Iamblichus on light and the trasparant

AGus SAYS Transparent JOHN F. FINAMORE The nature of light poses a dilemma for neoplatonists, who are committed to the view that the teachings of Plato and Aristotle are consistent.' Plato (Tim. 45b2-d3) states that light is corporeal; Aristotle (De an. 418b13-17) that it is not. OF the neoplatonists who discuss the nature of light, Proclus alone claims that it is corporeal, while Plotinus, Simplicius, Philoponus, and probably Syrianus as well think it is incorporeal.? In his surviving works, lamblichus does not explicitly discuss an examination of Julian’s Hymn to King Helios (133c-134d) the nature of light, but along with some works of the later neoplatonists and Jamblichus’ De Mysteriis III will suggest that Iamblichus’ theory of light represents a compromise between the Platonic and Aristotelian theories and influenced Proclus” unique theory. Plato in his Timaeus (45b2-d3) states that vision occurs when the fire that produces the gentle light (@@¢ fjepov, b5) of the day joins together with the pure fire emanating from our eyes (td tig yeas peSpa, c3). These form a single body (Ev o@po, c4) and vision occurs. For Aristotle, on the other hand, light is the actualisation of the transparent qua transparent (évépyeix 100 Siagavots 7] dt0avec, De an. 418b9-10), and is thercfore incorporeal. The transparent is “what is visible not simply in and of itself but because of the color of something clse; examples include air, water, and many solids’ (Siagavés 88 ASyo O Xow pev dpatéy, od} Kad’ adtd 8 Spatév we anAGs elmety, GAAG bt’ GAASTPLOV YoOLU. covodtov 88 gotiv a&tip kai fSwp Kal mOAAG tHvV otepe@v, 418b4-7). The transparent is, therefore, the clear medium through which vision can occur. Aristotle explicitly states that light is not fire or any body at all and argues against philosophers like Empedocles and Plato who think that vision occurs by an emanation from a body (b14-15).? The evidence that Iamblichus agreed with the Aristotelian doctrine that light is incorporeal is found in Julian’s Hymn to King Helios.’ Julian discusses the role of the three ‘suns’ in the three neoplatonic universes: the Good in the noctic realm, Helios in the noeric realm, and the sun in the visible realm. In discussing sunlight, Julian mentions the Aristotelian doctrine of light in the transparent (133c- 134d). Light is ‘in a way the incorporeal divine form of the actualised transparent’ (e105 . Compatov t <Kal> Gefov tod Kat évépyerav dSiapavotc, 133d1-3). Vision occurs only when the transparent is illuminated. The transparent, Julian says, is a sort of matter (SAn) underlying bodies; light is its form (134a3-5; cp. 134c1-d5).

That is to say, light makes what is present in the transparent visible. Thus far Julian’s explanation seems to be consistent with Aristotle’s. There is a difference, however. When Aristotle claims that light is incorporeal, he says that it is an actualisation (évépyeva), ie. a positive statc that either exists or does not. He does not believe, therefore, that light can travel (De an. 418b20-26). Furthermore, there is no continuum of corporcality; light is simply incorporeal. Iamblichus thinks differently.* For Julian says (134a5-b7): Tamblichus on Light and the Transparent 57 subsides within them (5v eic tO etoa, lines 30-1). But this is not true of light, which is an incorporeal activity of the body. Thus, one cannot rightly say that light ‘has left’ or ‘is present,’ for an activity does not act in that way (lines 42-4), Light corresponds to the form of the luminous body and is incorporeal (35-42). Fire is a body. Plotinus uses this distinction elsewhere. At II 1.7, Plotinus states that there are different forms of fire. Citing Tim. 58c, Plotinus claims that the sun is a fire that gives off a gentle heat. “This light is a body, but a light of like nature shines from it, which we say is incorporeal’ (lines 26-8). At1 6.3, Plotinus distinguishes between Of light, which is itself incorporeal, the rays of the sun would be some sort of summit (&kpdtyg. ..ttc) and as it were flower Gonep &vO0c). Accordingly, the doctrine of the Phoenicians, who are wise and knowledgeable