Terms for eternity : αἰώνιος and ἀΐδιος in classical and Christian texts

Terms for Eternity: afi≈niow and é ˝d i o w in Classical and Christian Texts ◆ 21 Ilaria RAMELLI and David KONSTAN Università Cattolica di Milano / Brown University ilaria.ramelli@virgilio.it / dkonstan@brown.edu RESUMEN: Este artículo estudia los usos de dos términos del griego antiguo —afi≈niow y é˝diow— comúnmente traducidos ambos por “eterno”, desde sus apariciones más tempranas en la poesía y en la filosofía pre-socrática hasta la versión de la Biblia de los Setenta, el Nuevo Testamento y los escritos del teólogo cristiano Orígenes. Examina, pues, el origen de la idea de un tiempo que se extiende infinitamente (normalmente indicado por é˝diow), y el novedoso concepto inventado por Platón de una eternidad atemporal (a veces descrita con afi≈niow). Argumenta, además, que en la Biblia griega afi≈niow, en contraste con é˝diow, no significa necesariamente eternidad absoluta. Dado que solamente afi≈niow, y jamás é˝diow, se aplica al castigo en el otro mundo, Orígenes pudo encontrar un apoyo en esta distinción para su hipótesis de la salvación universal y de la duración finita del infierno. *** ABSTRACT: This paper surveys the uses of two ancient Greek terms —afi≈niow and é˝diow— commonly translated as “eternal”, from their earliest occurrences in poetry and pre-Socratic philosophy down through the Septuagint and the New Testament, and culminating in the Christian theologian Origen. It examines the rise of the idea of infinitely extended time (generally denoted by é˝diow), and Plato’s innovative introduction of a concept of a timeless eternity (sometimes described as afi≈niow). It is argued that in the Greek Bible, afi≈niow, as opposed to é˝diow, does not necessarily denote absolute eternity. Since only afi≈niow, and never é˝diow, is applied to punishment in the afterlife, Origen could find support in this usage for his doctrine of universal salvation and the finite duration of hell. PALABRAS CLAVE: é˝diow, afi≈niow, Biblia, Christian Texts, Classical Texts, Eternity, Origen. RECEPCIÓN: 9 de agosto de 2006. ACEPTACIÓN: 26 de septiembre de 2006. Noua tellus, 24 2, 2006

Terms for Eternity: afi≈niow and é ˝d i o w in Classical and Christian Texts ◆ 23 Ilaria RAMELLI and David KONSTAN In this article, we offer a preliminary introduction to the research we are undertaking into the uses of two ancient Greek terms that are commonly translated as “eternal”. The terms are afi≈niow and é˝diow. Neither word, as it happens, is to be found in the Homeric epics or in the major poems of Hesiod (Theogony and Works and Days), although the noun afi≈n, from which afi≈niow derives, is very common, mainly in the sense of a “life” or “lifetime”. So far as we can judge, é˝diow enters into Greek sooner, whereas afi≈niow first occurs, surprisingly enough, in Plato. As we point out, Plato’s introduction of the term is philosophically significant, as is the fact that Aristotle eschewed it completely in his own copious writings. The subsequent history of these terms, and the dance in which they engage with each other throughout Greek literature and philosophy, is fascinating in itself, but the real pay-off, as will appear, is in the way these terms are employed in the Septuagint and the New Testament, and thereafter in Christian writers who are usually equally familiar with the connotations of these words both in the pagan tradition and in Scripture. What is more, a great deal proves to be at stake in how these two terms are interpreted: in fact, nothing less than the prospect of the eternal damnation of sinners versus the universal salvation of all in the end. These are big issues, needless to say, and much hangs, in this case, on the results of careful philological and lexical investigation. Thus, what may seem to be a dry investigation of subtle terminological Noua tellus, 24 2, 2006

