Porphyry and Iamblichus in Proclus' commentary on the Parmenides

Wr UL Gn x ; COMMENTARY ON THE PARMENIDES JOHN DILLON The combined skills of Westerink and Saffrey have already, in the course of their magisterial Budé edition of the Platonic Theology, extracted much of value from the vast bulk of Proclus’ Commentary on the Parmenides,' and elucidated many obscure passages of that work. Notable contributions are the discussions of the history of exegesis of the hypotheses of the Parmenides in Vol. I (Ixxv-Ixxxix), the addition to our knowledge of the doctrine of Origen the Platonist in Vol. Il (x-xx), a major discussion of the origin of the doctrine of henads in Vol. HI (ix-Ixxvii), and in Vol, [V a survey and analysis of Damascius’ commentary on the Second Hypothesis of the Parmenides, which demonstrates his dependence on the lost part of Proclus’ Commentary. To all of these a translator of Proclus Jn Parmenidem must acknowledge a profound debt, as I am glad to do here.? What I propose to do on the present occasion is to contribute to the elucidation of one further aspect of Proclus’ commentary, his use of previous authorities. It is notable that, in sharp contradistinction to his practice in the Timaeus Commentary. Proclus, in the Parmenides w Commentary, chooses to suppress virtually all reference to his predecessors, apart from his master Syrianus — and even Syrianus ts referred to almost exclusively by honorific periphrases,’ His “spiritual Proclus: Théologie Platonicienne, ed. H. D. Saffrey and L. G. Westerink, Paris, Vol. 1, 1968; Vol. {1, 1974; Vol, II], 1978; Vol. IV, 1981 (2 more volumes to follow). Although T still venture to maintain a different opinion on the vexed question of the lamblichean origin of the doctrine of henads (see below, note 10), fam also profoundly grateful to the honorand of this volume for his unstinting help in improving my translation of the /n Parm. — chiefly by brilliant emendations of the text, but also by many corrections of detail. Generally 6 hpétepog xadnyepwy or something such, e.g., 640, 20; 944, 17; 1033, 21; 1061, 25, etc.

Porphyry and famblichus in Proclus' Commentary on the Parmenides grandfather,” (6 twétepoc npondtwp) Plutarchus, is given one mention, a propos the subject of the hypotheses, at 1058, 22, and it is possible, as Fr. Saffrey has recently suggested, that Theodorus of Asine lurks beneath the very curious apparent reference to “the philosopher from Rhodes,” just before that. at 1057, 6.* but other than that, there are no references by name to any previous commentator on the dialogue. In particular, Porphyry and lamblichus. so prominent in the Timaeus Commentary, are nowhere to be found, though both certainly wrote commentaries on the Parmenides.* However, Proclus is in fact just as dependent on previous commentary on the Parmenides as he was in the case of the Timaeus. His chief debt is to Syrianus, but there is repeated evidence of his consultation of, and reaction to, other commentators throughout the work.® In Books VI and VII, however, a distinctive pattern makes itself visible of a sequence of three” views on a given passage, culminating in that of Syrianus (identified as “my own master,” or some equivalent). It is here, I think, that we can with some plausibility postulate a sequence (which would answer to that frequently exemplif ied in the Timaeus Commentary) of Porphyry — Iamblichus — Syrianus qt is not always, unfortunately, the case that the views expresse d ex. hibit any clear resemblance to the positions of either of these two philosophers, but there are often enough clues which render the attributions very probable. I will first set out, in tabular form, all the passages ruption of 6 Oedswpog prAdaompos. This I must say | find less satisfactory. Such a word-order (as opposed to 6 g1Adaopog O.) is not elsewhere attested, and hardly a natural one, but the truth may lie not far from this. The fact that Proclus refers to Plutarchus by name immediately after this at least increases the possibility of his giving a proper name herc too. 3 We know that both had views on the subject matter of the hypotheses, from the scholia to 1053, 38 and 1054, 37 respectively, but that by itself would not prove authorship ofa full commentary (it does not for either Amelius or Plutarchus). For lamblichus, however, we have one clear reference in Syrianus, /n Metaph. 38, 6ff. (my Fr. 1), and a number of passages in Damascius, De Principiis (= In Parm.; Fragments 3-14 in my edition). For Porphyry, there is just one such reference, at In Parm. M1, 112, 14, but it concerns a detail of the text (Parm, 144c5), and is found in the characteristic sequence “Porphyry — lamblichus (Fr. 4) — Syrianus,” so it constitutes pretty good evidence. I leave aside the Anonymous Turin Commentary, claimed for Porphyry by Pierre Hadot, as I regard the identification as less than certain. ® E.g., on the subject of the dialogue, 630, 37-640, 16, an elaborate doxography; 727, 26ff., on the validity of Zeno’s argument; on the existence of an Idea of Dirt, $32, 121f.; on Parmenides’ attitude to Ideas and participation in them, 837, 10If.; on whether there are Ideas of all things, 856, 9ff., on precisely what is being denied of the One in the First Hypothesis, 1083, 27 ff. “Occasionally four, as will be noted at the relevant places; and in one case (4, below), J am constrained to propose a reverse chronological order. in the Commentary where I discern this pattern, attributing the relevant pasSages provisionally to Porphyry and Iamblichus respectively, and then examine them in turn. They amount to eleven in all: Porphyry? Book VI am + “Le ‘Philosophe de Rhodes’: est-il Théodore d’Asiné?" in Mém, A-J. Festugiére (Geneva 1984) 65-76. Saffrey shows first that there is no serious discrepancy between the schema presented here and Theodorus’ known philosophical position (contrary to what had been argued by Westerink and himself in Proclus, Theol. Plat. 1 Ixxxviii), and then goes on to suggest that the text 6 x ‘Pddou @iAdaopog is actually a cor- 23 Book VII (1) 1053, 38 — 1054, 37 (2) 1089, 30 — 1090, 13 (3) 1106, 31 — 1107. 9 * (4) 111 204, — 35 (5) 1118, 19 — 25 (6) 1140, 26 ~ 1141, 13 (7) 115 20, — 21 (8) 1173 7, — 1174,3 * (9) 1216, 3 — 15 (10) 1226, 6 — 15 (11) 64K.25 — 66K.247 * Irregular lamblichus? 1054, 37 — 1055, 25 1090, 13 — 23 1107, 9 — 1108, 19 lll4,1— 14 1118, 25 — 33 1141, 13 — 1142, 10 1150, 22 — 1151, 7 117 3 4, — 22 1216, 37 — 1217, 13 1226, 15 — 26 66K.25 — 68K.14 (!.) This first passage concerns the subject matter of the hypotheses, and is the only one for which we have reasona bly secure attestation, since an industrious scholiast has identifi ed each of the authorities mentioned in the doxography.® Porphyry. then, regards Hyp. I as concerning the primal God; Hyp. Il as concern ing the Intelligible Realm: Hyp. III as about Soul: Hyp. IV as about ordered Body; Hyp. V, unordered Body; Hyp. VI. ordered Matter: Hyp. VI unordered Matter; Hyp. VIII, Forms-in-Matter, as in their substratum: This last notation refers to the pagination of Raymon d Klibansky’s edition of the ; Latin text of the last part of the Commentary, not preserved in the Greek manuscripts It is also dealt with fully by Westerink and Saftrey in Book | of their edition of the Platonic Theology (pp. Ixxvelxxxix),