about divine matters, states that the sunlight that proceeds in all directions (anavtayj mpotodoav) is the undefiled évépyeu. of pure intellect. Our theory is not inconsistent with theirs since light itself is incorporeal, if one should consider that its source is not a body but the undefiled évépyete of intellect illuminating into its proper abode. It was allotted the middle of the entire heaven, and shining from there it fills the heavenly spheres with vigor and illuminates all things with a divine and undefiled light. For Jamblichus and Julian, light travels not only within our own realm but also between realms. As Lacombrade has pointed out, the first sentence of this passage with its Chaldaean vocabulary shows that the incorporeal source of light is Helios and the One beyond him.’ Light is incorporeal, Julian says, because its source is incorporeal — not because it actualises a potentially transparent medium. In fact, the very meaning of the Aristotelian term évépyewa, which Julian himself uses, has changed from ‘actuality’ to ‘activity.’ It is this pure activity of Helios that is said to illuminate into (@AAapnopévy eic) the noeric realm and by that process through the sun to fill the lower universe with light. Julian and Iamblichus, then, seem to have conceived of a higher activity being transmitted from one place (admittedly, from a noctic and from a noeric one) to another. Light travels. It also seems likely that light becomes less pure in its descent and perhaps more corporeal. For Julian allows that the rays of sunlight are, although at their summit noetic and noeric, ethereal.” It is instructive to compare Plotinus’ writings on this point. In IV 5.7, Plotinus light, which is incorporeal, and fire, which is the most subtle of bodies and nearly incorporeal (Aent6tatov 88 tv GAAOv capctov, do éyydc Ov tod dompdétov, lines 17-23), For Plotinus, then, light is an incorporeal activity. There are corporeal forms of light, e.g. the sun and fire, that somehow house this incorporeal activity. These can be said to move within or outside of the body containing them, but light itself cannot. Light does not travel. Iamblichus’ contribution to this earlier neoplatonic doctrine is, as usual, a blending of his intricate metaphysical schema with his religious doctrines. He associates the incorporeality of light with the higher, incorporeal, noetic and noeric gods. Like Plotinus, he believes that light in its pure state is incorporeal. Unlike Plotinus, he thinks that it travels from the upper realms into our own through the sun. Plotinus believes in different kinds of light. There is evidence that Iamblichus believes that light becomes more corporeal in its lower forms.'° Proclus, although he believes that light is a body, holds a theory otherwise similar to that of Iamblichus. In his Platonic Theology II 7, Proclus discusses the analogy of the Good and the sun in Plato’s Republic 6.507a6-509c2. In a passage reminiscent of Julian’s, Proclus discusses how each monad exists both in the realm before its realm and in its own realm and illuminates the entities below it; e.g. in Iamblichean terms, the noeric monad, Helios, is illuminated by the noetic monad, the Good, and passes on its light to the sensible monad, the sun (Th. PI. 11 7.44.17-45.13)."! Proclus says that Plato calls the light from the One ‘the brightest of all realities’ (Rep. 518c9) not because it participates in light but because ‘it is the cause of the light everywhere (navtcyxo6) and the source (xny1)) of every noetic, noeric, and encosmic divinity’ (48.9-14), The One for Proclus, then, does not emit light, which he considers corporeal,’ but is the incorporeal source of light. Iamblichus would agree, describes light as a non-flowing activity of a luminous body (évépyeta. ob péovca,, of course, that the One is the incorporeal source of light, but he shows no reluctance line 4) and compares it to a soul whose activity can endow a body with life.