distinctions proves to be a key to understanding ancient philosophical and religious thought. The notion of “eternity” is not simple, in part because “eternity” has multiple senses, in part too because some of these significances are not immediately self-evident, and involve a high level of philosophical abstraction. On the one hand, terms for “eternal” may bear the loose sense of “a very long time”, as in the English “always”, without implying a rigorous notion of infinitely extended time. Even at this level, the Greek adverb afie¤, like the English “always”, has at least two distinct connotations, referring both to an indefinitely prolonged stretch of time, equivalent to the English “forever” (“I will always love you”), and to an action that is regularly repeated (“he always comes late to class”). And again, there are intermediate uses, for example, “the house has always been on that street”, meaning that, as long as the house has existed, it has been in the same place, without any implication of unlimited duration. On the other hand, “eternal” may signify a strictly boundless extent of time, that is, greater than any numerical measure one can assign. This latter description is itself imprecise, of course. It may mean nothing more than “countless”, that is, too large to grasp, or grasp easily. The Epicureans, indeed, speak of an order of magnitude that is neither finite nor infinite, which they define as “incomprehensible but not absolutely infinite”: an example in nature is the speed of atoms travelling in a void. But eternal time is more commonly understood to be strictly endless, with no termination at all. Even on this more rigorous conception, for which modern mathematics can render a precise definition, there are two senses in which time may be said to be eternal. It may, as some thinkers both ancient and modern have maintained, have a beginning but no end (or, though this is a rare view, an end but no beginning); or time may, as others have held, have neither a beginning nor an end, but extend infinitely into the past and the future. What is more, in addition

to all these varieties of “eternal”, the adjective has been appropriated also to denote something like “timelessness”, a changeless state that has no duration and hence is not subject to time at all. This sense too is attested in classical thought, although it is not characteristic of popular usage. We begin with a brief review of eternity in the presocratic thinkers. Ps.-Plutarch, Strom., 2, ascribes to Anaximander1 the idea that corruption and genesis occur in cycles §j épe¤rou afi«now, “from an infinite time”, but these are surely not Anaximander’s own words. Similarly, Hippolytus Refutatio omnium heresium cites Heraclitus’ words, “The Thunderbolt steers everything”,2 and goes on to explain that Heraclitus “calls the eternal fire ‘Thunderbolt’ ”: keraunÚn tÚ pËr l°gvn tÚ afi≈nion). Similar usages are ascribed to the Pythagoreans,3 but these again are clearly later inventions. In contrast to afi≈niow, the adjective é˝diow is attested in the sense of “eternal” or “perpetual” as early as the Homeric Hymn to Hestia4 and the Hesiodic Shield of Heracles,5 but in neither case does the expression imply a technical sense of “eternal.” With the Presocratics, however, the term é˝diow in the sense of “eternal” seems to come into its own, in a series of testimonies beginning with Anaximander and continuing on down to Melissus and beyond, although here again one must be careful to distinguish between paraphrases and original terminology. For Anaximander, any of the attributed sentences would, taken alone, be of doubtful authority, for example Testimony 12A12 D-K, which reports that Anaximander held that a principle more ancient than water is “perpetual movement” 1 Cf. 12A10 D-K. 2 Cf. fr. 22B64 D-K. Cf. John Lydus, On the Months, 2.8 = Ocellus, 48.8 D-K; Stobaeus, Ecl., 1.20.2 = 44B21 D-K. 3 4

