The Pythagorean Comma: Weber's Anticipation of Sociology in a New Key

HUMAN STUDIES 3, 115-136 (1980) y i GNOQUE y M: x Oo The Pythagorean Comma: Weber's Anticipation of Sociology in a New Key VITO SIGNORILE Department of Sociology and Anthropology Ca University of Windsor Throughout its history the Game was closely allied with music, and usually proceeded according to musical or mathematical rules. One theme, two themes, or three themes were stated, elaborated, varied, and underwent a development quite similar to that of the theme in a Bach fugue or a concerto movement. .... Experts and Masters of the Game freely wove the initial theme into unlimited combinations [p. 30]. (Hermann Hesse. Magister Ludi, 1970). The problem at the heart of any theory is epistemic, and the enduring cogency of Weber’s treatment of the problem can be found particularly in his discussion of ideal types. It will be shown that, to Weber, the ideal-type method involved the notion of a disciplined scientific mind at play with symbols. This was not seen as some frivolous puff of dilettantism, a kind of Castalian retreat, but rather a serious response to the fundamental condition under which man labored to achieve meaning while struggling with the concrete imperatives of life. In this sense, Weber’s work might be seen as an adumbration of a “sociology in a new key” (Malhotra-Hammond, 1975), participating, as it were, in the general swing toward the study of symbols heralded in 1957 by Susanne Langer's Philosophy in a New Key. For Weber, the epistemic importance of what we can now call the “symbolist” approach to scientific inquiry (cf. for instance, Brown, 1978) is succinctly captured in a concept generated by the Pythagorean school of philosophy in its attempt to rationalize the mystery of musical harmony. THE “COMMA” OF PYTHAGORAS The concept of the pythagorean comma appears at the very beginning of Weber's (1958a) treatise on the “rational and social foundations” of Western music, and it is here that he rather cryptically indicates its central importance for an understanding of the dynamics of the development of varying musical styles. To begin with, Weber (1958a) remarks that:

rests upon the octave harmonic music ration (vibration subdivisions into the fifth (2:3) and fourth (3:4) and the successive + 1) for all intervals smaller than the fifth [p. 3]. n/(n of 1:2) and its in terms of the rationalized division formula this in terms of the length of a vibrating string, what this Expressing statement says is that a succession of perfectly harmonious adjacent tones can a string of length L according to the series, be generated by subdividing + were a this series L harmonic would be If unit, 1). 1/2, 2/3, 3/4, etc. n/(n to a scale of tones and The Pythagoreans this, generate sought recognized involved. According which would be based on the mathematical relationship to this scheme, a scale should result in which all the tones were perfectly soon came to realize they could not achieve The Pythagoreans harmonious. such a goal by a strict application of this mathematical algorithm. As Weber (1958a) explains: If one ascends the octave powers or descends followed from a tonic [a given tone or length of a string] or other successively determined by fifths, fourths, can never meet of these divisions be continued. procedure comma than the seventh The octave twelfth in circles first on one and the same tone no matter perfect equalling fifth (1/2)7 (2/3)12 in the relations, how long the is larger by the pythagorean [p. 3]. is the twelfth fifth: the length of string, for is being compared that one would end up with after successively dividing its original length by two thirds (2/ 3 of the original length, then 2/ 3 of the result, then 2/ 3 What instance, ofthat result, etc.; a process repeated twelve times), and the seventh octave: seven times. If octaves a string in half successively form a dividing two same these the should recursive system, processes yield harmoniously a there is in the of tone?or ratios, discrepancy string. Instead, length mathematically expressed as the difference between (2/3)12 and (1 /2)7, which to the value .001232. Yasser comes (1932) put it thus: "no number of can exactly Fifths in general natural coincide, consecutively arranged acoustic dimension, with some number of consecutively arranged Octaves." as to be aurally it does This small is, happen discrepancy, [p. 118]. to a amounts octave it the between Within difference given distinguishable. A# and B?, in a natural, or "untempered," scale. Perhaps a feeling for the problem can be captured by noting that it is, in one sense, a Zeno's paradox of music. Just as the subsequent continuing reduction the subsequent of a distance by halves never actually eliminates it completely, division of a string of length L by ratios of n/(n + 1), that is, (1/2)L, (2/3)L, etc.; never brings you back to the original length L, despite the fact that the limit of n/(n + 1) as n approaches infinity is one (i.e., unity). fact that a fully lies in the unavoidable The importance of this discrepancy rational structure of tonality could never produce a completely harmonious scale of tones. Now, this fact becomes particularly acute when one attempts to develop states: a range of harmonies encompassing several octaves. As Wood

... notes sounded notes which to one another stand together. satisfying The rise of harmony this condition [pp. 117 in a simple frequency ratio form a concord when has therefore enhanced the demand for pairs of 186-187]. Since this was impossible on a purely rational basis, it became necessary that the rational division of notes be adjusted (or "tempered") to the ear. instruments involved just this quest for an The limited "temper" of musical aurally pleasing harmony, which required, in turn, a departure from purely rational partitions. On this point, Weber notes that Chinese music favored in the construction of instruments. rationality at the expense of musicality one instrument, the king, he says (Weber, 1958a): Concerning The main been of the Eastern-Asiatic instrument determined in mechanical symmetry. alter musical sensitivity the king... not had very obviously orchestra, but by requirements of consideration, tuning by musical It is evident how strongly such antimusical arbitrariness could and divert it from an understanding of harmonic relations [p. 96]. its was the object, it was found that not all musical When musicality to the flexibility instruments could lend themselves required to modulate tonal qualities and thereby achieve harmonies across instruments. The violin fine adjustments in tone, while the might easily submit to instantaneous, piano and many wind instruments were much less flexible. Indeed, the piano is completely inflexible during a performance. These facts lay behind the search, going back as far as the Sixteenth temperament that would encompass a Century, for a single most harmonious was devised, wide range of octaves. A "mean-tone" but temperament scale. The latter gave way to an "equal-" or "well-tempered" eventually ideal and temperament simply spread the "irrational" difference between tone relationships, harmonious comma, represented by the pythagorean within each of the seven octaves of the piano (cf. Wood, 1962, pp. 188-196). Effectively, what this did was bring sharps and flats into coincidence. Thus, the A# and B?> of the "natural" scale, mentioned above as separated by the notes identical in the became scale (for comma, pythagorean "well-tempered" an excellent description of this cf. Yasser, 1932, p. 117). The well-tempered scale, therefore, represented a compromise between rationality and reality. It did not get rid of the irrationality of the comma, but rather minimized its tonal dilution. presence by In their introduction to The Rational and Social Foundations of Music, Martindale and Riedel (1958) comment that Weber appeared to give this lack of fit between the requirements of the ear and those ofthe mind an immense belief that the two realms?of ideas and of actuality? significance. Weber's are immiscible can be found in several forms. It lies at the heart of his concept of "elective affinity." is the title of a novel by Goethe. In his introduction to the Elective Affinities Gateway borrowed edition of the novel, (1966) Victor the term from an Eighteenth-century Lange notes that Goethe treatise on chemistry (De