* This activity can affect an external body, Plotinus says, as an object causes a reflection the divine existence’ (etovota. tig Oelag badp—ews). As Saffrey and Westerink in a mirror (lines 44-51). The image is also called an activity, and the original acts on it without itself flowing (ob péovtos) into the reflective surface. As long as the object is there, the reflection persists. Thus, in an analogous way, a luminous body can illuminate a second body without light travelling to it. When discussing the phosphorescent bodies of animals (lines 25-37), Plotinus makes an intriguing distinction between incorporeal light and corporeal fire. These animals have fire within them. When they stretch themselves out, the fire shines outward (ExAGpnet elc tO to, line 28); when they draw themselves up, there is no light outside them. The explanation, Plotinus says, is that their contracted bodies block the fire, which then to call its emission light. Proclus concludes (48.14-15) that light is ‘participation in point out," citing Rep. 509b6-10, light can be termed ‘participation’ in the sense that just as all things on the earth obtain their existence and essence from the sun, so too all the lower gods obtain theirs from the first god. The act of illumination from on high is the act of participation as seen from below. For Iamblichus, this incorporeal light is the higher gods’ manifestation in all the lower realms. It is not visible to the eyes, but for Iamblichus as for Proclus, it is visible to the ‘eyes’ of the purified vehicle.'* Supracelestial light differs from its counterpart below. Indeed, Proclus believes in a descending scale of fire from less material to more material. In Jn Tim. 11 7.18-10.16,

Proclus takes issue with Aristotle’s doctrine that the heavens are not made of fire. corporeal compound with it because the mve6pa itself would be a body. There is not, 58 Alluding to Tim. 58c5-d1, where Plato distinguishes kinds of fire (tupdc yévn), such as flame (pA5E), the non-burning irradiation from flame that provides light, and the glowing embers of an extinguished fire, Proclus says (8.22-5): For light and flame (pA6&) are not the same, nor are flame and charcoal, but there is a descending scale (Sqeotc) of fire from up above down to the earth. Fire advances from the more immaterial, more pure, and more incorporeal to the most material and most dense bodies. Proclus believes that Aristotle has failed to consider the difference between immaterial and material fire. Heavenly fire is immaterial in the sense that it is free from sublunar matter, imperishable, and pure (9.11-15).'5 There is, therefore, a distinction to be drawn between kinds of fire, and this distinction is based upon the position and composition of fire. - Proclus again differentiates between heavenly and sublunar fire in In Tim. II 42,9-44,24, Heavenly fire is not the same as that beneath the moon but is a copy (Lippe) of the noeric fire (43.28-31).'5 Heavenly fire is pure fire (eiAixpivéc 6p, 44.6, cf. 44.1 and Tim. 45b7: nOp eiAtxpivéc); earthly fire exists by participation and materially (44.7). There is an obvious similarity with Julian’s text, where the source of sunlight is said to be the noeric god Helios. But here Proclus explicitly delineates a difference betwecn types of light based upon its materiality. We have alrcady seen that Julian considers sunlight ethereal, the equivalent of Proclus’ ‘pure fire.’ For evidence that the entire descending scale of light is lamblichean, we must turn to De Mysteriis TI. Throughout this book, Iamblichus is concerned with the kinds of sacred rites and divinations that occur through divine illumination. He gives several examples, but the basic elements of the rites are similar. The god illuminates from above. He is external to and separated from the recipient of this illumination.”” In agreement with Proclus’ statement in Th. Pl. 48.14-15, Iamblichus associates this divine illumination with the lower entity’s participation in the higher."® In his fullest account, that of the oracle of Apollo at Claros (124.10-126.4), Iamblichus explains what happens when the god illuminates the water of the shrine’s spring. It seems, Iamblichus says, that a mantic breath (rveOpo. paveircdv, 124.18) pervades (Stfcetv) the water, but such is not the case. 59 however, and cannot be a physical mixture of incorporeal light and corporeal spring water. Rather, there is what might be called interpenetration of the immaterial with the material, with no contamination of the immaterial element.’ As Iamblichus says in II 12, the divine prophetic power is present as an undifferentiated whole (GStaipetos Sdn, 129.4) in each entity that participates it.2° Under these circumstances, then, the divine power is separated from the lower realms. The recipient of their power is said to participate in it, There is no mixture or compound of the two elements. The divine light remains whole and incorporeal. Divine inspiration occurs under many guises, Iamblichus assures us, but in the end the central element in all forms of true divination is illumination by light (4 tfig abdyfig ZAAowyre, I 14.134.12). There is, however, another lower form of divination. In IIT 28-30, Iamblichus discusses what he calls the image-making art (| elSmAonojn«t) téxvn, 168.1314).?" This so-called art does not derive externally and separately from the gods but arises from the material and corporeal powers around matter and in bodics (168.6-7). Although some think that its practitioners make their images through the revolving stars (6t tHv nepinoAcbviwv cotépwv, 169.1-2), i.e. through the planetary gods, lamblichus disagrees. For whereas the heavenly gods have an infinite number of powers, one class of these is the final of all powers in them, viz., the physical. Aguin, of this class one, which is situated in the seminal reasons (Gyo. oneppatixot) and in the immobile Forms before them, in and of itself precedes [the realm of] generation; the other, situated in the perceptible and visible motions and powers and in the effluences and qualities from heaven, has dominion over all the visible cosmos. (169.4-12) Here Iamblichus provides a fascinating division of divine powers. The lowest of these is physical and concerned with the realm of generation, but even this lowest form can be further subdivided. The first class of physical powers has its source in entities above the physical gods, namely the noetic Forms and the nocric seminal reasons.2? This power is, therefore, equivalent to the description of divine illumination, whose source is also noctic and noeric. The second class of physical powers is, however, quite different. Its source is perceptible, is more immediately involved with the realm of generation, and proceeds by effluences from the visible gods. These effluences themselves seem to form a hierarchy; for, Iamblichus tells us, some Gianepoitncev odta Sractatés Kol pepiotd¢) through what participates it, but giving itself externally &mOev) and illuminating the spring, it fills it with the power of divination from itself. (124.19-125.3) of them benefit useful arts, such as medicine and gymnastics. The image-making art, however, makes use of a very obscure portion of these ecffluences that is enmeshed in the realm of generation (169.14-170.2). Far from using the revolving stars, the image-maker uses these final effluences of nature artificially (tex vik), Thus, the light of the god, which is equivalent to the rays that Julian called ‘the summit and flower’ of incorporeal light (134a5-6), is the incorporeal noeric and (170.10-13; cf. 171.2-4). Such effluences, welded together adventitiously (énixtnt6v ti ovyKeKpotytot, 171.19), are unstable, Using them for prophecy is, For the divine does not permeate in such an extended and divided way not theurgically (eoupytKH¢) (170.7-10). These effluences are mixed with matter noetic light of Helios and the One. Apollo is the separated and transcendent monad lamblichus concludes, worthless (172.11-12). of the visible realm, The power of divination comes about by a process of participation. If a mantic breath had entered the water, it would have formed a material, are unconnected with the gods. In III 30, he says: “The last of the things in generation It is important to note here that Iamblichus is not claiming that these effluences