In Parm, IT 286, 15 ff. (my Fr. 14) Damascius defends lamblichus against Proclus’ criticism of his identifications of Hyps. VID] and IX as involving composites rather than principles (dpyat): To this point of view we oppose the great Iamblichus, who well says that the composite és a principle; for example, the four elements are the principle of living things and the whole sublunar creation. and the heavenly spheres and the heavens are a principle and cause of generation. the intelligible. which Iamblichus seems to identify with the henads;!° s Hyp. II. not Soul, but rather the Kpeittova yévn, Angels. Daemon us and Heroes, thus reflecting the greater attention which Iamblich 1V Hyp. , Mysteriis De the from see we as being, of paid to these classes concerns rational souls; Hyp. V. secondary souls “woven on to” r (npoovpatvopevat) rational souls: Hyp. VI, the Forms-in-Matte in Body VIII, Hyp. itself; Matter VU, and Adyot Grepparikot: Hyp. — the heavenly realm; Hyp. IX, generated Body in the sublunar realm picking y difficult no has Proclus which a curious sequence of topics, holes in, but which shows lamblichus’ concern to contradict and “trump” Porphyry at every turn. Only at Hyp. VII (and to a certain extent at Hyp. VI) do their interpretations coincide. We learn a little more about Iamblichus’ interpretation of the later hypotheses from two of the passages in Damascius’ Ja Parmenidem'! mentioned above in note 5. Jn Parm, II 247. 15 ff. Ruelle (= my Fr. 12) confirms that Hyp. I] concerns “the beings that are in ‘| Rave dealt with this in my edition of the fragments of lamblichus' Platonic com- Fragmenta [Leiden 1973] 387-9). It is, indeed, the only passage from the Parmenides Commentary which I then ventured to attribute to lamblichus (Fr. 2). to confirm '© Indeed, a passage of Damascius (De Princ. | 147, 22 ff. Ruelle) would seem 16 vontov, this. There he represents lamblichus as maintaining that Ev to évi pévetv r) from it, rather than because it is more united to it, and takes its form (cidonoveita 1} from Being. This refers primarily to the summit of the noetic realm, admittedly, but n it seens to allow of henads as being in some way vontd as well. The lamblichea seems it but Syrianus, of that as developed as be not thus would henads doctrine of to me probable that he had one, And after all, we cannot ignore the fact that Proclus, yet is in spite of insisting that the gods (henads) transcend vénotg (ET prop. 123), as being “‘parprepared at ébid. 162 to refer to the mAFUog sav évadSwv as vontév, ticipated in by td Sv.” As we may now term the second part of the De Principiis, See Satfrey and Westerink’s remarks at the beginning of their study of Damascius’ commentary on the Second WestHypothesis in Vol. [II of Theol, Plat. (pp. Ixxviii-Ixxix), and before that L, G. sme (Paris $971) erink, “Damascius, commentateur de Platon,” in Le Néoplatoni 253-260. 25 constant attendance on the gods” (oi dei Geoig éndpevor), while at Hyp. 1X, Forms-in-Matter, considered by themselves. Iamblichus, on the other hand, while accepting Porphyry’s general scheme (nine hypotheses, each having reference to a distinct level of reality). disputes practically all the details.? Hyp. I for him concerns “God and the the gods,” which Proclus understands as meaning “the One and not and henads”: Hyp. Il concerns the intellectual (voepé) realm, mentaries (lamblichi Chalcidensis In Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Commentary on the Parmenides . This would provide proof, if such were needed, of the accuracy of the scholiast's identification. With the rest of the passages in question, though, we are unfortunately on rather shakier ground, though not entirely devoid of supporting evidence, as we shall see. (2.) This doxography concerns the question as to what precisely is the nature of the “many” that is being denied of the One at the outset of the First Hypothesis (137 c4). The situation is rather less clear here than in subsequent examples, since we do not culminate in an opinion expressly ascribed to Syrianus, but simply in an amplification by Proclus (Syrianic in substance) to the last opinion (1090, 25 ff.). However, the sequence of opinions seems worth including in our collection. Going back to the beginning (1089, 2! ff.), we find, first, tivé¢ who say that it is the Many at every level (ta navtayod rokAd) that he is denying of the One, because the One transcends all multiplicity, both intelligible and sensible. To these Proclus objects that in Hyp. II “Many” is asserted of the One. and that certainly does not include sensible multiplicity. This seems like a Middle Platonic opinion, perhaps reported by Porphyry. At any rate, we find next, dhAot Ett Gepvdtepot tovtwv, who identify this “many” as intellectual multiplicity (voepdv mi780c). “They argue, whereas Intellect is onemany, and Soul is one-and-many, held together by the conjunction!? by reason of its divisibility, while Body is many-and-one. as being "| accept here, with gratitude, one of Westerink’s many stimulating emendations, 6 ouvbeonip deGcicav for mss. tdv ovvdéopwv dendetcav, “requiring the conjunctions,” which makes some sense, but not much; Latin coniunctione indigeniem would seem to translate cuvdéop SenSetcuv (unless William is interpreting a little), which would be more acceptable. Nothing much hangs on it, fortunately.

divided, and thus characterised by multiplicity, and Mater is ‘many’ alone. This ‘many,’ then, removes intellectual multiplicity from the first cause, in order that it may be One alone and superior to Intellect.” The presentation of Nous as moAdd is thoroughly Porphyrian (though not, of course, in any way distinctive of him), as we can see from e.g., Sent. 43, 1 ff. (6 vod¢ obk Eotw apyy mavtwv ROAD yap totw 6 votc, «.t.4.), so the identification of this authority with Porphyry presents no difficulty. The distinction between Nous as €v 10226 and Soul as év Kai TOAAG is already Plotinian (V 1,8, 23-27). This authority is now criticised by GAAor Kai tovtwv EvOeactikatepot (1090, 13 ff.), who do not accept voepdv nAtBo¢ as an adequate identification. They declare that “far prior to intellectual numbers there are the intelligible monads (vontai povddec), from which there has appeared all the intellectual multiplicity arranged in its many orders; it is that multiplicity, then, which is removed from the One, inasmuch as it is next after the One, which the intellectual Porphyry and lambtichus in Proclus’ Commentary on the Parmenides 27 (3.) The next passage is of particular interest, and has actually attracted a certain amount of notice, having been made the subject of an article by Emile Bréhier, “L’idée de néant et le probléme de lorigine radicale dans le néoplatonisme grec,”' and an extended discussion, with translation, by Pierre Hadot, in pp. 355-375 of Porphyre et Victorinus. Vol. 1.'° Here we have once again a sequence of authorities, leading up, not explicitly to Syrianus, but to Proclus himself (1108, 19 ff.). The issue raised here is whether it is necessary or desirable to attribute some “nature and characteristic’ (borg Kai t86TH¢) to the One, lest it be regarded as absolutely non-existent (as was the view of Origen the Platonist, who regarded the First Hypothesis as having no positive subject matter!®). Attributing anything to the One was a constant problem, as we know. for Platonists from Plotinus on, since any epithet one might wish to attach to it, such as goodness or perfection or consciousness, is properly predicable only of Intellect; any characteristic attached to the One seems to introduce a suggestion of duality and less than absolute simplicity. Plotinus got round his difficulty (in so far as he did) by prefixing olov to anything he said of the One.'’ The authorities quoted here attempt a greater degree of precision than that. is not.” This sharp distinction between the intelligible and intellectual realms is a development of lamblichean Neoplatonism, as opposed to that of Porphyry.!? Indeed, since Porphyry did not observe this distinction, the criticism of him here is inapposite, but quite characteristic of lamblichus’ style of “‘oneupmanship,” as we can see from many passages of Proclus’ Timaeus Commentary. Also characteristic (of Proclus) is the description of lamblichus as EvOeaot1Kog — In Tim. 1 156, 31: lamblichus approaches the text EvBeaotiKGs, as opposed to Porphyry, who gives a more pedestrian interpretation. lamblichus’ distinction here between vontai povadeg and voepoi apiWyot can, I think, be equated with the distinction that he is reported as making by Damascius, in his Commentary on the Philebus (105, p. 49-51 Westerink = my Fr. 4), between “the monads of tO voobv (with the sense, Proclus is careful to explain, not of “intelthe Forms,” which manifest themselves in the Intelligible Realm in an undifferentiated (45uéxpttov) manner, while the Forms (the “numry In the~ Revue Re 5 ; de Métaphysique et de Morale, 1919, pp. 443-475; repr. in Etudes de bers” here) proper only manifest themselves at the intellectual level, the realm of Nous proper (as distinct from the levels of Being or Life). This passage, then, constitutes useful confirmation of the philosophical positions of both Porphyry and lamblichus, as well as presenting a characteristic contrast between them. 3 See R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (London 1972) 123-4. As I say, the sequence of authorities does not culminate with Syrianus, but with Proclus himself (dismissing all these attempts to characterise the One, as inevitably introducing multiplicity into it), but the three authorities must be fitted in somewhere in the Neoplatonic universe between Plotinus and Syrianus,'* and Porphyry and Iamblichus must be among the prime candidates. The first authority postulates, above Nous, something called vootns, “intellectuality,” envisaged as being something “simpler” (GnAovotépa) than, and presumably causative of, Nous; above this, Philosophie antique (Paris 1955). S Etudes Augustiniennes (Paris 1968). ie ov K.-O, Weber, Origenes der Neuplatoniker {Zetemata 27} (Miinchen 4. ‘ E.g., Ean. VI 8, 13, 50: Lap Bavéww 8 Kai 14 olov gp’ Exdatou. 1962) 98: Certainty none of them is Syrianus, since Proclus would never dismiss his master’s views in the way that he does these. Hadot actually wishes to identify them all with Porphyry, a position for which he produces persuasive evidence, but with which | am compelled to disagree, as will be seen presently.