(tØn é˝dion k¤nhsin); taken together, the several passages perhaps suggest that Anaximander himself may have applied the adjective é˝diow to motion. For Xenophanes we have attestations of his use of é˝diow in the sense not only of “indestructible” or “immortal” but also that of ég°nhtow, “ungenerated”;6 Xenophanes argues here that “either there exists nothing besides god, or all other things too are é˝dia.” Again, the convergence of the various accounts suggests that Xenophanes may in fact have employed the adjective é˝diow in reference to god or the universe conceived of as a single whole. Two testimonies concerning Heraclitus cite é˝diow as referring to the perpetual movement of things that are eternal and to the cyclical fire (tÚ periodikÚn pËr), which is god.7 Heraclitus’ use of the term é˝diow in connection with cyclical phenomena is particularly noteworthy, for in later texts recurring or periodic events tend to be described rather by the word afi≈niow. With Empedocles, we have the use of the term é˝diow in his Kayarmo¤, guaranteed by the meter: “there is a thing of Necessity, an ancient decree of the gods, eternal”.8 Aetius9 informs us —according to a supplement by Diels— that Empedocles maintained that the “One” was “spherical, eternal, and immobile.” Among the Eleatics, Parmenides is said to have described the “all” as é˝diow, in that it is ungenerated and imperishable.10 As for Melissus, Simplicius11 provides what appears to be a direct quotation affirming that “nothing that has a beginning and end is either eternal [é˝dion] or infinite.” It is worth noting that nowhere is the term afi≈niow ever attributed to the Eleatics. There is no reliable evidence for the usage of the 6 Cf. Test. 21A28 D-K. 7 Cf. Aetius, 1.7.22 = Test. 8 D-K; cf. Aristotle, De caelo, 1.10, 279b12 ff. = Test. 10 D-K. 8 Cf. fr. 31B115, vv. 1-2. 9 Cf. 1.7.8 = Test. 32 D-K. Cf. Eusebius, Praep. Evang., 1.8.5 = Test. 22 D-K. 11 Cf. in Phys., 110.2 = fr. 30B4 D-K.

early Pythagoreans in this regard, though later writers ascribed the term to them. According to Simplicius,12 Diogenes of Apollonia held that the air is eternal (é˝dion) and infinite. Simplicius cites the actual words of Diogenes13 to the effect that air “is a body eternal and immortal [é˝dion ka‹ éyãnaton]”.14 Finally, Democritus too argued, according to Simplicius,15 that time was é˝diow, on the grounds that it was ungenerated, and, according to Aristotle,16 that the whole of things too was eternal (é˝dion tÚ pçn). In addition, a fragment of Aristotle’s treatise On Democritus17 preserved by Simplicius,18 informs us that the atoms, according to Democritus, were also eternal by nature, as well as small and infinite in number. It would appear, in sum, that the term of art for eternal things —all that is ungenerated and imperishable— among cosmological thinkers in the period prior to Plato was é˝diow, never afi≈niow. In addition, é˝diow is the standard adjective meaning “eternal” in non-philosophical discourse of the fifth century as well. When we come to Plato, we find uses of both adjectives, afi≈niow and é˝diow, in the sense of “eternal”. Thus, in the pseudo-Platonic Definitions, é˝dion is defined as that which exists throughout all time, and is uncreated and not subject to corruption.19 In the Axiochus,20 we read of the “everlasting punishments” (afid¤oiw timvr¤aiw) of those great sinners, like 12 Cf. in Phys., 25.1 ff. = Test. 64A5 citing Theophrastus, Views of the Physicists. 13 Cf. 153.17 ff. = fr. 7 D-K. 14 Cf. also fr. 8 D-K. 15 Cf. in Phys., 1153.22 ff. = Test. 68A71 D-K. 16 Cf. Mete., 2.3, 356b4 = Test. 100 D-K. 17 Cf. fr. 208 Rose. 18 Cf. in De cael., 294.33ff. Heib. = Test. 37 D-K. 19 Cf. Def., 411A1-2.

the Danaids and Tantalus, who have been condemned to the underworld; for the ever-repeated devouring and regeneration of the entrails of Tityus, however, the adverb afivn¤vw is employed,21 perhaps suggesting cycles rather than eternal linear time. It is in the Timaeus, however, that Plato enters most fully into the question of eternity, and here we find é˝diow six times, afi≈n four times, and afi≈niow twice. Plato introduces the concept22 in reference to the model that the demiurge followed in creating the sensible universe by looking “to the eternal” (prÚw tÚ é˝dion, bis). This is the first occurrence in Greek literature, it would appear, of the nominalized adjective. Then, in a crucial passage, Plato remarks that the created universe was seen to be moving and living, an image of the eternal gods (t«n éÛd¤vn ye«n),23 and adds that it was itself an “eternal living thing” (z“on é˝dion).24 Plato goes on to say that it was the nature of the living thing to be eternal (toË z–ou fÊsiw §tÊgxanen oÔsa afi≈niow)25 —note the shift of vocabulary here— but that this quality could not be attached to something that was begotten (gennhtÒw). The creator therefore decided to make “a kind of moving image of eternity” (efik∆ dÉ §penÒei kinhtÒn tina afi«now),26 and so as he arranged the universe he made “an eternal image moving according to number of the eternity remaining in one” (m°nontow afi«now §n •n‹ katÉ ériymÚn fioËsan afi≈nion efikÒna),27 and this he called “time”. Like the universe, time itself can be undone, but the model or paradeigma is “of a sempiternal nature” (t∞w diaiv21 Cf. 371E7. 22 Cf. 29A3, 5. 23 Cf. 37C6. 24 Cf. 37D1. 25 Cf. 37D3. 26