are moved by the heavenly motions and are in sympathy with the effluences descending from them’ (173,14-16). Rather, the problem is that these effluences are more partial and divided, and further removed from their immaterial, divine source. They are, in short, compounded with matter and, hence, corporeal. The resulting images are, therefore, unstable and are untrustworthy guides to future events.’ This schema is consistent with Iamblichus’ doctrine in In Alc. fr. 8 that the effect of higher principles on lower entities diminishes as one proceeds lower in the chain. The more material a compound, the less it displays its higher element. There is evidence, then, that lamblichus like Proclus adopted a theory of degrees of materiality and corporeality in light. A reference in Simplicius’ De anima commentary helps to clarify how Iamblichus developed his theory. In De an. 133.31-5 (= Iamblichus, Jn Tim. fr. 89), Simplicius discusses Aristotle’s statement that light ‘is not fire or body at all or an effluence from any body’ (De an. 418b14-15), Simplicius believes that Aristotle has Plato’s Timaeus in mind here, and he refers the reader to lamblichus’ commentary on the Timaeus: How light is said to be the Form of fire there [i.e. in the Timaeus] and how daylight and the current that flows from the eye (td peOnpeptvov te @@¢ Kot 1 tfig Swen Pedic) having become conjoined (uprayas yevoplevov), are said to make a single body (€v o@«), one must learn from Jamblichus’ commentary on the Timaeus. (133.32-5) Tamblichus on Light and the Transparent 61 believes that planetary gods are involved with the lower powers of nature. These include a corporeal form of light. Thus, they can be responsible for the combination of two corporeal forms, like daylight and the visual ray, into a single body. This is not to deny that light, at its source, is incorporeal or even to deny that corporeal fire can emit incorporeal light, since even at its lowest level corporeal compounds have some connection to the incorporeal gods. Rather, what Iamblichus secms to have done is to combine the notion of light as an incorporeal noeric and noetic activity with the notion of lower, corporeal forms of light compounded with matter. We have seen that Plato himself differentiated different kinds of light (Tim. 58c5-7). Plotinus (II 1.7.24-28) and Simplicius (In Cael. 85.7-15)*> considered the three kinds of fire that Plato listed to be corporeal. One of the three types does not burn but provides light (Tim. 58c6-7). This was certainly taken as equivalent to the fire that does not burn but provides a gentle light (Tim. 45b4-5). Thus, lamblichus would have thought that both the daylight and the pure light from the eyes were corporeal. Plato’s theory of vision accorded with the neoplatonic view that light is corporeal in the realm of generation, lamblichus would not think that Aristotle disagreed with Plato. When Aristotle states that light (td @é&c) is not ‘fire or a body at all or the effluence from any body’ (De an. 418b14-15), Iamblichus would have interpreted him to mean that light in its purest form is not the same as corporeal fire. Aristotle’s view, therefore, would have been of prime importance in theurgic matters, where our purified vehicles with every material stain removed could be illuminated by the incorporeal light of the gods and participate in that light without Jamblichus would have been commenting upon Tim. 45b2-c5: First of the organs, they fashioned eyes that produce light and bound them [to the head] for the following reason. They fashioncd from the fire that cannot burn but provides a gentle light a body akin to the light of day. For they made the pure fire within us that is related to this [body] flow smooth and thick through our eyes, compressing the whole eye and especially the middle of it so that everything that is thicker is blocked, but the pure fire of this sort alone passes through. Accordingly, whenever there is daylight around the current that flows from the eye (ue8npepiviv 4] gag nepl 10 tig Syeas petua), then like meeting like and becoming joined together (ovpnayes yevopevov), one body (Ev cGy) is formed suitably along a direct line with the eyes. Simplicius, who believes that light is incorporeal, sends the reader of his commentary to Iamblichus’ description of a corporeal compound of daylight and ocular effluence. Iamblichus, who we know believed in the incorporeality of light, seems to have found a way to make Plato’s theory consistent with Aristotle’s, Simplicius does not explain how Jamblichus did this, but we can, I belicve, approximate lamblichus’ reasoning, The subject of the verbs in the third person plural in the Platonic passage is the younger, or planetary, gods.