Equality and justice in early Greek cosmologies

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HE early Greek notion of justice erally? lends itself with seductive ease to they envisaged harmony in terms of equalmade the opposite assumption: application far beyond the bounds ity. Cosmic equality was conceived as the of politics and morals. To respect the naguaranty of cosmic justice: the order of ture of anyone or anything is to be “just” nature is maintained because it is an order to them. To impair or destroy that nature of equals. is “violence” or “injustice.” Thus, in a never been established.* I propose to rewell-known instance, Solon speaks of the view the relevant evidence and interpret sea as “‘justest’’ when, being itself undisbriefly its historical significance. To my knowledge, this has turbed by the winds, it does not disturb anyone or anything.? The law of I. the MEDICAL THEORY Greek medical thought offers two wellmeasure is scarcely more than a refinement of this idea of one’s own nature and known formulas of equalitarian harmony: of the nature of others as restraining lim- Alcmaeon’s definition of health as “equality (isonomia) of the powers”? and the its which must not be overstepped. ture at large as a harmonious association, conception of temperate climate (xoñois TÓv wpéwr) in Tlepi dépwr, ddatwr, romwv 12, whose members observe, or are compelled as equality (?somoiria) of the hot and the Cosmic justice? is a conception of nato observe, the law of the measure. There cold, the dry and the moist.? Isonomia and may be death, destruction, strife, even enisomotria here render explicit the equalicroachment (as in Anaximander). There tarian assumption is Justice nonetheless, if encroachment is principles of medical theory, dynamis and invariably repaired and things are reinstated within their proper limit. This is the vantage-point from which the commentators have generally interpreted cosmic justice in the pre-Socratics. It is perfectly sound. But it leaves out the additional postulate of equality; for, clearly, it is quite possible to think of harmony and nonencroachment as a relation between unequals. Solon so thought of it.* But the founders of Greek scientific thought gen- 5 With the qualifications which we shall notice in the case of Heracleitus. 6 But see the interesting material on ‘‘equality in nature’’ collected by R. Hirzel, Themis (Leipzig, 1907), pp. 308-11; and Werner Jaeger, Paideia, I, 104 (my references to this book here and throughout are to the English translation {2d ed.; New York, 1945)). 7 Alcmaeon Frag. B4. (All references to pre-Socratic fragments are to H. Diels and W. Kranz, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker {5th ed.; Berlin, 1934-37]). Isonomia means more than ‘‘equality under the law’’; it means, rather, ‘‘equality of rights’’ and thus implies equality of dignity Professor Hermann Frankel or status among the citizens (see, e.g., Hat. iii. 142. 3; Thuc. vi. 38. 3). Oligarchia isonomos (Thuc. iii. 62. 3), possible as a form of speech, does not invalidate 1I am indebted to implicit in the first the traditional association of isonomia with democracy. and Mr. F. H. Sandbach for helpful criticisms of an 8 These earlier draft. 2 Frag. 11 (Diehl). For the interpretation see my “Solonian Justice,’ CP, XLI (1946), 66, n. 18. ‘just’ order, e.g., Solon (Diehl) and Theognis 677. 4 See my ‘‘Solonian Justice,’ pp. 78 ff. {CLassicaL PæiLozoay, XLII, Jury, 1947] head the list of opposites in isomoiria, it means ‘‘equality in portion,” as, e.g., of heirs inheriting equal shares of an estate (Demosth. 3 The expression is redundant in Greek, since kosmos itself means a two pairs Aétius' report of Alemaeon’s doctrine (loc. cit.). As for 1. 11 xlviii. 19; Isaeusi. 2 and 35) and, therefore, ‘‘equality in personal and social status or dignity,’’ e.g., Il. xv. 186-95, 209: Poseidon is Zeus’s homotimos because he is his isomoros.

krasis. The original meaning of dynamis, is assumed that the constituent powers as Peck observes, is not ‘‘a substance that must be (1) in equilibrium and therefore has power” but rather “a substance which (2) equal to one another, much as opposis a power, which can assert itself, and by ing parties in an evenly matched contest the simple act of asserting itself, by being are assumed to be equal.!® This is exactly too strong, stronger than the others, can the sense in which equality figures in the cause trouble.”* Its strength must, theremedical treatises and, indeed, as we shall fore, be “taken away’’!? and thus “‘modersee, in the whole development of early ated.’”!! And this is to be done not through cosmological theory from Anaximander to repression through Empedocles. Powers are equal if they can counterpoise against an equal. This is the heart of the doctrine of krasis. Alemaeon’s hold one another in check!‘ so that none isonomia of the powers is no more than its earliest-known statement at a time when in Alemaeon’s term, “monarchy”” over the interest still centered in the fact of equilibof equality even when it conceives krasis rium itself rather than in the specific nature of the equilibrated powers. The kind of equality here envisaged can not as the equipoise of pairs of physical best be gauged from the methodology of “Hippocratic” medicine. Observation, for here, too, the purpose of blending is to all its acuteness, is mainly directed toward qualitative data, with only the vaguest quantitative base.” No effort is made to measure individual “powers,” generalize their observed values, and construct therefrom an equation, however crude. The existence of the equation is rather an outright assumption. If there is health, it played.”17 Should any power escape this by a superior but can gain “mastery” or “supremacy?”* or, others. Medical theory assumes this kind opposites (hot-cold, dry-moist, etc.) but as a many-valued blend of powers;!® for insure that “no individual power is disblending and “stand by itself,’’!8 it would be ominously “strong” and thus create the “monarchy” which constitutes disease.!* When we come to the “krasis of the seasons” we move directly into the area of cosmic justice; for medical thought is not 13 Cf. the meaning of ¿voraAñs in Hdt. i. 82. 4, and 9 In his Introd. to Aristotle’s Generation of Animals Of ioöpporos in Eurip. Suppl. 706. (“Loeb Classical Library’’ [1943], p. li). For a good 14 Cf. Ps.-Arist. De mundo 396 b35, where isomoiria is paralleled by the expression ‘‘no one of them example see the definition of pathogenic dynamis in I. ápx. inrpuñs 22. 3-4 (Hippocrates, ed. W. H. S. is Jones, Vol. I {‘‘Loeb Classical Library’’]) as the ‘‘inand this is, in turn, explained by adding, ‘‘for the tensity and strength of the humors.’’ For ‘‘strength’’ (lexis, ioxupér) see ibid., chap. 14; for “strong” heavy is foods, translation). ibid., chaps. 3-6; see also below, n. 19; and the cf. Timaeus 33 a: ‘‘hot things and cold and all things that have strong powers..... ” 10 II. ápx. inrp. 16. 49: äparpebuevor rr Öbvanır. more powerful [rXéovr óvvaod0a:] than any other”; equally balanced [ionv ávrioraoiv ¿xe:] with light, and the 15 Cf. II. à. è. 7. hot 12. with the cold’’ (Forster’s 18: “nothing has violent supremacy”’ (unótv ñ érixpareov Bıaiws), as a parallel expression to ‘‘isomoiria prevails.’’ 11 Merplws, perpiérns, Common through the Hippo- 16 As, e.g., in the doctrine of coction in I. apx. inrp., cratic writings. “Iows is sometimes added for emphasis (II. dic. ávOp. 3. 7-8 [Jones, Hippocrates, Vol. IV]). which assumes ““innumerable'' powers (kai &XXa pupia [14. 33-34; 17. 9-10]) and lays down the principle that 12 The best clue to the observational roots of the doctrine of krasis (and its offspring, the doctrine of ber the humors) is the mention of ‘‘unmixed’’ substances in stools (d:axwpquata &kpnra, árerra, Often in 'Eriò. i and iii) and in vomit, sputum, and urine (e.g., Opoyv. 12-14). The humors were, no doubt, postulated to account for these unmixed substances: cf. the frequent association of ‘‘bilious’’ with ‘‘unmixed’’ in ’Em6é. i and iii; and, conversely, Opoyv. 13: ‘‘the vomit is most useful when phlegm and bile are most thoroughly mixed together.” these ‘‘become milder and better the greater the num- [sc. of powers] with which they are mixed” (19. 53). 17 Ibid. 19. 55-56. 18 Ibid. 14. 37-38: adrd ép’ éwurod yernrar. Cf. II. dio. ávOp. 10-11: ép’ évurod ar. Cf. below, n. 167. 19 I. rado 16 (Littré, VI, 224): “for phlegm and bile, when concentrated [£vverrnköra], are strong and dominate in whatever part of the body they establish themselves and cause much trouble and pain.”

content with the empirical fact that some justice to the cold, if the latter had its climates are better suited than others (and turn in the winter. And if a similar and thus more “just’’) to human nature. concurrent cycle of successive supremacy It goes further to explain the harmony of could be assumed to hold among the human nature to its environment through powers in the human body, then the krasis an absolute cosmic fact, 1.e., the harmony of man and nature of the environmental forces with one an- Medical thought must have moved gradother.?° This is, in turn, construed as an ually toward this elegant tissue of assumpequilibrium of opposites. But there is a tions.?* In "Eriónuóv 1 and lil we see the would be perfect. difference. This isomoiria, unlike that of view that each season has its own “conthe body, can be grounded in an observstitution,” able equation which is capable of strict eases and relieves quantitative equinox, vdaTwy, rórov goes into physiological dewhen (1) day is equal to night, (2) all tails on the dependence of the healthy expression—the which aggravates some disothers.” Ilepi dépwr, the hours throughout the day and night body on an ordered sequence of seasonal are equal to one another,” and (3) the sun change, explaining how even unseasonably rises at a point midway between the good weather would be harmful (chap. northernmost and the southernmost ris- 10). Finally, that confident dogmatist, the ings of the year (i.e., the summer and author of Ilepi dicios avdpwrov, produces winter solstices). That climatic isomotria the full-blown theory: should be attended by these astronomical Man’s body has always all of these [sc. four equalities was so impressive that the relahumors]; but as the seasons revolve they [sc. tion between the two was taken as one of the humors] become now greater, now lesser, causal implication. Thus the Island of Iambulus in Diodorus ii. 56. 7 is endowed each in turn [kara pepos] and in accordance with a year-round equinox to validate its claim to the most temperate of climates. But if isomoiria belongs to the equiwinter is strongest; next spring; then summer; noctial seasons, a way must be found somehow to bring the rest of the year within the framework of equalitarian harmony. This was done through the idea of rotation in office, or “successive supremacy” (& uepeı Or KaTa uépos kparelv), AMON: the powers. As in the democratic polis “the demos rules by turn,’ so the hot could prevail in the summer without inwith nature..... At one time of the year then autumn. So too in man at one time phlegm is strongest; next blood; next bile, first yellow, then the so-called black [7. 48-52 and 61-66]. II. EMPEDOCLES Empedocles is our best bridge from medicine to philosophy proper. His thought was so congenial to the medical theorists of his time that, by all accounts, his influence upon them was enormous.? 24 Their earliest foundation was the commonsense business of adapting food, clothing, etc., to the 20 E.g., the physician Eryximachus in Plato Symp. 188 a; cf. also Laws x. 906 c. 21 And thus light is in isomoiria with darkness; cf. the report of Pythagorean doctrine by Alexander Polyhistor, ap. Diog. Laert. viii. 26. 22 These are the standard hours of scientific inquiry, the ‘‘equinoctial hours,’’ as over against the variable ‘‘seasonal hours’ (@pat xatpexai) in popular usage (see Th. H. Martin, ‘‘Astronomia’’ in Daremberg-Saglio, p. 485 a). 23 Eurip. Suppl. 406. prevailing weather: e.g., cold potions in the summer, hot in the winter (II. ôvair. dé. 19 [Jones, Hippocrates, Vol. II]; cf. Heracleides of Tarentum ap. Athen. ii. 45 d). 25 The locus classicus is ’Eruô. iii. 15. 26 Wellmann (Fragmente der sikelischen Ärzte [Berlin, 1901], pp. 68 ff.) spoke of him as the ‘‘founder’’ of the Sicilian school, and his statement has often been repeated. Neither Galen nor any other ancient authority goes so far (see the texts under Emp. Frag. A3). However, it may well have been the influence of his four ‘‘roots’’ that fixed the first two pairs of opposites