Parphyry and famblichus in Proctus' Commentary on the Parmenides John Ditton on — as if it were ron a non 29 parts. A whole prior to parts has in some way need of the parts, and it is this that Plato has denied of it here (sc. 137d2-3), whereas a whole prior to wholes has no need of parts. ligising,” but rather of causing intellecti turn To vonna, which 2c ail a existent vodw!!%); and above this in claim that activities “ pe a be primal, making the remarkable them.” More remar at e ne essences, as being more unitary than of the Forms, a ene en ny this person postulates, prior to each , and declares that a t ress of the same type (with ending in -@pa) “ precisely he means gv (“‘one” or ‘ta one”), though what (1106, 20 ff.). sce ne Proclus professes not to understand adumbration of the sys cme being proposed here is rather like an taken as disingenuous (tl . ie henads, Proclus’ bafflement may be iating any plurality wn € he does consistently object here to assoc objection above to tamblic “s) One of the First Hypothesis; cf. his It is this commentator (whom Proclus also condemns, 1107, 20 ff.) that I would like to identify with lamblichus (pace Hadot), and therefore one (or possibly both?) of the previous two with Porphyry. Hadot’s otherwise rather implusible proposal that all three should be Porphyry (op. cit. 372-5) does admittedly have in its favour the fact that all three doctrines, or formulations, are to be found at various points in the works of Marius Victorinus.”! This is an embarrassment, , 31 ff.) seeks to non t e since there is no evidence, apart from a mere mention, much later, een God and the state of ene problem by making a distinction betw the proper designation ° he God” (16 Ge@ eivat), the latter being k to point out, is a deve op One. This formulation, as Proctus is quic do not think that we can rule out any acquaintance with Iamblichus by Marius (either with the Parmenides Commentary, or with a work At any rate, the next authority (1106 by Augustine,’- that Iamblichus was known at all in the West, but I On the Gods) on such an important question as the nature of God. otle $ distinchio® in one) of Arist ment (and in his view an invalid In favour of identification with Iamblichus (and against Porphyry) { would cite, first, a doctrinal point, and then a linguistic one. On the eto< obcia of a thing an a Met. H3, 1042b29 ff. between the obvO designated TO Tl WV ely a eet evépyeia Kai poppr, the latter being reminds us, that no such is Aristotle himself points out, as Proclus terial entities. There can! e tinction can be made in the case of imma and “being soul re wera no distinction, for instance, between soul otle’s the givat, 1043b2). This view of Arist commentator level of doctrine, first of all, we know that Porphyry identified his First Principle with the summit of the noetic world,?4 whereas this authority declares God to transcend all these. Certainly. Iamblichus’ metaphysics (as outlined by Damascius in the same passage) is a good deal more complex than this, but he does not introduce its full complexity into his Parmenides Commentary, where it would hardly fit. His primal One is entirely ineffable, but his “second” One is described by Damascius (/oc. cit.) as being mpd tig vontiic xp&tn¢ tprddoc, and dobvtaxtog xpdc trv tpidda (in distinction to that of Porphyry). “ w disregard. Once again. dl e am doubtless well aware of, but chooses to — God as Essence being is to present Activity as prior to Essence . — ubject of the Second Hypothesis. as follows d ribe desc is y orit auth _ The position of the third (1107, 9 FF.): First Principle have said that since the g is above Life, above Intellect, above Bein itself, it possesses within itself in some way the causes of all and in the most these things unutterably and unimaginably <but knowable us to le owab unkn unified way, and in a way things in it are all of s cause en to itself>;22 and the hidd y is a whole entit l prima the and models prior to modeis: ng need of havi not ), GAwv mpo prior to wholes (GAov moiotns is probably a model here, > But the (fancied) relationship of notéw and Latin. from added but mss., Greek from d 22 Omitte *' For the tirst position, Hadot adduces Adv, Arium IV 5, 23-6, 18; for the second, Ady, Arium | 33, 4-9; for the third, Adv. Arium IV 23, 27-34, and it is hard to dispute the analogies, although Victorinus dees not reflect the full elaboration of the first position as set out by Proclus. 2 De Civ. Dei VII 12. we There are others, however, who 3 R. Schmid, Marius Victorinus Rhetor und seine Beziehungen zu Augustin (Diss. theol.] (Kiel 1895), does in fact argue for some knowledge of lamblichus’ work by Victorinus (p. 23, note 2). * Cf. Damascius, De Prine. 43, [ 86, 3 ff. Ruelle: “Porphyry declares the first principle of ail things to be the Father of the noetic triad," which I take to mean the “Father” element within the (Chaldaean) triad of Manip - divayis - vots, which in Platonic terms is"Ov-Garj-vots. Cr. Procl. Jn Parm. 1070, 15 {f., which very probably refers to Porphyry.

