Monotheism and pagan philosophy in later antiquity

ASDA FALSE ‚I: 2 Monotheism and Pagan Philosophy in Later Antiquity MICHAEL FREDE There is a temptation to think that one thing which ultimately distinguished Christians from pagans in antiquity was that the Christians, following the Jews, believed in one God, whereas the pagans believed in many gods. Sometimes this is expressed by saying that the Christians were monotheists, while the pagans were polytheists. Obviously, even in antiquity, Christians were tempted to present matters as if they believed in one God, whereas the pagans believed in many gods. This is the way matters are presented, for instance, by Marius Victorinus. Marius Victorinus in his short treatise De homoousio recipiendo, a few lines into the first paragraph, says: "The Greeks, whom they call Hellenes or pagans, talk of many gods. the Jews or Hebrews of one, but we, as truth and grace have come later, against the pagans talk of one God, against the Jews of the Father and the Son.’ It seems to me that both the Christian and the pagan positions are a good deal more complex than this simple contrast would suggest. But in what follows I will not discuss the position or the positions of the pagans in late antiquity generally, but focus on the vast majority of philosophers in late antiquity. | will argue that, as far as the question whether there is one God or whether there are many gods is concerned, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between the Christian position and the position of Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, and their followers in later antiquity and thus the vast majority of philosophers in late antiquity. However, before we look at the Platonists, the Peripatetics, and the Stoics, let us very briefly consider the other major groups of philosophers in later and late antiquity. The Epicureans had no difficulty in believing in any number of gods. But it was crucial for them to insist that we and these gods have nothing

to do with each other, that these gods have not the slightest inclination sible to know. But, given that there are cults with an „> ic? tradition, it to destroy their bliss by meddling in human affairs, even if they could seems most reasonable to believe in and worship the :::*: "these tradiinterfere, and that hence it is completely irrational to believe that we tional cults. Against this Minucius Felix has Octavius -r;ue that, looking have anything to fear from them, in this or a supposed afterlife, or that we could expect any help from them or could gain their benevolence by worshipping them. The existence of the gods is simply irrelevant to our at the world and the way it is organized, it seems much more reasonable lives. This critical attitude of the Epicureans in religious matters must this dialogue. One thing to note is that, if we set aside Epicureanism, have contributed significantly to their extinction in late antiquity. whose adherents did not worship any gods, the position espoused by There is little of substance to say about the Cynics, except perhaps that they apparently tended to reject traditional religion. Demonax was 43 to believe in one God who providentially governs the universe. There are various things which are noteworthy or even puzzling about Caecilius is the only philosophical or at least philosophically inspired position in late antiquity I am aware of which reasonably straightaccused of impiety for refusing to worship Athena, and Oenomaus forwardly corresponds to our conception of polytheism. Caecilius does criticized the oracles, but also sorcery. believe in and worship many traditional gods, in part precisely because Then there were the Sceptics, first the Academics and then the his scepticism, however mitigated it may be, prevents him from Pyrrhoneans. It was part of their radical scepticism not only to think that know what to believe about them. So in this sense they certainly did not committing himself to a more theoretical, more speculative conception of matters divine. In this he is completely unrepresentative of the attitude of philosophers in late antiquity, but, I suspect, also of the general believe in any gods, let alone in many gods. Some of them, though, like attitude of the educated elite at least in the East. Platonists, Peripatetics, Sextus Empiricus, thought that this was perfectly compatible with and Stoics all took the position Octavius tries to persuade Caecilius of, namely that there is one God who providentially governs the universe. they did not know the truth concerning the gods, but even not to worshipping the gods of one’s forefathers. Given that one had to do something—either to continue in joining the cult of the traditional gods Now the phrase ‘belief in one God who governs the universe’ hides a of one’s community or to refuse to do so—and given that reason offered no guidance one way or the other, it seemed most sensible simply to certain ambiguity, and one might argue that everything turns on this ambiguity. One might argue that the Platonists, the Peripatetics, and the continue to do what everybody in one’s community since times Stoics believe in one highest god who governs the universe, but that they immemorial had been doing. also believe in many other gods. By contrast, one will say, the Christians But there were also representatives of a form of mitigated scepticism, believe in one and only one God, namely the being which governs the introduced into the Academy by Philo of Larissa and Metrodorus, whose universe. And one will rightly insist that to believe in one highest god is most familiar representative isCicero, Through Cicero’s later influence not the same as to believe in one God, even if this highest god should be in the Latin world, especially among those in the Latin world who had conceived of in such a lofty fashion as to be thought of as governing the little or no direct access to Greek thought, this mitigated form of sceptiwhole universe. cism also continued to find its adherents long after it had been given up But the matter, primarily for two reasons, is more complicated than by philosophers. Augustine, for instance, was attracted to it for many this. In the first place, the Platonists, the Peripatetics, and the Stoics do years. A sceptic of this kind would still insist that we do not know the not just believe in one highest god, they believe in something which they truth about the gods, but he would think that his scepticism was must take to be unique even as a god. For they call it ‘God’ or even ‘the perfectly compatible with the assumption that one had some rational God’, as if in some crucial way it was the only thing which deserved to justification for believing certain things, for instance, for believing that be called ‘god’. If, thus, they also believe that there are further beings there are certain divine beings. which can be called ‘divine’ or ‘god’, they must have thought that Minucius Felix in his Octavius, a dialogue between a pagan and a these further beings could be called ‘divine’ only in some less strict, Christian in which the pagan is won over to Christianity, represents the diminished, or derived sense. Second, the Christians themselves speak pagan Caecilius as holding a position of such mitigated scepticism. not only of the one true God, but also of a plurality of beings which can Caecilius argues that the truth in matters divine is hidden and impos-. ' e.g. Plotinus, Enn. 6. 8. à, line 19 in conjunction with lines 1 and 6.