Even in the Aegean it was strong enough to draw the fire of the author of Ancient Medicine?" In his system man’s flesh and blood is made up of the four world-comof his elements. In one argumentative passage (De gen. et cor. 333 a 19-34) Aristotle professes to be in the dark as to whether equality in volume*? or in ‘‘power’’?? was ponents on the pattern of isomoiria; where this equality is imperfect, we get the deviations from perfect health and wisdom in meant; in another (Meteor. 340 a 14) he gives himself away, assuming the latter man.?® But in the cosmos the “roots” are course.?* Aristotle’s quandary in the first (ica Tr dlvauw eir«) as a matter of strictly equal among themselves;? and, passage, even if only rhetorical, shows well since each of them is, like Parmenides’ Being, eternally equal to itself,?° cosmic justice is perpetually sure. Even at the zenith of the ascendancy of Strife,* when each of the four “roots” would be “unmixed” (Frag. B35. 15) and thus, by enough that the distinction had not been Hippocratic norms, a “strong substance,” settled by Empedocles. The second passage suggests just as well that “power” was, nevertheless, uppermost in Empedocles’ mind, as it certainly was for the medical writers.* Empedocles is not averse to spatial categories: Love is “equal no harm could result, for none would be in length and breadth.’** But when he stronger than any of the rest. Thus, even formally declares that the roots are equal, when Strife rules the World, equality is a he immediately goes on to say that (1) sufficient preventive of “injustice.” they are of equal age, (2) each has its Much has been written on what Empedocles really meant by the “equality” peculiar honor (ru), but (3) they rule in turn (Frag. B17. 27-29).58 Could we ask for more conclusive proof that not mere in Alcmaeon’s list nameis in Sicilian (Frag. B4) as the canonical dymedicine (usually in combination humors as, e.g., in Diocles, and with even elsewhere the doctrine of the Frag. 8 in Wellmann; II. radav 1 [Littré, VI, 208]; II. vovowv i. 2 [Littré, VI, 142]; II. rór. 7. x. ávOp. 42 [Littré, VI, 334]). extension but “power”. (with its associated concept of “honor’’) is uppermost? Points 2 and 3 state the principle of “successive supremacy,” whose significance in 27 Jaeger (op. cit., Vol. III, chap. i, p. 40) rightly 32 karà 7d woodv (1. 20), purely metric dimension; in warns against taking Empedocles as the sole butt of Meteor. the polemic. Certainly, the scope of the argument is and uéye0os. much broader. But it is nonetheless significant that Empedocles is the only opponent to be named. He clearly represents the objectionable influence of ‘‘philosophy”” in its most oppressive form. 340 a 7-9, rAñbos, 33 “Ooov divarar (1. 24). A third possibility, based on the distinction of ro.6v and rocév (ll. 27 ff.), need not detain us here. In Empedocles and his predecessors dynamis 28 Emp. Frags. B98, A78, A86 (Theophr. De sensu Aristotle speaks of ¿yxos, anteceded this distinction and denoted either quality or quantity or else (more commonly) both. 10-11). 34 Empedocles is not named here; but it is generally 22 Emp. Frag. B17. 27. Cornford (From Religion to Philosophy [London, 1912], p. 64) observed that agreed that the reference is to him. Empedocles’ roots are, like the three gods in Il. xv, 35 See above, p. 157. ‘‘equal in status or lot.’’ Actually, the equality of the roots is more thoroughgoing. In the Iliad it could be claimed for Zeus that he is superior in force and prior in birth (xv. 165 f.). Neither could be claimed for any of the Empedoclean roots. in 36 Emp. Frag. B17. 20. taking this spatial ocles’ true thought’’ atalanton in the (Pour l’histoire and Tannery was mistaken expression as ‘‘Empeddiscounting the preceding de la line science as dynamic ‘‘metaphorical’’ helléne [2d ed.; Paris, and the 1930], p. 314). Parmenides had used a similarly spatial thrice repeated abdrà éoru ravra (Frags. B17. 34, B21. formula of Being (Frag. B8. 49: rávrodev Toov), whose primary property is, nonetheless, dynamic equilibrium ¿30 Emp. Frag. B17. 35: #vexkès aitv óuota; 13, B26. 3). 31 This ascendancy of Strife is never explicitly mentioned in the fragments. But it is a legitimate— indeed, unavoidable—inference from (1) the general principal of alternate dominance of Love and Strife (Frag. B8. 44: ¿vorakés rávrg). 37 Cf. Emp., Frag. B30. 2: és riuàs 7’ &vbpovoe (sc. Neikos). 38 With é» péper kparéovo. here and (2) the amply attested dominance of Love in the B26. 1) Sphairos. Plato Soph. 242 d. cf. Frag. B30. 3: (and also in Frag. änoiBatos xpóvos),

medical theory has just been explained 29) that makes a cosmos possible.” And, (see above, p. 158); and they are introthis equality once assured, the process duced by Point 1, which rules out flatly works just as well backward as forward: the possibility that any of them could whether Harmony or Strife has supremclaim permanent supremacy in virtue of acy, the other will be “‘rising up to [claim] seniority rights.?? Because of 1 the unihis prerogatives” (Frag. B30. 2), and a verse cannot be a “monarchy,” for no world will be born and destroyed in either power within it possesses the qualifying case. primogeniture. Because of 2 and 3 the uni- A lacuna in the argument so far is the verse must be an tsonomia, for it conforms apparent absence of any explicit reference to the democratic principle of rotation of to justice in the fragments; the word dike office. is never mentioned. My answer is that the Thus Empedocles builds a universe to reference to justice is nonetheless present; the specifications of Alemaeon’s formula Empedocles’ surviving words, if carefully of health; and in so doing he levels ancient examined, contain expressions which are inequalities which had been fixed by relicharged with the imagery and notion of gious tradition. Zeus, heretofore “king of justice. kings, of all the blessed the most blessed, again: Strife “rose up to [claim] his pre- Consider Fragment B30 once over all the mighty sovereign in might” rogatives in the fulness of alternate time (Aesch. Suppl. 524-26) is now merely one set for them [sc. Love and Strife] by the of the roots on a par with the “unheardmighty of’’49 divinity, Nestis, so inconsequential tion). The fragment breaks off abruptly. oath....” (Burnet’s translathat its very identity remains in doubt. But we hear of ‘‘mighty oaths” again in And as for Strife—“‘unseemly,” “dread- Fragment B115, where they “seal” the ful,” “evil,” “mad”*—every impulse of sentimental justice would urge its subordination to the power that makes all “have thoughts of love and work the works of peace” (Frag. B17. 23), “queen Cypris,” who in the golden age ruled alone in place of Zeus (Frag. B128). But equalitarian justice rules otherwise. Were not Harmony matched with its perfect equal in Strife, there would be no created world, only the nondescript mixture of the Sphairos. It is only the strictly reciprocal power of Strife to undo the work of Harmony and “prevail in turn” (Frag. B17. “decree of the gods.” Here “oaths” represent the binding, inviolate, necessary character of that decree,* which is an “oracle of Ananke.’ But we know that in Parmenides Ananke and Dike perform the same function of holding Being fast “in the bonds of the limit.”** We may thus infer that “mighty oath” in Empedocles, like “strong Ananke” in Parmenides, alludes to the orderliness of existence con42 The mutual interdependence between opposites is explicit in I. dic. av0p. 7. 56-59: “if one [sc. of the hot, cold, dry, moist] were to fail, all would disappear, for by the same necessity all are constituted and are nourished by one another’’ (translation adapted from Jones). 39 See Peisthetaerus’ argument in the Birds 471 ff.: the birds are ‘‘prior to the earth and prior to the gods .... being eldest, the kingship is rightfully theirs.”’ aspect of justice that 8px.ov Could be taken as equiva- 43 The oath was often thought so important an This is also the logic of Plato’s long-winded argument lent to öikawov (Diog. Laert. viii. 33). Cf. 8e&r ¿vopxov in Laws x, tersely anticipated in Tim. 34 b—c. 40 Wilamowitz, Glaube der Hellenen, I (Berlin, ôikar in Soph. Ant. 369. 1931), 20. serves of ananke in Frag. B8. 30: ‘‘Ihr Tun wird da- 44 Parm. Frag. B8. 14-15 and 30-31. Frankel ob- 41 Emp. Frags. B27a; B17. 19; B20. 4; B115. 15. durch begründet, dass das Gegenteil nicht @éws sein Aristotle (Metaph. 1975 b 6-7) is shocked at the thought that Strife, the principle of evil (4 rod xaxod piors), Should be imperishable in Empedocles. Nachrichten Gôtt. (‘‘Parmenidesstudien,’’ würde’ [1930], pp. 153-92, at p. 189. My heavy debt to this study will be evident throughout this paper).