Attractionibus Electivus, by Torben Bergman). He then cites Goethe(1966, p. as that he was "reducing"1 a chemical ix) stating, in respect to this motif, For Goethe, his novel was an analogy to its "essential spiritual meaning." of the fact that "even the clear realm of rational choice is illustration of inevitably shot through with those traces of the confusing compulsion passion" [p. ix]. Weber's reference to "elective affinities" comes through with a striking that he was directly influenced significance when we consider the possibility on matter: choice the this rational Goethe by commingled with compulsion; irrational ineluctably linked to the rational. The picture that emerges is that of itself in both human motives rational action continuously and asserting and just as continuously understanding, being thwarted by the ineluctable In short, intrusion of the irrational, but compelling, demand of the moment. in the gaps between the the picture is that of a Pythagorean comma manifested rational and the irrational in history, in society.2 That Weber did indeed invest the comma discovered by the Pythagoreans with a deep sociological religion and rationality. is directly gleaned from his discussion significance In "The Social Psychology of World Religions" of he 1958b) says: (Weber, the Pythagorean In music, various The physics. manner in which on the other has seemed Emphasis great they have to tonal oriented 'comma' resisted complete rationalization in the systems of music of all peoples and ages have differed this inescapable either covered up or bypassed or, irrationality into the service hand, put irrationality to the theoretical to happen conception of the richness of tonalities. The same of the world, only far more so [p. 281, mine]. comma has a central place inWeber's conception of the The pythagorean in ideal type, which turn, has a great import for the perspective that sees all of of symbols. I the analysis and contemplation scientific work as essentially the belief that human want to explore Weber's announced mind, in its clearly into of knowing, must employ concepts which, when constructed mode systemic sets, can never truly capture reality. Our "intellectual articulation of a an image world," as Weber it, is unavoidably (1958b, p. 281) expresses our meant next this will Weber be task. what To discover by utopia. just use ofthe term reduce here. As it does for Husserl !One ought not to be misled by Goethe's (cf. it can be taken to mean "lead back," 1973, pp. 356-357), Schutz, 1970, pp. 56-60; Heap & Roth, back to the origins. 2 rather ofthe notion of elective affinity, as it relates toWeber's A usage, thorough discussion can be found in Howe (1978). There he states: ... the actor's choice denies necessity Weber science_Accordingly,... art based on a divorce affinity in the order is beyond the ken of social science. Therefore, values constructs in the relationships the conceptual of his constituting social science could never be anything more than a systematic of ultimate of the empirical Wever's of Max from the rational. thought [p. 381]. That yields the locus of elective

THE IDEAL TYPE As is not surprising for any central, important concept in science, there is or definition, no unanimity the proper meaning, of ideal type. concerning Weber's own studies have given rise to divergent views of what he was up to. It sources to be quoted at cross-purposes. for common is not unusual own Oakes Weber's (1975, p. 13-14) calls this spew of imagery, Borrowing a "plague of frogs." this Weberstreiten, controversy, Schutz (1972, pp. 243-245; esp p. 244n) claims that Weber changed his in his In of later Weber's earlier ideal view, Schutz types writings. conception avers, ideal types were applicable only to historical data. It is only when he generalized his notion of ideal types as a tool for sociology proper, that it had to all the social sciences (indeed, all the sciences, cf. Schutz, 1972, application of his p. 187, p. 246). A perusal of the passage Schutz cites in confirmation thesis (Weber, 1968, pp. 19-20) can only leave the reader in doubt. The earlier (Weber, 1949, p. 90) and the later statements appear to say the same thing. Indeed, Burger (1976) argues that Weber was largely consistent throughout. This is my belief. For the purposes of this paper, itwill be sufficient ifwe confine ourselves to a few illustrative examples to show how Weber's discussion ofthe ideal type has given rise to contrasting interpretations. account of the Protestant Upon noting that Weber's remark: one-sided, Luethy (1970) makes the following His nor mind was never particularly great and questioning even in social and economic systems, but rather impulses wretched man's forms realised of an historically in their purity), but rather never embodied which should accidents attitude and behavior. behind the essences provide of actual history [p. 125]. What Ethic is admittedly in the facts of history, in the detection of the ultimate he analysed was not the hybrid and interested such ultimate society (in which impulses are the abstract and chemically pure "ideal types" of a civilisation and stripped of all the adulterations the problem with this interpretation is that, not only is it debatable Now, whether Weber was seeking to determine "essences"(cf., e.g. Aron, 1970, p. 81, and Burger, 1976, p. 132), but also that, contrary to Luethy's reading, Weber could very well be said to have deep interest in the "historically realised society." the view of Weber's "interests" given by Loewith. He finds that Consider interested in the "historical Weber was particularly in making individual," this "historical individual" intelligible (Loewith, In 1970, p. 102). fact, Weber of an historical phenomenon, himself (1949) states, "We seek knowledge in its individuality." by historical: significant meaning [p. 78]. was striving after the intelligibility that Weber Loewith's of perception to an I the of his "interests." These think, is, key history understanding "interests" could be seen as two-fold: a desire to understand both historical and contemporary social events as they actually unfold, and a keen interest in

the best epistemic methods available for making these intelligible (cf. Oakes, and Society 1975, p. 12-13). In Economy (Weber, 1968) he writes: of a concrete course of action is arrived at when the overt interpretation the motives have both been correctly and at the same time the apprehended is to some degree causally adequate interpretation [p. 12. Emphasis mine]. A correct action causal and Weber's description of the method he recommends, the ideal-type method, iswell known, but will bear repeating here. "An ideal type,"he(Weber, 1949) states: ... is formed synthesis concrete emphasized of one or more points of view and by the accentuation by the one-sided of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent are arranged which to those one-sidedly individual phenomena, according viewpoints into a unified analytical construct (Gedankenbild) [p. 90]. "This construct," he continues, "in itself is like a utopia. "In a later passage on the same page he is more definite: It is a utopia. is not using utopia in the ideological sense commonly found Now, Weber in the original sense of ou-topost Greek it is being employed today. Rather, is saying then?and for "no-place." What Weber Burger (1976, pp. 123-124) that the ideal type is, by its very nature, incapable of this?is confirms reality, nor is it intended to do so. describing must be taken quite seriously on this point. He repeated it again in and Society (1968), where he specifically eschews the ideal type as or one which 'correct' meaning is 'true' in some having an "objectively sense" [p. 4]. metaphysical A conceptualization that may never have set out to define "reality" to begin with should not be faulted on account of its "falsity." The problem can be illustrated by reference to Gellner's criticism of functionalist theories. We find in his article on "Concepts and Society" 1973, chapter 2) the (Gellner, no-nonsense that the "extreme form" of a functionalist complaint admittedly view of society isplainly false. For it is obviously absurd to state that every? thing in society functions. The ideal type, Weber would agree, is "plainly false," but far from absurd. In fact, Gellner's emphasis on "truth"?in the empirical serve to encourage sense in which he identifies it?would the emergence of Weber Economy trivia. This is because the only protection against triviality ismeaning. It is we that is what relevant not. determine is what and through meaning a concentration on the acquisition of Yet, it must also be acknowledged, us our on in of sense. "truth" in the danger losing grip meaning puts empirical saw this quite clearly, and, when confronted with the alternative, he for could only be bought at the fully realizing that meaning opted meaning, to be a Weber this trade-off of considered expense empirical validity. condition of human knowing. The effect of irrationality?the fundamental be minimized comma?elective affinities?might by conceptual Pythagorean we not never was It that had a choice of accepting but eliminated. strategies, Weber