Porphyry and lamblichus in Proctus' Commentary on the Parmenides phrase “unA linguistic aspect which | think is notable is the ntary Comme us Timae the In knowable to us” (piv pév dyv@otws). ing declar as ichus Iambl s (IU 356, 11-12 = my Fr. 88) Proclus quote life with it endow and that the problem of how the gods create body is This r). ondpye Aniv is “unknowable to us” (tabta yap Gyvwota not perhaps much to go on, but better than to assume, I think, is that Porphyry actually saw the First and Second Hypotheses as concerning the same subject from different angles. the First dealing with “what it is to be God.” independent of all attributes while the Second presents God as the source of all Being, the Father of the noetic world, containing all within himself. If we could assume this, it would help to explain how Porphyry’s exegesis of the hypotheses of the Parmenides can be reconciled with what else we know of his metaphysics. (4) But we must leave this fascinating passage, accepting that not all its mysteries can be unravelled on this occasion. The next interesting sequence of authorities occurs at 1114, | ff., arising out of an aporia which confronts the denial of beginning, middle or end to the One here (sc. 137 d4-5) with the passage of the Lawy (IV 715Se) where the Athenian Stranger says that God “possesses the beginnin and the middle and the end of all existent things,” which would a ean to be in contradiction with the present passage. mp Before giving his own (or Syrianus’) solution, Proclus mentions nothing. as opposed to a The formulation “a whole prior to wholes.” it is certainly but whole prior to parts, cannot, I think, be paralleled, d Hypothesis, the case that Iamblichus, in his exegesis of the Secon which is the subject makes considerable play with the idea of the One (GAov mpo pepav).75 of that hypothesis being a “‘whole prior its parts” This, however. once again does not prove very much, ed to atAs for the previous two opinions, | would be inclin tribute the first to Amelius, who certainly loved elaborations of this Asine), and the sort® (a love inherited from him by Theodorus of Proclus speaks is, man first the er second to Porphyry himself. Whoev g evOvvag diAot (Kai ” others by d of him as having been “already refute that he think, I s, implie lly deSuKdtac, 1106, 32), which most natura on goes he whom man the of has found a refutation of him in the work ry. Porphy be ning to note next,?? who would on my recko 10 86 Again, while any exact equivalent to the formulation ne is doctri ! genera the g, evar in Porphyry’s extant works is lackin e. schem ysical metaph concordant with his relatively simplified Noetic the of er ‘Fath the “God” in the present context would be Hypothesis, triad,” mentioned above, the subject of the Second subject of the be while “being God.” or “the essence of God" would s, in Proclu by the First Hypothesis. This, however. is given earlier as 6 23), p. his doxography of views on this question (cf. above, need we ce, what np@tiatosg Bed. To reconcile these pieces of eviden two earlier essays at solution. Again, one would be tempted to take these as Porphyry and Iamblichus, but there are complications. The first a 1 14, hidden mode (kpugiws), whereas it does not possess them distinctly (Stnpnpéveng); for it contains everything within itself in a manner inexpressible and inconceivable to us but knowable to itself, nt naturally, 1 think. 1-5) actually sounds more like something that Tamblichus There are some who say in reply to this difficulty that the First Principle both possesses beginning and middle and end and does not possess them; for it possesses them in a oy ee ee my Fr. 6). 8 Cf, Damascius, In Parm. 1 146, 3 ff. Ruelle (= on the basis of Timeeus 39E (Proc, es demiurg of triad a up conjure could who man 2 A logical analysis of the word arithmo an give In Tim, U1, 103, 18 ff. of. 1398, 16 ff), or g in the area of metaanythin less or more of capable is LOff.) 274, 1 wouxt (ibid, by Proclus to Theoed attribut physical elaboration. This fatter passage is actually in an essay entitled it ng attacki as hus famblic reports ff.) 27 dorus, but he then (277, which suggests that TheoTlpdg tobe aygi "ApéAtov kai Nouprviov dvtippricets, dorus is only adopting doctrines of Amelius. this man, like all of the others, 27 | cannot insist on this point, It might only mean that the way it comes across most not is thal But . has been fully criticised by Syrianus 3! Now this conjunction of terminology has a remarkable resemblance** to that of the third authority in the previous sequence whom I have ventured to identify with Iamblichus, and indeed this propensity to see foreshadowing of entities which manifest themselves distinctly at a later stage is characteristic of lamblichus, as we can see from his doctrine of Forms, as revealed in his Philebus Commentary 2x Kpvelos 114, 3 / xpbere 1107, 14 (but this is Chaldaean terminology); appdata reat Gventvor tag 1h14, 4-5 / 1107, 12-13; abt@ b& yvaards 1114, 57 1107, 14 abta 5&8 yvwortis (from Latin sibt ipsi autem note).

ary on the Parmenides s within (mentioned above, p. 26), although this only concerns moment other limit itself; and the One is unlimited the hypothesis of Nous. But if one adopts this view, one is constrained to argue either that Proclus is quoting his authorities not in chronoy logical order, but in order of acceptability, or that the second authorit of (to whom Proclus is much more hospitable”) is perhaps Plutarch Athens, to whom Proclus is uniformly polite on the rare occasions when he mentions him. On the whole, though, | prefer to maintain the first possibility, since this second opinion seems to represent a simpler metaphysics. The second authority in effect seeks to cut the Gordian Knot by suggesting that the Laws passage refers not to the Supreme God but to the Demiurge. “For the phrase, ‘going about his circuit’ (Laws 716a1) is not proper to the One. and the statement that ‘Right (Aixn) follows upon him’ (716a2) demonstrates to us that quite another order and a different god is being talked of.” This eminently sensible solution (though it does not quite satisfy 6 hwétepoc Kadnyenav (1114, 36 ff.)?° seems entirely suitable to Porphyry, so I would prefer to leave Plutarch out of the reckoning, and accept that these This isa most interesting passage, because it is reminiscent of. while not being entirely in accord with, Plotin us’ twice-repez J distinction of two senses of Gneipov (Eun, VI but interesting nevetthet with the attested views of Plotinus (1118, 19-25): : ‘ Others take its unlimitedness to refer to its being of unlimited power (Gxeipodbvapov) and that it is generative of all things (navtav yevvntikov), and that it is the cause of all unlimitedness in existent things and extend s the gift of itself through the totality of beings: for all things are contained in the One and exist through the One, and none Some declare the One to be termed unlimited in this sense, that it is untraversable (aSveEitntov) and is the limit of everything else (for the term “unlimited” has two senses, the one as being ungraspable (GAnntov) and untraversable, the other as being the limit of all things, and not having any could come to be unless they become memes we S subject, not the One, so it is less relevant, since the Line is declared to be Gimeipog becau se év 1 16 the QVTOYPapAS OK EvL TpoovootpEvov népac .* On the whole, th in T would favour the conjecture that what we have here is an opi ion of Plotinus reported by Porphyry. pinion et On the other hand, the second Opinion too is quite in accord in turn. “ 9, 6, 10-11 and V6 17 13-14), the first being dévefizmtov, but the secon d being, in VI 9, tO anepiAnntov Tg Suvdépews, which is furthe r explained as i volving absolute self-sufficiency (attaupxéo tutov Kai dvevd be. tarov). From making this distinction to statin g that it is firey cov as being a népus for everything else, while requir ing none itself. i further step, but not a large one, In VI 6, the Line (ypappn) is the (5.) A little further on (1118, 9 ff.), at any rate, we find another sequence of authorities, this time answering an aporia®: which asks in precisely what sense the One is unlimited (Gmerpov, 137d7). Three authorities prior to Syrianus are recorded, and we must consider them multiplicity into the First Principle. of it, In fairness to Syrianus, it must be said that Plato in the Laws is, on the face superior deity no then but deity, subordinate any to not God, referring lo a supreme to the Demiurge is suggested in the Timaeus either, so that is not conclusive, One might spare a thought, at this point, for the propounders of these aporiai. Who can they have been? I do not think that we need postulate a tradition of hostile comIt mentary on the Parmenides {as there was on Aristotle’s Categories, for example). only himself problems these raised particular) (in Porphyry that is quite possible lo solve them. in both senses both as being ungraspable and unencompassable (axeptnyntov) by all that is secondary to it, and as being itself a limitia ether of everything and not ot i itself beiing ng in I need of any doxographical sequences are not always chronological. 2% of 8€ ye yapiéotepov dnavtdvtes pdg tiv dnopiav, 1114, 20-1, as opposed to the a previous Adyos, which is ca8pa pOeyySpevog (E14, 17), as once again introducing 33 nature, one by their own , ate acral compound term dnepodtivapog is not found in Plotinus me irst attested in Porphyry (Sent. 37, p. 43,9, Lamberz. referring © the soul), but the idea is expressed in 10 Gxepi dnntov tic duvapeas vi aes Speculations are dependent, to some extent, on Aristotle’s discussion of nity in hysics 17, where the term GdueEi tov is emploved (207b 2 i nite “Philological i Comments on the ms onthe Neoplatonic Notion of Infinity,” in The Significance of Neoplatanism, ed. R. Baine lopic, see the useful discussion of John Whittaker Harris (Albany 1976) 155-172.

