anim., p. 6208, 11. For further references see Otto Koller, Thiere des classischen Althertuma, Innsbruck, 1887, p. 268, and pp. 447, n, 295, 448, n. 296. On tho use of the eagle by Hellonistle and Roman royalty, see Oder in Pauly-Wigsowa, Real-Eneyel., I, 871-375,

mentation which is affected by government no city would be habitable. For this laws are needed, as well as some sort of civil system, both by the ruling element and the ruled, if . . .° Out of these things there is produced a common good, viz., a sort of fine harmony and tuning of the mass together which results from their concordant obedience. He who rules in accordance with virtue is called, and is, the king, for he HELLENISTIC KINGSHIP 85 and shepherd’ to call him a ‘‘law’’ to his subjects. Herein is suggested at last the origin of the idea of vépos énpuos. It is clear that with the Persian conception of royal glory aa described in the Zend-Aveste” has come to Ecphantus its oft-repeated legal ' significance. For as Persia is the country where the people had a Special kingly race, so it is the home of the king as a living law to his people, This has clearly appeared in the quotations from the Zend-Avesta. But it was not only taught in Persia, but known to the world outside as a Persian teaching. Xenophon has deseribed the Persian king as personally law, law which watched his subjects.°° Much later Serenus Aelius records in his Memoirs the universe and the things in it. And there must exist complete good will {etvow], first on the part of the king toward his subjects, has the same love and communion with his subjects as God hos with and second on their part toward the king, such as is felt by a father toward his son, a shepherd toward his sheep, and by a law toward those who use it. of the king and law When there was no king bringing the divine glory in his own person into Persia there was no law in for five days in order that the Persians might perceive the value the Persian law that when the king died there should be dvopia Thus, remotely superior as is the king above the ordinary race of men, he should be the immediate means by which men may get into harmony with the universe. He is to be a father to his subof the king ns the good shepherd in Plato's Politicies at once comes jects, a shepherd to his flock, whereat the remarkable description Persia. So it was probably from Persia that the conception came-f into Greek thinking. Long known to the Greeks, it was adopted by them in direct imitation when the Hellenistic kings were tepresented as the divine living law of their kingdom. to mind? But Plato’s good shepherd, as well as the description of the king as father, was definitely connected with Persie by | tion to the double empiro of Rome in viow of the accepted theory of the vo Btob., IV, ii, 26 (IV, 162). It is interesting, in loco, to notice hie reac- #8 Cyrop., VILL, 1, 22.” 87 Seq above, p. 78. eattle without the herdsman.’ The descriptions of the king as maker and law of the state are summarized in the fact that he is the protector of his people, a conception almost entirely analogous to the title Zwrúp used by Hellenistic kings, for it includes military protection, and at the same time protection from the ills of anarchy. Persia had a similar notion in its doctrine of ‘‘Saodie without the king; they would sink into utter darkness like special creation of the gods, and frequently identified with one of the gods. All social health, the very existence of socicty, are dependent completely upon the kingly rule. ‘‘These people would In India, apparently indigenously, though perhaps with some Persian influence, the king was also represented as incarnate “dharma’’ or divine law.’ As such he is of divine origin, a Xenophon.** Incidentally Xenophon has another figure for the king, that of the queen bee, who was thought by the ancients to be king bee, and who is of a different nature froin the other bees, king over his subjects, Persia, then, seems to be the race of people and so is aptly descriptive of the divine supetiority of the Persian referred to by Aristotle which claimed to be able to produce a kingly race of a different sort from the rest of the citizens; for sian “king bee.’’ Plato knew and rejected the figure, and Aris- Aristotle’s language is perfectly fitted to the Xenophontic-Perknown that the Hellenistic age took over the figure, for Plutarch totle did the idea, as impossible for Greeks, because so exalted a | race or individual was simply not to be found in Greece. But it is applies it to the king. Furthermore, Eephantus, who in writing has his eyes thus on ; the Persian conception, goes on from calling the king ‘' father 91 No manuscript makes sense of this phrase, uniquoness of the kingly office, 100 Bee Joh. J. Meyer, introduction to his translation of the Arthacästra of the Kautilya, Leipzig, 1926, pp. Ixii ff.: ‘‘Dor König ist der verkörperte 03 Cyrop., I, i, 2, where the king is shophord of the people; ‘bid, VIII, 92 265 d, 268 a, et passim, i, 1, 44, where tho king ie father of the people. The conception of the king 238 shopherd is very ancient in the east, Prof, Dougherty called my attention to an inscription of Sennacherib, where tho king Is ‘'the wiso Shephord,’’ See D. D. Luckenbill, Annals of Sennachertb, p. 28, ling 8. The fragment of 4 301 Bee this entire passage quoted by Ghoshal, pp. 90 £., and 170. Hopkins and Rostovtzeff. Sco also Maine, Early Law and Custom, pp. 38 ff. “King.’’ My attention was called to this Indian material by Professors dharma und der verkörporto Stantagedanke.’’ Cf, U. Ghoshal, A History of Hindoo Politicat Theories, London and Calcutta, 1923. Seo index, e.v. Archytas hos already used the figure of the shepherd. See above, p. 62, 94 Cyrop., V, i, 24, 25. es Polit, 1288 a. Seo above, p. 63. ve Polit, 301 a. Te a wedj