in our quest for understanding, or rejecting the ideal type method but rather that there was virtue in clarifying and perfecting the method. seriously, then, when he refers to our inability to attain an Taking Weber intellectual grasp of the empirical, objective world, we ultimate, complete, come to suspect that Luethy is misreading Weber's "intention" entirely. If Weber gave scant attention to the detailed "facts" of history, itmay not have for lack of interest, but rather because he knew very well that this was chimerical. approach to the pursuit of historical understanding is found among those commentators who Another departure from Weber conceive of the ideal types as a temporary construct, a liaison that will get us on our way to reality. Thus, Cahnman (1965) emphasizes the use ofthe ideal against which our grasp of reality gropes gradually type as a comparison somewhat like Yeats' "rough beast." The same attitude towards completion, been can be found in Martindale's (1959, pp. 81-88) critique of the ideal type method. Theories based on ideal types, Martindale avers, will give way in time to what Hempel (1970, pp. 111-113) calls "interpreted theory" (cf. especially Martindale, 1959, p. 87). Here again Weber's own comments lend credence to reached by those who see in the ideal type a temporary, or the conclusion of reality, a conceptualization "sensitizing" conceptualization provisional, a self-corrective process, gradually to lead to a which is expected, through precise and totally concrete (1949), Weber did say: Whether constructed comparison grasp of reality. In his treatise on the method course of development was actually identical with the the empirical-historical one, can be investigated... by using this construct as a heuristic device for the of the ideal-type and the 'facts' [pp. 101-102]. can be no arguing Weber's of the ideal type as description a utopia. The ideal type simply could not be expected to fundamentally describe reality. So, why even bother to compare itwith the "facts"? Could Weber ultimately have justified his method, "plainly false" though itwas, on that it was "useful for purposes the grounds of comparison and Yet there measurement"? as the central methodological to accept utopias reluctance and an of devices empirical science is understandable. What hope epistemological would any science have which employed amethod of thought that confessedly to write off ideal could never describe real empirical events? Nevertheless, as not is false" different from essentially types "patently discarding Boyle's and gravity, Einstein's mass-energy law of thermodynamics Law, Newton's and all of statistics, because, obviously, nature equation, most of mechanics, does not make smooth curves. We would perhaps be at an impasse in exploring this epistemic relationship The were it not for the deeper insight intoWeber's struggle afforded by a cluster of works dealing with the symbolic nature of human understanding, particularly in a New Key. The convergence Susanne Langer's (1957) superb Philosophy

ideas with those found in the symbolist tradition lends weight to that Weber's manner of attacking the epistemic problems of the treatment of the relationship the symbolist social sciences adumbrated between the structure of mind and the structure of experience. of Weber's the belief SYMBOLIC SYSTEMS To begin with, it is important to recognize the implications of Langer's in turning to the investigation of symbols, that philosophy, announcement had found a "new key" for the analysis of its traditional problems, as well as Just as the generation for investigation. of new and important problems that clarifies and indicates musical keynotes establish the audial perspective in which to resolve the structural relations of other notes in a the direction in philosophy musical system, so also the symbolic perspective begins to in which the resolution of age-old directions lie. problems philosophical of human life is asserted by The fundamental place of symbolization a she act in the of symbolizing which in remarkable passage postulates Langer to it as a as an innate and insistent function of the human mind. Referring "basic need," she (Langer, 1957) goes on to say: and clarify The point out is one of man's function symbol-making It is the fundamental about. process moving like eating, primary activities, looking, or of his mind, and goes on all the time [pp. 40^1]. of this ebullience of symbols. Its she explains, is a manifestation Dreaming, a trial-and-error attempt to been considered in had children long emergence This world. the grasp Langer rejects. By its very nature, she empirical are "to humans used contends, by bring things into their minds, not symbols into their hands" [Langer, 1957, p. 121]. Symbols are not simply substitutes for their objects, she (Langer, 1957) explains, but rather they: In talking about things we have conceptions are vehicles for the conception of objects? not the things, that symbols and it is the conceptions, of them, not the things themselves; directly Geertz "mean"[pp. 60-61]. (1973), borrowing from Langer, defines symbol thus: ... any a vehicle for a conception? object, act, event, quality, or relation which serves as is the symbol's the conception "meaning." ... the Cross, the expanse of painted canvas called talked about, visualized, shaped..., stone called a churinga, or the bit of painted the word "reality," or even the "Guernica" morpheme tangible concrete or at least symbolic because elements, they are -ing. They are all symbols, from experience fixed in perceptible of notions, abstractions formulations forms, of ideas, attitudes, embodiments longings, or beliefs, judgments, [p. 91]. importance of this view of symbols is in its implications for those who study human cultures. For example, Geertz argues that to study a religious system is to study a system of symbols, since a religious system is, would

like any other cultural entity, "a cluster of symbols, woven into some ordered whole" (Geertz, 1973, p. 129). in a new key is a sociology which sees symbols as the most Now, sociology of human social systems. This is, to be sure, nothing important characteristic new. Langer (1957, p. 51) points out that Freud could be credited with the "symbolic function ofthe mind. "Lacan (1970, p. 103) notes, in dicovering in general, that "what the psychoanalytic of respect psychoanalysis in is the the whole structure of language." unconscious discovers experience of this insight into the symbolic foundations The implications of human of action have gradually emerged as fundamental strategies inquiry. From Blumer's interactionism," (1969) "symbolic through Burke's (1968; 1970) to Cicourel's and Geertz' "thick (1973) "logology" description," (1973) Brown's and (1978) "symbolic realism," the range of sociology," "cognitive perspectives based on a systematic utilization ofthe symbolist framework has in sociology and anthropology. become a widespread phenomenon In Weber, we find an anticipation of all this. What lies at the heart of his of the ideal type is the idea that symbolic structures are the key to discussions an understanding of human societies. The ideal type is first and foremost a In elevating structure. it to a method, Weber was attempting to symbolic make this of human knowing to conscious ineluctable model accessible To the ideal historical and paraphrase Langer, type presented manipulation. In doing so, it made such actions meaningful, social action to our minds. and objective. We will exmaine these functions of ideal causally adequate, more types closely. MEANING is not a property of terms, Langer (1957, pp. 53-56) argues that meaning but rather a function the residing in the relations between terms. Noting search for the nature of meaning in the terms themselves?for misguided features common to all terms?Langer example, by looking for embedded (1957) observes that this search was, from the beginning, doomed to failure, because "there is in fact no quality of meaning; its essence lies in the realm of one not with does deal qualities, but only with relations" [p. 55]. logic, where In other words, meaning is contextual. But what is implied by "context" is ordinarily denoted by "context of should not be confused with what situation." For example, although they aver that "meaning is a relationship, not an essence," Lindesmith, Strauss, and Denzin(1975, p. 104d) identify this relationship as the responses people make to objects or words. Nor should it be identified with Winch's notion of (1958, pp. 24-29) Wittgensteinian the idea that meaning is a form of sociality. meaning as socially contextual: That is not the idea embraced here, nor the one Langer intends. It should be clear that the context she implies is a purely symbolic (conceptual) one; it constitutes a structure of relationships among constituent symbols. To arrive