“rightful share” or “just portion” (aîoa).{? they can overstep the limit of their own nature. There can be no injustice in Being, for its limit is an unbreakable “chain” (Frag. B8. 26 and 31) or “fetter” (Frag. B8. 14) which “holds it fast.’’’® Justice or Necessity is thus spoken of as an active force. But it is immanent in Being, since Being is all there is. What is 2. “In the fulness of time” (redecopévoro there, then, about Being which accounts ceived under the aspect of justice. This inference is confirmed by three other terms in the fragment: 1. “The ‘prerogatives’ (riuai) of Strife.’* —This tells us that the dominance of Strife is not lawless self-assertion but duly established right or “office”; it is its xpövowo).— Time” here is no abstract measurement of the passage of events. It for this necessary justice? It is its selfidentity or, as Parmenides thinks of it, its is the proper time-span allotted to Strife homogeneity or “self-equality.” “It 1s all (as also to Love) in the cosmic order; it is a “measure” whose observance is of the esalike’’; “it is equal to itself on all sides.””! For the historical source of this concepsence of justice.*? tion we should look to Anaximander’s the- 3. “Alternate (äuoıßatos) time.?49—“AIternate time” specifies what kind of jusits all-around equality (öuowörnra).5? Aristice this is: the equalitarian justice of rotatotle’s paraphrase of the theorem leaves tion of office. us uncertain as to which of the words, if III. any, are Anaximander’s own.* But taking PARMENIDES In Parmenides’ Being the reference to justice is more explicit, and there is a stronger accent on its orem that the earth owed its stability to compulsiveness. There may be injustice among men, for the text at its face value, the similarity is striking: 50 See below, n. 159. 51 Frags. B8. 22: rá» ouoïor, and B8. 49: of rávrode» Tao. be expressed by homoiotes: Eudemus ap. Proclus In 46 For the same association of the ‘‘great oath of the gods’’ with the establishment of a ‘‘prerogative’’ (yépas) see Pindar, Ol. 7: 65: Tiny, like yépas, is the dignity of one’s status in an ordered society (see Cornford, op. cit., p. 16). The scrupulous observance of its claims to deference is the basis of justice. For cosmological application of the idea see Soph. a Ajaz 660 ff. Eucl. 250. 20 (Friedl.) = Thales Frag. A20. For homoios with the sense of ‘‘equal in rank or dignity’’ see Liddell and Scott, Lexicon (new ed.), s.v., II. 52 De caelo 295 b 11 ff. Stocks in the Oxford translation and Guthrie in the Loeb translation render homototes here by ‘‘indifference.’’ The sense is clear enough from the context, which refers specifically to the earth at the center of a circle (cf. the definition of 47 Emp. Frag. moira, Originally order”” or B26. 2: & péper ‘‘share,’’ right order”” alons. derivatively ‘‘destiny,’’ and thus, that what is fated to like ‘‘appointed on the assumption be is right, (cf. vrep alcav Aisa, “appropriate or = drèp ôtxyr). Empedocles rationalizes aisa exactly as Parmenides (Frag. B8. 37) had rationalized moira, and Anaximander (Frag. 1) chreon. The latter means generally ‘‘fateful necessity,’’ such as attaches to the prediction of an oracle, but (like Homoion and son are so Closely connected at this stage of thought that geometrical equality may 45 Cf. also Emp. Frag. B17. 27. aisa and moira) could also mean ‘right.’ In Heracleitus (Frag. B80) chreon is equivalent to dike; in Parmenides (Frag. BS. logicophysical necessity. 9, 11, 45) it stands for Fränkel goes too far in excluding ‘‘necessity’’ from the full meaning of chreon: ‘‘Die Wörter des Stammes xpn- bezeichnen ein Sollen und Schuldig Sein, nicht Sein, ein ein Müssen Gebrauchen und und Brauchbar Unvermeidbar Sein’ (op. cit., p. 183). What else but ‘Müssen und Unvermeidbar Sein’’ is the chreon of an oracle? the circle in Plato Parm. 137 e; Arist. Rhet. 1407 D 27). In deducing the stability of the earth, meant that the earth is in “he clearly equilibrium’’ (Heath, Greek Astronomy [London, 1932], p. xxiii). Isorropia is not used here by Aristotle; but it is in Simplicius (De caelo, 532). Burnet objects (Plato’s Phaedo [Oxford, 1911], commenting on Phaedo 109 a 3): ‘‘Anaximander’s cylindrical earth could hardly be called isorropos like the Pythagorean spherical earth in the centre of a spherical ouranos.’’ But Aëtius iii. 15. 7 applies Anaximander’s theorem with the world isorropia to Democritus, whose earth was anything but spherical. 53 Stocks (in his note to De caelo 215 b 12, in the Oxford translation) observes: ‘From Aristotle’s wording it seems probable that he had the Phaedo (109a) in mind here.’’ But what did Plato ‘‘have in mind’’ in the Phaedo? The conception, once launched by Anaximander, seems to have had a considerable 48 Cf. ‘‘the ordering of time’’ in Anax. Frag. 1. vogue; Aét. tii. 15. 7 attributes it also to Parmenides 49 Cf. above, n. 38. and Democritus.

PROBLEM ANAXIMANDER: Why the earth is stationary (wéver) 54 PARMENIDES: Why Being is stationary (ever). SOLUTION ANAXIMANDER: Because it “is set at the center and is equably related to the extremes.” PARMENIDES: Because it is “like the bulk of a well-rounded sphere, equally poised from the center in every direction.”56 Anaximander is thinking of the earth, moving with the whirl, yet keeping its rounded sphere, equally poised from the center in every direction.” Deprived of its cosmological application, the sphere is merely vestigial. It is only a simile; the round shape as such is irrelevant to Parmenides’ thought: he is concerned only with the formal property of all-around equality.*® In this sense the sphere makes a perfect vehicle for his conception of Being as “all alike,” without distinction of “greater” and “lesser’’® or of more and less complete,®! a whole whose parts are all equal among themselves, so place.” The circumference of the eddy that none can dominate any other.” Thus moves, the center also moves, yet the center is stationary with respect to the cirabsolute homogeneity means an internally secure equilibrium; and, since it is also secure against external disturbance, Being cumference.?® Let us abstract from Anaximander’s cosmological detail; keep only the part of the design which insures the paradoxical triumph of stability over motion by virtue of equality (ôuowrns); alcannot move. It is “held fast” by its own “all-around equality.” The same property, applied to Truth, low for the fact that equality will be no defines a perfectly “just” universe of discourse, for Truth, like Being, is ‘‘welllonger an external relation and that the rounded’’®’—a, term which we must in- “extremes” are now the “limits” of Being itself; then what is left will be “like a well54 De caelo 295 b 12 and 17; and uévovoar (sc. viv) in Hippol. Ref. i. 6. 3. 55 Frag. B8. 29-30: rabròr 8’éy rabröı piprer kad’ éavró Te keîrar | xobrws Eumedov adt uevet (text as in Fränkel, op. cit., p. 186). 56 Frag. B8. 43-44: and cf. also 49: of yap mávroÖer Toor. 57 Eudemus Frag. 94 (= Anax. Frag. A26): “Anaximander held that the earth is in mid-air [ueréwpos] and that it moves about the world’s center.”’ That the ‘‘motion”’ is that of the whirl is not stated in our evidence, but it is a reasonable inference (see Heidel, ‘The Aivn in Anaximenes and Anaximander,” CP, I [1906], 279-82, and ‘‘On Certain Fragments of the pre-Socratics,’’ Proc. Amer. Acad. Arts and Sciences, XLVII [1913], 681-734, at 687-88). However, I agree with Burnet (Early Greek Philosophy [4th ed.; London, 1930], p. 13, n. 3) that Heidel went too far in assuming that the whirl was itself the ‘‘eternal motion’’ of the apeiron (see below, n. 140). Burnet’s own argument for crediting Anaximander with the whirl (op. cit., p. 61) assumes that the ‘‘Pythagorean”’ cosmogony of the Timaeus (52 d-53 a) implies an eddy; Cornford has since shown that this assumption is mistaken (Plato's Cosmology [London, 1937], pp. 290-92). 58 Cf. Plato Laws x. 893 c, where circles rotating in situ are described as having rÿr rôv éorbruv & péow Öbvautv. 59 Fränkel: ‘‘Den Gegenstand des Vergleichs bildet nicht die Rundheit ...., sondern das ausgeglichene Kräftespiel (tcoradés) in einer so verteilten Gewichtsmasse (öyxos)'’ (op. cit., p. 191). 60 Parmenides’ terms are suggestive of “power,” not mere volume (cf. above, pp. 157, 159) ; and they are charged with associations of dignity (cf. the ruuú of Empedocles’ roots): xeıpörepov, Batdrepov, and even Hooor (Frag. B8. 24, 45, and 48) should be read in the light of the distinction in ru between the peyado and Batol, uéyas and ouikpós (e.g., Soph. Ajax 158-61) and uéyas and öXiyos (Callinus Frag. 1. 17). Note the force of éd» &örrı medater (clearly a play on the proverb öuotov dpoiw wedater [Plato Symp. 195 b]) following the repudiation of „äAXov and xeipórepov (Frag. B8. 23-24). Fränkel has some valuable comments on all this; see especially his remark on uäNor in Frag. B8. 48: “ein Adverb des Grades, nicht ein Adjektiv der Ausdehnung”’ (p. 192). But he objects, I think unnecessarily, to any spatial content in Parmenides’ terms (p. 191). Why the either/or? Parmenides’ denial of nonbeing entails, among other things, the rejection of empty space; this destroys differences in density as postulated by Anaximenes and entails a world ‘all full of being’ (Frag. B8. 24— 25). To Parmenides this would make good sense in terms of both space and ‘‘power’’ (see also above, n. 36). 6 Frag. B8. 42-43: rereheouévov. & The exact meaning of isoradés (see above, n. 13; ef. Fränkel, op. cit., p. 191, n. 1). 63 An elegant instance of the general principle that “thinking and being are the same thing’’ (Frag. B3): they have the same basic properties.