n¤aw fÊsevw),28 existing “for all eternity” (pãnta afi«na).29 Finally, the fixed stars are said to be “divine living things and eternal” (é˝dia).30 On the one hand, é˝diow and afi≈niow appear to be virtually interchangeable: the model for the universe is “an eternal living thing” (z“on é˝dion) and its nature is eternal (toË z–ou fÊsiw oÔsa afi≈niow). Both “eternity” (afi«na) and “eternal being” (é˝diow oÈs¤a) are tenseless, without distinction of past, present and future. And yet, Plato seems to have found in the term afi≈n a special designation for his notion of eternity as timeless, one that could substitute for the nominal phrase tÚ é˝dion; and with this new sense of afi≈n, afi≈niow too seems to have come into its own (along with diai≈niow) as a signifier for what is beyond time. It was Plato who first articulated this idea of eternity, and he would appear to have created a terminology to give it expression. Although we cannot go into detail here, we may note that Plotinus and Porphyry further developed Plato’s conception of a timeless eternity —a view that remained specific to Platonism and closely related schools in antiquity. Aristotle, as we have said, seems never to use the term afi≈niow, and afi≈n only occasionally, most often in the traditional sense of “life”. At the same time, there are nearly 300 instances of é˝diow, which is Aristotle’s preferred word to designate things eternal. It is clear that Aristotle was not moved to adopt Plato’s novel terminology, whether because he perceived some difference between his own concept of eternity and that of his teacher, or because he felt that afi≈niow was an unnecessary addition to the philosophical vocabulary, given the respectability of é˝diow as the appropriate technical term. We may note too that the same disproportion we have 28 Cf. 38B8; 39E2. 29

observed in Aristotle in the use of the two terms is reflected as well in the Aristotelian commentators, for example Aspasius, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Simplicius. In the Stoics, é˝diow occurs over thirty times in the sense of that which endures forever. It is applied to bodies and matter, the ˆnta or realities that truly exist according to Stoic materialism, and above all to god or Zeus. To the extent that the Stoics employed afi≈niow and its cognate afi≈n, however, there is either a connection with their specific view of cosmic cycles, as opposed to strictly infinite duration, or else the noun occurs in phrases indicating a long period of time or an eternity. As for later Stoicism, we may note that Posidonius31 employs afi≈niow in connection with cyclical events that continue over time, such as tides. In this, Posidonius is in accord with single use of the term that is cited for the Old Stoa. Also, the adjective afi≈niow can refer to the condition of life in the world to come, as in the mention32 of the view that death is an evil “because of lasting terrifying retributions and punishments in the underworld” (timvr¤aiw afivn¤oiw ÍpÚ g∞n ka‹ kolasmo‹w frik≈desi); since the Stoics rejected the notion of a permanent afterlife, it is not dignified with the epithet é˝diow, which pertains rather to truly eternal elements in the Stoic system. The Epicureans, in turn, regularly employ é˝diow to designate the eternity of such imperishable constituents of the universe as atoms and void. In the Letter to Herodotus,33 on the other hand, Epicurus uses afi≈niow in reference to the future life that non-Epicureans expect, with its dreadful punishments: that is, to an afterlife in which Epicureans do not believe, and which does not deserve the name “eternal” (é˝diow), properly reserved for truly perpetual elements. So too, in Principal Doctrine, 28, Epicurus affirms that “nothing terrible is afi≈niow 31 Cf. fr. 44a Theiler. 32 Cf. fr. 441e Theiler.