Plotinian a place must involve bein 8 many,; and touching i its contai points, whereas it is impossible for the One to be inany.” “imams This is in fact . presumably, ; all that Plato meanss, but i not satisty Proclus, since, as he says, “There is nothing social abort 7 : sarscterist which is shared even by individual souls. But what s berbeing proved fe should s be a special quality i of the One :é principle which is set above all beings (1141, 9 ft), nod onene causa The second commentator pleases him better (1141, 13 ff): Commentary on the Parmenides 35 34 e, p. 33). However, the very of Ean. V1 9, 6. 11-12 (see abov . ument also in favour of Porphyry quality of the doctrine is an arg n ntio atte and lety subt of ee The third view shows, I think, a degr 3): 25-3 two (1118, to detail not present in the other dness in this sense: since Others, again, take its unlimite is above Intellect. for this Intellect is limit, and the One mited: for, they say, it is reason they have termed it unli o predicates of the One, only these two things that Plat ss, since Intellect is limit unlimitedness and motionlessne s to show that it is superior and Soul is motion, and he want there are three ruling hyto both Intellect and Soul, for scendent over”? the other postases, of which the first is tran two. and &kivytov (139a2) are y, pointing out that Gmeipov This authorit ones, actually applied here to the the only epithets, albeit negative sthis is in order to specify its tran One, ingeniously concludes that ial spec this out With . vely respecti cendence to Intellect and Soul of Plato to characterise the One as t rrec inco tly stric be point, it would unopposed to “neither limited nor “unlimited” or “motionless,” as to n ntio atte of sort This ” nor at rest. limited” and “neither in motion er matt ect subj the but us, of Iamblich detail seems to me characteristic t. e this intuition susceptible of proo mak to as re natu is not of such a J ern patt the e leng however, to chal There is certainly nothing here, am arguing for. and specifically to the com(6.) We move now to Book VU, lus is here concerned mainly with mentary on the lemma 138a3-7. Proc on KUKA@ in the phrase KOKA@ TOU the precise sense of the expressi ence of three authorities, culmiav nepiéyouto. Here we find a sequ NATIHP, 1142, 11), and the identifinating in Syrianus (6 HpEetEpOG and Iamblichus is relatively easy. cation of the first two with Porphyry s xiKkk rather prosaically The first authority (1140, 26 ff.) take g ed sense.” Proclus says), as meanin (uepikdtepoy, “in a rather restrict at “wh ainer.” and concludes that simply “in a place,” or “in a cont in the One is not ina place, if being is being demonstrated to us is that Harl. (Lat. exalLEqpyoGar here with mss. D and 32 {| now think it preferable to read (and myself, in in Cous by ed adopt ) tavar (ABC tatam) in preference lo the &nye ks. remar s adds point to our authority' my translation), since this reading ne looking to the facts (ta npdypata), have stated at he ts denying here of the One every sense of being in hing. and they are right: for in no sense is the One somethi in something, as we have said earlier. requiresEven en see as is sounion solution gi gives rise k to certain difficulties, and rear inement y Syri Symanus, in ways that need not cono make Whatnwe € find f i a contrast which Proclus can be seen here, first, is soaks of P e hinaeus Commentary (I 204, 24 ff. Diehl), where he Felows romp yry as discussing the introductory portion of the erage ote piKatepoy, as opposed to Iamblichus, who treats it Elsewhere (I 87, 6 Dich oer pov, in an inspired manner.” am? “ss praised, in distinction from his predecessors, for re« ne Be G2, °v el5 TaTa mpaypat mpd; a, while i at IIT 168, 5-7 he is reported; ‘ation as criticising his predeces , s ors for missing issing 1| TOV Ta mpayudt 5 ov hchean As® regards the content, 2 i one seems to see an lambonce again wane ncern for Scholastic exactness in distinguishing various ‘nterpretation wer a view to upstaging Porphyry’s oversimplified interp ne . We We find a similar concern with wih the th various i ous senses5 of (CAG VIII] 46, 154 Commentary on the Categories (ap. Simpl. In Cat in Physics {¥ ; 7, 28) _ following on Aristotle's own distinctions ie — though in a rather different context © are sufficient indications here to support the identifi r cations, , passage. ees + with nothin 8 Opposing i . g . th : them. Let us proceed to the next This term has, ’ I think . the connotation, + both there a and in t the Pppresent nt pz ssage pa “with. vhysleal 2 reais out regard to the wider ler context,” i ; without evard to td4 mpdyuuta, the meta, Le,

Porphyry and fambtichus in Proctus’ Commentary on the Parmenides If, ae it is by this (sc. the One) that everything else creates itself, it becomes surely clear that it would be such for discussing Parm. 138b2(7.) At 1149, 26 ff, in the course of be acted upon and act at the same 5, which argues that the One cannot e time, Proclus turns to an attack on those Platonists who wish to mak 1 (Se.elf Pp rimall y; since by it all other tatov). We find here a rather the One “self-constitutive” (avGundo s. nor culminating in Syrianus, peculiar sequence of three authoritie principle to be adOumootatov, the of whom the first declares the first 1150, 2) even to assert that it is second dares (Eniveavievopevol, vi ¢ two remaining authorities? The second one especially is oublesome. What Neoplatonic troub i thinker thi would have been so rash to assert that the One is adtoxivntov? ° r be superior to every paternal and t@ MAdteve, 1150. 22), declares it to v xai natpixis aitiag andons generative causal principle (kpeitto Kal yevvyqtiKy|s). al One lus’ description accords well As to the first authority, Proc on the One in Enn. V1 8, where enough with the doctrine of Plotinus as creating itself by its own will (notably in sect. 13), he presents it oy the technical term atOund(Pobanots).’* Plotinus does not empl 13, 57, abtdg &v oftwe bnootatoc (though he comes near to it at ainly maintained the general otjous av cin avtév), but he cert In fact. the criticism contains position that Proclus is criticising here. happened is that for Proclus an element of anachronism, What has us), “sealf-constitutive’”” has be(and possibly as far back as Iamblich city of intermediate hypostases come a term confined to the capa lect and Soul. to “constitute” proceeding from the One, such as Intel s to seem beneath the dignity themselves, and so such a process come of the One. ard, however, for the The particular argument here put forw attention. According to Proclus self-constitution of the One deserves “even as the first principle of (1149, 32 ff.) these people argue that ed, even so the first principle moving things (sc. Soul) is the self-mov of existence is self-constituted, of all those things which have any sort ciple also derive from the prin for all things subsequent to the first possibility esage (Fe is Pp assage I 5 Fr . 15 ’ forth to all must 1 olve } e this back to . Is a reference, Numenius, 8-9 des Places ), declares not to who. ina any post well-known the OTAOIC ot the primal fror 1 which proc eed he order of the However, any prepared to accord it a sort of tr iad ! pr Oceed th the motion, Proclus does, who attribut “ e self-motion to the to this from the concept of selr-constitution Ineh) kinship Treason " mar : ~ H the two concepts > and he himsel 2 c.g. > in between Eleme Us of Theology, prop. EOTLV if es his primal might not have actually been umenian One ° directly creative activity Por 2) hy ry, since . he 1der Father of the noetic all ? Say ( 1150 > 3-5 ) that those of sort of some sort of §,piritual m ouon + al least, a ni d the question alter ENLG Tt t pe TT \KOV) » 2 (Tlév Tecognis 0 Ses tO abOunda TATONV that Rpog EAUTO self.~ constitution involves a for m of motion (a cycle of procession and re ( whoever 1S being criticise Stituvion ? Ic € ve er no that 8 of self-motion toO the One 1 gnis o evidence , shar y from this isa rather ec el thoug motion e concept P of Numenius I S e If-conn . € d I e di proper ’ he d oubtless d 1 stinguished to Soul. But J ecogn precat 10Uus speculation. The third authority, on the other hand, 1s less problematical. I roclus approves of him . but does not grant him the accolade reserved for his master, Syrianus ’ so that he must be somebod authorit ¥y, wo as eetatnne e e e paternal ism and Patrist that but pr esen S! ts 1 tsel f asSs tO Whether I h her question): 0 (repr. in Suudies in Platon XXN (Vandoeuvres-Genéve 1975) 193-23 Thought (London |984)). 1s things. ¢ 70d with the by Proclus or some intermediary is anot ion Hardt que @ Proclus (Entretiens de ta Fondat the Av@unéatata,” in De lambli ic soe cosmos and its eternal fixity, and from which ? p reservation 1s poured her it is so derived says at VI 8, 13, 24-27 (though whet ive See on this whole question the comprehens !2 Cf. especially 13, 24-29 and 50-58. of ne Doctri s’ Proclu of ical Background discussion of John Whittaker, “The Histor . Ge »d to be KIv }OLG CLLOLTOS, first principle.” could be derived from I1 seems to me that this formulation what Plotinus th ings Vz come to be for " i this first authority is Plotinus, however, what are we to do ¥ e to the spirit of Plato” (EnGpevo abtoxivntov, while the third, “‘tru 37 als Oal asso 10 a earlier. we have seen 2 declares the One to be super 1 or This to every and generative cause (surely an attack on I orphyry! ), and Siva sh id Oo vv H1¢ (w Ic,h P. Orphy! 7 y. fo 1 Owing the C };2UHAAeAR Yes. rach *” See on this is Stephen Stephen Gersh, Kivnoig Ge ‘Axivytog: 4 Study of Spiritual Motion in the Philosophy of Proclus (Leiden 1973), Appendix I pp. 129-135