terpret in line with Parmenides’ own conception of the sphere as a whole whose parts are all equal among themselves. This is not a bad way to describe the purely deductive system which is Parmenides’ norm of truth: in such a system (to use the language of a later logic) every proposition expresses an equivalence, and “all inviolable.””* But it can and does injure thought, foredooming it to “blindness,” “wandering,” and “helplessness.’’”! A final confirmation of the present thesis—that Parmenidean justice is grounded in equality—may be found in the cosmological appendix to the world of Truth and Being, which makes sense of the quasievery difference masks an identity. This a perfectly coherent universe, truth and quasi-being of the world of implies “mortal opinion.” It is no use glossing without rifts or gaps.** Here inference can over the harsh contrast between the two pass securely from the given to the notworlds: the first is Truth, the second opingiven.® Here the starting-point becomes a ion;” the first is “unshaken” in its “trustmatter of indifference: as on a circle, one worthiness,” the second “deceitful” at its can traverse the same line of truth from very best;’3 the first is “all alike,” the secany starting-point whatever.® In such a ond a mixture of two absolutely unlike world, thought is perfectly “just,” 1.e., in powers. full accord with its own nature and the nature of Being. Outside this world, count of the second is not a systematization of current error.’ It is original physithought is “forced”* to utter the unutcal inquiry, attempting the same task to Nevertheless, Parmenides’ acterable and think the unthinkable. It thus which the Ionians had addressed themattempts the impossible,®® in defiance of selves, using their own categories and the just necessity (chreon) of thought and reaching are Being. This cannot injure Being, for it is proclaimed superior to theirs.” The gen- 84 Coherence is asserted in Frag. B4, but only proved in Frag. B8. 23-25, where ‘‘Being is £uvexes’’ B4. 1: which confidently eral formula of this cosmology is defined is inferred from “Being is rá» óuotov.”” 65 Frag. results 70 Frag. B8. 48. “See steadfastly with your mind 1 The state of the ‘‘wanderers’’ (Frags. B6. 5-6; things absent as though present.” Ilapeóyra here (cf. B8. 54), their eyes ‘‘sightless,’’ their hearing ‘full of Emp. Frag. B106) should be interpreted in the same noise,’’ is that of mankind before sense as óxolovo” of the arts (‘‘seeing they saw not, hearing they heard éykupéwour (Archil. Frag. 68 [Diehl]; [Aesch. PV 447-48; and Prometheus’ cf. Heracl. gift Heracl. Frag. B17, reading öxöooıs éyxupevaiv; Heracl. not’’ Frag. B72; cf. Emp. Frag. B2. 5: drwı rpoctxvpoev); it is B107]). ’Aunxavin is the Greek word for the helpless- Frag. the tiny fragment of actual experience as against the ness of such a state. Theognis (140, 1078) uses #eipar’ &ov. Parmenides feels that for those who have found áunxavins the ‘‘light’’ the opposition of rapeóv and áreóv has been him so often the very opposite of his intention. resolved: to know anything is to know everything, since Being is ôuoû rá», tv, auvexés (Frag. B8. 5-6). 66 Frag. B5 in conjunction B103, which it seems to echo with Heracl. Frag. (fvvóv). The homoitotes axiomatic in Milesian thought and the earlier theogonies, between uncreated arche and created world. There arche was an absolute beginning for thought as well as for being; Parmenides denies this. 67 Fränkel’s interpretation is somewhat narrower: ‘‘Dike ist also hier [Frag. B8. der Konsequenz, Konsequenz; einer 13-14] die Richtigkeit die fiir die Sachverhalte ebenso bindend ist wie fiir das Denken über sie’’ (op. cit., p. 161). 68 Frag. B7.3: Biácdw. This is a different compulsion from that of 76 xpewv; it is ‘‘violence,'’' which frustrates the intent of thought, while the just necessity of the limit is the condition of thought’s self-fulfilment. 69 Frag. B2. 7: où yap ávvoróv. inscrutable moira, which brings 72 ’A\n@ein (Frags. Bl. 29; 2. 4; 8. 51) versus Bporév öö£as and the like (Frags. B1. 30; 8. 51; 19. 11; 8. 61). of Parmenides’ universe of discourse abolishes the distinction, Of man’s 73 ’Arpeuts (Frag. B1. 29); rioris ¿Anóns (Frag. Bl. 30); riaruos ioxds (Frag. B8. 12); riaróv Adyov (Frag. B8. 50) versus «ócuov ¿ubv éréwy àrarn\é (Frag. B8. 52). 74 For this view, now generally abandoned, see Burnet, op. cit., pp. 182 ff. 751 cannot [Groningen, menides’ agree 1942], pp. with Verdenius 56 ff. and ‘‘mortal opinions’’ refer of nonphilosophers. Parmenides’ (Parmenides 77-78) that Paronly to the views doctrine of Being contradicts the views of his philosophical predecessors no less than those of the man in the street; and as for his cosmology, ‘‘no mortal judgment shall ever outstrip”” it (Frag. B8. 61 [Cornford's trans.]); Verdenius correctly observes that ‘‘mortal’’ here includes even Parmenides himself qua mortal in a mortal world; a fortiori it would losopher. include every other phi-

with astonishing precision, and it is for- (Frag. B31). “Strife” is justice because, mally identical with that of Empedocles: through the very conflict®® of the oppo- (1) each of the opposites is, like Parmensites, the measure will be kept. This means ides’ Being, absolutely self-identical ;* (2) (1) that in every transformation the fire neither which is “exchanged’’®’ remains constant is, like Heracleitus’ opposites, identical with its own opposite;”” (3) both and (2) that the distribution of fire among are equal.’® On the meaning of equality the opposites is also constant: “The way here our best clue is in Parmenides himup and down is one and the same” (Frag. self, who, as we have seen,”? elsewhere B60), which I take to mean that the sum uses “equal” as an alternate for “equally total of “upward” changes in the universe poised”; and this agrees perfectly with equals the “downward” ones, so that the medical and Empedoclean usage. In the middle term, water, is exactly divided beequipoise of opposite powers Parmenides tween the two ways, half of it “turning” finds the next best thing to the internal to earth and the other half to fire.8° equipoise of Being itself.8° That is why the Much could be said of the similarities of mock world of Light and Night is, in its this design to the Empedoclean. Both are own way, not chaos but cosmos* and falls, inspired by the principle of the “hidden” like Being itself, under the sway of Just harmony (Frag. B54) of Harmony itself Necessity.*? with its own opposite, Strife,* achieved in both systems by assuming that these, like IV. HERACLEITUS Just as the self-identity of Truth and Being is justice for Parmenides, so the “strife” of Becoming 7s justice for Hera- 86 Frag. B36: each lives the other’s death. 87 Frag. B90; and see the parallel passages to this fragment in Bywater’s edition of Heracleitus (Frag. 22 there). cleitus.®® Here, too, we find, among the 88 Philo (De incorr. mundi 108-9) puts much the mediating concepts, necessity (chreon)*4 same interpretation on this fragment. He speaks of and measure: “The earth is poured out as ing to the standards of equality and the bounds of sea, and is measured according to the justice.’’ He also speaks of the interchanges as isosame logos® as before it becomes earth”’ [116]; and a similar passage in De cherubim 109-12, “reciprocation nomia [ávréexriois] and interchanges accord- (112; cf. also iookparis Y T@r arotxeiwy peraBoAr esp. 110: Avriöociv riva Kai Avrertıoıv TávTAUrrouévovTa ....). 76 Frag. BS. 57: &wuröı wavroce TwÜTOrV. Philo hereis not merely echoing Stoic doctrine, though 77 Frag. B8. 58: 701 6’ érépwe wh Twbrov. his immediate source may be Stoic, for he is arguing against the Stoic éxripwors; and he has a fair knowledge 78 Frag. B9. 4: iowr Audorepwv. of Heracleitus, as one can see by his quotations and 79 Above, n. 36; and cf. n. 60. allusions. See further, below, n. 154. 80 Note the parallelism in the expressions: Frag. BS. 24: rav è’ éurdedv tor éévros and Frag. BY. 3: rá» m\éor toriv óuod paeos Kal VUKTOS. 89 Frag. *0The 81 Frag. B8. 60: ‘rakoouoy torkòra. B3la, following Burnet’s interpretation (op. cit., p. 149). prototype of this idea, I surmise, was 82 Cf. the Ananke which ‘‘drove and fettered it [sc. Anaximander’s dinos. The effect of dinos and dinesis the embracing Ouranos] to hold the limits of the stars”” is to unsettle the established order of things: «vraeır, raparrew (e.g., Plato Crat. 439C; Aesch. Ag. 987; (Frag. B10. 5-7 [Cornford’s trans.]) with the Ananke- Dike- Moira whose ‘‘fetters’’ hold the limits of Being itself. 83 Frag. B80: kai ôtknr Epıv. 84 Frag. B80: car’ ¿pi kai xpewv. 85K. L. Minar, Jr., rightly calls attention to the primary significance of logos as ‘‘computation, reckoning’ (“The Logos of Heracleitus,’’ CP, XXXIV [1939], 323). Perhaps ‘‘value’’ would be a better rendering here, conveying the double sense of “worth”” (Cf. où rhelwv Móyos [Frag. B90]). [Frag. B39} and its ‘‘measure”’ Pind. Pyth. 9. 38; Emp. Frag. B110. 1). Thus the dinos shook the apeiron out of its proper state, the krasis of the opposites. But, strangely enough, the effect of this unsettling was not chaos but cosmos. To Heracleitus this must have seemed a perfect instance of the ‘‘hidden’’ harmony and the unity of opposites. Though the dinos has no place in his own cosmology, he does refer to an analogous instance in Frag. B125 (Frag. 84 in Bywater); and the point is still clearer in the form in which the fragment is quoted by Alexander Aphrod. (cited by Bywater, ad loc.): à dè xuxewy, Sorep kat “Hpáxdeiros nov, dav un Tis Taparrn, dulorarat.

all other opposites, balance.” But there abroad” the same measure of light.** This are important divergences both in strucmeasured give-and-take accounts for the ture and in intention; and these are matepermanence of the world which “was and rial to the role of equalitarian justice in is and is to be.?”% the two cosmologies. The structural dif- But there is another difference which ferences are mainly two: (1) the universe may has not yet been parceled out into six “equal” and ‘‘equality’’ never occur in the separate sets of Parmenidean being; nor fragments.* To express the harmony of (2) has its history been marked off into the opposites Heracleitus does not say separate epochs of successive supremacy. that they are equal but that they are Because of 1 it would be useless to look for one;* to express their equivalence he says well be intentional: the words the formal equation of physical roots. that they are “the same thing.” This is Everything in Heracleitus’ no verbal accident. It is true to a pattern world is in process; instead of equality between subof stantives of permanence, we find reciproc- Anaximander (as well as from Empedity between verbs of change. For everyocles) and brings him closer to Anaximthing “turning” one way, something else enes: the physical opposites are all exis “cold plained as modifications of one of them; things grow hot, the hot grows cold; the they are thus literally “the same thing.”’” “turning” the opposite way: moist grows dry, the dry grows moist” thought which separates 984 Combining Frags. B30 and B91; him from cf. Arist. De iur. (Frag. B126).” Because of 2 the world is 470 a 3-4: ‘fire is ever coming into being and flowing not made and unmade in alternate eons ;”? like a river.’’ Fire is the ‘‘eater’’ par excellence (De gen. generation and destruction are concurrent and constant, hence the form of the world is also constant. Fire, “kindled” by “gathering”’ into its own substance a measure of fuel, is also “extinguished” by ‘scattering et cor. 335 a 16); ‘‘it can live only as long as it is fed, and the only food for fire is moisture’’ (Meteor. 355 a 4-5; and cf. Galen in Hippocr. I. “and fire....manifestly needs dic. à&r0p. moisture i. 39: for its nourishment, as the flames of [oil-] lamps show’’). The last point has not always been understood, even by close students of Greek science (e.g., Tannery, op. cit., p. 175); yet that is what accounts for Heracleitus’ triad fire-water-earth on the way up and down: % The assumption that not only Love-Strife but fire and moisture (‘‘water’’) are juxtaposed in ‘‘conthe four ‘‘roots’’ as well are conceived as opposites by cordant discord’’ (Plato Symp. 187 a); fire is fed by its Empedocles may be questioned. But see Emp. Frag. ‘‘enemy’’ (cf. Aesch. Ag. 650-51). B21. 3-6: fire is ‘‘bright and warm,’’ while water is “dark and cold’’; the earthis ‘‘closed-pressed and solid’’ while—if we may fill in the fourth term which does 95See employed the concept of krasis without its universal surfeit-hunger. accompaniment that it is a balance of opposites. 93 Burnet’s argument against the ascription of the by Heracleitus Reinhardt, has Parmenides been (Bonn, 1916), pp. 169 ff. Two further points may be added: (1) Philo against (cited the Stoic above, n. 88) quotes conflagration; and Heracleitus (2) Cherniss suggests that Aristotle’s dorep "Hpäxkeırös pau aravra shown is winter-summer, the fact that a “Die war-peace, uerareaér ternatively, Heracleitus will Frag. ‘‘immortals [are] mortals, B62: becomes ‘up’ and ‘‘down’’) [Baltia is not-a— mortals “one and the same” as its opposite (e.g., [are] Frag. B60, means is obviously not identity but equivalence). 9% Anaximenes’ wording is, of course, lost to us; Apollonia, (Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy that of the upward and downward ways, where what he at some time becomes everything’ (sc. in the course say immortals, etc.’’ Finally, he will say that a thing is but more, 1935], pp. 29, 108). day-night, through things at some time become fire’’ but rather “that fire way 2: upshot is that a and not-a are “the same thing.’’ Alyiveodal more rip (Phys. 205 a 3) does not mean “that all of its circulation on the n. not-a, and not-a mél uerareoor becomes a; the logical posite directions (see above, n. 89). strengthened 176, 98 E.g., Frag. B88: the equivalence of contraries is 92 Cf. the rporai of water, equal parts turning in opto p. 27 E.g., Frags. B50: ‘‘all things are one,’’ and B67, ‘‘god’’ conflagration cit., 88 Nor homoion and homototes. ‘‘compact’’ and ‘*heavy’’). It would be strange indeed if Empedocles periodic op. Ausdruck für die Unveránderlichkeit,” and citations. not occur in the context—the air would be rare and light (as, e.g., in Parm. Frag. B8. 56-59, ‘‘rare’’ and “light’’ appear as the opposites to Reinhardt, Worte Fv re xal gori kai tora: [Frag. B30] formellhaft, ein that of his fifth-century follower, agrees verbally with Diogenes of Heracleitus—Frag. B2: wavra rà ôyra . ... To avrò elvar.... 7d abrò éd» pere rirre moax&s. To be sure, there is “a difference: Unlike Anaximenes’ (and Diogenes’) air, Heracleitus'