shyant.”” Clearly in India, as well as iit Persis (atid the Hellen istic rulers were in touch with otie protip as well as with the other, especially the Seleucids), the religious chardcte® of the king makes him the animate constitution of the stäte, The king id actually, in the famous phrase, himself the state, It is precisely at this point, it has been seen, that patallels betweeit Egyptian cot: ceptions and these Pythagorean fragmeiita break down; in Egypt the king was solar deity incarnate, but not law incarnate, But with such a remarkable parallel to the véyos gupuxee directly at hand in Persia, and attracting the attention of thoughtful Greeks as all Persian customs did, it is impossible for me Hot to feël that the whole conception got into the Pythagorean tradition, aa well as into the other streams of Greek thinking, from the Bast.1b? The next fragment to be considered will be the third rather than the second of Ecphantus ;°* In so far as he has a sacred and divine mentality he is truly a king; for by obeying this mentality he will catise all good things, but nothing that is evil. And he will clearly be just, ünë who has commot relations with all, For communion [kowovla] consists in equality, and while id the distribution of equality justice plays the most important part, yet communion has its share. For it is impossible to bé Unjust while giving a share of equality, or to give a share of equality and tot to be com: munal. And could one doubt that the self-sttfficlent hiati [8 abropxys] is continent [2yxparjs]? For extravagatica is the mother of inéhtitience, who in turn is the mother of insurgency [{Ppis], froti whotn tiost, human ills arise. But self-sufficiency does not bepet extrivagatics or. her brood. Rather self-sufllciency, being # primal entity fdpxdj, leads all things, but is itself ted by nothing, and precisely this is a propetty HELLENISTIO KINGSHIP 87 tain without mind [vos]. Nor could the king without intelligence have these virtites: I mean justice, continence, communion, and their sisters, Here in the conception of self-sufficiency Stoi¢ influence is for the first time distinctly felt. The Stoies by no means originated the ided that private virtue, and particulatly self-control, was the criterion of eligibility for the kingly offcei®® But when . Xenophon and Plato spoke of coppoorry, the term used of the king in this connection by Diotogenes, the Stoies preferred their own slightly different atrdpxea.**? Yet the passage is much more Pythagorean or Platonic in its fundamental conception of the king than Stoic,** for Plato had said the same thing of the king in the Politicus in the most explicit language!” But it is in the elose of Plato’s Lais, rather than in Stoicism, that a closer parallel to the latter part of the fragment will be found. Reference has already been made to the fact that Plato, in despair of finding a true king, suggested a council of ten, which might introduce mind (vo) into the machinery and laws of the state.1!° The knowledge which gives the councillors power thus to affect the blate is the khowledge that Yoxy is cosmically the primary substärce, dominant over matter, and that the active principle in the Wie is an all-petvading tots, which can be called the World Mind, ahd which governs all things.!™ It is from such knowledge that the councillors will come to see that all virtues are but aspects of a single virtue, to which all law must be made to conform."? Similarly here Bephantus puts the king into a unique position: the king is himself the sole representation of this divine voîs among men: But I dnt haunted by the feeling that it is the Hvarena conalike of God and the king himself to be the ruler (whence he is called the “Self-Ruling”),!°* but to be ruled by ho one. Now that this could _ ception of the Persians which Plato is trying to introduce as voûs not occur apart from intelligence [ dpévgous] is clear, while it is obvious that God is the intelligence of the universe. For the universe is into the organization of the city-state. And is not Ecphantus looking steadily éastward for his symbolism and sounding Plaheld together in arrangement and proper order, and this could not ob-. tonic here because Plato was furtively doing the same thing? For it is in the Eastern kingdoms that the metaphysical character of 102 Tt is at this point that Professor Ferguson seems to me to have missed lutiem en route from Greece to Romo,’? in American Historical Bev, XVIII 106 Seë on Isocrates above, p. 57, and Socrates, p. 70. i107 References in Zeller, Phil, d. Gr., III, i (4th ed.), 224, n. 5. English translation, Stotcs, p. 224, n. 4. he makes a false distinction between the political element and the Persiahwhen, in revising the Platonic statement that kings should be philosophers, it asserted that irrospective of social position any wise man is Dao facto a some of the significance of Hellenistic royalty, Bee his ''Lapatized Abso: (1912), 29-47, He was clearly right in emphasizing the constitutional and legal, rather than the religious, importance of the divinity of the king. But Egyptian religious element, He seems not to have been aware of the legal and constitutional significance of oriental royal divinity. 108 Btoiciam of course added nothing new to the doctrine of kingliness king. Beo Plato, Polit, 259 b, 292 a, 105 Ibid,, 267 b, 276 c. 108 Stob., IV, vii, 66 (IV, 278). 104 Ecphantus is attempting to derive abrdpxys from dpy}. 105 See above on Plato, p. 62. 110 See above, pp. 66 £. 121 Laws, 966 6 ff, Especially 907 e, À, vdv, . . roy rv Evry. 112 Told, 968 a, 965 a.