we would push Wittgenstein's back a step conceptualization, is social, the social, itself, is aform of symbolic further: granted that meaning All cultural acts, as Geertz constitute "the (1973) observes, structuring. utilization of and forms" construction, symbolic apprehension, [p. 91]. in this structure has a differing meaning according to Any term embedded at Langer's the structure taken in reference to it. points of view within illustrates this by referring to the change inmusical Langer (1957, pp. 55-56) one the derives key inwhich the given notes are to be by changing "meaning" the different considered. therefore, is not to be found by correlating symbols with "facts," Meaning, but rather internally, by exploring the relations to be found in the symbolic domain itself. This position, of course, flies in the face of the received opinion found in all the sciences. Bridgman (1961, pp. 83-84) perhaps expresses the stresses when he that logic ("deduction'^ is not the only dominant position to at of "truth." Some cultures into effective way "manage get arriving enough so they must have some method of getting at contact with the environment, 'truth' not formally logical." sense of "truth," already mentioned in connection with This empiricist on the Gellner's criticism that functionalism verges "plainly false," is quite that science makes to human identified as the central contribution generally to leads the knowledge. This, naturally enough, requirement that theories, if are must to be be they "interpreted"?or "interpretable." Which specific, means that they must lead to sense experiences that constitute both a test and a foundation of their validity. There is a strong current of thought that perceives a fully "interpreted" one-to-one theory?a as unambiguous correlation between facts and terms? of in his analysis goal of any science.3 For example, theories, Lachenmeyer (1971) perceives sociology as essentially sociological in need of empirically purifying its language, since it fairly reeks of vagueness, opacity, and contradiction. ambiguity, the smell of of avoiding Weber would not disagree with the desirability but he would quarrel with vagueness, ambiguity, opacity, and contradiction, claim that one can achieve genuinely meaningful theories, Lachenmeyer's which will be both clean of these infections and, at the same time, fully the ultimate "interpreted." and the rest, while at the same The struggle against ambiguity, vagueness, a is not with the empirical world, connection time striving to maintain of to The the social sciences, however. confined precise empirical connection 3Even Blumer in his methodological for symbolic interactionism, program (1969, pp. 27-47), as the ultimate goal in the quest for scientific of complete description to the philosophy two kinds of "truth." The distinction between than a precious is at issue is more truth. What subscribes whole rest on concerning argument the distinction. the relevance for symbolists of Weber's ideal type might be said to

some key concepts in the physical sciences eludes specification. Terms such as time and space do not yield to complete empirical interpretation. Einstein's treatment of these concepts in his little book on relativity theory is especially useful in illustrating the point. For example, his definition of simultaneity (Einstein, 1961, p. 23) as a function of the time it takes light to travel from one place to another is not dependent on divining the "physical nature of light," but rather "a stipulation which I can make of my own freewill in order to of simultaneity."4 arrive at a definition his "method of fluxions," Newton quite explicitly proposed In developing as a hybrid entity hovering the "infinitesimal" between existence and nonexistence. Thus, ydx represented an infinitesimal area which, when added total result! infinitely under a given curve, could yield afinite The logical flaw in Newton's reasoning here was pointed out by the of Newton's. He very philosopher, Bishop Berkeley (1956), a contemporary that at the center of Newton's method was an absurdity: a as "the ghosts which Berkeley amusingly characterized nothing/something, of departed quantities." It took a hundred years before the absurdity Berkeley pointed out was resolved. The solution was generated internally?from within the structure of clearly showed mathematical convergence is known as the method ideas. The solution of limits: a on a certain value as one approaches Newman, 1956, infinity (cf. p. 287). but it gets us Now, this process is perfectly valid in the logic of mathematics, nowhere near the real world, for the idea of a finite being "approaching infinity" is no less absurd than the idea of an infinitesimal. This problem is, of course, the problem of the pythagorean comma; it is the problem of infinite regress that awaits us when we attempt to bridge the world of symbols with the world of empirical experience. So long as experiments remain imaginary, absurdity can be avoided. It is when we leave the imaginary world that we court the danger of unruly irrationalities. This is precisely the import of Burke's (1945, p. xx) observation that such absurdities constitute unavoidable difficulties generated by the very nature of in what he symbol systems. He found such a condition especially manifested calls the "paradox of the negative." After Creative reading Bergson's it became clear to Burke (1968, chapters 1 and 7) that the negative Evolution, ?Cf. also the discussions of concepts like "body," "force," and "straight line" in Lindsay and the difficulty of determining (1957, pp. 85-89). After exploring Margenau just what "force" is, "There is, however, they comment: certainly one further attitude one can take toward Newton's first law and escape the embarrassments view that just outlined. This is the now rather common the law is really a definition meaning through (viz., a definition). some empirical that such a solution [p. 88]. Note referent, but rather, to find it embedded of force" is, not to establish in a system of symbols

rather an artifact of language? a system generates a definitive Simply or concept relationship, we are not thereby guaranteed was not an item to be found that is, of a symbol-system. itwas in nature; because and logically coherent are fully even if its basic terms and conceptions its ontological existence, we Burke often have feels that been gravely mistaken in reifying interpreted. or the relationships by our conceptual systems, generated empirical on he On this remarks also otherwise. (Burke, 1970; Langer, 1957, p. 85 point a similar point): were to say: We can solve certain problems as though a mathematician in can be by using the square root of minus one. Our solutions of such problems a to the needs of engineering and the like. So students of nature should undertake It is somewhat mathematics applied as useful as the square search for the square root of minus one in nature itself. However, root of minus one may be in solving certain kinds of problems, it is purely and simply an and not a thing discoverable in nature, internal to a specific symbol-system, expression insofar as we use nature would be if all symbol-using in the sense ofthe animals less-than-symbolic, their symbol-systems and the sort of things that there were obliterated [p. 18]. "Imaginary" numbers like the square root of minus one, as well as "surds," the ineffable square root of two, are like/?/ and that bane ofthe Pythagoreans, not absurdities within the system comprising the set of integers and their are rational within this system. The canonical They eminently operations. sense of absurdity arises when one attempts to connect such "surds" with the empirical world. One important reason why this slippage exists between symbolic systems and systems in the real world is that the former are emic while the latter are etic (Pike, 1954; 1964).* out of the The way in which human communities pluck their phonemes a is of a of instance human sounds discerned continuum readily phonetic selection from the etic ofthe world. consensual of emic process plenum larger The importance of this emic "chunking" (as Miller, 1956, pp. 92-97 might say) is that it supplies us with the units with which symbolic structurization of symbolic It constitutes the basic building material can take place. structures. 5Pike (1964) gives the following description of what he means by "emic": ... when in their own culture they react to it as if itwere a people react to human behavior For this reason, a purely physical analysis of sequence of separate particles of activity? of waves, but a cultural analysis of human it as comprised human behavior may analyse label we shall apply to any such of particles_The behavior must treat it as comprised particle of activity word phoneme...). kinds... The from is "erne" or "emic Ernes occur unit" not only the terms from the latter part of the (deriving of all in speech but in nonverbal activity [p. 55]. "wave" or purely "physical" contrasting the linguistic term, "phonetic." characteristic of such behavior is identified as"etic,"