This One is the “common” thing throughtorical sense.! His tirades against the out the universe.!°° And, since it defines “many” follow logically enough from his the measure of every process (Frag. B90), basic conviction that they are philosophi- Heracleitus thinks of it as the ‘‘one divine cally benighted.1% But the philosopher’s law,” all-powerful, all-sufficient, all-viecontempt for the folly of the crowd is torious (Frag. B114). It is the “thought not peculiar to Heracleitus. which shared it; and so did Empedocles, whose governs all things through all things” (Frag. B41)! Parmenides loyalty to democracy is well attested. Should this doctrine of the One “gov- What is peculiar to Heracleitus is, rather, ernor” of the universe be interpreted in the doctrine of the “common”: truth is line with the “aristocratic” politics with the “common”; the world is “common” ;198 which Heracleitus is commonly credited and in the state, law is the “common.’’!® in the textbooks?!” It is clear enough that This concept of the state as a comhe was a misfit in Ephesian politics.193 munity, united by a common stake in a This is in striking contrast to common justice, is perfectly compatible Anaximander, Parmenides, and Empedocles, all with democratic of whom seem to have held posts of ausixth century it had inspired the Solonian thority and influence in their respective reform program." It survived throughout politics. Early in the states.!% But from this we cannot jump to the conclusion that Heracleitus was a partisan of aristocracy in its relevant, hisfire is not an original substance from which the world 105 Diogenes Laertius’ statement (ix. 2) that Heracleitus declined the invitation to ‘give laws’ to Ephesus is unsupported by creditable authority. If true, it would only suggest that the demos did not think him an aristocratic partisan. evolved, but the ‘‘ever living’’ power in the world 106 Jaeger (op. cit., I, 180 ff.) rightly insists on the (Frag. B30). On the other hand, the two systems are unity of theory and practice in Heracleitus. Wisdom precisely similar in that the ‘‘one’’ appears in the (sophie) includes ‘‘word and yet it explains the unity in all the opposites; it is The many who live like dreamers, each in his private both world (Frags. B89, B73), cannot “follow the common’ among the many and the one which is (Frag. B2). the many. 100 See below, n. 108. Heracleitus uses £vror as an alternate to rairdv to express the equivalence of opposites as, e.g.,in Frag. B103. function (Anaximenes Frag. B2; Diogenes Frag. B5). History of Greece (“Modern Library’’ ed.; New York, 1937), p. 305: ‘‘he was an aristocrat in politics.’’ Zeller, losophy, English trans. History of Greek Phi- (London, 1891), II, 99: “he hates and despises democracy”; this position remains unqualified in the sixth German ed. by Nestle (1920). 103 We can infer as much from Diogenes Laertius 1-6), without taking too seriously his various stories. There is no reason to doubt the fact that Heracleitus renounced a hereditary basileia in favor of a brother (Antisthenes of Rhodes ap. Diog. Laert. ix. 6); but the facile interpretation of the motive (ueyadrodpootvn) is another matter. Temperament and (ix. politics aside, would his attacks on the mysteries (Frag. B14) and the purification ritual (Frag. B15) be compatible with the discharge of the duties of a priestly office? 104 Anaximander Frag. A3; Emp. Frag. Al (Diog. Laert. viii. 64, 66) and Bignone, Empedocle (Turin, 1916), pp. 78—79; Parm. Frags. Al (Diog. Laert. ix. 23) and A12; a commercial city, founded by Ionian émigrés, Elea was probably a democracy. B112 and B73]). This indictment cuts across class lines. The ‘‘many’’ are not the demos but all who fail to meet the austere standards of Heracleitean wisdom, including the illustrious company of Homer, Hesiod, Archilochus, 101 Anaximenes’ air no doubt performed a similar 102 E.g., J. B. Bury, Xéyew—roeir [Frags. act’ (én—éya [Frag. one Bl]; both world in a double role: it is itself one of the opposites, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Hecataeus (Frags. B40, B42). 107 Cf. ‘‘mortal opinion’ in Parmenides (above, n. 72) and Empedocles (Frags. B2. 7-8, B3. 1, etc.). Contempt for the ignorance of the public (cf. Hecataeus of Miletus Frag. la; II. iepñs voboou 1. 3-5) need not of itself imply rejection of democracy except on the further assumptions that (1) this ignorance is incurable and (2) the enlightened would fare better under some practicable alternative to democracy. 108 Cf. Frags. B89, B30. In Frag. B80, zynon bears the same relation to dike and chreon, as ‘‘war’’ to ‘‘strife’’: the “common” in Heracleitus denotes the same category of rational necessity which appears as ananke-dike in Parmenides. 109 Frag. B114. Here the law is clearly the ‘‘common’’ thing in the polis, and as such the source of its strength. Hence ‘‘the demos must fight on behalf of the law as for the city-walls’’ (Frag. B44), i.e., as for the supreme condition of its common freedom. Similarly, in Frag. B43, ‘‘hybris must be extinguished even more than a conflagration,’’ the reference is again to a common peril. 110 See my ‘‘Solonian Justice,’’ pp. 68-75 and 82-83.

From this perspective we should inthe fifth century and into the fourth as a cherished doctrine of Athenian democterpet those fragments racy.‘ Thus the doctrine of law as ““comwhich exalt the in mon” remains constant throughout a pe- “many.’’!6 The core of his politics is the riod of sweeping change within the demosupremacy of the ““ccommon’’—law. “And cratic tradition. The vital choice in demoit is law, too, to obey the counsel of one” ‘one’ Heracleitus against the day was (Frag. B33) can only mean: the will of whether to accelerate or to resist this de- “one” is law only when it expresses the velopment; whether to press forward to- “common” to which all (including the cratic politics in Heracleitus’ ward the radical equalitarianism of the “one”) are subject.” So, too, we must lot and “ruling in turn” or else adhere to think of the cosmic supremacy of fire in the earlier democracy, predicated, as in Heracleitean Solon, not on equal dignity but on comdominance of a single power but as the mon justice.'” If our meager evidence persubmission of all powers to a single law. mits any hypothesis concerning physics, not as the pre- Hera- For if we think of fire as itself one of the cleitus’ political sympathies, it would be powers, then it must keep its equal place that he favored the limited democracy of among the rest. Thus water is absolutely the past. This is in line with his known impartial as between fire and earth, its admiration for Bias of Priene, who figures two neighbors (and enemies) on the way in the tradition as an early democratic up and down: it dies into earth as much as statesman.!!3 Indeed, Heracleitus’ saying, into fire; it lives from fire as much as from “the many are bad” (Frag. B104), is also earth. Or if, conversely, we think of fire traditionally ascribed to not as one of the many but as the One Heracleitus’ doctrine that Bias.!!4 the And city which zs the many, then fire is not a sepa- “strengthens” itself through the law has rate power lording it over the rest; its jusan obvious affinity to Bias’ reputed saying tice is simply the common measure in all that “the strongest democracy is the one wherein all fear the law as their master.’’! fear much more than your men fear you.’’ This doctrine 11 E.g., Eurip. Suppl. 430-32; Demosth. xxi. 30 ff. 112 Solon's laws common (Frag. 24. 18 justice does imply [Diehl]; literally, ‘‘equal’’ “like,” óuotws, but see above, n. 51). But these equal laws do not sounds—and is—Spartan. But it is not opposed to democracy as of óeorrórns vouos such, but to Persian absolutism; it is matched in Aeschylus (e.g., Eum. 516-27 and 698-99). Its broader formulation in Demaratus' first speech to the king (Hdt. vii. 102)— annul the vested inequalities in dignity between the ‘‘virtue is acquired, wrought of wisdom and strong social classes. Solon clearly thinks of himself as conlaw’’— is explicitly applied to “all Greeks.’’ It could serving the difference in ‘‘honor’’ and ‘‘prerogative’’ certainly be taken as the maxim of both Solonian between the demos and their social superiors (Frag. 5 and Heracleitean morality. [Diehl]). His rejection of isomoiria in land is a corollary (Frag. 23. 21 116 Frags. B49, 99, 110, 121. The point of Frag. B121 [Diehl)). should not be blunted by rendering ériicros 113 There is good evidence of his repute as a ‘‘pleader’’ (Hipponax Frag. 79 [Bergk]); this suggests that, whatever his political power at Priene, it was not above the law. Plutarch (Moralia 862 d) lumps his career worthy with that of Pericles statesmanship. Of as examples of praise- Priene’s history we know next to nothing. constitutional or ‘‘worthiest,’’ as in Cicero (nemo de ‘‘best’’ nobis unus excellat) and subsequently in the textbooks. Hermodorus’ intrinsic worth is not in question here. Heracleitus’ point is that the Ephesians are losing the man who would be pre-eminently useful to the community and thus to themselves. But it is fair to assume that early in the sixth century its constitu- 117 The form of this fragment suggests the possition, like that of other commercial Ionian cities, was bility that it is a qualifying antithesis to a preceding at least moderately democratic. generalization: e.g., law is common counsel (cf. Frags. B114, B2, B113), but ‘‘it is law, too, to obey 114 Diog. Laert. i. 88. the counsel of one.’’ At any rate, a comparison with 115 Plutarch Moralia 154d. The obvious comparison is with in Hdt. vii. Demaratus’ words to the Persian king 104: ‘‘Law is their despot, whom they Frag. B114 shows that the ultimate ‘‘one’’ on which all human laws rest is the ‘‘common mind” (= ‘the one divine law’’).