or longlasting” (mhy¢n afi≈nion e‰nai deinÚn mhd¢ poluxrÒnion), where afi≈niow clearly bears the sense of “life-long”. Given the prevalence of the term é˝diow in Greek literature down through the Hellenistic period, it comes as something of a surprise that in the Septuagint, é˝diow is all but absent, occurring in fact only twice, both times in late books written originally in Greek: 4 Maccabees, 10: 15.2, and Wisdom, 7: 26.1. In addition, there is one instance of the abstract noun, éÛdiÒthw, again in Wisdom,34 attested prior to this only in Aristotle (the word occurs 11 times, however, in Philo). On the other hand, afi≈niow occurs with impressive frequency, along with afi≈n; behind both is the Hebrew colâm. A few examples of its uses must suffice. In Gen., 9: 16, the perpetual covenant with human beings after the flood, commemorated by the rainbow, is termed diayÆkh afi≈niow, just as in Gen., 7: 13.19, it is that between God and Abraham and his descendants; in Ex., 31: 16, it is the compact between God and Israel sanctified by the observance of the Sabbath, which in turn is called “an eternal sign” (shme›on afi≈nion) of this covenant across the generations and ages (afi«new). In Is., 63: 12, we see the sense of afi≈niow relative to afi≈n, understood as a time in the remote past or future, in accord with the original significance of colâm in the Hebrew: §mnÆsyh ≤mer«n afivn¤vn, “he remembered days long past”, in the time of Moses. In general, the sense of afi≈niow is that of something lasting over the centuries, or relating to remote antiquity, rather than absolute eternity. Now, when the same term is employed in reference to God, e.g., YeÚw afi≈niow (“eternal God”),35 the question arises: does afi≈niow mean simply “long-lasting” in these contexts as well, or is a clear idea of God’s everlastingness present in at least some of these passages? Take, for example, Ex., 3: 15, rendered in the RSV as follows: 34 Cf. 2: 23.2. Cf. Gen., 21: 33.

God also said to Moses, “Say this to the people of Israel, The Lord, the God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, has sent me to you”: this is my name for ever [afi≈nion], and thus I am to be remembered throughout all generations [gene«n genea›w]. The emphasis on successive generations, past and future, suggests perhaps that afi≈niow here connotes repeated ages, rather than a strictly infinite period of time. Many of the other examples come from relatively late texts, but even in these it is difficult to decide which sense is intended, in the absence of the kind of precise language to be found in the philosophers but alien to the Hebrew Scriptures. In some cases, moreover, the reference may be to the next epoch or afi≈n, rather than to an infinite time as such. Of particular interest is the mention in Tobias36 of the place of the afterlife as a tÒpow afi≈niow, the first place in the Hebrew Bible in which afi≈niow unequivocally refers to the world to come.37 In 2 Mac., 7: 9, the doctrine of resurrection is affirmed and afi≈niow is used with reference to life in the future world, efiw afi≈nion énab¤vsin zv∞w ≤mçw énastÆsei. In sum, the Septuagint almost invariably employs afi≈niow, in association with the various senses of afi≈n, in the sense of a remote or indefinite or very long period of time (like colâm), with the possible connotation of a more absolute sense of “eternal” when the term is used in reference to God, from whom it borrows, as it were, its more abstract significance. In certain late books, like those of Tobias and the Maccabees, there is a reference to life in the afi≈n, understood in an eschatological sense as the world to come, in opposition to the present one (kÒsmow, kairÒw). The adjective é˝diow occurs, as we have noted, only twice in the Septuagint. In Wisdom, which is saturated with the 36 Cf. Is., 33: 14.