be called ‘divine’ or ‘god’; for instance, the un-fallen angels or redeemed ‘medieval interpretatio Christiana’. The suggestion is that Aristotle and saved human beings. could not be speaking of one God, since the issue of whether god is one I will return later to the Christian position and to a comparison between it and the position of our philosophers. We have to consider 45 or many arises only with Judaism and Christianity. To begin with a minute point, we find here the re ‘= association first the position of these philosophers in more detail. Their theology— of Christianity with the Middle Ages, as if Chr':t::'; were not a even in its, for our purposes, most crucial respects—is a vast and comthoroughly ancient phenomenon, one without wl:i:*. «ivi 1ity would plicated subject, and my discussion will therefore be determined more not be fully understood, and one which would not be i:!!y understood, than I would like by considerations of expediency of exposition, mainly at least historically, without understanding its origir: * of brevity. As a matter of such expediency I begin by considering is a more important point, namely the close ass“: :.}ui: made here Aristotle’s position. As is well known, Aristotle in the Metaphysics is concerned to identify ::'‘‘uity. There between monotheism and Judaism or Christianity, 75 if one had to be confronted with Judaism or Christianity to think of the possibility, and the ultimate principles of what there is. Metaphysics Lambda, preconceive of a reason, to assume that there is just one god. This is sumably originally an independent treatise, makes a fresh start in this obviously mistaken. Antisthenes for instance, as the Christians were well endeavour. It is also well known that Aristotle elsewhere, but in particuaware, claimed that in reality there is just one god. lar in Metaphysics Lambda, identifies as one of these first principles It is also untrue that this is exclusively the medieval Christian inter- (indeed in some sense as the first principle) the so-called unmoved pretation of Aristotle; it is already the ancient pagan learned undermover. On this principle, he claims in A7, 1072°13-14, the heaven and the standing of Aristotle. And this is not surprising, as it so obviously is the whole of nature depend. He goes on to refer to this principle as 6 eds, correct interpretation. Aristotle begins his argument in A6 with the ‘the God’ (107225, 28-9, 30). This is what tradition came to regard as assumption that, since time does not have a beginning or an end, there Aristotle’s God. This traditional interpretation, however, has been rejected by Ingemar must be something which always has been and always will be moving in a circle. He goes on to argue that this never-ending motion can only be Düring, and since these objections are highly relevant to our concerns, explained if we assume that there is something which itself is not subject we should take time to consider them. Düring claims that 6 @eés here to motion or change and which causes this motion. But it would be a cannot refer to a single and unique god, but must be referring to the mistake to assume that this is Aristotle’s argument for the so-called whole class of divine beings; Aristotle is supposed to use the phrase unmoved mover. It is just an argument which purports to show that ‘the god’ collectively, just as one might talk about ‘the French farmer’ or there must be objects which unceasingly are in motion and that such a ‘the tax-payer’, not referring to a single and unique individual, but to motion in each case has to be explained in terms of an eternal object any and every number of a group of persons, or to them as a group which itself is not in motion. In fact, it turns out in chapter 8, as Aristotle (p. 214). To assume otherwise, Diiring argues (p. 219), is to fall prey to a hinted in chapter 6, 1071°20-2, that there are quite a number of such eternally moving objects, and hence quite a number of such unmoved grievous anachronism, namely to suppose that Aristotle was concerned movers. What Aristotle primarily is concerned to show is not that such with the issue of monotheism versus polytheism. He quotes Eduard eternally moving objects have a certain kind of principle and explana- Meyer who remarks that the Greeks were interested in the question tion, but that there is one unique principle which is a principle of everywhether there are gods, but hardly in the question whether there is one thing there is, and in this sense the principle of everything there is. He or whether there are many gods.’ He goes on to claim that to assume that does so by showing in the second part of chapter 6 and in chapter 7 that Aristotle is talking of one God when he speaks of ‘the god’ is to follow a there is one object which eternally moves in a circle on whose motion the motions of all other eternally moving objects—and indeed all other 2 1. Düring, Aristotle (Heidelberg, 1966). 3 This, incidentally, is a point often repeated in the literature, e.g. by Guthrie in his comments on Xenophanes (W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, i (Cambridge, 1962), 375). motions and changes—depend, namely the heaven of the fixed stars. It follows, given what he has argued at the beginning of chapter 6, that this motion can only be explained in terms of an unmoved mover. It is this

first unmoved mover which he then goes on in chapter 7 to identify as earth, air, fire, and water do not in themselves suffice to explain the the God. existence of an object, let alone its behaviour. An object which behaves 47 It should be obvious that it is difficult enough to follow Aristotle in the in a certain way must have a certain structure or organization imposed assumption that the motions of the heavenly spheres each require an on its material constituents. It is only because the material is thus unmoved mover. It is impossible to see why Aristotle should compound organized that the object thus constituted can behave in its characteristic his difficulties by assuming that there are any number of gods who are way. Moreover, one might think, it takes somethir | involved in moving the one first heaven of the fixed stars. Indeed, impose this structure or order on the material. Ais) «31:2 right finally amebody to Aristotle explains at 8, 1074736—7 why this first mover has to be numerithink that at least in some cases the behaviour of an c;20! is io be undercally one, rather than just one kind of thing, possibly instantiated by any stood in terms of the end it tries or is meant to achi 7, number of things. He also explains (e.g. 10, 1075*11) that the relation aims at. Against this background we readily us"? :0»d Socrates’ the good it between God and the world is rather like that of a general to his army: it remarks in the methodological section in Plato's ‘‘4géo. Socrates is a good general who makes for a good army, rather than the other way complains that natural philosophers talk as if one ““uld understand round. The simile does not make much sense, unless we assume that Socrates’ behaviour in terms of his physical constituents. And he reports Aristotle thinks of the God as an individual. For though there are many how delighted he was when he first heard of Anaxagoras’ theory of a armies and perhaps some good armies and hence some good generals, cosmic intellect, only to be bitterly disappointed when he found out that there is just one world which, if we follow Aristotle, needs one God. Nor Anaxagoras, having introduced such an intellect, then continued to does the final sentence of Met. A (1076*3-4) make any sense on Düring’s explain the world in terms of its material constituents. interpretation ‘What there is does not want to be governed badly’ (ov«. ayador toAvKotpavin: els Kotpavos). Hence, I conclude that when Aristotle talks about ‘the God’ he does For our purposes it suffices to point out that it lies in the very nature of the enterprise in which Thales, Anaximander, and later philosophers were engaged that, sooner or later, somebody would claim, and that not use the phrase in that vague sense we sometimes find in classical many would follow him in claiming, that to explain the world we not times in which it might be used interchangeably with 76 8eïov and of #eot only need some ultimate material principle or principles but also an to refer to a vaguely conceived divine source of the order of things. On agent who imposes an order on this material. It is in this spirit that Plato the contrary, Aristotle does mean to talk about one particular being in the Timaeus introduces a demiurge who, looking at the forms or which governs the world. There must be some deep-rooted prejudice ideas, imposes the order determined or defined by the ideas on matter, a at work, if one wants to deny this in the face of all the evidence to the position later doxography summarizes by saying that according to Plato contrary. But Aristotle’s text also allows us to see a crucial point which Düring seems to miss entirely, namely. why, long before the issue of monothere are three principles: God, the ideas, and matter. And it is for similar reasons that the Stoics say that there are two ultimate principles, an active and a passive one, God and matter. theism versus polytheism arose, Greek philosophers had very good It also lies in the very nature of the enterprise that one tries to explain reason to assume that there is one unique God who is the, or an, ultimate the world in terms of as few principles as possible. The principles themprinciple of what there is. Aristotle quite rightly thinks that philosophy selves, moreover, must be such that they themselves do not stand in need from its very beginnings had consisted in an attempt to identify the of further explanation. For they are supposed to constitute the final principles of reality and to explain whatever there is in terms of answer to any question. Given this, it would ruin the whole enterprise to these. Aristotle in the Metaphysics also points out quite rightly that assume more than one principle which is divine, unless there turns out philosophers originally identified these principles with the ultimate to be some special reason for this. A pressure is generated by the very material constituents of things, in terms of which they then tried to nature of the enterprise to have either no God or a God whose postulaexplain the phenomena. But it is also not surprising that some philotion has enough explanatory power for there to be no need to postulate sophers should have thought that an explanation just in terms of further gods as ultimate active principles. Having a number of them elementary or basic material constituents was bound to fail: some bits of would create immediate pressure to try to reduce them to an ulterior