the true king is combined in this way with the hecessity that he be virtuous. Beginning from Archytas the ettiphasis ttpon this twofold criterion has been continuous in the fragments under discussion. The very fact that such & twofold criterion is illogical makes more significant the fact that the two are to be found simi: - self-sufficiency. For as he will have his friends ns a result of his own virtue, so in making use of them he acts in accordance with no other larly combined in both Persia and in India. The combination of the two in India is strikingly illustrated in the Narada, a composition of much earlier material made shortly after Christ. Here the king is described as like each of nine deities according to the nature of his functions. He is like the sun, for example, because he can be gazed at with difficulty because of his luster. Later the same document says: ‘‘The king by virtue of his brightness and purity is like the being without beginning and without end, pro- - vided he does not stray from the path [of duty].’’* Like the royal standards which Xenophon represents as Persian in his description of Cyrus, this Indian righteousness of the king is described as primarily the union of justice with self-control. Stoicism may have suggested to Ecphantus the termi abrdpxud rather than cwdpoovvy, but his whole royal desctiption is too Hast: ern and traditional to admit here of essential Stoic influence. The second fragment from Ecphantus’s treatise on kingship reads as follows :1?° ‘ In ruling over men and in controlling his own life he tises one and the same virtue, not massing acquisitions on account of ätiy lack, for his personal service, but doing as one does in life of action according to nature. For although this communion exists, yet each man lives sufficient unto himself. For in carrying out his life the self-sufficient man needs nothing outside of himself; and if he must live an active life, and sd 118 Ghoshal, Hindoo Political Theortes, pp. 226 ff. | 114 Ibid., pp. 97 #., 100: “If the king practices rightoousness, it is ur ed, he attains very nearly to the position of a God, while he goes to hel he does the reverse. The person through whom righteousness flourishes is verily called a king (Rajan), while he through whom it decays, is called by the gods the destroyer of righteousness (Vrigala). Of the same nature is the. | distinction drawn by the sage between tho haughty and the modest king. One becomes a king, he saya, by vanquishing pride and u slave by succumbing to it. . . . Tho unjust king who employe sinful and wicked itilnistors, anys the sage, should be slain by tho people.” This is all accompanied by tho con- : ception of tho king as a divine creation, See especially p; 191: ‘Tho king should . . . learn the four traditional sciences and should conquer the senses, The last involved the suppression of eighteen vices which Manu declares to be worse than death. The reason for the exercise of this self-command is indicated in another place where it is declared that the person who has conquered his own senses is alone able to keep bis subjects under control.’? 4118 Stob,, IV, vii, 65 (IV, 276 ff). 89 take other factors into account, still none the less will he keep his virtue than what he uses also in his own life. This must follow since there is no other virtue especially provided to this end. God, who has, neither. ministers ‚nor. servants, makes. no use of anyone in giving His orders, nor does He crown or honor those who obey Him, or disgrace those who disobey; not such are the means he uses to extend his personal rule over a realm so vast. Rather, it seems to me, by offering Himself as one worthy of imitation God implants a desire [{äAov] to imitate Him in every man who has a nature like God’s. God is Himself good, and to be go is His sole and easy function [épyov], while those who imitate Him do as a consequence all things better than other people. The resemblance which each man can achieve consists in self-suflciency. For there is not one group of virtues which do what is pleasing to God, and snother which imitate Him. Now the earthly king would be just as self-sufficient as the rest of us (by imitating God). For in making himself like God he would inake himself like the Most Powerful, and everyone who tried to be like him. . . „1*® Now when matters are put upon subjects by force and necessity their individual zeal for imitation is sometimes diminished, for without good will [etvolas] imitation is - impossible, and nothing diminishes good will like fear. Oh, that it were possible to put from human nature all need for obedience! For the fact that as mortal animals we are not exempt from it is the basest trace of our earthiness, inasmuch as a deed of obedience is very close to being one of necessity; for what just escapes being brought about by the one is produced by the other. For whatever things can by their own nature use the Beautiful [rd xaAdv), have no occasion for obedience, ns they ‘have no fear of necessity. The king alone is capable of putting this good into human nature so that by imitation of him, their Better, th will follow in the way they should go. But his logos, if it is accepted, strengthens those who have been corrupted by evil nurture as if by drink, and who have fallen into forgetfulness; it heals the sick, drives out this forgetfulness which has settled upon them as a result of their sin, and makes memory live in its place, from which so-called obedience springs. Taking thus its beginning from seeds of trifling import [ daöAa créppara] this grows up as something excellent [orouaïoy], even in an earthly environment, in which the logos, associating with man, restores what has been lost by sin. The Pythagorean fragments have led us into a purely eclectic peroration, in which oriental, Pythagorean, Platonic, and Stoic notions are inextricably blended to form a conception of the king as saviour which is as amazing as it is suggestive. It is known from Xenophon"? that the Persian tradition much discounted the 116 The toxt again is hopeless. 141 Cyrop., I, vi, 20-25,

value of obedience to the king then based upoñ evinpulsion. Cambyses tries to explain to young Oyrtis that the method of fear in ruling will never be satisfactory. Like Hephantus he relumpishness into the divine existence God meant him to be. Thus transformed in his spiritual nature man will be an imitation of the king as the king imitates God, each in turn gelf-ruled and 90 jects a ruletship based upon reward ahd ptinishment, which he subject to no external compulsion. So man will at last have calls necessary obedience, and türhs to spôntatieotis bbediehes based upon a sincere conviction on the part of thé stibjeots that the king is actually wiser than they. Similarly Xenophon says achieved the dream, however represented, of all Greek ethical thinking, he will be able to live spontancously by divine law and dispense with the seriatim compulsion and injustice of the written codes. It will now be recalled how Diotogenes describes this that though Cyrus ruled over such an enormous territory and held all his subjects in fear, ""yet mote he was able to awaken in process.'?° One needs only to gaze at a king who looks the part them all so lively & desire to please him that they always wished to be guided by his will.”"