Greek philosophical lexicon, Wisdom is defined38 as épaÊgasma fvtÚw éÛd¤ou, “a reflection of the eternal light” that is God. In 4 Mac., 12: 12, an impious tyrant is threatened with “fire afi≈nion” for the entire age or world to come (efiw ˜lon tÚn afi«na). But here we find the expression b¤ow é˝diow or “eternal life” as well (tÚn é˝dion t«n eÈseb«n b¤on), in reference to the afterlife of the martyrs;39 this blessed state, moreover, is opposed to the lasting destruction of their persecutor in the world to come (tÚn afi≈nion toË turãnnou ˆleyron, ibid.). This contrast between the parallel but antithetical expressions ˆleyrow afi≈niow and b¤ow é˝diow is notable. Both adjectives refer to the afterlife, that is, a future afi≈n, but whereas retribution is described with the more general and polysemous term afi≈niow, to life in the beyond is applied the more technical term é˝diow, denoting, at least in classical philosophy, a strictly endless condition. In the New Testament, when the reference is to God, afi≈niow may be presumed to signify “eternal” in the sense of “perpetual”, as at Heb., 9: 14, where it is applied also to the Holy Spirit (pneËma afi≈nion). Also perpetual is Christ’s reign 2 Pt., 1: 11, afi≈nion basile¤an, and Christ himself is “the eternal life” (tØn zvØn tØn afi≈nion) that was with the Father in 1 Jo., 1: 2. Nevertheless, the precise sense of afi≈niow in the New Testament, as in the Hebrew Bible, cannot be resolved with the help of explicit definitions or statements equating it with terms such as “ungenerated” and “imperishable,” of the sort found in the philosophers and in Philo of Alexandria. Hence, the positions adopted by religious scholars in this controversy have embraced both extremes. On the one hand, William Russell Straw,40 affirms of afi≈n that, in the Septuagint, 38 39 Cf. 7: 26. Cf. 4 Mac., 10: 15. Cf. Afi≈n and Afi≈niow: A Word Study of their Most Important Occurrences, Diss. The Evangelical Theological College, Dallas, Texas, 1935, p. 303.

it is never found with the meaning of “life”, “lifetime”, proving the great advance in its use under the hand of God... The majority of instances can bear only the meaning “eternal...” Of the one hundred two occurrences of afi≈n in the New Testament, sixty-six unmistakably refer to eternity, a proportion of threefifths to the whole. This is too great a proportion with which to trifle. As for afi≈niow, “It may be rendered ‘eternal’ or ‘everlasting’ in every occurrence”.41 Peder Margido Myhre, on the contrary, argues that the Platonic sense of the term as “metaphysical endlessness” is entirely absent in the New Testament, and concludes: As afi≈n in the New Testament is limited to denote the ages of the past, present, and future of this world, so the adjective should follow that usage except when modifying God. Consequently, these words which do not mean “endless” cannot prove the everlastingness of God, for then they would also prove the everlastingness of sinners.42 Myhre goes on to affirm in with some passion: Since, in all Greek literature, sacred and profane, afi≈niow is applied to finite things overwhelmingly more frequently than to things immortal, no fair critic can assert with any degree of probability that when it is qualifying the future punishment it has the stringent meaning of metaphysical endlessness... The idea of eternal torment introduced into these words of the Bible by a theological school that was entirely ignorant of the Greek language would make God to be a cruel tyrant, compared to whom the most ingenious inventors of torment in modern concentration camps would be mere amateurs.43 41 Cf. ib., p. 304. Cf. Myhre, The Concept of Olam, Aion and Aionios in the Light of the Biblical and Certain Other Related Languages, Diss. Pacific Union College, Angwin, California, 1947, pp. 159-160. Cf. ib., pp. 160-161.