single divine principle. Thus, if one does postulate an intelligent agent as an ultimate principle at all, one will try to postulate a unique, single agent of sufficient power, unless there are overwhelming considerations unmoved mover as a divine being. But to the extent that we regard a god to the contrary. This will be done for the same reason as one will try to get away with postulating fire as one element, rather than a whole number of irreducibly different kinds of fire. Hence, though it is perfectly true that Aristotle did not have to concern himself with the question of monotheism versus polytheism, he, like Plato before him and philosophers like the Stoics after him, had a precise reason to assume that there was one particular, individual, active principle which 49 not only as a living, intelligent being which is immortal and enjoys eternal bliss, but also as a source of order and goodness, and as of some power, the first unmoved mover also, in this regard, has a not only very elated but a unique status. As the principle of everything it is, according to Aristotle, the ultimate source of all order and goodness in the world. And Aristotle explicitly aattributes unlimited power to it. So when Aristotle talks about the God, he means one particular divine being whose status, even as a divine being, is so unique that it can be called ‘the God’. We may ask why such an activeprinciple should be regarded as divine. It is perhaps not entirely inappropriate to dwell on this point for a moment. Any theory which postulates one divine being as a first Here it will be relevant that even the first Philosophers of nature, when principle automatically puts the status of all other beings one may want they tried to explain how everything had arisen out of such stuff as their arche or their archai, used the language appropriate to the divine for their first principles. Presumably this has something to do with the fact that their accounts were meant to replace creation stories. Second, it lies in the nature of a first principle, as the philosophers quickly came to see, that it is not subject to generation and corruption itself and hence in this sense is immortal. Third, an active principle was seen as an intelligent, indeed wise, agent, being not only immortal but also, in his wisdom, not beset by the troubles and confusions we mortals suffer from and thus enjoying a life of never-ending bliss. Tellingly, it is only after Aristotle in to call ‘divine’ into a perspective in which their divinity appears limited, subordinate, derived. So, for instance, the traditional gods will appear at governs the world. A7 has explained that his first unmoved mover is an intellect enjoying an eternal life of bliss that he identifies him as the God (107224-30). It may be noted in passing that Aristotle seems to go out of his way to characterize this divine principle as a living, thinking being. This should best as very derivative beings with a highly subordinate role to play in the general order of things. Indeed, given the way philosophers conceive of the order of things and the derivation of subordinate beings from first principles, no philosopher accepts the traditional gods as they are traditionally represented. Aristotle, for instance, at the end of chapter 8 of Metaphysics Lambda explains that the traditional stories about the gods are due to the fact that our ancestors grasped that nature is governed by the divine and that there are gods, namely immaterial substances, but that they cast these simple truths inte the form of the traditional myths. Otherwise ordinary people woul .. . re accepted these simple truths. Their beliefin these traditional ...:i-s 21:9 serves an important social function, for instance in that it xx pe ple more be enough to set aside another prejudice, namely, the view that, though ancient pagan thought may have moved in the direction of postulating one supreme God, this God was conceived of more as an abstract principle than as a concrete person. There is nothing impersonal about inclined to abide by the laws. Even if the order of thins: -:. isaged leaves Aristotle’s God, or the God of the Stoics, or the God of Numenius or the relation between a first principle and those things which depend on room for beings which can be called ‘divine’, it is giar t+! ¿hey will be so fundamentally derivative and subordinate to ‘*: God that, for instance, talk of a ‘highest God’ is in some ways quite tnideading: For Plotinus. the principle involves a much more radical subordination than that What we have said explains why Aristotle regards the first unmoved mover as a god; it also explains why he regards the first unmoved move as a unique individual. We need numerically only one item in our involved in a pantheon or hierarchy of gods with one god at the apex. A ontology to fulfil the role of a first principle of this kind, and, in the absence of particular reasons to the contrary, there does not seem any place or justification for more than one item of this kind. And this already in itself goes some way to explain the special status of the first fortiori, the analogy with Zeus is somewhat misleading. The relation between the first principle and other divine beings is quite unlike the relation between Zeus and, for instance, the other Olympian gods, It would be quite misleading to say that somebody who believes in one divine first principle and five further divine beings believes in six gods. To say this would be to disregard the categorial difference between first

principles and the things derived from them. This becomes particularly clear if we consider the Platonist position. The demands Platonists tend to make on first principles are so stringent that most Platonists come to insist that God cannot be regarded as a being, let alone as a further being, as one further item on a list of things which are. Hence, if one talks of a first principle as ‘the God’, and yet allows for other things to be called ‘god’, the predicate ‘god’ here will not be used in the same way or sense. It is for this reason that Aristotle can call the first unmoved mover ‘the God’ and then go on to talk of other beings as gods, as if there were no conflict. There is no conflict because the way the first principle is a god Monotheism and Pagan Philosophy 51 I have discussed Aristotle in some detail, because he offers us in Metaphisics Lambda a short text on the basis of which we can establish and understand the relevant points with considerable confidence. Once we have understood the crucial points in his case, it is also much easier to see them in the case of Stoicism and Platonism, though the evidence to be taken into account there is much more complex and controversial. Since Platonism raises a further problem relevant to our inquiry, I will begin with the Stoics. According to the Stoics there are two ultimate principles, an active and a passive one, God (or the God), and matter. There is a controversial is unique. problem of interpretation here which I will not try to resolve. Given the Given that it is clear that there is a substantial sense in which Aristotle believes in one God, though there are many other things he is prepared to call ‘divine’, let us briefly consider these. Having introduced the first unmoved mover in A6-7 as a substance which is not subject to any kind of change, but rather is the ultimate source or principle of all change, Aristotle in chapter 8 turns to the question whether there are other substances which also are not subject to any change and, if so, how many they are. He argues that we have to postulate forty-seven spheres to account for the motion of the planets, the divine bodies, as he calls them (107430), and that hence there must be forty-seven further substances which are not subject to change to account for the never-ending rotation of these spheres. It is these substances which, in 1074°2-3, he calls ‘gods’. So, apart from the first unmoved mover, he also calls the unmoved movers of the planetary spheres, and thus of the planets, ‘divine’. It is easy to see why