as inferior to its For a power generates what it generates upon the One, wing follo s own powers: of those thing from it inforth shine those which are nearest the One i s argument against the One's ranked with the Father). This authority’ for its terminology (1150, 30possession of potency is of interest 1151, 7): Porphyry and lumblichus in Proclus’ Commentary on the Parmenides r John Dilton 38 39 Theology, but we have nevertheless the basic distinction between the primal God and the second, which presides (though douvtdktw¢) over the noetic triad. It is here that a sharp distinction from Porphyry can be made, as Damascius emphasises ad /oc. Once again, then, we have a doxographic sequence with a nest of problems, but we need not despair of making identifications (8.) We pass now to the exegesis of the lemma 139b 4-5 (“the Kpv@iac). One cannot be either the same as another or the same as itself. no in respect of all possess paternal and generative rank virtue of their own beings, and produce other things by are more multiple powers from themselves. and in this way s which are selfthan the One, by generating those being dy distinct and constituted, while those that are alrea r of the selfmultiplied take in to themselves the powe from the primal constituted, receiving their substance elves; and these causes, but being produced also by thems which generate are dependent upon the paternal causes”? t upon the One, the forms, while they in turn are dependen makes shine which is superior to all such causality, but yet other than itself or other than another’). The fact that Plato he : effably and at a hidden level (4ppritw¢ Kai le (@yv@otws¢) to forth from itself in a manner unknowab iple of beings. all in all directions according to the first princ ed for Iamblichus, I quote this at length since, if it can be claim icism of Porphyry, and an it presents both a good example of his crit east of the ‘*monads of the exposition of his doctrine of henads (or at | to deny self-constitution Forms”). It would also indicate that the move of the One was initiated by him. De Mysteriis (VIII 2), In that connexion it is notable that in the but his second, as ‘‘self{amblichus characterises, not his prima! God, ple transcends even this generated” (abvtéyovos). The first princi riis is considerably simpler characteristic. The theology of the De Myste ch. 43) from his Chaldaean than that quoted by Damascius (De Princ. translate the Greek text, but Moerbeke’s ” There is an awkward textual point here. | ia. Ante virtutem igitur Causa merito existent ab est a secund virtus Etenim Latin suns: which betokens a quite different causas, les superlocata est et supra laudatas paterna Greek Lext. n between hidden and manifest 4” Here again, we seem to see famblichus’ distinetio occured already in two “Yambhas xpugiws term The above. 31 p. Cf. levels of Form. below. dyv@atHg lichean” passages, 1107, 14 and 1114, 3. Cf. also 9 Presumably the henads, as are “those things nearest the One,"* above. seems to be progressively denying of the One the megista gene of the Sophist leads to the question, at what level of reality the megista one are to be Placed. We have here a sequence of three authorities “ul minating in Syrianus (1174, 21 ff.), who mediates between the first a (whom Proclus describes as “famous and divine men,” 1174, 22- It was the first authority (1173, 7 ff.), it would seem. who raised an aporia as to why only the “genera of Being,’ Motion, Rest, Same ness and Otherness, are denied of the One, and not all forms d proposed the solution that it is because these genera are resent every level of being. Proctus reports this authority (1173 24) as de. claring that 16 mpa@tw> dv (a term which Proclus professes not t understand, ‘6 ti noté éott') comprehends all these genera, “in so fat as it has proceeded forth from the supra-essential (onepovciov), having become Being, and in so far as it has assimilated itself towards what has produced it, acquiring Sameness instead of Unity (vor ) while in so far as it has distinguished itself from the one. not being he One, it becomes Otherness. . . . In so far as it proceeds forth, it is wstab. lished in motion, while in so far as it is established in the One, even while it proceeds, it has a share in rest. For in general, processions as they say, are causes of motion and otherness in Being, while reversions are causes of sameness and rest.”’ : This is a most interesting piece of doctrine, especially if we could claim it for Porphyry. This relating of Sameness and Otherness Motion and Rest to Primal Being owes a certain amount to Plotinus’ discussion of this topic in Enn. VI 2, but it goes beyond what is to be found there. That Sameness is an imitation of the One’s unity while Otherness is the result of its distinctness from it, Motion the accompaniment of its procession from the One, while Rest is the expression of its remaining, or return (for these two aspects of the cycle are frequently assimilated) is a creative, if rather scholastic, develop-

ment of Plotinian speculation such as one would expect from Porphyr monéof scheme That Porphyry had already developed the triadic proodos-epistrophé is indicated by its presence in the work of Marius Victorinus.® and from the last section of the Anon. Taur. commentary (XIV 21-35)"! we can derive, not only an indication of the knowledge use of this triad, but also, more significantly still, of a disposition to Being the genera of Being as a means of distinguishing Intellect or from the primal One: 4] I realise here that | am using one disputable passage to buttress the authenticity of another (though perhaps Pierre Hadot and I would shake hands over it!), but it seems worth while. none the less, to draw attention to these scattered clues. If we turn to our second authority, we seem once again to find attitudes and turns of phrase which I have already identified as lamblichean. This authority firmly restricts the genera of Being to the intellectual realm (td voepd, 1174, 3), that is. for lamblichus, the level of Forms proper. His argument is that such a number of entities (a pentad) would not arise in the realm immediately contiguous to the Kai nuodv ovodv évepyerOv Kai Os kata pév thy brapetv gotoa dv cin 1 évépyeta, Katd dé TH vonoty sig abtrv otpageica évépyeta, Kata S& trv Cory Ex tHc omdpgewg One, where the theologians only postulate monads and triads: éxvetoaca évepyeia. periHere the three moments within the hypostasis are mentioned of phrastically, but clearly enough, and connected with the triad shes distingui author the bnapéts, Car and votc. Following on this, the One of the Second Hypothesis from that of the First (which he describes, significantly, as tO Ev wirdov, which I would take Porphyry and lamblichus in Proctus’ Commentary on the Parmenides as expressing the same as 16 évi [8e@) efvat), by giving a list of its attributes, in which, it seems to me, the genera of Being are given special prominence (though they are not the only ones mentioned): kai Kate todto EotyKev Gpa Kai Kiveitat Kai év Eaut@ totw Kui Shov éotiv Kai pépy Eyer Kai tabtév got Kal Etepov, Kata S& wihdv adtob tO év kai olov rpdtov Kai Svtwg To Ev obte EotyKev obte Kiveitar obte tabtév gory otte Etepov obte év Eaut@ dotw obte Ev Ghrg. By judicious grouping (altering the Parmenidean order), the s and author highlights, it seems to me, Rest and Motion, Samenes Otherness, though he cannot omit some other epithets. His way of referring to the One of the First Hypothesis, as I say, seems to present it, not so much as a distinct hypostasis. but as the First Principle viewed in itself, as merely “tone,” as opposed to its role as Father of All, and that, if my conjecture earlier is right, is how Porphyry viewed the subject of the First Hypothesis. *© Hymn If, 71-74: “Status, Progressio, Regressus, O beata Trinitas.” 4} Although its authorship must remain in doubt, this item of agreement aids Pierre Hadot's case. At the least, the Anon. must, I think, be of the “school” of Porphyry. for such a number could not derive its existence immediately from the One; it is necessary that the multiplicity which manifests itself immediately from the One should be most akin to the One, constricted in quantity and incomprehensible in power (ti Svuvéper dnepianntov), in order that through the constrictedness of its quantity it should imitate the quantitilessness (Gxogov) of the One, and through the incomprehensibility of its power the infinity of the One which is prior 10 power: but the pentad is remote from the One and goes beyond even the first order of numbers, by which I mean the triadic: but Plato has termed the summit of the realm of beings the One Being, as being the monad of Being; whereas the theologians celebrate intelligible monads and triads, but not pentads or other numbers; so then, the genera of Being do not come immediately after the One. We may note, in this connexion, that lamblichus is reported by Proclus, at Ja Tim. 1 230, Sff. (= Iambl. In Tim, Fr. 29 Dillon), 4 propos Tim. 27D, as declaring 16 dei Sv to be on a higher level than the genera of Being and the Forms, and situating it “at the summit of the noeuc realm, enjoying primary participation in the One.” And Proclus goes on to say that lamblichus supported this by referenc e to what is said in the Parmenides about tO év Sv, and from the Sophist. It is also interesting that there too Iamblichus is recorded as vigorous ly opposing (EnBpiWa> Siaqpayetar) those who would put them on the same level, (which is indeed the obvious interpretation of the pas- Sage); Proclus does not, unfortunately, give a name to his but they may well have included Porphyry. opponents