* This is significant. The Demiurge is the intellectual Helios and is, therefore, directly involved with immaterial light from the One. The younger gods, on the other hand, are more closely connected than the Demiurge to the realm of generation. From De Mysteriis TI, we have seen that Iamblichus forming a corporeal compound with it. Plato would be thought to have agreed with Aristotle on the incorporeality of light (as the Republic would have been assumed to show). In the end of the Timaeus, however, where the material realm is under consideration, light would rightly exist corporeally. Thus interpreted, the theories of Plato and Aristotle are not in conflict; the one complements the other.”® Notes 1. Plotinus uses Aristotelian language in IV 5.7 to define light as an évépyeta and says explicitly that it is incorporeal: do@patov 52 n&viws Sei Evo, Kav GHpatos fj (lines 41-2). Cf. 1.6.3, 1.18: gwtds cowpdctov and IT 1.7, lines 26-8: the light of the sun is corporeal but a light of like nature is incorporeal. Simplicius [?] affirms that light is incorporeal in De an. 131.38-132.4 and 134.22. In In De Phys., Simplicius interprets a Chaldacan oracle (fr. 51) as saying that light is prior to corporeal entities and is ‘the whole incorporeal realm that transcends the corporeal worlds’ (n&o0av thv dodpatov Sidtaétv, tty tots cMpatiKoic K6ojL0IG broyoupévnv, 616.12-13). Philoponus argues at length that light is incorporeal in In De an. 324.25-330.27. For Proclus, compare Simplicius In De an. 134.5-20 and In Phys, 612.24-35 with Proclus Jn Remp. If 163.1-2, 195.8, and 198.26-9, Although it seems likely that Syrianus considered light incorporeal, we have no definite statement about his beliefs, In his In Metaph. 85.22, he uses a conditional: ‘even if someone should wish to call [light] incorporeal’ (el kal dompaté tg PobdAotto A£yetv). He has just stated that immaterial bodies interpenetrate and that they are

like light from two lamps interpenetrating (85.15-22). He concludes that light, even if one grants that it is incorporeal, interpenetrates matter because it is simple and immaterial (85.22-8). See R. Sorabji, Matter, Space, and Motion (London, 1988) 112-13 and S. Sambursky, The Concept of Place in Late Neoplatonism (Jerusalem, 11. On the Iamblichean origin of the doctrine, see Finamore, above n.3, 33-53 and 133-44. Proclus’ metaphysical scheme is, of course, more complex, although here he simplifies it by omitting the noetic/noeric and hypercosmic/cosmic gods. 1982) 59. : 2. Aristotle does not mention Empedocles or Plato by name here, but does so in De Sensu 437b10-438a5. Aristotle takes Plato to task for thinking that vision occurs when fire leaves the eye because under such circumstances we could see in the dark Elements of Theology, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1963) 282-3. 12. For Proclus, light can be more or less corporeal: ‘For of the elements fire is more corporeal, but light is more incorporeal than fire itself’ (apud Simplicius, In Phys. 612.28-9), But even the light described by Plato in the Myth of Er Rep, 616b2-6), which Proclus thinks is supracclestial (Im Remp. Il 196.1-15), is corporeal (195.9; 196.11). Proclus calls this light ‘the purest of bodies’ (apud Simplicius, In Phys. 612.29) and makes it the place of the universe (30-5). On this topic, see Sorabji, above n.1, 114-18; Sambursky, above n.1, 18-21; and A.J, Festugiére’s notes to Proclus, Jn Remp. Il 193.2-202.2 in his Proclus: Commentaire sur la République, vol. 3 (Paris, 1970). Lewy, above n.5, 409 says that ‘the eternal (‘infinite’) light which is created by Ormuzd (Ahura Mazda) and in which he dwells, is called ‘location’ or ‘place;’ ‘place’ is, according to the report of Aristotle’s but could not see in a rainstorm (when the visual ray would be extinguished). 