he does so. It is part of the order of the universe which depends on the first unmoved mover that there be immaterial substances, pure unembodied minds who, being immortal, enjoy eternal bliss contemplating the first unmoved mover and the order which depends on him. But it is also part of the order of the universe that there be planets which eternally move in the same way, not to be derailed from their steady path by passion, and which thereby can be seen to be superbly intelligent and wise beings which are equally immortal and enjoy eternal bliss. Obviously there are great difficulties in understanding the details of this, but the main point for us seems rather simple and straightforward. On Aristotle’s view of the world it is part of the order of things determined by the God that there be intelligent, living beings which are not subject to generation or corruption and which enjoy a life way God and matter are contrasted, one might think that God is conof eternal bliss. This alone, given ordinary Greek usage, suffices to call them ‘divine’. ceived of as immaterial. But the Stoics not only think that all beings are material or corporeal, they also, more specifically, identify God or Zeus with a certain kind of fire which is supposed to beintelligent, active, and creative. So perhaps we have to assume that the Stoics distinguish two aspects of the fiery substance which is Zeus, two aspects, though, which in reality are never separated, namely its divine, creative character, and its material character. Thus God and Zeus are the same to the extent that Zeus is active, creative, intelligent. Now the Stoics also believe that the world is a rational animal that periodically turns entirely into the fiery substance which is Zeus. What happens is that the reason of this animal is itself constituted by this fiery substance, and that this reason slowly consumes and absorbs into itself the soul and the body of the world. Thus, in this state of conflagration, the world, the reason of the world, and Zeus completely coincide. But as soon as the conflagration has taken place, Zeus, the creative fiery substance. sets out to create the world anew, or, put differently, the reason of the world creates for itself a new soul and a new body. Zeus does so by partially turning himself first into air and then through air into water and ultimately into earth and, again, fire, while at the same time completely pervading these newly created elements, mixing them and mixing with them in such a way as to shape them into the world as we know it. As part of this process the stars arise which consist of this divine fiery substance and human beings which are governed by reason, which also involves a high concentration of the fiery substance. Some Stoics believe that this human reason, if perfected, has enough stability to survive the death of a human being, only to be reabsorbed into Zeus or cosmic reason at the next conflagration. The details of this are complicated or even controversial, but the points which concern us stand out clearly enough. On this view of the

world there is one intelligent being which governs the world and which justify them as true, though perhaps veiled, accounts. This tradition the alone survives all of its changes, including the periodic conflagrations. It Stoics take up and carry to an extreme. They see these traditional stories 52 53 alone is eternal. All other beings are the product of its providential about the gods as veiled accounts of the truth as explicated by Stoic creation. So we readily understand that it, being a first principle in physics. So they will identify each of the traditional gods with some this way, should be called the God. That this for the Stoics means that, entity in true physics, Zeus with the creative fire, Hera with air, Poseidon strictly speaking, there is just one God is made clear also by the followwith water, etc. They will account for the divinity of the stars in terms of ing detail. Plutarch (De comm. not. 1051 E-F) reports that everybody is in their being constituted by the divine fiery substance. They might, in agreement that a god is not subject to generation and destruction, and particular, account for the divinity of the sun as the seat of the divine he then specifically quotes Antipater of Tarsus for the Stoic view that the reason which governs the world, analogous to the heart which, accordnatural notion of a god is one according to which a god is enjoying a life ing to the Stoics, is the seat of the hegemonikon of a human being, i.e. its of bliss, is not subject to destruction, and is provident for, or beneficent reason. They might account for the quasi-divinity of the souls, or rather of, human beings. On the basis of this he accuses Chrysippus of contraminds, of the departed who have achieved wisdom and virtue in terms dicting himself when he claims that fire or Zeus alone among the gods is of their high proportion of the fiery substance which gives them the not subject to destruction (1052a; De comm. not. 1077£), whereas the stability to continue to live the life of the mind until the conflagration. other gods are consumed by the fire in the general conflagration. But it The crucial point in all this is that the Stoics see themselves able, by is also clear how the apparent inconsistency is to be resolved. We also virtue of their theory, to accommodate popular beliefs concerning the learn from Plutarch (De comm. not. 1075 c) that the Stoics distinguish gods, That they do so does not mean, though, that they accept these between ‘not subject to destruction’ and ‘not subject to death’ or stories and the corresponding religious beliefs at face value, and it does ‘immortal’. This allows them to say that Zeus alone is not subject to not mean that they are prepared to compromise their belief in one God, destruction, but that the other gods are at least immortal in that they last the God who providentially governs the universe. It is very clear in their till the conflagration, when they do not die, but are reabsorbed by Zeus. case, even more so than in Aristotle’s, that these further divine beings are Nevertheless, this clearly means that only Zeus satisfies the criterion for radically dependent on the God and only exist because they have a place being a god fully, whereas all other gods only satisfy the criterion by not in the divine order of things. Far from governing the universe or having insisting on strict indestructibility, but by accepting a weak form of any independent share in its governance, they only share in the execuimmortality. It is only in this diminished sense that things other than tion of the divine plan; they are not even immortal, strictly speaking. Zeus can be called ‘god’. More importantly, though, these other gods Theirs is a rather tenuous divinity. only exist because the God has created them as part of his creation of the best possible world, in which they are meant to play a certain role. The When we come to the Platonists, matters for a variety of reasons are | more complicated, too complicated to do justice here even to all the power they thus have is merely the power to do what the God has fated major details. Let us begin with the view concerning first principles, them to do. They act completely in accordance with the divine plan. which later doxography ascribes to Plato. According to Plato the first Given this radical subordination one may ask why the Stoics are principles are supposed to be God, the ideas, and matter. The report prepared in the first instance to accommodate a plurality of gods by clearly is based on the Timaeus, according to which the world is created the questionable manceuvre of attributing a rather tenuous form of by a demiurge who realizes the intelligible order defined by the ideas in immortality to them. Here we have to take note of a significant shift in an antecedently given matter to the extent that this is possible. This the attitude towards traditional stories about the gods. As we saw, creation not only includes the stars but also the soul of the world and the Aristotle was only willing to acknowledge that these stories had a minisouls of human beings. Now one crucial element of the account is that mal element of truth, which truth was presented in mythical form both the beings which have been created by the demiurge directly, having to make it acceptable to ordinary people and also because of the social been created, are not by their very nature eternal, but are granted utility of popular belief in the truth of these stories. By Aristotle's time immortality by the demiurge who promises to see to it that they will not there was also a tradition of reinterpreting these stories allegorically to face death and destruction (Tim. 41 a). This allows Plato to talk not only