‘t The idea reémerges as à distinction of his teal sublimity to be affected as by music, to be softened, and to have the discordant element of his life brought into the in Plato and Aristotle between a king and & tyrant, that the king perfect harmony of Snowy, a harmony which expressed the ultimate aim of Pythagoreans and Platonists, as well, of course, rules over willing, the tyrant over unwilling, subjects." But Ecphantus does not stop here; he goes otf to exptess itt Stole as of Pauline Christianity later. symbolism a conception which goes beyond anything in Stoicisnt — proper, and which can be explained ultimately again only in So we have, perhaps, at last grasped the meaning which lies behind the conception of the Animato Law; it means that the king is personally the constitution of his realm, that all the laws terms of the oriental royal glory, For to show the king’s power to influence his subjects the Stoic doctrine of Adyos owepparinds is of localities under him must be ultimately moulded by and extransferred from God tnd applied to the king. In Stoicism the universal divine logos is sometimes conceived in terms of the press his will. But more, he is the saviour of his subjects from | their sins, by giving them what the Hellenistic world increasingly generative principle: after a primeval division of itself into art wanted more than anything else, a dynamic and personal revelation of deity. But an important question remains, that of how generally it ean be shown that this philosophy of royalty was known and accepted in the Hellenistic age. On this point I will cite only a active spiritual principle and an inert base, the Logos had pro: ceeded to work as the active spiritual principle transforming the base into the material universe, as the living principle in seeds works upon the inert ground to produce & treé or a hitman being, Such is the figure which is now applied to kings. From him the few examples, logos goes forth, as the logos in ecledtic Platonizing Stoivism . The pseudo-Aristotelian ‘Letter to Alexander,” which introwent forth from God, to work in men as the other works in mat: duces the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, gives a very interesting illustration. The letter need not here be quoted entire?! It has ter, and to infuse life into them. Life man once had had, but by his sin he lost it, and fell into a helpless inertia and lethargy in which his only response is to compulsion. The supreme function of the king is by virtue of his own relationship with deity, official long been recognized that the work is not Aristotelian, and a series of scholars, most recently Wendland, have tried to show that it is the work of Anaximenes. Wendland!” argued that the letter as it now is at hand is a reworking of an original and personal, fo infuse into man a new power, which is a new. recognition by man of his own potential nature (this stems to be the sense of the awakened memory), until the logos of the king, prelude to the Rhetoric by Anaximenes to make it sound to a like a grain of mustard seed, or, to úsé anotlio® New Testament figure for the same conception, like leaven, has trahafornted stan he | ; a En 118 Cyrop, I, 1, 5. moet FEN 119 Pinto, Polit, 2760; Aristotle, Polit, 285 a, 27, et passim, The cahcop: tion that good people were controlled by the example, bad people by thé . Oynie-Stole way of saying the sane thing, But ower, of the king was the h was hardly'an original oatelbubion of the Oynies, ua Kaorst days in Geach. des Hellenismus, II (24 ed.}, 828, n. 4. 91 ‘ ‘ "4 Hellenistic reader like the sort of letter Aristotle ought to have written, according to the reader’s standards, to Alexander. That 126 Boo above, p. 72, . 121 It is accessible in the English translation by E. 8, Forster, in The Works of Aristotle translated into English, under the editorship of W. D. Ross, vol. XI, Oxford, 1924, The best text is that of Spengol-Hammer, published under the title ‘Asatinévour Téxvy 'Prropuch, in Rhetores Graect, vol. I, Leipzig, 1894, 122 In Hermes, XXXIX (1904), pp. 499 fr. { Ae a aMhi

is, the additions which Wendland distinguished werd precisely life, and the king in no other part of his remarks acts as though he felt personally in danger, the other meaning seems more justified. If the translation be allowed to stand as I have made it, it can only mean that the writer had the Diotogenes-Ecphantus coneeption of the king in mind. For the zveöpa is the royal principle of divinity with which we are now familiar, while the courtiers are chatged with being bastards in the sense int which Ecphantus used the term, that is, with the impiots sin of trying to take this 93 those added in the Hellenistic period to conform to Hellenistic ideas of the king. Those additions then at ohce assume coiisidetable importance for our subject. They are in part! : Among those whose political constitution is demdctacy the Anal appeal on all matters is to the law, among those wlid are tinder ingly tule thé appeal is to your logos. . . . Again you tnust tealizé that there is a model set before men, which for some is th law, For others your life spirit upon themselves. 'H dpx} kal +d mvedjta are thus synonymous and logos. In order, therefore, that you tiay- excel all Greeks and barbarians you must exert yourself to the titntost; 86 that those who rms. Similerly it would seem that Justin took for granted the spend their lives in these pursuite [that is, Forster hotes, those who make your life and logos their guide], using the element of virtue in same philosophy of kingship: One recalls the description of the them to produce a beauteous copy of the model this set before then, may not direot themselves towatd ignoble ends, but tiake it their desire to partake in the same virtuo,t22 youth of Hiero,' an exposed child miraculously preserved and taken back by his father because the father was admonished by soothsayets that sovereign power was predestined for the child. As a boy and young man, Hiero’s life was accompanied by portenta, not the least important of which was the fact that an eagle at one time petched upon his shield, an owl upon his spear, revealing the fact that in wisdom and valor he was to be supreme atid a king. Handsome in person, powerful in physical strength, Used in an introduction to a treatise on rhetoric, the logos here is that conception, impossible to express in modetn language, of speech as the dynamic emanation of one’s rational life, But it is | also given a deeper and imore specific meaning+ it is that radiation of the king’s life and virtue in which those who copy the king may have a share, until they themselves beconië copies of kindly, just, and moderate in commands, he lacked nothing but his model, and are indeed made virtuous by his virtuous logos. The passage is thus an epitome of the philosophy of the Pythago- | & kingdom to be a king, a lack of which was of course soon supplied. The eagle as a symbol of this royal power has already been discussed, Justin mentions an eagle also in the case of Alexrean fragments. Another suggestive parallel is to be found in IIt Maccabees vi. 24. Here the king in his attempted persecütio of the Jews is deterred by the appearance of angels. In terror he turiis üpon his courtiers to put the blame upon them, ‘You hive tistirped royal prerogatives,’ he cried, ‘and you hive sutpassed tyrants it . their cruelty, And me, your benefactor, you hävò attempted to remove from the rulership and the pi tit, by your dectet coiitriving against the interests of the kingdom.’"