The "psychological reality" of the phoneme (Sapir, 1949, pp. 46-60) and its of linguistic meaning is fairly well known the in role construction significant it is much less known that precisely widely (cf., e.g. Brown, 1968). However, the same emic process is to be found inmusical structure. What we callmusic of sound as is required requires the very same "chunking," or "emicization," most from the This emerges clearly following passage by Wood by speech. (1962): of music In the process of the development the limited series variety of notes available called a scale. The forming used. Nor smallest interval in our own lie at least twenty-five a mechanical limitation the interval is this the first step was to select from the infinite to be used. The series of notes so selected is scale is a semitone. other distinguishable one due to difficulties the two notes Between is notes, none of which of the design of keyed for the use of a limited scale occurs where music has been developed isntruments, by It is due to a necessity in the nature of music human voice without any such hindrances. itself?the by definite in pitch which constitutes melody that the movement necessity and appreciable steps, and not by indeterminate gliding... should proceed [p. 171]. As Wood explains it, then, we can conclude that the notes of a scale are to a melody what the phoneme is to the word (or morpheme). What this implies is that music everywhere has a tonemic structure. This does not gainsay the But these events tendency to shade off the toneme in actual performances. of allophones in nature from the phenomenon in may not be different on 1958, 33, Weber, p. music). Patagonian linguistics (cf. The emic is an ideational datum. It retains a sense of constancy despite the etic, empirical, variations that are at play under its rubric. H olio way (1969) refers to this as an "imposition of arbitrary form," which he identifies as the sine qua non of culture. Again, the example of music is instructive. Although the tonic progression we call "melody" requires that there be a font of emic tonalities from which itmay be constructed, no actual (etic) performance of it In fact, any actual performance ofthe melody, would constitute that melody. one to another, would be considered a performance despite variations from of that 1973, p. 11). melody (cf. Geertz, playing then, requires structure, and structure requires emic units of Meaning, "arbitrary form," or, as Langer (1957, pp. 204-212) expresses it, "significant form."6 this very emic "chunking" is responsible for the emergence of Nevertheless, comma. The notes of a scale, once established the pythagorean (and the no are of comma. the Thus, relevance), inevitably produce precise frequencies a device central to the creation of meaning is also responsible for the of an absurdity. and veerings from the established emergence Shadings as from the as such: exist and are evaluated norm, tonality departures HDn what p. 872). could be called the"emicization"of the continuous flow of time, cf. Zerubavel

or valued, as the case may be, depending the unique. irrational, the unpredictable, abhorred on how one responds to the CAUSE in untangling the sense in which Weber uses the There is some difficulty notion of "causal adequacy." On the one hand, he identified it with a on as the Schutz statistical expectation, while other, (1972, p. 233) says of Weber's "second concept of causal adequacy," he can be seen as saying that causal adequacy is "based on principles of meaning-adequacy. "Schutz (1972, insofar as it is a concept applying p. 234) concludes that "causal adequacy... to human behavior, is only a special case of meaning-adequacy." It is helpful to conceive of the relationship between cause and meaning as similar to that between species and genera. Cause is one of the kinds of meanings we have available to our minds. that the idea of cause can be divided into necessary and modalities is 1961, chapter 3). This distinction (cf., esp. Francis, sufficient at in of Weber's "causal criterion clearly adequacy." As Schutz'(1972, play that the ideal type be shows, Weber's pp. 229-234) discussion requirement on a we is the level cause" criterion of understand how a "adequate whereby It is well known it necessarily particular event could happen, without knowing whether (or In would Roscher and Knies states: (1975) Weber ontologically) happen. A historical is causal explanation in absolutely the same interpretive inquiry into motives of any concrete natural process. This is because logical sense as the causal interpretation its goal is the discovery of a sufficient ground? Such an inquiry cannot make knowledge of the necessity of action (in the nomological human sense) its theoretical goal_Both and non-human cosmic knowledge events, [p. as finite conceived (living or dead) entities, can never be exhaustively from deduced 194; also cf. Weber, 1930, p. 27]. of the totality exclusively nomological aspects of of ideal types yields sufficient causes (implication, ones (subimplication). but not necessary For terminology), for in the the certitudo Protestant Ethic salutis, quest example, (cf. Tenbruck, to one's calling (Weber, 1930, pp. 166-170; cf. 1974), through obedience especially note p. 58: "... loveless fulfillment of duty stands higher ethically to the leads logically than sentimental philanthropy") (sufficiently) the causal So, in Francis' component of capital (Weber, 1930, pp. 172-173). acquisition This idea of cause puts it entirely in the realm of symbolic contexts. For example, Francis (1961, p. 54) does not say that cause is a relation between things, but between "data statements." Hempel (1970, p. 249) makes similar assertions about scientific laws. They do not refer to reality, but to statements about reality. A view of cause as an aspect of symbolic our epistemological i.e., what problem, takes us directly relationships is the empirical connection into that

enable us to claim that we are doing science? One answer is through the that we engage in definitive predictions of events in the empirical observation would once we set up our syllogism, As Francis (1961, p. 58) mentions, "are made and tested. If the behavior is that which was expected, deductions one verifies the assertion of causal relations." But this way out is not entirely world. satisfactory. The difficulty has convincingly hinges on the idea of verification. Popper (1965, pp. 33-59) shown that verification is not a practical possibility. The problem is, again, our finite condition compared to the plenitude of nature. That Popper should opt for a more tentative kind of verification, which he is in keeping with the present mood of science, amood calls "corroboration"7 which has led directly to the rejection of cause. The movement has generally been in favor of away from causation probability as the mode of explanation.8 This state of affairs ledMax Planck to make the following observation. In a critique ofthe acausal implications of the new indeterminism that gained adherents with Heisenberg's discovery, Planck states: (1963) nature is entirely a matter of statistics and it is their aim to build of probability. on the opposite has hitherto developed assumption_[There? For them [indeterminists] up physics on a calculus In fact, however, physics it will now be found fore, that,] in order has been slightly modified. What causality... which the term event is employed. Theoretical as an event, measurement to be preserved has been physics such a measurement because done does the principle intact, of is to change the sense in not consider an individual accidental and always contains It intellectual process. By an event physics means a certain merely a new world in place of that given to us by the senses or by the measuring substitutes instruments which are used in order to aid the senses. This other world is the so-called an intellectual structure. To a certain extent it is physical world image; it is merely unessential arbitrary. inherent elements. It is a kind of model in every measurement idealization and to facilitate created in order exact definition to avoid the inaccuracy [p. 53. Emphasis mine]. a causal approach in promoting to physical Planck, science, parallels Weber's own position, that causal explanation is desirable?particularly over statistical 1949, pp. 90, 101; 1968, p. 12). analysis (cf. Weber, purely the resolution of the problem underlined by Planck?saving Furthermore, the sense of causation by recasting the objects of explanation on a purely and "confirmation. "He would eschews the terms "verification" 7Actually, Popper specifically as a form of verification, to my referring to his idea of corroboration however perhaps object tentative. to note that Popper, 8It is interesting an argument though rejecting verification (through are a suitable alternative. does not feel that probabilistic The induction), interpretations he asserts, is not a probability. Cf. Popper(1965, "degree of corroborability," p. 58n). Curiously, one of Weber's two concepts of "causal adquacy" entails the use of probabilities and frequency against ratios, causal according interpretation to Schutz cf. Weber's However, (1972, pp. 229-233). of the probability ratio as an "anthropomorphism" reference to J. S. Mill's (Weber, 1949, p. 186).