the powers. If everything is fire, then the A. EQUALITY OF THE OPPOSITES “government” of fire in the cosmos is Aristotle writes: cosmic self-government.!!8 Some people make not air or water the infinite, but this [sc. “something distinct from V. ANAXIMANDER the elements’’]!2° in order that the other ele- We must reckon, finally, with the oldest ments may not be destroyed by the element and most controversial text in pre-Sowhich is infinite. They are in opposition to one cratic philosophy, Anaximander’s Fragment 1: | another—air is cold, water is moist, fire hot. If one were infinite, the others would have been destroyed by now. As it is, the infinite is And into those things from which existing things take their rise, they pass away once more, “according to just necessity [chreon]; for they render justice and reparation to one another for their injustices according to the ordering of time.’’!19 something other than the elements, from which they arise [Phys. 204 b 24-29). Anaximander is not named here. But the identification is made in Simplicius, and there is no good reason to question it.!”! What the argument aims to prove is for- Any responsible interpretation of these tunately clear enough from independent words calls for justification; and this inevidence. We know that the first generavolves unavoidably the evaluation of certion or two of Ionian thought did turn one tain Aristotelian texts which form our of the opposites into the boundless source I of everything else. This is obvious for have left this last so as to approach it in Anaximenes’ air. In the case of Xenophthe anes, we have his own words, off-hand, most important light of collateral evidence. Heracleitus, Parmenides, writers: untechnical, and all the more valuable on their thought-forms are safer guides to that account: the earth has its upper limit Anaximander than are the categories of just where you see it, “next to your feet”; Empedocles, and the Aristotelian physics. medical Yet, even so, we must respect what we know of the development of pre-Socratic thought and guard against reading into Anaximander atomic physics or Parmenidean logic. 118 The Greek term aúróvouos as for its lower limit, there is none, “it goes on 120 Phys. phrase n. 165) fits Heracleitus’ thought exactly: the universe is ‘‘a law unto itself’; its law is inherent in its own nature, not 204 serves mander’s (below, endlessly” (eis úxreipov ikveiraı [Frag. B28]).! Thales’ water, too, must b 23-24: well arche ró enough from its rapàa to ta oroıxeia. distinguish derivatives. The Anaxi- Aristotle’s interpretation of the phrase—as a ‘‘sensible body’’ which to be ‘present 32-34)—may be disregarded; (ll. ought Anaximander’s own thought in our it but world is a here” clearly not construction which Aristotle puts upon it for polemical purposes. imposed upon it by a superior. 121 Cherniss 119 Diels-Kranz start the citation with é &. Burnet’s (op. cit., p. 52, n. 6) and Heidel’s But (“On Anaximander,’’ CP, VII [1912], 212~34, at 233) doubts rejects it as “the peculiarly Aristotelian argument of the necessary equilibrium of contrary forces’ (op. cit., p. 376), referring to Meteor. 340 a 1-17. But the latter isitself an Aristotelian adapwith regard to rots odvat, yéveors, and $@opà in the first tation of the old physical and medical doctrine of clause have never been properly answered. ioovouia Tay Öövvauewv. also in particularly It an abstract open to noun suspicion. in any never pre-Socratic ®6op4 is Here (and Phys. 204 b as 14-18) Aristotle enriches the argument with various fragment other notions of his own; these are absent from Phys. occurs (Democ. Frag. B249 has an obviously different mean- 204 ing). Parmenides, whose polemic against the Ionians “power” and ‘‘bulk,’’ which is foreign to the medical refiects their terminology, uses öAedpos (and literature the verb, 6\Xtvai). That Anaximander, too, would use ¿xebpos instead of $@opà is probable Phys. 203 quoting b 14, from ävwAedpov in Arist. especially and the earlier 122 Aristotle (De caelo the distinction between philosophers (see above, 294 paraphrases p. 00). a 22) Xenophanes' doctrine as follows: &r’ äreıpov airy [sc. the ág0aprovin l. 8, where Aristotle is using his own words. earth] éopizG00a:. Xenophanes seems to be combating for ¿0eipeoda:, this stage of philosophic prose? in 23-29, place of As for @@opav Yivesdaı Anaximander, b is this likely the Hesiodic view that the y%3s pita: start somewhere, i.e., from Tartarus (Theog. 728).

as Xenophanes’ with equality as the main motif: the interearth and in the same sense: it must “go vals between each of the infinite worlds have been as endless on endlessly,” for it supports the earth, are equal; the intervals between earth, while no provision is made for its being fixed supported, in turn, by anything else.!?3 equal; earth and sun are equal;!?° the Thus, in denying infinity to any of the two land-masses of the earth— Asia and stars, moon, and sun are also opposites, Anaximander was going against Europe—are equal, and the two great the general trend. He could only have rivers in each are equal and divide the done so for a good reason. The argument regions through in Phys. 204 b 24-29 supplies the reason: to equal parts.'! To cap all this with the safeguard the equilibrium among the opequality of the opposites which constitute posites. which they flow into this world would be in fine harmony with That the main components of the unithe whole design. The argument in Phys. verse are equal was an old tradition in 204 b 24-29 takes us beyond this aesthetic popular cosmology. In Jl. xv it is implied presumption into physical reasoning: If that the heavens, the sea, and “the murky one of the opposites were boundless, it darkness” are equal, since their respective lords are equals in “rank” and “porelegance of the cosmology but would position.’’!?4 In Hesiod earth and heavens are tively “destroy” the other opposites.!?? declared equal (Theog. 126); and the dis- Why tance between heavens and earth is equal to that between earth and Tartarus (ibid. Fragment 1—the opposites are constantly encroaching upon one another. If one of 719-25). Such ideas are mainly without them were limitless, there would be no even a semblance of physical justificastopping it by the rest, singly or in comtion.!® They boldly read into the universe that feeling for symmetry and balance bination, for they are all limited. Its encroachment would continue until the rest would not only mar the architectonic so? Because—as we know from which makes the Odyssey speak of a wellwere destroyed. made ship as “equal”? and of a wise, balanced mind also as “equal.” Anaximander’s own cosmology is designed with B. We may now settle accounts with the just such a sense of aesthetic symmetry, older interpretation of Fragment 1: that 123 That the earth floats on water is well attested (Thales Frags. A13, A14, and A15) and a surer ground of inference than the conflicting tradition on the question as to whether or not Thales’ water was boundless (Theophrastus vs. Simplicius in Thales Frag. A13). Anaximander may well have been the first to name his arche ‘‘Boundless’’ (so Theophrastus ap. Simplicius Phys. 24. 15-16). JUSTICE IN THE BOUNDLESS the very existence of the cosmos is itself an injustice against the Boundless, to be 128 Aët. ii. 1. 8. 129 From the data in Hippol. Ref.i. 6. 5; A&t. ii. 20. 1 and ii. 21. 1; with Tannery’s reasonable conjectures (op. cit., pp. 94 f.). 124 See above, n. 8; and Cornford’s discussion of 130 Aët. ii. 21. 2. Strictly speaking, this means that this passage in From Religion to Philosophy, pp. 15-16. the diameter of the circular vent of the sun-ring 125 Only for the equality of heavens and earth in Theog. 126-27 can one conjecture a rough appeal to observable fact, i.e., the apparent coincidence of the visual horizon with the base of the celestial hemisphere. 1% viii. 43 ff. The most striking example of this use of equality to express geometric symmetry is the definition of the straight line in Euclid: Arıs ¿E loov [i.e., symmetrically] rots éd’ éaurijs onpelots xeirat. 127 xi. 337; xiv. 178; etc. which constitutes the visible sun is equal to the diameter of the earth. 131 All this, of course, on the assumption that the geography of ‘‘the Ionians’’ in Hdt. iv. 36 and ii. 33 is substantially derived from Anaximander (via Hecataeus) and conserves his accent on equality (see Jaeger, op. cit., I, 155-56). 132 Cf. the association of encroachment (““injustice’’) with “destruction” by Eryximachus in Plato Symp. 188 e.