of the world (34 A, 8), on his view a living intelligent animal, but also of a plurality of intellects. For each idea is a divine thought, and each the planets (similarly intelligent beings) and certain beings or powers thought is an intellect. And yet the divine intellect is not supposed to lose which reveal themselves in the workings of the world as gods. So there is its unity as one intellect. So the one God turns out to be many things, without thereby losing his unity. Instead of pursuing this, though, I want 54 one God, but there are also other beings which are called ‘divine’, though they are created, because they are by Divine grace immortal and enjoy a good life. But they only exist as part of God's creation and they are immortal and hence divine only due to the God’s benevolence or grace, that is to say they owe their very divinity to God. So far, then, the Platonist account, in its essential features, is very much like that of Aristotle and that of the Stoics. In late antiquity, though, this account becomes much more complex in the following way. The one God of the Timaeus, the demiurge, comes himself increasingly to be seen as something of considerable internal complexity, a complexity according to later Platonists only hinted at in 55 to consider one detail concerning the divine intellect. According to the Timaeus the rational part of the soul is created by the demiurge himself and thus immortal by divine grace. But Plotinus and others consider the possibility that there are ideas, not only of kinds of things, but in the case of man also of individual men. So these will be intellects, too. This raises the question whether the individual human intellect may not be part of the divine intellect insofar as the divine intellect contains the idea of the individual human being. In any case, Platonists generally assume that the human intellect is part of the intelligible rather than the sensible world. And this introduces a lack of clarity as to whether there are two the Timaeus, for instance when Plato speaks of the world as an agalma of creations or just one, whether part of the intelligible world is already the eternal gods, as if there were a plurality of truly divine beings of created. which the creation is a reflection. The reasons for this are easy to see. If we think of the demiurge as However this may be, we see that the God who creates, according to later Platonists, in truth reveals an internal structure and multiplicity being constrained by the ideas as something antecedently given to him, which allows us to talk not only of uncreated gods, but also of any this in itself, combined with the complexity introduced into him by number of gods which are created but proceed from the first principle. assuming that he tries to realize these ideas in the visible world, seems to But this plurality is not supposed to affect the unity of God. After all, the divine intellect is just the intellect of God, the way God presents himself be incompatible with his status as an absolutely first principle. Hence we see that Platonists begin to distinguish between God (the first principle) in thought. Hence, though the Platonists can talk of many gods, at the and the divine intellect (mind or reason, which will be identified with the level both of created and of uncreated beings, this is not supposed to ideas as the thoughts of the divine intellect). Once we come to Numenius undermine the belief that there is one God. and to Plotinus we have a further distinction between the divine intellect To sum up our discussion so far. There is a clear sense in which Platonists, Peripatetics, and Stoics and thus the vast majority of philowhich is purely contemplative and a third divine principle which is demiurgic or creative. Thus Numenius can talk of a first and of a second sophers in late antiquity believed in one God. They believed in a god who God and, by implication, of a third God. But Platonists after Plotinus not only enjoys eternal bliss, but in a god who as a god is unique in think they can articulate this trinity further. that he is a first principle which determines and provi? ‘“-Ily governs reality. There are, as part of the divinely imposed .:.:. of things, In spite of this vertical articulation of the God into a first God, a thus introduced is not supposed to obscure the fact that we are just dealderivative beings which also enjoy immortality and bt: a4 which, hence, following Greek usage, are also called ‘divine’. E::: li: the case of ing with different hypostases of the one God. The second God, very Plato’s and the Stoics created gods even this immert:""*: exists only roughly put, is simply the first God who in himself is beyond being and through divine benevolence and, for the Stoics, is net =‘ ‘: second God, and a third God and further subarticulations, the plurality intelligibility, but reveals himself at the level of being and thinking as the genuine immortality. The fact that they assume the existence «f such divine divine intellect. Thus the vertical articulation is supposed to preserve the beings does not in the least conflict with their belief in one God. This unity of the one God. What is true of his vertical articulation also is true simple picture is complicated in the case of late Platonists by their belief of a certain horizontal articulation. Consider the divine intellect. It is identified with the Platonic ideas. It is thus a plurality of things, indeed in uncreated gods. Though they are completely subordinated to the first principle they are nevertheless divine in a much more powerful sense

than the secondary created gods we have been considering. This reflects the fact that they are so intimately connected with the first principle as to be articulations of what is already contained in it. But for this very reason belief in them would surely threaten the belief in one God as little as the belief in God’s justice or God’s wisdom would threaten the belief in one God who is absolutely simple. I want to conclude this part of my argument by referring to at least some of the evidence which indicates not only that the vast majority of usually assume that there is a god, the God, who is the most important 56 57 cause or principle of reality and who is provident. And this God would not be conceived of as just the highest of a plurality of gods, but as unique in his divinity, as the expression ‘the God’ shows. We get the same impression from many other texts, for instance from Justin’s Dialogue with Trypho. Trypho, a Jewish refugee from the war in Palestine, has been attending the lectures of a philosopher. Questioned by Justin as to whether he really expects to draw the kind of enlighten- | philosophers in antiquity believed in one God who providentially ment from philosophy one gets from Moses and the prophets, Trypho governs the universe, but that this is also what they were perceived to believe by the ancients themselves. In later antiquity there were two basic issues for theology: namely, whether there is a God who governs the universe and whether God is provident. Stoics, Peripatetics, and Platonists, and thus the vast majority of philosophers, answered both questions affirmatively, whereas Epicureans answered them negatively. These also are the only theological issues which Sextus Empiricus at the end of the second century AD addresses in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism. He does so in the context of considering the views of the dogmatic philosophers concerning the principles and causes of reality (3. 1 ff.). Dogmatic philosophers, according to Sextus, distinguish between active and passive or material principles. They claim that the active principles are more important, or ‘may be more justly called ‘principles’, than the material ones. And the majority of philosophers, he says (3. 2), claim that the most important active principle is a God, or, as he also puts it (3. 3, 4, 5, 6), the God. He then attacks this view arguing that it is quite unclear how we are supposed to conceive of a god and that, moreover, it is quite unclear whether there is such a thing as a god. He then goes on to consider the question whether we should think of a god as provident for the things in this world (3. 9ff.). Here he adduces Epicurean arguments against providence. He concludes his remarks in this way (3. 12): answers, ‘Don’t the philosophers talk all the time about God and do not As a result of this we come to think that perhaps those who insist on claiming that there is a god are forced to be impious. For in claiming that he is provident about all things they will be saying that he is the cause of all evil, but if they claim that he is provident only about some things or nothing, they will be forced to say either that the God lacks good will or is weak; yet obviously only people who are impious will say this. So Sextus’ discussion, to say the very least, strongly suggests that at the end of the second century ap, if you were a philosopher you would their enquiries always concern divine monarchy and providence?’ (1. 3). Justin’s response (1. 4) is less enthusiastic. He agrees, but complains that the great majority of philosophers have not sufficiently considered the question whether there is one God or whether there are many, and whether divine providence extends down to each individual among us or whether, as some philosophers argue (he has Aristotle in mind), is limited to the general order of things. Yet even Justin’s criticism confirms that the vast majority of philosophers in the later second century AD believe in one God who governs the universe and vw” * ~rovident to some degree. What Justin’s response also shows is . '. has some difficulty appreciating the distinction between the ser::: i.- :-" . .h there is one God and the sense in which there are many god:, :. .‘ "st that he sees some lack of clarity in this distinction. Justin’s r:::°":* may also reflect the fact that the distinction was not always sufí. *-* '” lear to the pagans. Before I turn to the Christians, it must be at least briefly noted that there was a further source of confusion. Both Stoics and Platonists assumed that the world above the earth was filled with demons. Not all of them were divine. Some of them were far from living a life of bliss, because they were far from being wise and virtuous, if not outright malevolent. Nevertheless, they might have extraordinary powers and knowledge, for instance, about the future. If one knew how to do it, one could, because of their weaknesses, manipulate them to exercise these powers for one’s own benefit or to reveal their knowledge. This line between good demons and questionable demons, or rather the line between enrolling the help of good demons and manipulating questionable demons, was not so easy to draw. If we now turn to the Christian view, it should be clear that the position Minucius Felix’ Octavius converts Caecilius to, namely, the belief in one God who providentially governs the world, does not differ