or imaginary, intellectual, plane?is strongly reminiscent of the ideal-type method.9 Planck saw this maneuver as a means of attaining accuracy of "prediction," while, forWeber, his method was ameans of achieving meaning in particular. But a moment's in general and causal adequacy reflection on can with whatever method Planck's what accuracy, will reveal predict, just is not essentially different from Weber's. that his position from prophecy?that If we are to distinguish is, distinguish prediction on which is based from that which has no rational foretelling understanding Admittedly, such basis?then, again, the place of symbolic play in the act of prediction a as is generated by manipulations central theme. Prediction emerges purely a theory, etc.). to the internal symbol system employed (a conceptualization, of experiments and the This would, of course, guide both the construction to in this the of and way open system (but not phenomena, perception content. the in what is is a observed However, causality guarantee) empirical by which the observed is identified, for logical property of the descriptions a type of logical necessity or, to express it more cause can be considered accurately, sufficiency. In his attempt to clarify the problem of historical necessity, Weber (1949, pp. 113-188) discusses Meyer's distinction between the strategy of being and asserts that any given Meyer, Weber becoming. points out, correctly as for it had inasmuch historical event, us, absolutely is, already occurred, no other possibility is admissible. is Therefore, necessary. Only what conceived of as becoming, Meyer argued, can be looked at from the point of in his own view of a range of possible outcomes. Weber then notes that Meyer, method, was not strictly faithful to this perception. Weber exploits this fact to make his own point. It is the contrast between to that contributes what actually happened and what could have happened 9Kant's clear For Kant (1909), "it is a in the criterion of causal necessity. is clearly evident thus from a principle of experience, to try to extract necessity "[p. 97] While that necessity is a rational he transcends Hume's Hume, by arguing scepticism influence contradiction agreeing with (1909), in his "memoir product. Abbott Kant does so in the same sense inwhich of Kant," states: "As to testing maxims by consequences, tests a hypothesis Euclid in indirect demonstrations by its not i.e., by the logical consequences, consequences,... observation by Beck (1963) in his explication following No the practical." of Kant's the [p.iii]. Also consider of Practical Reason: Critique in the face of a well can do anything but surrender generalization an An apriori principle of law, on the other hand, can condemn exception. science. A body that does not fall and it does so even in natural exception, to Galileo's law?none does?is simply not a freely falling body. We do not empirical authenticated apparent according revise the law when we find an exception in spite of apparent not merely is prescriptive, be held form and may, laws for men's exceptions to it; we reclassify the object. The law which can not a mere summary of experience; it is accordingly its even though experience may have suggested descriptive, it. there are such laws in science; there seem to be such in fact, corroborate practical conduct

It is precisely this technique that is found inMeyer's historical understanding. own practice as an historian (cf. Weber, 1949, p. 127-178, et passim.; also the discussion of the objectively "correct" and the "incorrect" in history, 1949, pp. 40-43). This is done, Weber argues, when the researcher projects himself back into the circumstances prior to and during the event in question, and, in this purely imaginary sense, creates a world of "becoming" inwhich hypothetical, outcomes?can a range of possibilities?alternative be contemplated.10 this fact does insofar as it has already happened, If history is determined not mean that it is thereby intelligible. For Weber (cf., e.g., 1949, pp. 77-78), is to be achieved through an analysis of causal necessity, intelligibility as And this, Bunge (1963, p. 52) observes, requires the sufficiency?adequacy. strands from the complex of factual causal of selecting "Utopian" process is very close to That Bunge's Utopian sense of causation determination. is particularly apparent in Bunge's Weber's ideal type notion of causation of the paperback edition of reply to critics, which appears in the Appendix Causation. An objection ismade that, if strict and pure causation works never to confirm causal hypotheses? Bunge's (1963) and nowhere, how is itpossible a that would be familiar to Planck): reply (in phrasing If we say that the Galileo-Newton equations we do not thereby mean that the phenomena of ballistics have been verified many times, describe they partially and approximately the physics or of sociology, is valid exactly are entirely mechanical_Every law, whether theoretical only with respect to the corresponding model, which disregards complications [p. 366]. OBJECTIVITY is given a lengthy treatment by concept of "objective possibility" sees as an it He "imaginative construct" involving (1949, pp. 164-188). as he describes Such causes." constructs, them, are "logical "adequate from Martindale's structures" (Weber, 1949, p. 176). Now, (1959, p. 70) there is the danger of coming away with the of the concept, description is, forWeber, an empirical possibility, impression that "objective possibility" to objectivity. that Weber meant to give an empirical meaning The Weber of Weber's methodologi? Even Aron's (1970) generally cogent explication cal ideas leaves one with this impression. After noting the influence of inWeber's work, Aron goes on to imply of objectivity Rickert's discussion solved Rickert's problem of empirically objective explanation by that Weber showing that only selected aspects of reality are empirically interpretable?a is characterized as having selection guided by values. In other words, Weber a reduction of empirical the problem validation of solved through ofthe difference p. 227) discussion along the same lines in his explication to a state of emergence the meaning-context to a state and that appropriate appropriate versus things already produced. of completion?i.e., things in the process of unfolding I0Cf. Schutz'(1972, between