expiated by reabsorption.!** This was the how can things “render justice and reparageneral view before the restoration of the tion to one another” in a process which dewords “to one another” (aXXnXoıs) in the second clause; thereafter, it was left withstroys their very existence? Unless this out firm foothold in the text and has been selves drifting back into the older view, largely abandoned.!** What still gives it a measure of plausibility is the suggestion in even after formally abandoning it; we shall be constantly tempted to think of the first clause that “reparation” is somethe Boundless itself as the payee of the how connected with “passing away” ;19° 133 Jaeger observes (op. cit., p. 159) that this is not a Greek idea. Certainly, it is alien to the pre-Socratics. The least objectionable version of the view is in O. Gilbert, ‘‘Spekulation und nischen Philosophie,’ “damages” and, consequently, as itself the victim of the original injustice. We may approach the answer by way der ioof the little-noticed fact that the fragment Religionswissenschaft, refers in the plural'#% to the matrix from Volksglaube Arch. f. paradox can be resolved, we shall find ourin XIII (1910), 312. He thinks that the divine energy “stuft sich, je weiter es sich von dem Urquell der which all things arise and to which they Gottheit [sc. the Boundless itself] entfernt, mehr und all return. This is strange, for the refermehr ab.’’ Even so, I see no good reason for reading this Neo-Piatonic notion into Anaximander. Hippol. Ref. i. 7. 1 (Dozogr. Graeci 560. 13-15), to which Gilbert appealed, does not bear out the interpretation he put upon it. 134 Diels clung to it to the end (see “Anaximandros von Milet,’’ Neue Jahrbücher f. d. klass. Altertum [1923], p. 69). For a more recent defense see Mondolfo, ence is obviously to the Boundless; and this is plainly singular. The shift to the plural can mean only that in this context the Boundless is explicitly thought of as a plurality.!57 This is in line with what Aris- Problemi del pensiero antico (1935), chap. ii; also his totle tells us in Phys. 187 a 20-22, where “La he speaks of Anaximander’s opposites (¿vavriórnras) as being “contained in” Giustizia Eraclito,'' cosmica secondo Anassimandro ed Civiltà moderna [1934]). He argues that, because ‘‘injustice’’ is normal (he compares war and strife in Heracleitus), existence is inherently unjust (“La Giustizia,'” p. 416), and thus a collective sin against the ‘‘universal law of harmony and unity” (ibid., p. 418). But this misses the whole point of the equation of reparation and encroachment which insures that, on balance, existence is always “just.” Mondolfo existing writes only of Heracleitus: through war, ‘‘Generated and individual things exist through each other's destruction and thus through hybris’' (ibid., p. 416). But hybris is not in Heracleitus, except in Frag. B43, where the reference is not cosmological. As for war and strife, whatever we may think of them, they passed at the time for perfectly proper instruments of justice—so much so that veixos could stand Hesiod Op. for action-at-law 232); és could (e.g., mean Od. simply xii. 440; and even participation in stasis could be made a matter of statutory obligation by Solon (Arist. Ath. pol. 8. 5; Plut. Solon 20. 1). As I have argued in the text, inverse processes of ‘strife’’ balance in Heracleitus, his own statement that ‘‘strife is justice’’ (Frag. even a paraphrase of anything nation of the text—is completely unfounded. The same word occurs frequent136 Cherniss (op. cit., p. 377) observes that the standard translations obscure this point by turning the plural of the original (¿E iv... . eis raèra . ...) into the singular. Thus Burnet translates: “Into that [ = eis ravra] from which [ét dy]... .. ‘‘god’s’’ standpoint there is no 137 Cherniss (loc. cit.) infers an unlimited plurality. B102). His system not only expels From Simplicius’ statement, ‘‘opposites are hot, cold, makes sense: from injustice ‘not Anaximander said.’’!3 But his objection to Aristotle’s word for ‘‘contained in” (évetva) as “unhistorical”—his only definite reason for the sweeping condem- ‘‘cause’’ (e.g., Aesch. Suppl. 644-45: dripwoavres épiy yuvacxdv); because (évoboas) the “one” and issuing from it by a process of “separation” (éxxpivecOat). Burnet ruled against this statement as hybris and injustice from the cosmos but employs dry, moist, and the rest’’ (Phys. 150. 24-25), we may strife as an essential instrument in their expulsion. infer that Anaximander assumed a great number of 135] follow Cherniss (op. cit., p. 376) in assuming that the first clause, though probably only paraphrased (see above, n. 110), does convey the substance of Anaximander’s thought. We would save ourselves a good deal of exegetical trouble by assuming (with Heidel, ‘On Anaximander,” pp. 233-34) that the thought, as well as the wording, is not Anaximander’s but Theophrastus’. opposites (as did Alcmaeon: ‘‘the wet, dry, cold, hot, bitter, sweet, and the rest’’ [Frag. B4]). But to say that he assumed an infinity of opposites goes beyond our evidence and leaves unexplained the practice of Aristotle and his school, who regard this as the innovation of Anaxagoras (e.g., Theophrastus ap. Simplicius Phys. 27. 4). 138 Op, cit., p. 57, n. 1.

ly in the pre-Socratics and the medical identical in the mixture as in the world literature with the very sense required in which issues from it.!4 This is just what we cannot ascribe to Anaximander withthe present context, i.e., the relation of any ingredient to the compound of which it forms a part.!5° As for the other terms out used here by Aristotle—‘‘separation” and ‘oppositions’ —both refer to characteristic concepts of Ionian medicine and physsense than would have been possible for a ics and accord perfectly with what we vise the basic concept of krasis and to know of Anaximander’s system. The “‘opposites” are obviously “the hot, cold, dry, think of it as a mere juxtaposition of moist, and the rest” (Simpl. Phys. 150. 24), which are the main components of his cosmology. “Separation” is the basic cosmogonic category of Ionian doctrine of krasis we may look to the antithought, “the clue to the sense in which Anaximander's heavens and all the infinite worlds” are Boundless is ““one””: it does “contain” the the process by which anachronism: he thought of his Boundless as “one” in a far more intimate physicist schooled in Parmenidean logic. That logic compelled Empedocles to reminute particles.!4 For the unreformed Empedoclean Ilepi apxains inrpuwñs, which speaks of a compound in krasis as “one and simple.’’!44 This seems to be our best formed in Anaximander.!*° “opposites”; but these are so thoroughly There is, nonetheless, a residual problem here: If the apeiron is a compound of opposites, why should Aristotle think of it as “one” and contrast it as such with mixed that none of them appear as single, the “one and many” of Empedocles’ Sphairos and Anaxagoras’ primitive mixindividual things.' This would explain why Aristotle and his school commonly refer to Empedocles’ principles (archai) as six and to Anaxagoras’ as infinite in number, while they invariably speak of ture?!4 The answer is surely that Emped- Anaximander’s principle as one.!# And it ocles and Anaxagoras both thought of their original compound as made up of Parmenidean bits of Being, eternally selfderstand by the Aristotelian term “indewould further explain what we must unterminate” (bois äöpıoros) as applied to Anaximander’s Boundless. Just as in a 139 For the pre-Socratics see Kranz’s Wortinder, 8.2. évetvat. For the medical literature see, e.g., UT. äpx. inrp. 14. 29, 31; 16. 6; see also instances cited by H. C. Baldry in ‘‘Plato’s ‘Technical Terms,’ ”’ CQ, XXXI (1937), 141-50, at 146. 140 Ps.-Plut. Strom. 2. For a good discussion of ‘‘separation’’ see Heidel, ''On Anaximander,’’ pp. 22932. But Heidel’s suggestion that & rod didlov in Pseudo-Plutarch means “from eternity” has not found favor. The correct rendering of the whole phrase (Dozogr. Graeci 579. 13-14) seems to me to be: “something productive of hot and cold was separated off from the eternal’’ (adapted from Burnet’s translation). That the process which generates the hot and the cold should be spoken of in the passive voice as itself ‘‘separated off’’ sounds strange perhaps; but cf. Democ. Frag. B167: divov ard rod rarròs áxoxpióñval. ‘‘Productive of hot and cold’’ may also seem strange, since both are “contained in’ the Boundless; but I think this sufficiently explained in the suggestion which I make in the following paragraph: hot and cold, being perfectly ‘‘blended’’ in the Boundless, emerge as distinct, recognizable powers only after the ‘‘separation.’’ 141 Phys. 187 a 21-22. 142 This leads to at least two fundamental differences from Milesian doctrine: (1) generation, the prime category of Milesian physics, is now denied (Emp. Frag. B8; Anaxag. Frag. B17); (2) the opposites themselves usurp the role of the Milesian arche: they become ‘roots’ and ‘‘seeds,’’ are thus the “source” (rny4) of mortal things (Emp. Frag. B23. 10), and, in Empedocles, are endowed with the divinity which the Milesians had assigned to the arche. 143 Galen’s commentary on Hipp. Il. gio. ävßp. 15 (cited in Diels-Kranz under Emp. Frag. A34): of un» kekpauérwr ye dc’ ¿Miko [the Hippocratic doctrine] 4a xarà cuuxpà uòpra wapaxerpevwr. Empedocles was followed by the atomists: Alexander Aphrod. De miztione 2 (cited in Diels-Kranz under Democ. Frag. A64). 144 Frag. 14. 55-57: eb re xéxpnrat Kai . . . . Mov Er re yéyove xai änkoüv. Contrast this with Aristotelian usage, where xexpaptvor and àrXoîy appear as contraries (De sensu 447 a 18). 145 In Hippocratic terms, ‘‘no individual power is displayed” (see above, n. 12). 148 With the single exception noted above: plural té dv... . els raûra . . . . in Frag. 1.

Hippocratic compound in krasis the indithe process which insures full reparation vidual opposites are “not apparent,?** so among the opposites themselves; the damneither are they in Anaximander’s Boundages are paid not to the Boundless but to less: no part of the compound, no matter one another. how minute, being either hot or cold or dry or moist, etc., the whole is just what Aristotle would call ‘‘indeterminate.’’!48 On this interpretation we can explain the strictly reciprocal nature of injustice and reparation in Fragment 1. The Boundless itself, being perfectly blended, must be a state of dynamic equilibrium.!** In no portion of it can any power dominate another and thus commit “injustice.” Only when the world-forming segregation occurs can separate powers show up. Thereafter, wherever one of these is strong enough to encroach upon another, “injustice” will result. When the world is, in due course, reabsorbed into the Boundless, the opposites are not destroyed. They do not cease to exist. They are only blended once again, and their equilibrium is perfectly restored. And this must entail a process of “reparation,”” where unjust gains are disgorged and unjust losses fully made up. Thus at no time is there either injustice against the Boundless or reparation to it. Reabsorption into the Boundless is only 147 E.g., Ancient Medicine 16. 35; when the powers are ‘‘mixed and blended with one another, they are neither apparent [gavepá] nor do they hurt a man; but when one of them is separated off and stands by itself [see above, n. 18], then it is apparent [pavepó»] and hurts a man” (translation adapted from Jones). 148 For Aristotle determination is primarily qualitative, not quantitative; e.g., Metaph. 1063 a 28: rd roidy wpiouerns Pioews, rd dè wordy rs doplorov. C. JUSTICE IN THE WORLD But what of the interval between generation and dissolution? Are we to suppose that the life-history of the world is a series of encroachments, unchecked until a judgment day at the very end? Such a supposition would go against every canon of pre-Socratic physics. If becoming were a theater of injustice without reparation, it would be not cosmos but chaos, and the elegant pattern of balanced equalities in Anaximander’s world would collapse. But such a possibility is precluded by the structural elements of Anaximander’s own cosmogonic process. The opposites, balanced in the Boundless, issue from it together in balanced proportions.'° It follows that the hot in a given world will be no stronger than the cold, and so for the other opposites. Moreover, since the world is “encompassed” by the Boundless, 5! nothing can enter or depart to upset the balance fixed upon the opposites in the process of generation. Thus the Boundless “governs”” the world through150 Of, Frankel, op. cit., p. 184: ‘‘nichts Einzelnes werdend aus dem apeiron heraustritt, sondern nur gemeinsam die Gegensätze.’’ 151 Arist. Phys. 203 b 11-13: “and it encompasses all things and governs all things, as those assert who do not recognize other causes besides the Boundless, e.g. nous or love.” The terms of reference apply definitely, though not exclusively, to Anaximander. Cf. also Hippol. Ref. i. 6. 1 (Dorogr. Graeci 559. 18). 149T say ‘“‘dynamic,’’ for the Boundless, in spite of 152 For the atomists, matter inside and outside a its perfect homogeneity, is eternally in motion. Parmenides made the opposite assumption: that a perfectly homogeneous whole would have to be in a state of static equilibrium and, therefore, absolutely motionless. Parmenides is followed by Plato in this: “Motion will never exist in a state of homogeneity” (Tim. 57 e). Plato’s original matrix moves because, unlike Anaximander's, being ‘filled with powers that were neither alike [or ‘equal,’ ôuoiwr] nor evenly balanced,’’ it was therefore in disequilibrium. Anaximander’s Boundless—ungenerated, indestructible, homogeneous, necessarily just—satisfies precisely the conditions of Parmenides’ Being, except at two points: it is (1) in eternal motion and (2) unlimited. ‘‘world’’ was homogeneous; hence the eritus introitusque through the spiracula mundi (Lucretius vi. 492- 94; cf. i. 999-1001; i. Democ. Frag. A40 Frag. Al 1035-51; ii. 1105 ff. See also = Hippol. Ref. i. 13. 4; Leucippus = Diog. Laert. ix. 32). Similarly, Anaximenes’ world which was could the ‘‘breathe same stuff in’’ as the the outside air, air For within. Anaximander, on the other hand, the Boundless is unassimilable, unless duly separated out; and there is no hint in our sources that this separation could occur except at the appropriate stage of world-formation. This would seem to invalidate Heidel’s assumption (‘On Anaximander,’ pp. 227-28) of cosmic respiration in Anaximander.