*4 The meaning ander;!2° while the portent of similar significance which accompanied the birth of Mithridates was an extraordinary comet.!?' Seleucus, his sons, and grandsons were born marked with an _ anchor, as Justin describes it, but since in his symbolism the anchor is connected by Justin with a ting, it was probably © of the passage is not certain, The first word, wapePauAedete; is tite, usual, while rod srvelparos nehioräv night normally teut {deprives En me of my life.’ But since there has beet Ho attempt on the king's 128 The Epistle also identifies réuor and Adyor. kal yap d His dorky bt dert , elreîr MSyos cpiopdvos xad’ dpodoylay xowhy wbhact, pnrddy rt bef epdtred Éracra. | Kaerst, Studien sur Entwickelung und theoreltèchen Begründung der Mon: archie im Altertum, Munich, 1898, p. 31, n. 1, treats this idoiitification ns distinetly Stoic, disrogarding the game fdentifieation in Plato} for example] Laws, VIII, 885 e, Protag., 824 b. u 14 rapapacihedere, ral rupdvvous drepfeAnkbres dubriprt! kal duh abrds 76 dpb ebepyérny érixupeire rhs dpxfis #57 Kal Tod wreduaros kabırrär, d40pd bnyavdperet r& ph cundlporra 1% Paoidelg. Tho document Is probably second century 2.0. 93 the ankh, long familiar as the Egyptian symbol of divine _ ‘royalty, itself the hieroglyph in Egyptian for the word meaning ‘Life,’"*° Clearly to Justin, though in one passage he seems to represetit the royal office as a gift of the people,!* royalty is a divine gift, in which the royal office and a peculiar royal character are combined. It is very likely that if we had the work of Trogus which Justin is epitomizing these hints would appear more fully expanded. 126 Justin, 23, 4; cf. 44, 8. 120 Ibid,, 12, 10, 121 Ibid,, 86, 2. 128 Jbid., 16, 4. Bee F. Kampers, Vom Werdegange der abendländischen Katsermystik, pp. 14 ff. See illustration above, p. 81. 120 Justin, 28, 3.

A fragment On Kingshipt® of Musonits, the Helectic Stoic of the first century after Christ, is importäbt in dating the idea of while by direeting into others the prineiple of rulership, like a the king as Ai mate Law. Musonitis says that the hé king can save — and benefit his subjects only by understanding thè.+éy of ruler: ship; hence he must be a philosopher. To be just he inlist under: : stand Stavoren. Similarly by'philosophy he müst leat the other virtues, and thereby become godlike and worthy of respect: He proceeds: . So in general the good king must be sinless and perfect in word hid he to desire that foible of many rulers, especially. of the Persian eontrary he must be conscious constantly of himself being ruled. But by what? ‘‘ ‘By the Law, which is king of all, mortals and Whereupon Musonius returns to the praise of royalty us being a immortals,’ äs Pitidar seid, Not by that law which is written externally in books and on tablets, but by the Law which is Animate [dpspvyos] in him, viz., the Logos, which dwells with him and philosophical art. Nójos &ufuyos was thus a by-word fot royalty of great antiquity in the first century of our era. u A very important use of this symbolism for the kingly office protects him, and never leaves his soul without guidance.”## \- is to be found in the writings of Philo of Alexandria, also in the first century. But Philo’s remarks open up an entirely new aspect of the problem, which I shall have to leave for future discussion ** At present I shall content myself with citing one more author, In Plutarch, the late Platonist, then, this Animate Law concep- ¥ ° tion has been fully identified with the Logos. The true king is the incarnate representation of the universal Nomos, and as such he is the incarnate representation of the Logos. The conception is expressed, like much of the early Christian Christology, in terms of a tripartite division of human nature into body, soul, and logos. And apparently it is generalized in such a form that anyone Plutarch. His development of the Diotogenes-Ecphantus conception of royalty is stated most distinctly not in his records of the occasional utterances of kings, though these are very impottant, but in a treatise of which we have only a fragment, that entitled A Discourse to an Unlearned Prince.” The fragment opens with the statement of the difficulty of giving advice to goes on, if the logos curtails power, it does 80 in a way whi enhances the value of being a ruler. For exatiple, Theopompus, king of Sparta, guided by this logos added the Bphots to the, system of rulership in Sparta, an act which, as his wife protested, seemed to diminish his powers as king. But Theopomptüs denied that he had diminished the advantages of his office, for it Bome- , what curtailing his jurisdiction he had at the same time much lessened the danger to which the king was exposed from envy, ‘Bo 180 In Stob., IV, vii, 67 (IV, 279 ff.). ! te1 I hope to publish an article upon thlé aspect of the subject shortly in the Harvard Theological Review, | 182 Moralia, ed. Bernard, Leipzig, 1898, V, 11. William Goodwin's translation, Boston, 1870, IV, 823 ff., is very unreliable. and ledves the wholesome part.’’ But most rulers are unintelliking, the feeling that he is free of all‘external restraint; on the strife, and being a careful worshipper of Zeus, and, like Zeus, & father to his subjects. vantages of their authoritative position.’ As a matter of fact, he gave to others; yet the Logos, which is implanted in the ruler by plillosophy, ad his throne-mate and güardian, takes away the dangerous part of his power, which is of itself seemingly healthy, pline, else he can never teach self-control to his subjects. Nor is deed; since he must be what the ancients call Animate Law, creating 4 law-abiding spirit and unanimity, and thrusting out lawlesstiess and lest, by its enslaving them to what is proper, it eurtall the. ad: great stream [from himself], he diminished himself by what he gent, and in consequence are like colossal statues which are very impressive outside but are actually only dirt or stone. So if a rtiler is to be truly such he must begin with self-disci- ’ kings. ‘For they fear to receive reason [the logos] as their ruler, 95 whose life is guided by reason might be represented as an Animate — Nomos-Logos, or king. Such seems to be a corollary which Plutarch draws in traditional form.’ Still the true king is officially in a unique position. For ‘‘the rulers are ministers of God for the care and safety of mankind, that they may distribute or hold in safe keeping the blessings and benefits which God gives to men.’’ The forces of nature, preéminently the sun, are working wonders about us, yet none of their productions can be properly used or eitjoyed withottt law, justice, and the ruler. ‘‘So justice _{êben] ie the end of law, and law is the business [or product, dpyov] of the ruler, while the ruler is the image of God who ordains all things. So he has no need of the art of Pheidias or Polycletus or 189 Boo. 8. Tle od» Apta roû dpxovros; à ‘rbjzos à mévrur Bacideds Ovar@» re kat ddardruw, ds Von Ilvbapos, ode Er BrBMlors Mo veypaupdvor odBd rise EGXoIs, AAN Yınbuxot dv do adr Abyor, del ovvorr@p «al rapagduddrraw nal pydérore Thy Puxhy dOr Upnpoy tyyeporlas. 104 Especially in tho stock anecdote of Alexander and Diogenes in Bec, 5. See below, p. 97.