from the belief of most pagan philosophers, But, one might argue, the difference is that the Christians only believe in the one god who providentially governs the world, whereas the pagans also believe in many other gods. 1 have already tried to explain that this is a prejudicial and misleading way to put the matter: the pagans believe in one God, but also in further beings which, for reasons which are easy to understand, they also are willing to call ‘divine’, without thereby wanting to deny that Monotheism and Pagan Philosophy 59 It is often assumed that the philosopher in question, in fact, is Porphyry.* What speaks in favour of this hypothesis, among many other things, is that Augustine in De civ. Dei (9. 23) seems to respond to the same point, and, indeed, to agree that it is just a matter of terminology whether one calls these beings ‘gods’, provided that they are wise and virtuous. Augustine says: there is a strict sense in which there is one and only one God. But we If the Platonists prefer to call these ‘gods’ rather than ‘daemons’ and to count should not overlook that the Christians themselves, in fact, did not differ them among those of whom their founder and master Plato writes that they are from the pagans in being willing to acknowledge a sense in which there are further beings which can be called ‘gods’. Though the Christians in general avoided speaking of gods in the plural (in particular the West had difficulties with the plural, both in the gods created by the highest God, let them say what they want. For one should not engage with them in a controversy of words. For if they say that they are not blessed by themselves, but by being attached to him who has created them, then they say precisely what we say, whichever word they may use for them. .. . For even as far as the word is concerned, that they call creatures which are immortal case of the Trinity, and in general; cf. Synod of Rome 382, Tomus and blessed in this way ‘gods’, this is not really a matter of disagreement between Damasi, $24, Denzinger 176) there were doctrinal reasons which made it us and them. difficult for them to deny that even created beings could be called ‘divine’ or ‘gods’. After all, there was scriptural authority for this. Scripture, Psalms for instance, is full of references to the gods in the plural, for example in such phrases as ‘the God of the gods’ (Ps. 49: 1). Even the Suida, hardly a source suspect of unorthodoxy, has an entry theoi, drawn from Theodoretus (In Ps., PG 80. 1229c), explaining ‘those created in the divine image who have managed to preserve the image undefiled’ and referring to Psalms 49: 1. Origen (C. Celsum 5. 4) refers to this and other passages to show that talk of ‘gods’ as such must be unobjectionable, and so does Augustine (De civ. Dei 9. 23). Origen takes Scripture to refer to the angels. After all, they do enjoy a life of eternal bliss. Augustine in 9. 23 takes Scripture to refer in this way both to angels and to the saints, because they are immortal and blessed. Notoriously, Arnobius in his Adversus Nationes repeatedly speaks of ‘gods’; as if he believed in a plurality of divine beings (e.g. 6. 3). This has given rise to great puzzlement and been taken to be an indication of Arnobius' lack of proper instruction in Christian doctrine. But presumably Arnobius, too, is just referring to the angels. We also find Boethius in Contra Eutychen (1. 29) speaking of “God and the other divine beings’, thinking apparently of the angels (2. 28). So we understand why the pagan philosopher to whom Macarius Magnes responds in his Monogenes (4. 21) can claim that surely it is just a matter of terminology whether one calls these beings ‘angels’ or ‘gods’. This claim presupposes that from the point of view of this pagan philosopher there is really no issue here between Christians and pagans. What is no longer a matter merely of terminology is the doctrine of the deification of man, that is to say the doctrine that human beings who have been redeemed and saved are divine, which Augustine also alludes to as we saw. As we noted, there are many passages in the Psalms which speak of ‘gods’ in the plural.’ Another such passage is Psalms 81: 6: ‘I have told you: you are gods.’ The commentary attributed to Cyril of Alexandria again takes this to be a reference to human beings who by Participation are gods, and so do others. Athanasius in Contra Arianos (1. 9) has no difficulty in referring to this text according to which even human beings might be divine. He argues that Arius’ mistake does not consist in regarding Jesus as God, but in regarding him as divine only by participation, rather than as divine in himself, as we might become divine by participation, but, of course, are not divine in ourselves. This is a view which we also find in Origen. Thus, for instance, in the Commentary on John (2. 16-17) Origen discusses the difficulty some Christians have in acknowledging the divinity of Christ for fear of compromising their belief in one God. Origen thinks that the way to resolve the problem is this: we have to distinguish between ‘the God’ with the article and a ‘god’ without the article. There is the Father who is the God, but this does not prevent us from believing that there is a god or even 4 Cf. A. von Harnack, Porphyrius, “Gegen die Christen’, 15 Bücher Zeugnisse, Fragmente und Referate (Abh. Berliner Akad. d. Wiss. 1916, no. ı), fr. 76. 5 One such passage is Psalms 95: 4. Cyril of Alexandria (PG 69. 1244D) warns us not to take this to be a reference to the saints, not because the saints cannot be called ‘gods’, but because the next line, he argues presumably wrongly, makes it clear that the Psalmist is speaking of demons.

61 that there are many gods by participation in the God. And again he refers the philosophers. I want to argue that this attempt is not a particularly to Psalms 49, ‘The God of gods, the Lord has spoken’, to assure us that successful one. But I hope that its discussion brings us somewhat there is nothing wrong about speaking about gods in the plural. The fact nearer to an answer to the question why the Christians might have been that later orthodoxy will think that Christ is placed here on the wrong tempted to claim that the Christians believe in one God, whereas the side of the participation relation and that Origen thus reveals himself as pagans, even their philosophers, believe in many gods. a precursor of Arius should not distract us from the fact that Origendis- As Augustine himself tells us towards the end of his life in his tinguishes between the God and a god in the very terms I have ascribed Retractations (2. 43 init.), he wrote the De Civitate Dei in response to to pagan philosophers, and that there is nothing unorthodox about the those who, after the sack of Rome by Alaric in 410, ‘tried to put the blame distinction as such. So the Christians are willing, and even committed, to for its fall on Christian religion, being themselves worshippers of false talk of a plurality of created beings as ‘gods’. For they take it to be underand many gods, those whom we call “pagans”, to use an established stood that these beings are not the God himself, but mere creatures of term’ (quos usitato nomine paganos vocamus). The definition is based on him. Tertullian, Cor. Mil. 11. But what about the uncreated gods of the Platonists? It is also Origen In the De Civitate Dei itself he sets out to show that it is true of even who, following the precedent of Philo of Alexandria, but more importhe most respectable among pagan philosophers, the Platonists, that they tantly of Numenius, can speak of a first and a second God, referring to worship many false gods. Following Augustine’s actual argumentwe can the persons of the Trinity. In this he is followed by Eusebius (e.g. PE 11. analyse this claim into the following three assertions: 14. 