If this passage can be claimed for [amblichus, an interesting Syrianus to see the series of negations in the First Hypothesis (and the corresponding assertions in the Second) as representing the successive levels of the noetic and noeric realms,”? but if lamblichus is here asserting that characteristics proper to the moeric realm are being denied of the One, then perhaps he had already advanced at least some foreshadowing of Syrianus’ elaborate theory. (9.) But let us pass on. The next passage in which a doxography occurs is the commentary on 140c1-141d6, which argues that the One is neither older nor younger nor the same age either as itself or anything else. This brings us clearly into the realm of Time. The proof that the One transcends Time involves Proclus in an interesting doxographical discussion. After dismissing those early philosophers who thought that all things, including God, were comprehended by Iamblichus mention this doctrine in their Lives of Pytha ora or anywhere else in their surviving works. On the whole. 1 would bn fer to postulate Amelius and/or Theodorus of Asine as pro ound of this particular formulation, and leave to Porphy ry the sim ler x i tion. One dislikes complicating the scene by the occasional int >. duction of Amelius or Theodorus as a deus ex machina but in this case the scene is already complicated by the presenc e of four disti n opinions prior to Syrianus. “ The identification of the fourth authority with Iamblich as I have suggested above, is rather less problem Time (1213, 17ff.), he turns to the question of precisely what kind actually accords well with certain declarations of Porphyry’s. Proclus reports at Plat. Theol. 1 11 (p. 51, 4ff. S-W) that in his Peri Archon Porphyry declared the highest aspect of Nous (which is united to the One) to be npoaiwviog, while Nous itself is aidvios.? The One itself, then, obviously transcends Eternity. This identification, then, seems plausible and in accord with the relative simplicity and reasonableness of Porphyry’s exegesis; but a problem then arises with the third authority (1216, 15 ff.). This person is not in disagreement with the previous position. but wants to give a atical. This auth 2 See Saffrey and Westerink, Theol, Plat. | pp. lavii-lxix, in, dismisses the identification of “time” here with Eternity, and de "ates it to refer Tather to “the causal principle of the intellectual ondeos (T6 tig THEEMS TH voEpac aitiov, 1217, 2). Proclus professes n ‘t understand what this means, but if we consider it against th bat t ground of lamblichus’ known doctrine of Time,** we can see that it corresponds to the xpdtoc Kai GpnéBextog ypdvoc, or yw wove Zpovos. which is, as it were, the monad of the time in the hye a world, or at the level of Soul. This is a curious concept certainly "bu Proclus in fact understood it perfectly well, since he discusses thi . self in the £imaeus Commentary (III 30, 30 ff), Here howev ‘he dismisses it in favour of the comprehensive solutio n of Syrianus whi h actually sounds very little different (he identifi es it as the sort of im enjoyed by divinised, pure souls). “ems here nai sable should identify the relevant level of Time dietean | Principle of the intellectual order is a further inn that he, like Syrianus, saw the epithets denied of the One as “ Cf. Proclus, fn Alc. 121. 45 * ! here contradict the Position } took up : ration! of7 more careful conside in my translation ad lec. — “ and The text: Pay elating to this i (from Simplicius’ Categories roclus’ Timae Thi us Commentary y ) are collected by S. 3 Cf. also Sent. 44, passim. 43 name to the mode of existence proper to the One. For this he choose the term Kaipoc, “Instant,” borrowed from the Pythagoreang !*Cond inspired also by such a Platonic passage as Philebus 66A) Prock soe not approve of this subtlety. and denies that Fhilebu s 66A sup, ts it, but our problem is rather to determine who would have sroposedd such an idea. It is noteworthy, perhaps, that neither Por h nest corollary ensues. Hitherto, it has been regarded as an innovation of of Time is intended here by Plato. We find at this point a five-part doxography (1215, 24-1219, 9), ending with Syrianus, and with its fourth member showing significant signs of affinity with Iamblichus, as I shall demonstrate shortly. The identity of the first three is less clear, however, but some reasonable conjectures can be made. The first is probably Plotinus, since what he is being accused of by Proclus is declaring the One to be exempt from Time without further specification (1215, 24 ff.), and Plotinus declares this of the One at Enn. VI 9, 3, 42. in the course of an interesting passage based on the Parmenides. The second authority takes “time” here to refer to Eternity (1216, 3ff.). since that is the sort of “time” necessarily enjoyed by the One of the Second Hypothesis (Nous), in Parm. 152A. This position Commentary on the Parmenides The Concept of Time in Lal € N Neopla oplat tf t onism ne. ( Jerus S alem the cons the consequence and Physics Commentari. Sambursky and S. Pines in in 1971). ) - See also R . Sorabji,