3. Sec JF, Finamore, lamblichus and the Theory of the Vehicle of the Soul (Chico, 1985) 133 and 159, note 29, for the arguments that Julian’s hymn is Tamblichean. See also Priscianus, Metaphrasis in Theophrastum 9,12-14: ‘Following Iamblichus, I do not think that [light] is a body.’ I am grateful to P. Huby for this and other references to Priscianus. 4, Sorabji, above n.1, 109, cites Simplicius, In De an. 133.31-5 and 134.6-20 as suggesting that Proclus ‘and perhaps Ilamblichus before him’ think that light travels. See below. 5. Sec C, Lacombrade, L’Empereur Julien: Euvres Completes, vol. 2, Part 2 (Paris, 1964) 105, note 1 and 202, note 2. On the Chaldaean term d&xpotne, see also E. des Places, Oracles Chaldaiques avec un Choix de Commentaires Anciens (Paris, 1971) fr. 76 with note 3 and fr. 1 with note 1, as well as J.M. Dillon, lamblichi Chalcidensis in Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta (Leiden, 1973) 374; on &vOog, see H. Lewy, Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy, M. Tardieu (ed.) (Paris, 1978) 167-9 and note 384. On the ‘doctrine of the Phoenicians,’ see Lewy, 409, note 32. Proclus (Im Parm. 1043,.30-1045,1) holds a similar view of the origin of light. The first principle of light, he tells us, is not the sun or its soul or even its intellect, but the One itself, which he calls ‘the flower of this intellect.’ I am grateful to A.C. Lloyd for this reference. For a translation and analysis of this passage, see H.-D. Saffrey and L.G. Westerink, Proclus: Théologie Platonicienne, vol. 3 (Paris, 1978) tx-lxvi; G.R. Morrow and J.M. Dillon, Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Parmenides (Princeton, 1987) 404; and Lewy, 151 and note 312. I shall discuss Proclus’ theory of light below. 6. On this shift, see S. Sambursky, ‘Philoponus’ Interpretation of Aristotle’s Theory of Light’ Osiris 13 (1958) 114-17. 7, 132c5-6. See Lacombrade, above n.5, 103, note 2. 8. On this topic, see A.H. Armstrong, The Architecture of the Inielligible Universe in Plotinus (Cambridge, 1940; rpt. Amsterdam, 1967) 54-8 and his Plotinus, vol. 4 (London, 1984) 308-9, note 1. 9. We may compare Priscianus, Metaphrasis in Theophrastum 9,7-12. He distinguishes between that which causes light (e.g. the sun or fire) and light itself. The argument about light, he says, is not about the cause but what goes out from the cause (nepl 108 cx’ adt0O npordvtos), i.e. the activity of the transparent. The use of mpot6vtog suggests that Priscianus, like Iamblichus, thinks that light travels. 10. De Myst. Il 4.77.10-18 also reveals a descending scale of light for divine GyéApoter, from incorporeal tight for the gods, archangels, and angels to corporeal fire for demons, heroes, and souls. 63 See Saffrey and Westerink, above n.5, vol. 2, 105, note 3 and E.R. Dodds, Proclus: disciple Eudemus, one of the names of Zervan’ [i.e. of Aion]. Further, in note 32, Lewy states that Philo of Byblus interpreted the name Iao (= Aion) as gag voryt6v. Proclus, who cites Chald. Or. fr. 51 in In Remp, I 201.10-202.2 (cf. Simplicius, In Phys. 615.36-617.34), may have been elaborating upon a Chaldaean doctrine first explicated by Iamblichus. 13. Above n.5, vol. 2, 108, note 6. 14. In Remp. Il 195,12; 196.19-21; 199.21. Cf. Sorabji, above n.1, 117, note 89 and Plato, Rep. 508d4. ; 15. Cp. 10.3-7: ‘I mean by ‘material’ and ‘immaterial,’ as I have said before, to distinguish matter that is the most dense and that does not receive the Forms from that matter that always remains the same in its appropriate form.’ See Festugtire, Proclus: Commentaire sur le Timée, vol. 3 (Paris, 1967) 32, notes 1 and 4. 16. Proclus is engaged in a discussion of the mixture of elements. Heavenly fire is pure but contains kat’ aitiov the qualities of the other elements (43.20-8). Sce A.J. Festugiére’s edition, above n.15, 72, note 2 and Dodds, above n.11, 235-6. 17. God or the power of divination is external (EG@Oev) to what is illuminated: 125.2: 127.10, 18; 129.5; 134.13; 150.5; separated (y@ptotdc): 126.18; 128.2; 129.3; 133.2; 138.13; 140.1; 150.5. 18. 