We turn now to the two uses of the more strictly philosophical term é˝diow in the New Testament. The first44 refers unproblematically to the power and divinity of God: ¥ te é˝diow aÈtoË dÊnamiw ka‹ yeiÒthw. In the second occurrence, however,45 é˝diow is employed of eternal punishment —not that of human beings, however, but of evil angels, who are imprisoned in darkness (ÍpÚ zÒfon) “with eternal chains” (desmo›w éÛd¤oiw). But there is a qualification: “until the judgment of the great day” (efiw kr¤sin megãlhw ≤m°raw). The angels, then, will remain chained up until Judgment Day; we are not informed of what will become of them afterwards. Why é˝diow of the chains, instead of afi≈niow, used in the next verse of the fire of which the punishment of the Sodomites is an example? Perhaps because they continue from the moment of the angels’ incarceration, at the beginning of the world, until the judgment that signals the entry into the new afi≈n: thus, the term indicates the uninterrupted continuity throughout all time in this world —this could not apply to human beings, who do not live through the entire duration of the present universe; to them applies rather the sequence of afi«new or generations. We conclude with a glance at Origen’s use of afi≈niow and é˝diow.46 In Origen, there are many passages that refer to the afi≈niow life, in the formula characteristic of the New Testament: the emphasis seems to be not so much on eternity, that is, temporal infinity, as on the life in the next world or afi≈n. A particularly clear instance is (we believe) Philocalia, 1.30. 21-23, where the afi≈niow life is defined as that which will occur in the future afi≈n. Origen affirms that God gave Scripture “body for those who existed before us [i.e., the Hebrews], soul for us, and spirit [pneËma] for those in the afi≈n to come, who 44 Cf. Rm., 1: 20. 45 Cf. Jud., 6. In our larger project we carry our investigation down to the time of Dionysius the Ps.-Areopagite.

will obtain a life afi≈niow”. So too, in the Commentary on Matthew,47 the future life (afi≈niow) is contrasted with that in the present (prÒskairow). Again, Origen in a series of passages opposes the ephemeral sensible entities of the present time (prÒskaira) to the invisible and lasting objects of the world to come (afi≈nia). In the Commentary on John,48 Origen explains: “the expression ‘And he gathers the fruit for afi≈niow life’ means either that what is gathered is the fruit of afi≈niow life or that it itself is afi≈niow life.” In the Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, 22.11, in turn, Origen writes: “I believe that punishments are given as due and as retribution for sins. That is why even the Apostle said that death is the wages of sin. But the afi≈niow life is no longer these wages and, as it were, what is due on the part of God, but rather a gift of grace.” Here life in the afi≈n is consistent with punishment that is prior, but does not endure in the apocatastasis. Consistent with the usage of the Septuagint and the New Testament, Origen also applies the adjective afi≈niow to attributes of God. In one particularly illuminating passage,49 Origen speaks of the eternal God (toË afivn¤ou yeoË) and of the concealment of the mystery of Jesus over afi≈niow stretches of time (xrÒnoiw afivn¤oiw), where the sense is plainly “from time immemorial.” So too, at Commentary on Matthew, 15.31. 37, Origen mentions the “days of the afi≈n”, and “afi≈nia years” (¶th afi≈nia), that is, very long periods of time, and the phrase efiw toÁw afi«naw here signifies “for a very long time”. In Origen, the adjective é˝diow occurs much less frequently than afi≈niow, and when it is used, it is almost always in reference to God or His attributes; it presumably means “eternal” in the strict sense of limitless in time, as in, e.g., 47 Cf. 15.25. Cf. 13.46.299. 49 Cf. Commentary on Romans (cod. Athon. Laura 184 B64), 16.26.

Selected Passages in the Commentary on the Psalms, vol. 12, p. 1560.35 PG: ≤ m¢n afisyhtØ zvØ oÈk é˝diow, tÚ d¢ ¶leow toË Kur¤ou é˝dion, “perceptible life is not eternal, but the mercy of the Lord is eternal”:50 é˝dion ka‹ éparãtrepton ka‹ éyãnaton, “eternal, immutable, immortal” [of God], commenting on the expression, sÁ m°neiw efiw tÚn afi«na, “You endure for eternity.” In On Principles, 3.3.5, Origen gives a clear sign that he understands afi≈n in the sense of a succession of afi«new prior to the final apocatastasis, at which point one arrives at the true eternity, that is, éÛdiotÆw. Eternity in the strict sense pertains, according to Origen, to the apocatastasis, not to the previous sequence of ages or afi«new. So too, Origen explains that Christ “reigned without flesh prior to the ages, and reigned in the flesh in the ages”.51 Again, the “coming afi≈n” indicates the next world (§p‹ tÚn m°llonta afi«na), where sinners will indeed be consigned to the pËr afi≈nion, that is, the fire that pertains to the future world; it may well last for a long time, but it is not, for Origen, eternal.52 In this connection, it seems particularly significant that Origen calls the fire of damnation pËr afi≈nion, but never pËr é˝dion.53 The explanation is that he does not consider this flame to be absolutely eternal: it is afi≈nion because it belongs to the next world, as opposed to the fire we experience in this present world, and it lasts as long as the afi≈new do, in their succession. It does not, however, endure into the éÛdiÒthw, that is, in the absolute eternity of the final apocatastasis. Similarly, Origen never speaks of yãnatow é˝diow, or of é˝dia punishments and torments and the like, although he does speak of 50 Cf. Fragments of the Commentary on the Psalms, Ps 101.13.7. 51 Cf. afivn¤vw, adverb: Selected Passages on the Psalms, 12.1676, and Commentary on John, 10.30.187: épostalhsom°nouw katå tÚn metå toËton afi«na. 52 Cf. Selected Passages on the Psalms, 12.1156. 53 Cf. On Principles, 3.1.6; Homilies on Jeremiah, 19.15; Selections on the Psalms, 12.1156, where the context specifies that the afi≈nion fire pertains to “the afi≈n to come” (§p‹ tÚn m°llonta afi«na).