3). It is true that later orthodoxy will avoid this language which reflects Origen’s subordinationist view of the persons of the Trinity. But even authors of unquestionable orthodoxy will not deny that there are three uncreated persons each of whom can be called ‘God’. Yet_neither the language of a first, a second, a third God, nor the language of a 1. even pagan philosophers believe in many gods; 2. these gods, some or all of them, are false gods; 3. even if they are not false gods, it would be wrong to worship some or all of them. plurality of divine persons is supposed to undermine the Christians’ We have already seen that Augustine in the course of his argument claim to believe in just one God. A Platonist does not have any difficulty concedes that, properly understood, there is nothing wrong as such in accepting this. about believing in many gods. Given all this, I do not see any way in which the Christians are in a He also concedes that the sense in which the best Platonists believe in position to claim that they believe in one God, whereas the pagan many gods is unobjectionable. So, though Augustine still tries to accuse philosophers believe in many gods. We have seen that the belief in one the pagans of polytheism, the emphasis of his attack has shifted. It is now highest god, combined with the belief in many gods, might or might not a question of believing in the right god and of worship. So the suggestion be monotheistic, depending on whether or not the many gods are subnow is that the pagans are in the wrong, because they believe in the ordinated to the highest god in the appropriate way. If, as in the case of wrong gods, that is to say either in pure fictions or in things which, our philosophers, they are subordinated to the first principle in the way though real, are not divine. Augustine is encouraged in this thought by they are taken to be subordinated to it, the fact that these philosophers scriptural authority. In 9. 23 he refers to Psalm 95: 4-5 where we are told also talk of many gods does not in the least mean that they do not believe that, though there are gods, the gods of the Gentiles are mere demons. in one God precisely in the way the Christians do. could have been tempted to present things otherwise. To make this Already Origen, in Contra Celsum 8. 3-4, had not only referred to five passages in the Psalms to show that besides the God of gods there are gods, but also, on the basis of some passages in Paul, distinguished question appear more pressing, I want to consider what might seem to between gods and so-called gods, and then quoted from the Psalms the This seems so obvious as to raise the question how Christians even be a more differentiated and more promising attempt to distinguish same passage according to which the gods of the Gentiles are mere between pagans and Christians, namely Augustine's in the De Civitate daemons. Superficially, both Origen and Augustine have some evidence Dei. This has the added advantage that Augustine specifically addresses to support their claim. Origen (C. Celsum 8. 67) can point out that

Celsus defends the worship of demons. and Augustine can rely on Apuleius’ De Deo Socratis to give him an excuse to spend nine chapters flagration, but somewhat later (22. 5), in a rather tortuous paragraph in criticizing Apuleius’ praise of demons (De Civ. Dei 8. 14-22). I will just note that both Stoics and Platonists believed in demons, that there was doctrine of the one God as if it were testimony in favour of the Christian 62 some lack of clarity or even confusion about the boundary-line between gods and demons, but that no Platonist would have taken a demon who was a demon also in the Christian sense to be a god. ) 63 which he makes the same point, he also seems to adduce the Stoic belief in one God. He addresses the Stoics: ‘if you believe that the highest God is one, has not come into being and is eternal . . .°. So the Christians can argue, as far as the God of the Stoics and the Peripatetics is concerned, that although these philosophers believe in one Rather than pursuing this, it seems more promising to take up the God, they do not believe in the one true God. But when it comes to the general claim that the many gods of the pagans are false in the sense that they are not truly gods, a claim constantly repeated in Christian antifrom Leg. 6. 2, like most Christians Fathers do, and as Augustine does in Platonists, Athenagoras, for instance, definitely thinks, as we can see pagan literature right from its beginnings. Given that the philosophers in De Civ. Dei (10. 1), that the God of Plato and the Platonists is the one true question believe in one God and many derivative divine beings, one naturally asks oneself whether the Christians want to claim that all these God. gods are false or whether they accept that these philosophers at least in terms which are most favourable to the philosophers, Aristotle makes So, the picture, as far as the God is concerned, is not entirely clear. Put believe in the one true God, though they also believe in many false gods. the mistake of not attributing universalprovidence toGod. This need The Christian argument tends to rely on a conception of a god which not prevent one, as the attitude of Platonists and some Christians in late is in essence the conception that the Stoics’ claim to be natural or antiquity and the Middle Ages shows, from thinking that Aristotle is common (cf. Plut. De Stoic. ref. 1051 E-F). A god has to be incorruptible talking about the God, though his conception of him is limited and and eternal, that is to say he must be without beginning and end, since inadequate. The Stoics do not make the mistake of denying God unianything which has a beginning, at least as far as its nature is concerned, versal providence, but think of him as a spiritual, rather than as an also has an end. He must, moreover, enjoy eternal bliss. This is supposed incorporeal being. Only the conception of the Platonists seems to be to exclude his being subject to passions, let alone to moral corruption. beyond reproach. Nevertheless, all these pagan philosophers believe in And he must be benevolent or provident, in particular towards human the God the Christians believe in, certainly from a time when they are beings. Given this notion, it is easy to see how the Christians can argue almost invariably Platonists. On the other hand, even at this abstract that neither the God of Aristotle, nor the God of the Stoics qualify. The level, one can see why the Christians might insist that the philosophers providence of the God of Aristotle does not extend to the sublunar realm in general do not believe in the one true God, since believing in the one ' and hence to human beings. Moreover, there is some confusion already God from their point of view would be a matter of believing not only in in the pagan doxography concerning Aristotle’s first principles which the one true God, but in ‘the God who has revealed himself in the Old allows Christians to think that Aristotle regards ether, the quintessence, Testament and in Christ’. and hence the stars as divine (cf. Clem. Recog. 8. 15, Athen. Leg. 6. 3). But As far as the created gods are concerned, the Christian argument rarely if Aristotle's God is corporeal, he is created and hence not eternal, at least seems to take into account that they are not meant to be measured by the by his own nature. Lactantius notes the conflicting evidence about criteria of what it is, strictly speaking, to be a god. Hence, for instance, Aristotle (Div. Inst. 1. 5), but is inclined to think that on balance Aristotle Athenagoras’ argument against the Stoic secondary gods, which we believes in a divine intellect governing the world. Even in this case, mentioned earlier, seems to miss the point. He should have argued that though, Aristotle’s God is ruled out by not being sufficiently provident. they are not even immortal by divine grace, rather than that they are not Similarly the God of the Stoics sometimes is rejected on account of eternal. He and other Christian authors seem to forget that they themhis corporeality (cf. Tatian Ad Graecos 25; Clem. Strom. 5. 14). In fact, it selves want to assume gods by participation. It is easy to see why the is remarkable that some authors like Athenagoras do not avail them- Christians are not prepared to regard the elements divine even in the selves of this argument. Athenagoras argues (Leg. 20. 3) that the created secondary sense. But they can hardly, given their own views, reject gods of the Stoics cannot be gods, because they perish in the con- Aristotelian immaterial substances, later interpreted as angels, or the