125.1; 127.11; 129.4, 19. On the neoplatonic concept of interpenetration, see Sorabji, above nl, 106-19. Proclus (In Remp. II 162.24-48) explicitly states that immaterial bodies pass through immaterial and material ones. Syrianus (In Metaph. 85.15-28) argucs that two immaterial, simple bodies can interpenetrate. He gives as examples light and the ethereal vehicle. Syrianus says that two interpenetrating lights are ‘simple, immaterial, and when divided do not split up’ (&nAG got Kol Goda Kol od pepifetor Stoipotpeve., 85.25). Just so, the divine light in the De Mysteriis does not permeate in parts (ueptotc). The vehicle is ethereal, and hence halfway between corporeality and incorporeality. An ethereal body can be said to interpenetrate with a material one if it is pure, ic. without material accretions. It is only when our vehicles are purified that they can ascend and unite with the ethereal bodies of the

visible gods. Thus, the rays of the sun, which are ethereal, can be said to interpeneirate with the spring water. There is, unfortunately, too little evidence in the present passage from the De Mysteriis to determine with certainty if Iamblichus is speaking of interpenetration of ethereal light and water or merely of illumination/participation. Besides the use of epiot@¢, mentioned above, the use of the prefix d10- in the words dufixetv, SianepoithyKev, and Stactatéc also suggests interpenctration. See the passages cited by Sorabji and Plotinus’ discussion of interpenetration in II 7.1: SeATA006c (line 18), Suévan (lines 28 and 31), and diappetv (line 29), lam grateful to R. Sorabji and D.J. O’Meara for discussion of these matters. 20. See also IIT 21 for Iamblichus’ arguments against the possibility that this external, unmixed prophetic power could form a compound with the human soul. 21. On the nature of these images, see E. des Places, Les Mystéres d’ Egypte (Paris, 1966) 141, note 3, who associates the image with a cloud from incense burned over charcoal. Iamblichus (167.13-15) claims that using such images is like exchanging what is first G.e. the gods) for what is last. For the Chaldaean belief in a single correct form of divination that is opposed to lower forms, sce fr. 107 and Lewy, above n.5, 254-7; cf. 285. 22. On the Adyo. oneppatikol, see Dodds, above n.11, 215: ‘these creative forces in Nature became for Neoplatonism the intermediaries between the Forms ‘and the material world.’ Iamblichus (In Parm. fr. 2) links them with enhylic forms in the sixth hypothesis of Plato’s Parmenides, just above matter (6A) in the seventh. Cf. Finamore, above n.3, 141, 23. The problem with the image-making art is two-fold. First, there is its corporeal nature that is far removed from the gods. There is, furthermore, a second problem: the human agency behind it. Near the beginning of his discussion (168.34), lamblichus clearly differentiates between true prophetic power from the gods and the images made by human beings. Image-making is a human art (avOpantvn véxvn, 168.8) and the resulting powers are weaker than their human creators. Although many arts make better use of the sensible powers and qualities ‘of the effluences descending from heaven’ (t@v ax’ odpavot Kataneptopévov anoppotev, 169.16-17), the image-making art is inferior to all of them. The imagemakers themselves are impure and incapable of being illuminated by the gods (172.17-173.8). Thus, their pavté&opoto can be said to have nothing divine in them (173.13-14), although strictly speaking even these images are part of the great chain of nature. 24. They arc referred to as the Demiurge’s ‘sons’ in 42e6, where they take over the creation process begun by the Demiurge. They are called simply Oeot at 44d7 and 45a4. Sce Dillon, above n.5, 373 for the neoplatonic view that the véou Beot are the planetary gods. 25. On the passage, see P. Hoffinann, ‘Simplicius’ Polemics’, in R. Sorabji, Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science (London, 1987) 79-80. A similar theory is also held by Proclus (fn Tim. II 8.22-5). 26. I wish to thank the American Council of Learned Societies for their travel award to the conference, the other conferees, and especially Professors Blumenthal and Clark for organising the conference.