Myron, but by his virtue he makes himself into the closest like- If any possible doubt could have existed as to Plutarch’s intention before, that has been made clear by this p e which 96 ness to God, and fashions himself into the faitest to behold of all statues, and the one most appropriate to divine mäjesty, And 97 certainly presttpposes the Diotogenes-Eephahtus philosophy, especially that of Ecphantus. For here is the supreme and selfjust as God put in heaven the sun, his exceedihy beautiful image and the moon, such also is the rule in the city, his copy and büfficient God, who radiates his force and power into the universe when he has intelligence [ &dvov], the Logos of Gad, tot by virtue of his sceptre, or of the thunderbolt ot trident with which söme have themselves carved and depicted, making thereby their folly invidious to the Unattainable One, For God visita with riemiesis emphasized by the Stoics, this cannot be true unless the king is subject to and guided by his own logos, which is brought up to its effulgence, ‘when he dispenses God-like justice.’ And such he is those who copy his thunder and lightning and radiation of sun beams [dxrwoßoAla], while he delights to atigttent those who de: in a way which is reflected and illustrated to percipiont men by the sun. Similarly the king is in the state an effulgence of this baie divine radiation. Yet, and here enters the element commonly propet position of predominance only by philosophical training. and love of mankind; and he shares with them the fine order, jus: If there is no royal road to learning, yet philosophy is the road to true royalty, and he who follows this road comes to have a share in the royal spirit regardless of his position, as we have seen nor the course of the sun, nor the tisitig and setting of the stars, no, not eternity nor immortality are more divine than these. For royal as is every man who copies true royalty, only a king can beso in the full sense. So Plutarch illustrates by Diogenes, whose royal sire his virtue and wish to make themselves like hitn in beauty tice, truth, and mercy which surround him. Not fire, not light, God is not happy by reason of the duration of his life, but by thé fact that he is ruler of virtue; such is true divinity, while to be: ruled by virtue is a beautiful thing also.’’ Far from its being true, as | | Anaxarchus tried to convince Alexander, that everything the king does is ipso factd just (notice this tradition which was also a part of Hellenistic law, and was doomed to reappear in some of the most itnporläht crises of history), the king must conform himself to justice. For Zeus haa not Themis and Dike for throne-mates iti the sense that they are subservient to his arbitrary whims, btit his nature is itself that of Themis and Dike, and a king who is like him will resemble him in these virtues. After illustrations of virtuous and vicious rulers, Plutarch returns to the metaphysical aspects of kingehip. What some philosophers say is neither probable Hor proper, viz, | that God is mingled in with matter which is completely passive, or with things, which are subject to a myriad of tiecessities, fates, atd chatiges. Rather he is fixed somehow above [all that] with à tinttite whith ia eternally unchanging; and turning about hatutally ôh holy Zotinda: tions, as Plato says, he perfects his work itimed iatelÿ for ih a straight line). And just as the sun in heaven, his surpassingly beautiful image, reveals his likeness in ita reflection of him to those who cari see him thus, so he has established in the state the effulgerica of high justics and of his attendant Logos like a picture which thdse who have beer made blessed and self-controlled by philosophy copy, in order to shape themselves into the most beautiful of objects. But this state of affairs is brought about by nothing else than the Logos which is produced by philosophy. 80 often emphasized by philosophers of all schools since Plato. Yet rule of himself aroused almost the envy of Alexander himself. But as Alexander had so much greater opportunities to indulgence, and so much more difficult a course to steer, so if Alexander made a Diogenes of himself and developed his logos so well as to be able to guide himself thereby through the storms of his greater sea, he made himself at once into a greater Diogenes than the Cynie could ever do. Similarly, if he failed, his failure was more enormous, his vices were more vicious, than those of ordinary men. The greater the king the greater his need of the logos as a guide. The struggle is quite beyond the power of human endeavor. Success is impossible ‘‘unless the reasoning power [4 Aoywuós] be heavy, and bedr and weigh down upon his authoritative power [&tovela]; or unless the ruler imitates the sun, which as it rises to greater heights in the north moves more slowly and so steers a safer course.” \ The fragment then concludes with two tests for worthy rulers. : The unworthy, when lifted up temporarily by Tyche,'® are actually soon cast down by her, like epileptics becoming dizzy at a great height; or they prove to be leaky tubs, that cannot contain the mighty influx of authoritative power when it flows into them, but spill it out in sins. . So the value of training the logos of the prince is to make him capable of bearing the influx of the Divine Logos which royal 198 Kampors (op. cit.) hag pointed out that this is but anothor torm for the sun-radiance of royalty.