If the empirical explanation o? everything is doomed ambition. explanatory to failure, the explanation of only selected parts of events is, by contrast, eminently capable of "objective" empirical accomplishment. treatment opposes such an interpretation. The The whole tenor of Weber's is definitely not empirical. Besides the of objectivity he espouses meaning own argument, the following citations already noted in referring toWeber's toWeber, cannot help but reinforce the assertion that "objectivity," is a form and that he remained faithful to Rickert's of rationality, postulate is "empirically rooted, not in "facts," but transcendent," objectivity that ideas 1949), values?reason:11 (Weber, The objectivity always related of the social to those sciences evaluative rather on the fact that the empirical depends them worth knowing ideas which alone make data are and the of the empirical data is derived from these evaluative ideas. But these data can significance never become for the empirically the foundation proof of the validity of the impossible ideas [p. 111]. evaluative of objectivity as a rational entity, a ratio cognoscendi, interpretation most Personal Knowledge emerges clearly in Michael (1958). Polyanyi's After pointing out the curious fact that the Copernican theory recommends it affords our sense-perceptions, he itself to our minds despite the violence we reason to its for wide "When the claim describe acceptance. proceeds This for the Copernican greater objectivity ... we do inherent imply quality that universal deserving of anthropocentrism of our anthropocentrism which command sense an objective is, not a matter its excellence cruder respect acceptance senses?but our reason. In doing in their own standing theory," he explains, 1958): (Polyanyi, taste on our part, but an of personal the by rational creatures. We abandon in favour of only so, we claim the capacity right, by their very rationality, a more ambitious to formulate and which have ideas in this [pp. 4-5]. 11 notions of objectivity, does not draw both Rickert's and Weber's Burger (1976), in describing a consensual out the symbolist nature of their perceptions very clearly. Objectivity is, for Rickert, to wants in the sense that it is based on a common interest, "what everybody phenomenon, know." objectivity change," objectivity In this and which attributed absolute. Weber seems of any given value-orientation, the researcher need not subscribe to abstract this further orientations which by identifying are "ever subject to a position is taken, to personally. Once in reference to that position (cf. Burger, consistency is a the influence of Kant for whom (causation) necessity is the result of a rational/logical we see here Again, Cf. Kant (1909, p. 97) as well as his and thereby attains the status of objectivity. the notion of "objectivity" of Hume's (1909, pp. 140-147). Finally, being "scepticism," in his is not the same as that which Schutz (1972, pp. 132-138) describes here toWeber 1976, pp. 87-89). rational product, discussion it is not sense, as a function distinction between between the meaning is that For Schutz, the distinction subjective and objective meaning-contexts. of and the meaning of an entity in the process of being produced (subjective) from any notion of how, the product itself, detached can be "objective" above. in the sense discussed or why, it was produced (objective.) Both

APPRECIATION Thus far I have tried to indicate the essentially symbolist kernel at the heart ideal type method and the ways in which later symbolist studies of Weber's of Weber's bear out the profundity insight into the core problem of the sciences: the problem of epistemic knowledge. Yet Weber's approach does It favors the rational idea, the "clear and distinct" idea as the have a weakness. the only means?of achieving a genuine human preferred means?possibly 1972, p. 239 on interpretive (cf., e.g., Schutz, understanding sociology's "preference" for rational action types). The goods that rationality can deliver are formidable; the general pressures leading to ever greater rationalization in attest to that. But rationality emphasizes the discursive, human organization in contrast to what Langer (1957, pp. 79-102) calls the "presentational" in In fact, her view of "rationality" ismuch more general symbolic experience. is the essence of mind," she says, "and symbolic than Weber's. "Rationality its elementary process. It is a fundamental error, therefore, to transformation of systematic, explicit reasoning. That is recognize it only in the phenomenon a mature and precarious product" [Langer, 1957, p. 99]. sense of causation is derived from the lineality of the The ordinary is whether presentational mode, Langer asserts. The question This formulations. symbols can admit of causally adequate, meaningful matter is dealt with more fully in a separate paper. Here itmay be sufficient to in the presentational mode note that Langer (1957, pp. 204-210) sees meaning discursive to the neglected as contained form." This draws attention in "significant we Gestalt how of achieve expriences of totalities, of experiences, question what Michael entities." A Polanyi (1966, pp. 18-19) calls "comprehensive 1966; 1969; 1971), inspired by Polanyi's group of philosophers (cf. Grene, ("we can know more than we can tell") in discovery of the "tacit dimension" to explore has human knowing, the wide-ranging begun systematically assert this of the ramifications importance of "background" question. They a knowledge found on the fringe of consciousness, in our knowledge, the of world. apprehension In advancing his penetrating insight into the importance of the "tacit dimension," Polanyi (1958, pp. 55-57; 1966; 1969) introduces the important distinction between "focal" and "subsidiary" awareness. His view is that focal awareness is impossible without the necessarily subliminal subsidiary awareness. In order to attend to its focus, our mind requires to attend/row the subsidiary particulars which are gathered for the shaping of the focal are the vehicles of awareness. In a word, the subsidiary materials a our full account must of include the Therefore, understanding awareness. of This is in contained phenomenon subsidiary perspective ofthe "world ofthe natural attitude," a pp. 79-82) conception Schutz'(1970, form.

in which the things taken for granted form the foundation of conscious life. Cicourel (1973, pp. 59-62) makes a similar observation when he the backdrop take into account of that any semantic theory must a with the "kernel" in associated found meanings "fringe" meanings linguistic world social notes lexicon. AU Qf these matters require separate treatment, and, of course, imply a of Weber's the further criticism methodological insights. Nevertheless, to a it of has made studies evolution attain fuller possible symbolist into the methodological of Weber's inquiry probing appreciation of social science. requirements now see in the method we can of the ideal type?and what Weber What to in this method?is the myriad play of himself sought illuminate employing an construct systems with which humans reality. It constitutes symbolic as use constructs of the imaginative humans they imaginative reconstruction make their labyrinthine ways through the world. "Whether we are dealing of fruitful method game or with a scientifically simply with a conceptual can never be decided a-priori" and theory-construction conceptualization as It is himself aMagister Ludi, were though Weber, [Weber, 1949, p. 92]. us not to thereby giving up the inviting join him in The Glass Bead Game, search for the real, as did the virtuosos of Castalia, but pressing with ever renewed ambition to capture with our limited faculties the unlimited richness that lies in the nature of things. ACKNOWLEDGMENT to acknowledge I wish meaning Music, is also the of the pythagorean University of Windsor. gratefully acknowledged. help given me toward an understanding comma by Paul Mclntyre, The sympathetically of the musical Director of the School of responses of the reviewers critical REFERENCES Abbott, on T. K. Memoir Aron, N.J.: Beck, of Kant. In Kant, I.Kant the Theory of Ethics (T. K. Abbott, R. The logic of the social sciences, 1970. Prentice-Hall, on Kant's L. W. A Commentary Chicago Ed. 'sCritique of Practical and Trans.) London: In D. Wrong Critique (Ed.), Max of Practical Reason and Other Works Longmans, Weber, Reason. 1909. Englewood Chicago: Cliffs, University 1963. Edition, Press, Phoenix In James R. Newman B. G. The analyst, (Vol. (Ed.). The World of Mathematics 1956. (Originally & Schuster, 1934). published, 1969. Interactionism. Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Blumer, H. Symbolic Englewood 1961. York: Are. New P. W. The Edition, Viking, Compass Way Things Bridgman, Berkeley, New York: Simon New York: Cambridge University for, Sociology. and Things. New York and Toronto: Collier-MacMillan, 1963. New York: World Co., Publishing Causality. Brown, R. H. A Poetic Brown, R. Words Bunge, M. 1978. Press,