yãnatow afi≈niow,54 eternal chastisements (kolãseiw afi≈nioi),55 and so forth. Origen was deeply learned in both the Bible and the classical philosophical tradition; what is more, he maintained that damnation was not eternal, but served rather to purify the wicked, who would in the end be saved in the universal apocatastasis. His careful deployment of the adjectives afi≈niow and é˝diow reflects, we have argued, both his sensitivity to the meaning of the latter among the Greek philosophers, and the distinction that is apparently observed in the use of these terms in the Bible. For Origen, this was further evidence in Scripture for the doctrine of universal salvation. BIBLIOGRAPHY BRADSHAW, D. H., “In What Sense is the Prime Mover Eternal?”, Ancient Philosophy, 17, 1997, pp. 359-369. CASADIO, G., “From Hellenistic Aion to Gnostic Aiones”, in D. Zeller (ed.), Religion im Wandel der Kosmologien, Bern, Peter Lang, 1999, pp. 175-190. CASADIO, I. G., “Aion”, Encyclopedia of Religion, 1.2, Detroit and New York, MacMillan Reference Books, 2005, pp. 207-210. DEGANI, E., Aion, Bologna, Patron, 2001. FOLLIET, G., “L’ambiguïté du concept biblique aion”, Wiener Studien, 114, 2001, pp. 575-596. KEIZER, H., Life, Time, Eternity. A Study of AIVN in Greek Literature, Amsterdam, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1999. MCGUIRE, J., and S. STRANGE, “Plot., Enn., III, 7: On Eternity & Time”, Ancient Philosophy, 8, 1988, pp. 251-271. MYHRE, The Concept of Olam, Aion and Aionios in the Light of the Biblical and Certain Other Related Languages, Diss. Pacific Union College, California, Angwin, 1947. 54 Cf. Selected Passages on the Psalms, 13.824; Selected Passages on Ezechiel, 13.824. 55 Cf., e.g., Fragments of the Commentary on John, 42; Against Celsus, 3.78, 8.48; Homilies on Jeremiah, 20.4; Fragments of the Commentary on John, 42; Selections from the Commentary on Ezekiel, 13.793.

MOHR, R., “Plato on Time & Eternity”, Ancient Philosophy, 6, 1986, pp. 39-46. OTTAVIANI, M., “L’eternità in Plotino”, Acme, 51, 1998, pp. 213-229. RAMELLI, I., “Aion”, in V. Melchiorre (ed.), Enciclopedia Filosofica, Milan, Bompiani, 2006. ROBINSON, T. M., “The Timaeus on Types of Duration”, Illinois Classical Studies, 11, 1986, pp. 143-151. SASSE, H., “Aion”, Grande Lessico del Nuovo Testamento, Brescia, Paideia, 1965, pp. 531-563. STRANGE, S., “Plotinus on the Nature of Eternity and Time”, in L. P. Schrenck (ed.), Aristotle in Late Antiquity, Washington, The Catholic University of America Press, 1994, pp. 22-53.