power represents. The unlearned prince is warned that he is an incarhation of the Nomos-Logos, with enormous power as a result | for good or evil. He will only be à true prince as by philosophy he learns to use and direct this superhunian powet, The doctrine, go much favored by the Stoics, that the true king is the productof philosophy and vittue is all herd, but much bte is here as well. And the additional element, even to details of liiagery, is recognizably the philosophy of Ecphantus. | It seems tight, then, to conclude that the philosophy of royalty of Ecphantus was a thoroughly familiar, if not a pro: verbial, explanation of the royal office. A glance at the official titles of rulers in the period suggests the conclusion that it was the official philosophy of state as well. Much eüntested as is the meaning of these titles their generally increasitig popularity throughout the Hellenistic age is indisputable. Particularly the titles owrijp, dridarijs, and ebepyérys came to be almost fixed epithets of royalty. Important as was the religious significance of these, their universal use implies that they had an even greater political importance. But that they are all three explained fully, or adequately, in both a religious and a political sense by the material under discussion hardly needs elticidation. For while the title corp, for instance, implied that the king reptesented military protection and security to his subjects, certainly its iieahing is much enriched by Ecphantus’ conception of the kite as saviour of society, while its frequent jitztapositioh with drdarje is, so far as I am aware, here first clearly explaitied ;** the revelation of deity in the king is in itself the salvatioti of society.i# Similarly with other royal titles. Antiochus IV Eplplianes is called curfpos tis ‘Actas kal krérou rijs méÂeus (Babylot),!*5 atid the title xrlorys is applied, Collitz thinks pethaps ti the third eeti186 On tho king as "Eripards seo Pfister in Pauly-Wissowray Real-Enoyet., e tided in dits ferring dates for a philosophy from the date of the first ofilelal appentanes Supplementband IV (1924), 808, 807. Great caution must of a title. For example, if drigards ia first teed by Ptolemy V, who died 181; \ this does not mean that the king has not long beett thotight of sa debt drtpardt, but only that at this time it first occurs to the king to usé the word ds à royal epithet. The philosophy of royalty which lies behind thé word imdy, and . normally would, be centuries older than its use aa a title. i 187 The best discussion of the king og saviour is atitt Paul Woendidnd’s , Zuwrtp, in Zeitsch. f. d. neutestamentl, Wissenschaft:, V (1904), 886-858, Bub : see also Kampers, op. cit., and Kaerst, Geschichte des Hellentemtta, IT (1926), / 811 ff., especially the bibliography on page 811, #. 3, A donvetiont eollection of texts showing royal titles is In P. Wendland, Die hellentsttsch-rdmischd Kultur, 2d cd, 1912, pp. 406-411. 188 Dittenberg, Orientis Inser., 268, from Wendland, op. eit, p. 839; n. 6. - HELLENISTIO KINGSHIP © 99 tury, to Sosandrus by the little city of Latyia in Thessaly.i®® Wendland shows that the epithet, with others of Greek royalty, was commonly applied to Pompey, Theophanes, and Potamon, as well as to later Roman emperors. But it is only in terms of the conception of vójot Zupuxos that it is intelligible how the king could bé described is the creator of the state. For while the hero patron of a city was sometimes described as its ereator,i* this was à bit of traditional or mythological history which could hardly have been applied in the same sense to a contemporary king who was ruling over a city or country of great antiquity. But since as vépos tupvxos the king strictly speaking is himself the state, certainly it is correct to say that in him it is created. Similarly in ati inscription at Priene Augustus is described as dpx} 708 Alov kal tijs wijs, 4? a title which suggests the connection of the inystical doctrine of the power of the king in the personal lives of his subjects with the Augustan saviour speculation on which Norden has recently brilliantly written.’ In direct contrast, then, to the Stoic description of a king, the Diotogenes-Ecphantus philosophy of kingship not only harmonizes with, but brilliantly illuminates, the official royal epithets of the period. So that it is hard to see any grounds for rejecting the conclusions that a philosophy which was as widely known as this has proved to be, and which was fully in harmony with the official descriptions of royalty, and the only one known iso The declaration of a title by a city tnust not, as is usually done, be tegarded hs the conferring of a title, It was rather the recognition by the eity of the ruler’s character as being such as to justify the use of the titie. He was truly king, and the city acknowledged its allegiance to him, or his right to give it laws, by recognizing his right to use the titles owrdp, or krlarns, or tho like, His own use of the title on coins or inscriptions, aa his own conception of his powers, would bo quite unaffected by auch action on the part of a city. 140 Wendland, op. eit, pp. 340-942, It was Caesar'o task, according to Oleero (pro Marcello, 27); to found tho state anew and to give the world peace and quiet, 44: G, Horzog-Hauser, see op. cit. below, n. 143, p. 807. It is likely that the term originated, as Plaumann thinks in the case of Alezandrin, as the title used by eity-culte in the worship of their founders. Seo Gerhard Plaumann, ‘Probleme des alexandrinisehen Alexandercultes,’’ in the Archiv für Papyrusforschung, VI (1920), 77-09. But the later uses indicate an expansion of meaning beyond this original algnificance. 142 Wendland, op. cit, p. 344, , 148 Norden, Geburt des Kindes. On the worship of the king tho best disevsaion is that of CG, Herzog-Hauser in Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Enoyol., Bupplementband IV (1924), 800-853, with excellent bibliography passim and at the end,