Burger, T. Max Burke, Weber's Theory of Concept Formation. N.C.: Durham, Duke Press, University 1945. (Republished Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Englewood of Motives. World Co.). Publishing as Symbolic Action. of California Berkeley & Los Angeles: University K. A Grammar 1962, Cleveland: Burke, K. Language 1969. Press, Burke, K. 1970. The Rhetoric of Religion. Berkeley & Los Angeles: of California University Press, W. and some of its derivations. Ideal type theory: Max Weber's The concept 1965, 6, 268-280. Sociological Quarterly, A. V. Cognitive New York: The Free Press, 1973. Cicourel, Sociology. New York: Crown Publishing 1961. Co., Einstein, A. Relativity. of Minnesota 1961. Francis, R. The Rhetoric Press, of Science. Minneapolis: University Cahnman, New York: The Interpretation of Cultures. in the Social Sciences. E. Cause and Meaning 1973. & Kegal Paul, Routledge C. Geertz, Gellner, von Elective J. W. Goethe, & L. Bogan, (E. Mayer Affinities. 1973. Books, I. C. Jarvie & J. Agassi Basic 1966. (Originally Edition, published Gateway Regnery, New York: Basic and the Known. Grene, M. The Knower Grene, M. The Anatomy Grene, M. (Ed.). Interpretations of Life P. On phenomenological Heap, J., & Roth, 354-367. C. Hempel, Amherst: of Knowledge. sociology. of Scientific Explanation. 1970. Paperback Edition.), Ludi. R. & C. Winston Magister G. Aspects trans.). 1966. Books, of Massachusetts Chicago: York: 1969. Press, & Kegan Routledge American New and 1933.) University London: and Mind. Eds. (Eds.), London: Paul, 1971. Sociological Review, 1913,38, The Press. (Toronto: Free Collier-MacMillan, 1970. Hesse, Hermann, (trans.) New York: Bantam Books, R. L., Jr. Culture: A human domain. Current Anthropology, 395-407. 1969,10, Holloway, Elective Affinities: R. H. Max Weber's within the bounds of pure reason. Howe, Sociology American Journal 1978, 84, 366-385. of Sociology, on the Theory of Ethics. and other Works Critique of Practical Reason (T. K. and trans.). London: 1909. (Originally Longmans, published, 1787.) In J. Ehrmann The insistence of the letter in the unconscious. (Ed.). Structuralism. I. Kant's Kant, Ed. Abbott, Lacan, J. Anchor Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Edition, 1970, 101-137. C. W. The Language New York: Columbia Lachenmeyer, of Sociology. Press, 1971. University In J. W. von Goethe, Elective Affinities. Lange, V. Introduction. Chicago: Regnery; Gateway 1966. Edition, in a New Key. (3rd ed.). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Langer, S. K. Philosophy 1957. Lindesmith, A., Strauss, 1975. Press, A., & Denzin, N. Social Psychology. (4th ed.). Hinsdale, H. Foundations B. & Margenau, New York: of Physics. K. Weber's of the bourgeois-capitalist world interpretation of 'rationalization'. In D. H. Wrong (Ed.). Max Weber. principle Lindsay, R. Loewith, Prentice-Hall, H. Once Luethy, Englewood theory. 1957. Dover, in terms of the guiding Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 101-122. and again: Calvinism N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Cliffs, Malhotra-Hammond, Martindale, 1970, 111.:Dryden V. In D. capitalism. 1970, 123-134. H. Wrong (Ed.). Max Weber. a sociology in a new key: An inquiry into dramatis tic social Southern Illinois University, 1975. dissertation, on theory and the ideal type. In L. Gross (Ed.). Symposium York: Harper & Row, 1959, 57-91. Toward doctoral Unpublished D. Sociological Sociological Theory. New D. & Riedel, J. Introduction. InWeber, M. The Rational Martindale, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University 1958. Press, of Music. and Social Foundations

Miller, processing J. R. Newman, World Oakes, G. Economics. two: Some limits on our capacity for seven, plus or minus Review, 1956, 63, 81-97. Psychological on Bishop Berkeley and infinitesimals. In J. R. Newman (Ed.). The (Vol. I). New York: Simon & Schuster, 1956, 286-287. number The magical information. Commentary of Mathematics. Introduction. New SIGNORILE InMax Weber, Roscher and Knies: The Logical The Free Press; Toronto: Collier-MacMillan, Problems York: of Historical 1975. to a Unified in Relation Behavior. Theory of the Structure of Human of Linguistics, Summer Institute 1954. Calif.: Glendale, vols.). a theory of the structure of human behavior. In D. Hymes Pike, K. Towards (Ed.). Language New York: Harper & Row, Culture and Society. 1964, 54-62. K. Pike, Language M. Planck, Polanyi, M. Toronto (2 in 1963. (Originally The Philosophy 1936.) of Physics. New York: Norton, published, of Chicago Press; Toronto: of Personal Knowledge. Chicago: University University Polanyi, M. 1958. Press, The Tacit Dimension. Garden Polanyi, M. The structure consciousness. N.Y.: Doubleday, In Marjorie Grene Sapir, E. Selective Writings. 1949. California Press, D. G. Mandelbaum (Ed.). Berkeley Schutz, A. On Phenomenology 1970. of Chicago Press, Schutz, A. The Phenomenology and Social Knowledge. K. R. Popper, of City, 1966. (Ed.). The Anatomy of of Massachusetts Press, 1969, 315-328. University New York: Harper & Row; Torchbook and Refutations. edition, Conjectures Amherst: 1965. Toronto: Tenbruck, Relations. & Los Angeles: H. R. Wagner (Ed.). Chicago: of University University Eds. and trans.). (G. Walsh & F. Lehnert, of the Social World. 1972. (Originally Heinemann, 1967.) published, of science: A case reopened. and the sociology F. H. Max Weber Zeitschrift f?r 312-320. 1974,5, Soziologie, T. Parsons Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Weber, M. The Protestant (trans.). London: Goe, 1930. (Reprinted Allen, & Unwin, 1976.) Weber, M. The Methodology (E. A. Shils & H. A. Finch, Eds. and trans.). of the Social Sciences. 1949. 111.:The Free Press, Glencoe, Weber, M. Riedel, Weber, M. G. Neuwirth, and Social Foundations & J. The Rational (D. Martindale, of Music. Illinois University 1958. (a) Southern Press, Eds, and trans.). Carbondale: From Max Weber. (H. H. Gerth & C. W. Mills, Eds. and trans.). New York: Oxford Press, University M. Economy Weber, Weber, M. Roscher 1958. (b) and Society. & C. Wittich (Eds.). New Problems Logical of Historical Free Press; Toronto: Collier-MacMillan, G. Roth and Knies: (trans.). New York: The P. The Idea of a Social A. The Physics Wood, of Music. Winch, (Ed.). Max Weber. Science. York: Yasser, J. A Theory of Evolving E. The French Republican Zerubavel, 1977, 42, calendar 867-877. 1968. Bedminster, G. Oakes Economics. 1975. 1958. Press, Bowsher. London: Methuen, Humanities by J. M. Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Englewood New York: American Tonality. Library D. H. Review, New (6th Ed.). Revised Wrong, Sociological York: The A case study 1962. 1970. of Musicology, in the sociology of time. American