Commentary on the Parmenides 4§ ic and noeric levels of Being (cf. representing the whole series of noet above, p. 42). is actually of very (10.) The next doxographical sequence older than that which had become younger; for this is to ms up times and not to preserve the rule which he himself aid down regarding all relative expressions (1226 15-26) is becoming older than itself must which Parmenides argues that what . The problem raised is whether also be becoming younger than itself here, as some commentators have Plato is being merely sophistic there is some serious philosophical considered (1226, 2 ff.), or whether se (1226, 26 ff.), is able to discern point being made. Syrianus. of cour , but he is preceded by two aua substantial piece of doctrine here I will simply quote them, and thorities who are less satisfactory. seem eminently reasonable.** Syrianus, however, seeks a solution by of needs to be recorded for the sake little philosophical interest, but in , 7-b3 exion with the Jemma 141a completeness. It arises in conn leave it at that. A (Porphyry?): ly see Others (sc. than those who simp up to these critics, have sophistry here), in trying to stand y: for they say the weakl too championed the truth rather older; in respect and ger same thing is at the same time youn yet attained to not has it of future time it is younger, for that; in respect of past time, on the other hand, it is older, But this is not what since it has already lived through that. younger and older it is to become both simultaneously thing and older one than oneself, but rather younger than entator is comm this than another. So the argument of . 6-15) , (1226 quickly revealed to us as being weak , declared that everyB (lamblichus?): Another set, again younger, what is now also is thing which is older than itself was before the what and existent being the “older,” be said to be can older “younger,” and that what is now too fail these but ger: older than what was formerly youn b 3-6). (141 t emen stat to understand the sense of Plato’s st again be will what which puts what is against what is, >, been has what st what will be <and what has been again ssions.”’ So then, it is these in all cases being relative expre is older has become not possible to say that that which now The ; efforts of both 4 and B to elucidat i e Plato’s meaning h contrasting linear and cyclical time, the latter of which is the type of time enjoyed oy ure souls (the level of being which, on his theory ¢ should sho now be denying of the One);; and i yclica] ical time ti what is i becoming older is also simul taneously becomiing ngyo younger, Ber, as *as getting gettin nearer fo a new cycle, since the end is also the beginning 2 good . : x : . example of Syrianus’ creative interpretation of the :textoo to s it hi elaborate metaphysical scheme. “roses (11.) The final passagege in which ( i I have identified this d oon ¢: eer occurs in that part of the commentary only oreserved < ; ° seems to permit only a negative conclusi sion to the whole h h hesis: sis Is it possible that all this sh ould hold good of the One?” “shoul ** d 1” This, say not!” This, it would ap pear,” 49 was used " by Origen the he Pi Platonis i at a firm indication that there is n o subject j of the ; First i H vothesis, and thatint in turn provokes Proclu$ to attack him (p. . 64, 64, |1 ff.), fF), se aschad he h ad d dene earlier a the Commentary (cf. 1065, 1 ff. & 36. 19 ff Klibansky), who sctept ther ten next (p. 64, 25 ff.) to a doxography of those e subject of the hypothesis is th bothered by this final passage. As so often. ‘ we have ve < aseguen7eeotihee authorities, aut Hes,’ culminat C ing g in Syrianu tw two lend themselves i s,; and the first t two ‘° eentihieation as Porphyry and Iamblichus. For one thing, we find * con met at 68, 15-16 between those who follow AoyoypagtKr} Lov8ia fconsequentia logographica) and those who follow 1 tv * Et is instructive t o compare Cornford’s re ord’s remarks ad loc, (Plato and Parmenides, p. 128): . . ; ar “The above ferent age at svety moment t a sophism, Whatever exists in lime must be of a difinterval between its younce nae ts age at any eartier moment; and the lengthening interval between ite anne i and its older self must always be the same as the sitions involving ihe eel and ts younger self. But we have seen that no propog ei tov mpd tl tade ds from Latin, and readin 4) Adding t6 8& 7E7OVOS npds 16 yeyov que ad aliquid, which eorum r sempe Latin f, € for dei tv mpdg 16 tHde of Gk. mss.; here, and also 1.26 at least shows that xpd¢ T figures below. ; ne vert<! ‘ s hatinP. 64, 25-66, 24 Klibansky). This concerns the e First Hypothesis (142a 6-8), -8), whi ch at first sight defined.” s ‘same’ and ‘different’ cun be true of the One we have “Ch Saffrey and Westerin k, Theol, 7, Plat. + Vol. }. VW Pp. x-xx Oho (thoughgh this passage). they do> Mt not recognise

John Ditton s' Ciommentary on the Parmenides nmpaypdtwv Sewpia (rerum theoria).°° Just such a contrast is made by Proclus in the Timaeus Commentary 1 73, 28-29: kai toito pév Aoyoyougikév, éxeivo dé olxetov tots npoKettévotc), but there too, unfortunately, he does not name his authorities. That it is the sort of contrast he makes between Porphyry and [amblichus is shown, however, by Jn Tim. 1 195, 22 ff., where Porphyry’s litera, philological exegesis of Tim. 26 BC is contrasted with that of lamblichus. who attends rather to tv mpaypdtav fh Gan Bempia. Certainly nothing in the content of the two opinions expressed is such as to contradict this evidence. The first authority (66, 25 ff.K.) wants to take the troublesome passage, not as the conclusion of the First Hypothesis, but as the beginning of the Second. The arguments adduced by this authority are of interest, though reported by Proclus at too great length to be reproduced in full. He points out that the First Principle in Rep. VI 509 B is described as being beyond Intellect, the intelligible and existence. and, since the subject of the First Hypothesis is to be equated with the First Principle described there (and with that of Ep. I1, 312E), all the negations presented here are true of it. and this “final” sentence should thus be taken rather as introducing the Second Hypothesis than as rounding off the First: “In order to show the way to the Second Hypothesis, he says that someone may find these conclusions impossible as concerning the One. He had to bring in what was needed to pass over to the Second Hypothesis, so that we should not find anything superfluous. For these things only For just as there are conclusions rounding off every theorem, so this conclusion is appended to the rest “that all things are impossible of the One... .” All of these as has been shown, are impossible of the One. This is wh he asks if it is possible to say these things whic h he has asked about of the One, and Aristotle denies it. For whatever you add to “one.” any kind of existent whate ver, is somethin other than one. If “one” has something else added to it besides what it itself is, it becomes “somethi ng that is one” (év au, aliquid unum), instead of being simply one (anh@c eV, simpliciter unum), : fous ‘This point — provoked, perhaps, by the use of ti in the pre; sentence (1426: ovdé Tt tHv Svtwv adtod aio@dvetai) — has a most interesting resemblance to a The ninth problem is, what is the meaning of “some one thing” (&v yé tt), and what is the significan ce ofadding the word “some” (ti)? Is it because “something ”’ is the opposte of noe as Porphyry proposed, or is it because “one” ” i the ‘erm for the wae eca pated tesOne, ne hee theTk then participated is denominated “some one”; for “some” and Participated,” which is what “some” signif ies, are cotnetdental, according to the philosopher Syrianus — or as is the view of the great lamblichus, it is the fact th t after the absolute form of each of entity (t6 dmhdic xu wy) there is ‘‘a certain” particular form, so that after the is obvious to anyone that, as far as truth goes, they are not impossible.” Here Porphyry (if it is he) certainly seems to recognise a transcendent. ineffable, supra-essential One as the subject of the First Hypothesis — as after all, if he is to be a faithful follower of Plotinus, he must de, But I would maintain that it was possible for him, with Oa by (tO &mAG@S Ev) there some fancy footwork, to take his supra-essential One as just the First %* This is mistransiated in Klibansky, in such a way as to obscure the contrast. remark of Tamblichus on 144c5 in theRuel Secon(= I3ft, d Hypoth esis. - Fenne my lamb, re reported l by ¥ D Damasciius, i In Parm. . I] 112, seem impossible because of the inexpressibleness of the One, since it Principle in its transcendent aspect — 10 Evi iva, in the terminology of passage (3). However that may be, the second authority (66, 25 ff.) is fairly certainly identifiable as lamblichus. Rejecting his predecessor's solution, he regards this conclusion as “a generalisation which contains all the previous negations”: 47 $i Wi is the particular One baa © may5 ae not e here, byV thethe way, wi Damascius jus’ independent knowledge of the contri oon ions a orphyry/ and lamblichus, i since there is ho reason to suppose that Proclus ; xed Ais his reticence re about namin Z authorities iti later in his c ary ic Damascius is in general following). emimensany Gach * .. Cf. also Proclus’ clus’ eriticism critici of7 famblichus’ i views on the subject of Hyp. I at Pp. 36, 8 ff. ove, where he himself makes a distinction between @ ’ in dis. tinguishing between ‘God” od” and “ “the gods’ fi {i.e., the One“and and the henads).winds

Proclus, then, salutes this solution as following more closely the metaphysical realities (ta mpdypata), though Syrianus is still able to add further refinement to it (68, !6ff.). For us, it presents lamblichus once again in a characteristic position vis-a-vis Porphyry. In conclusion, what has this laborious strip-mining of Proclus’ text (if the results be found plausible) achieved? It seems to me that xi it should both throw some further light on the relations between Porphyry and lamblichus as commentators (already amply attested, admittedly, from the remains of their commentaries on Plato’s Timaeus and Aristotle’s Categories), and increase our knowledge of certain points of doctrine of each of them. Of these, I would pick out Porphyry’s rather baffling views on the First Principle (on which subject I can still only make some tentative suggestions, as we have seen), and lamblichus’ doctrine of henads and levels of Form; as well as his view of the levels of reality depicted in the First and Second Hypotheses. which seems to have to some extent anticipated that of Syrianus. In general, also, this investigation may serve to remind us that Proclus is being no more original in the Commentary on the Parmenides than he is being in the Commentary on the Timaeus; he has merely decided, for some reason, aesthetic or “political,” to downplay his predecessors, except for Syrianus, into an anonymity from which it is a laborious task even partially to rescue them. GAWMoOg Trinity College, Dublin