to be in such harmony, was actually the official philosophy of kingship in the period. This is the philosophy of state which Salisbury with the statement: ‘Under a good prince it is not the prince himself who governs, but the law.’’ Similarly in Canon 100 101 thrust itself irresistibly upon the Romat imperator, It was only Law the Pope was called lex animate for his unique relation to religion of the empire which in the fourth cetituty deflected the ter was asserted or recognized has not been established.’ the Divine Law, though how generally his claim to such a characthe later influence of Christianity as the official or quasi-official Nomos-Logos into milder forms of expression.14 But still the In conclusion may I remind the reader that I have not attempted a history of the conception of kingship in the Hellenistic period. The Stoic data need going over again; the coins, the inanointed, to touch whom was itself sacrilege against deity, to say scriptions, Persian and Egyptian conceptions of royalty and the Measiah, these and much else need to be considered anew, while adoption of the full conception of the king ag the incarnäte king as the source of law, as the divinely appointed, the Lord’s — nothing of the ‘‘Roi Soleil," is a conception which has only the ideas of royalty in classical Greece should be analyzed much ceased to be of immediate importance to Westetti Europe in the last century, and which still represents the political philosophy of a large part of the human race, And even the phrase lex animatasurvived in the codes of both Civil and Caton Law, though more carefully than I have had space to do here. My purpose has simply been to point out a neglected body of material, in the light of which all this other evidence should be examined, and to indinot with the full meaning of the fragments we have been deseribing. But medieval political theorists called the true secular prince cate in some degree the importance of that new material, In brief, it has appeared that in politics the conception of the lex animata,“* and Gierke says of the medieval prince: ‘The essential difference between the principatus regalis and the pritcipatus politicus lies in this, that the latter is a responsible govking as himself the state, its constitution, and its link with the world otder seems early to have influenced the thinking of ernment according to the laws, while in the formef tho lex is in pectore regentis, wherefore he can at any time produce os law . from this living fount whatever seems expedient to him.” In 1169 John of Salisbury wrote: ‘‘Most properly that which pleases the Greeks, but tb have been developed to great significance only during the Hellenistic age. As represented in the figure of Animate Law it was first assimilated from the East into Greek thinking by the Pythagoreans. When they became interested in it, it prince therein (in legal matters) has the force of law, because his decision may not be at variance with the intention of is impossible to say. The fragments of Archytas may, of course, é genuine, as Delatte so brilliantly insists, which would make the Pythagorean speculation go back parallel to that of Xenophon, 244The Emperor Constantine is described as rdyos tuyvyos by Thomistius in Orat., V, 64b, XVI, 212d, from Delatte, p. 86. The idea is clearly imis not the case, actual proof either way is lacking, and the hypothesis of their early date is still entirely possible. But whether the Pythagoreans had earlier assimilated the material, or did so equity.’’#* ‘‘The will of the true ruler depends upon the law of God.’"*? Professor Dickenson sums up the position of John of Plato, and Aristotle. While I still am inclined to think that this plicit in Julian’s declaration ‘‘Imperatorem mitissimi animi legibus praestare caeteris decet.’? Ammianus Marcel., XVI, v, 12. But tho expression was apin the Hellenistic period, does not affect the fact that under Code, Nov. CV, ii, 4, It will be recalled that the same reticence attached itself long to the use of the term Bacıdedı. Bee Bréhier, ** L'Origino des titres of its Limitations, as Developed in tho Politicus of John of Salisbury,’ in Speculum, I, 335. parently too strong for Christians, for it reappears only once In the Justinian 148 John Dickenson, ‘‘The Medieval Conception of Kingship and Some imperiaux à Byzance,’’ in Bysantinische Zeitsch, KV (Leipzig, 1906), * 160-178, 449 The following statement occurs in Ulrich von Hutten’s Epistolae Viro- 1450, F, Gierke, Political Theories in the Middle Ages, p. 77, nnd p. 176, n. 264, ‘‘ The Prince stands in the middle between Natural Law and Positive; the latter receives its auctoritas from him, and he must adapt it to the . particular ease.?? 148 Politicus, iv, 1. Ut nichil sibi princeps Heere optnetut, quod a tustitiae aequitate discordet. Also, in loco: popolo nichtt ulilius est quam ut principte| necessitas expleatur; quippe cum seo uoluntas eius frislitios inuentatur aduersa, Est ergo, ut eum plerique diffiniunt, princeps potestas publica et in terris quaedam diuinae maiestatis imago, 147 Ibid,, viii, 22. . rum Obscurorum II, 6: Et Papa non est sub lege, sed ipse est lex animata in terris, ut habetur in glosa super capitu xt, de off. Jud, del. Et si Papa est lex, potest facere quid vult et neminem respicere. Et quamvis semel dizit tegta,'* tamen posted potest dicere ‘‘non.’’ The reference has been traced by Stokes in his edition of the Epistolae, in loco, to tho Corpus juris canonict, Sexti Decretal. Lib. I, Tit, xiv, De Officio et Potest. Judieis Delogat. c. 11, gloss. Yale has unfortunately no copy of the Corpus Juris Canon. with the medieval glosses, so I have been unable to check the reference, But Gierko quotes (loc. cit., n, 265) Boniface VIII as saying of the Pope: qui dura omnia in scrinio pectoris cehsetur habere.

gent slots a great beeti the officlal politea philosophy ofiu Hal ea though ‘so:müeh has ad te be’ * disétiéston, this philosophy of royaltywill