Platonists’ secondary gods or good demons or angels. One would also have to discuss under this heading why the Christians reject the divinity case of Platonists, that divine beings form a hierarchy in which the lower of the stars. They are, no doubt, right in this, but one suspects that in this being, however modest its position in this hierarchy, represents the regard the stars fall victim to the Christian’s rejection of fatalism and divinely ordained order of things and is a reflection of the God. It is clear astrology. even from what Origen quotes from Celsus that Celsus argues that we 64 65 beings are images or reflections of the higher beings, and in which each This is a very summary discussion of the question of the secondary should pay respect to or even worship demons because in doing so we gods. But even so, it should emerge clearly enough that the Christians are show respect for God and the divine order. This suggests a line of doubtlessly right in rejecting many of these gods as false. But it should be thought which justifies the worship of lesser gods, as long as they are equally clear that, given their own views, they are not in a position to declare all of them as false. Most importantly, given the appropriate kind of Platonism, they are hardly in a position to declare the Platonist gods hand, it is also clear from Augustine (De Civ. Dei 10. 26) that Porphyry, at least at times, thought that we should not worship or invoke any as false. secondary gods or angels, but only take them as an example, emulate It is in part for this reason, | take it, that Augustine finally resorts to understood to be mere images, pale reflections of the God.. On the other them. This is a position strikingly similar to the one Origen takes in the claim that these beings, even if they are gods, should not be Contra Celsum 5. 5. Origen enjoins us to invoke God only through worshipped. I say ‘in part’, because one might argue that to believe in Christ, and not the angels, but to imitate the angels so that they may be the one God anyway was not just a matter of, as it were intellectually, well disposed towards us and that in this way we may achieve a clearer assuming there to be an entity of a certain kind, but having a sufficient understanding of Christ. Augustine himself points out that Porphyry’s grasp on the fact that it, and it alone, in virtue of being this kind of view in this regard corresponds closely to the Christian position (De Civ. entity, demanded a certain kind of attitude towards it expressed by Dei 10 26 init.). It should also be pointed out that neither Porphyry nor worship. One might argue that this attitude was part of what it was to any Platonist will expect salvation from a secondary god. For salvation believe in the one God. Hence it is incompatible with this belief to consists in the vision of the first principle through which one becomes worship other beings, even if they are divine. Augustine argues that, like God. And this vision one can only achieve oneself—if, that is, being created, they owe their immortality and their salvation to God. God reveals himself to one. Hence I also think that Augustine’s Hence it is absurd to expect salvation from them, when they themselves claim that even the Platonists worship beings which do not deserve to owe their salvation to divine grace. This again obviously is a complex be worshipped in this generality does not stand up too well to closer topic which I can only address very briefly here. scrutiny. Either Platonists do not invoke and worship secondary gods, Notoriously in the De oratione (15) Origen took the position that only and from what we know about Platonists like Plotinus it would be God the Father should be invoked. But obviously there are a number of incongruous to imagine him as, say, sacrificing to the gods or consulting increasingly wider Christian positions in this regard. One is that God is oracles; or, when Platonists so invoke and worship secondary gods, we to be worshipped; another is that God in all of his persons is to be have to see whether this does not happen in the rather qualified sense in worshipped. Paul (Col. 2: 18) warns the Colossians not to give themselves which the Christians venerate and invoke the saints and the angels. to the worship of angels, but now the question arises what we mean by Nevertheless, it also becomes clear from De Civ. Dei 10. 26 what part ‘cult’, ‘worship’, ‘invocation’. Even on an orthodox view there is a place of Augustine's concern is here: he accuses Porphyry of not sufficiently for the invocation or even the veneration of the angels and the saints in distancinghimself from those who engage in magic and theurgy, At this some sense of these words. point it may help to note that, though philosophers always remained On the pagan side, one crucial text is Plato, Timaeus 37 C, according to critical of traditional religious belief and cult, their attitude towards which the world, itself divine,is itself animage (agalma)_ofthe evertraditional religion from Aristotle’s time onwards became more and lasting gods. We certainly do not expect Plato or any Platonists to more positive. Aristotle had been willing to admit that traditional worship the world. What we do expect is that they treat the world with religious belief contained a very small though important element of respect, given that it is an image of higher things. It is clear, at least in the truth, but was willing to defend it as the only way ordinary people would

67 accept this element of truth and because of its social utility. The Stoics What are we to make of all this? One conclusion which suggests itself and, following them, the Platonists believed that traditional belief by and is that the pagan philosophers we have been considering, in particular large was true in the sense that it had an elaborate hidden meaning which the Platonists, were monotheists in precisely the sense the Christians corresponded to the truth in whose knowledge salvation consists. If this were. Given this, it is tempting to assume that also the Hellenes Marius truth was only accessible to ordinary people in the disguised form of Victorinus refers to in the passage quoted at the beginning—at least traditional belief, it nevertheless offered them some kind of access to the those among them who thought of themselves as representing, maintruth which saves, an access which can be deepened by reflection and taining, and defending the tradition of Hellenicity, for the most part philosophical instruction. And it seems that Porphyry took a similar attiunder the influence of the philosophers—were monotheists. We have to tude to traditional worship—that, despite of all its distortions, it does be cautious here, though, because, as we have seen, the mere belief in a reflect the truth and thus, if only properly understood, is perfectly highest god who rules the universe does not in itself qualify one as a acceptable. If properly engaged in and reflected on, it does put one in monotheist. But even with this qualification it seems likely that a good touch with a higher reality, which in turn would be a reflection of a yet part of the educated elite was monotheist. It thus seems all the more higher reality and so forth. Hence Porphyry seems to have thought that puzzling why the Christians insisted on their monotheism as a distinworship, engaged in the proper way, might put one on the road to guishing mark. salvation. It might be the only way open to a non-philosopher to come Another puzzle which arises is that the discussion we have been nearer to the truth. Some later Platonists took a much more positive attireviewing from a Christian point of view seems to obscure the real issue. tude towards cult as a means of attaining the truth which saves. In any The real issue is whether Jesus is God. The pagan response to this claim, case Porphyry clearly defended and encouraged the traditional cults of as we can see from Celsus, is that it compromises the belief in one the gods, perhaps even as a means to salvation of a limited kind. God, for, if it were true, the Christians would believe in and worship two Porphyry, of course, did this on the understanding that there was a true gods, God the Father and Jesus. Moreover, there is no way in which Jesus reinterpretation of these gods and their cults. And it was open to the can be God himself, being a man. He, given his life, cannot even claim to Christians to argue, obviously correctly, that the traditional stories about be a divine man. This might go some way to explain the Christian the gods did not contain a hidden message which made them true, but emphasis on pagan polytheism as a polemical response. If the pagans are ‚that they were to be taken at face value, and taken this way were an unwilling to countenance even the possibility that Jesus is God, abomination. If this was the position one took, Porphyry’s advocacy of why should the Christians take the claim seriously that idols and the the traditional pagan cults could not but seem an invitation to worship traditional gods, properly understood, are true reflections of God? The false gods. Christians could then go on to argue that, even with a reinterpretation Porphyry also defended the use of oracles, indeed the use of oracles to gain philosophical knowledge and understanding. For a Christian like of the traditional gods, the pagans were still believing in and worshipping many false gods, instead of the one true God. Augustine it seemed clear that this involved, if not the appeal to, then the The fact that the Christians availed themselves of this sort of argument use of questionable demons. So for Augustine oracular cults amounted to maintain their position should not mislead us, though, into believing to the worship of false gods.° that pagans in late antiquity almost by definition were polytheists. Given Porphyry’s aggressive defence of paganism and the impact it had, it is perhaps somewhat easier to understand why a Christian like SELECT Augustine might be tempted to say in arguing against them that the pagans, even pagan philosophers, instead of worshipping the one true BIBLIOGRAPHY Denzincer, H., Enchiridion Symbolorum (37th edn., Freiburg, 1991). God worship many false gods. But, however far we go in understanding DURING, I., Aristotle (Heidelberg, 1966). and accepting this claim, it seems that it will not be quite the truth. GUTHRIE, W. K. C., A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1962). von HARNACK, A., Porphyrius, ‘Gegen die Christen’, 15 Bücher Zeugnisse, 6 Needless to say, this is not how Porphyry looked at the matter: for him revelation was a genuine possibility, a possibility Christians could hardly deny. Fragmente und Referate (Abh. Berliner Akad. d. Wiss. 1916, no. 1). AL PAGAN Maso TRES LATE AVTQewy