out its growth and decline. This is never a matter of direct action by the Boundless upon the inner structure of the world, for the whole of the cosmology is delineated in terms of the interaction of the opposites themselves upon one another. The Boundless “governs” by ‘‘encompassing,”’3 i.e., by safeguarding the original plete and absolute end of all injustice, nevertheless over-all justice is preserved throughout the life-process of the world despite the occurrence of injustice; and this by the equation of reparation to encroachment, which is itself assured through the invariant equality of the opposites. | equality of the opposites with one another. Every student of Greek science must If this equality is maintained, justice is feel how profound was the debt of subassured, for no opposite will be strong sequent cosmology to Anaximander. His enough to dominate another. When enwere the seminal ideas of the whirl, the croachment occurs, it will be compensated infinite worlds, the unsupported earth, the by “reparation,” as, e.g., in the seasonal conception of sun and stars as huge, freecycle the hot prevails in the summer, only swinging masses rather than fixtures on a to suffer commensurate subjection to its copper dome. Yet more important than rival in the winter. We have already met these and his other physical hypotheses this ordered sequence of ‘‘successive suwas his philosophical concept of nature premacy” in the medical writers and Emas a self-regulative equilibrium, whose or- And, although our evidence is der was strictly immanent, guaranteed not sufficient to establish it conclusively through the fixed proportions of its main pedocles. in the case of Anaximander, we can imconstituents. Once established, this idea pute it to him with considerable likelibecomes the common property of classical hood.154 In any case we can assume with thought. It is shared by minds as diametperfect confidence that, while reabsorprically opposed as Lucretius,! on the one: tion into the Boundless would be the com153 And thus performs the function menides would later assign to which Par- Dike-Ananke, i.e., it holds the world fast ‘‘within the bonds of the limit’’ (see Parm. Frags. B8. 31, and B10. 5-7, mind that repiéxew nalized—to Being = áuqis in Frag. B10—this which Anaximander’s éxeuw. Frag function B8, of bearing in Parmenides to the “holding Boundless inter- Ouranos the performs in limits” by surrounding each world from the outside). But to ‘‘hold hand, and the pious author of the De mundo, on the other." In Anaximander we can trace it back to its source in the political assumption that justice was an affair between equals’ and that its settlement involved an equation of compensation to injury.’ the limits (or ends) of all things’’ had been the divine prerogative (e.g., Semonides of Amorgus Frag. 1. 1-2 155 On isonomia in Epicurus and Lucretius see below, p. 178 and n. 184. [Diehl]; Solon Frag. 16 [Diehl]). Hence the point of Aristotle’s reference to the œeuvorns Of the Boundless: tò ràvra mepiexov (Phys. 207 a 19; cf. the ancient tradition in Metaph. 1074 b 2: ‘‘that the divine encompasses the whole of nature’’). The connection between ‘‘holding the ends” and ‘‘governing’’ need not be labored. But it may be worth nothing that boundlessness capability as (e.g., such conveyed Aesch. Suppl. the idea 1049-50); (1) of ines(2) even &xeıw alone could mean ‘‘to hold to the course, guide, steer’ (Liddell and Scott, s.v.); (3) repiéxev has also the sense ‘‘surpass, excel” and ‘‘overcome in battle’ (ibid., 8.v.). 154 Heidel Proc. Amer. ‘On Anaximander,’’ Acad., XLVIII pp. 233-34; also (1913), 684-85. To the parallels cited by Heidel add Philo De incorr. mundi 156 His nature explanation through the of the imperishable tsomoiria and order of successive supremacy of the opposites comes strikingly close to Anaximander’s (see citation above, n. 14: and 397 b 6-7). Cf. Philo (above, n. 88); Ocellus Lucanus 22: évtirabets oboat , eis LA , TeAos LI abral Seneca QN iii. [sc. the avT@y four pare ‘‘powers’’] unre kpar@aw kpar@vrar abral im abr&y; 10. 3: “omnium elementorum alterni recursus sunt; quicquid alteri perit, in alterum transit; et natura partes suas velut in ponderibus constitutas examinat, ne portionum aequitate turbata mundus praeponderet.’’ 157 As Heidel observes: ‘‘dike obtains between peers,’ (‘On Anaximander,” p. 234). 158 To ‘‘get justice’’ was literally to ‘‘get (back) the 108 ff., which explicitly uses the cyclical exchanges of equal” the seasons to illustrate ‘‘reciprocation between the four powers.” (öixnv didbrar) was, again literally, ‘‘to pay the equal’ (icny (aa éricey tocera. [Soph. (Od. OT ii. 203]). 810]). The To “give justice’’ underlying prin-

Justice is no longer inscrutable moira, im- THE NATURALIZATION OF JUSTICE Dikeposed by arbitrary forces with incalculable Ananke holding Being fast in the bonds of effect. Nor is she the goddess Dike, moral When Parmenides speaks of and and rational enough, but frail and unreli- Semonides, who speak of fate as a “bond able. She is now one with “the ineluctable the limit, his words echo Hesiod of unbreakable fetters” ;5% but his thought laws of nature herself” ;# unlike Hesiod’s is far from theirs. In Hesiod and Semon- Dike, she could no more leave the earth ides the source of the compulsion is exthan the earth could leave its place in the ternal to the thing compelled. firmament. In Parmenides the compulsion is immanent. The first is a nonrational concept of ananke: Thus the naturalization of justice transformed her status and added imthe determining agency remains hidden measurably to her stature. But it also from human reason. transformed nature. The second is so thoroughly rational that ananke merges These “ineluctable laws of nature,” what were they prior to with dike, and dike with logicophysical Milesian necessity: the order of nature is deducible stability of heaven and earth had lurked a physics? Behind the massive from the intelligible properties of nature realm of arbitrariness and terror. The uniitself. We may speak of this transition, the form motions of sun and moon could be his succesinexplicably broken by an eclipse;!? the sors,!®° as the naturalization of justice. fertility of earth and womb might myswork of Anaximander and teriously fail; children could be born ciple is that of an exchange: equal value rendered for “unlike those who begat them, but monvalue taken. The same words apply to the closure of a sters””;1% commercial transaction, like barter, sale, or loan, and natural aueiBw, avrapeiBopai, äuorB, avtapo Bn áMadacon, ávraAAácaw" aröönaıs, avramööocıs. was of indefinite This pattern of thought generalization. sequences by (and thus one event and a thousand other capable was ‘‘exchanged for’’) the cycle of birth and death regularly followed its reciprocal: (Phaedo 71 e-72 interventions of authority of the supernatural by suspending or reversing the ordinary course of b); day and night (e.g., Hesiod Theoy. 749); the cycle of the seasons (Philo De incorr. mundi 109); hoofs that strike the ground in turn (Pindar Pyth. 4. 226); land, (Pindar special e.g., waking and sleeping (Phaedo 72 b); the succession of plowed and left fallow in turn order, Zeus and his instruments, vindicating the It was popularly applied to physical where these things could be thought of as lesions in to the satisfaction of justice: Nem. 6. 9). Scientific thought used this pattern to join events chap. viii and also p. 158 in chap. ix. Yet the old magical conception of justice Survives in Solon, side by side with the new (see my ‘‘Solonian Justice,’’ pp. 76-78). 161 Maurice Croiset in a brilliant comment on which had either been left unconnected (like evapora- Solon Frag. 3 (Diehl): ‘‘La Morale et la cité dans les tion and precipitation poésies de Solon,’’ Compt. belles lettres 1903), p. 587. [Arist. Meteor. 355 a 28]) or else had not been clearly grasped as strict equations by the popular mind (like breathing in and breathing out [Plato Tim. 79 e 7-8]; or the stretching of a lyre string and the vibration when released [Arist. Mech. prubl. 803 a 31]). But the uniformity of nature as a whole could also be construed as just such a reciprocity among its basic components. strues it in Frag. Anaximander so con- 1. (Paris, rend. Acad. d. inscrip. et 162 Archil. Frag. 74 (Diehl); Pindar Paean 9. 1-21. But it is worth noticing that Archilochus takes the eclipse not as the operation of a Superior type of order, obscure but unquestionable, but rather as a threat against all order. He identifies order implicitly with nature (even though everything comes under the power of Zeus). His very consternation at the thought ¿AM in’ dvayans |... . péyas that a natural uniformity could be broken is a conrarà deopos épixer. Semon. 7. 115 (Diehl): decpov Aubednxev fession that he has lost faith in magic as a realm of 159 Hesiod Theog. 615: &ppnxrov réôns. Parm. Frag. B8. 14: (oùx) ávixe Aixn xaXdoorder in its own right. caca réômaur, | add’ éxer. Frag. B8.31: reiparos év decpoior attitude than Pindar’s, whose main reaction is fear [sc. "Avayxn] &xeı, TO pur duis éepyet. at the calamities that the eclipse may portend. 160 For ‘‘Solon's Solon’s contribution Eunomie,’’ see Sitzungsber. Werner Preuss. Jaeger, Akad. d. This is a more enlightened 163 See Hesiod Op. 225-45 and parallels cited ad loc. in Mazon’s edition; further parallels mentioned in my ‘‘Solonian Justice,’’ nn. 9, 10.

Of the four physiologoi we have studied, of Heracleitus alone appears estranged from magic, detached it from the personal condemocratic politics. His interest in the nature.!% Ionian The adventurous science charted reason this realm trol of supernatural beings, and integrated current belief in equality is not so much to it into the domain of nature. All natural vindicate as to qualify and correct it. It events, ordinary and extraordinary alike, is therefore significant that there should were now united under a common law. The equality of the constituents of this be no mention of equality in his physical fragments. The equalitarianism of his new commonwealth of nature was of the physics, such as it is, seems imposed upon essence of the transformation, for it meant the author as a structural necessity rather the abolition of distinctions between two than as a conscious choice. Order he must grades mortal, have, and he knows of no other way of lordly and subservient, noble and mean, getting it than by enforcing the equal subof being—divine and of higher and lower honor. It was the endmission of all powers to the “common” ing of these distinctions that made nature law. Thus Heracleitus in his own way reautonomous and therefore completely and mains within the general framework of unexceptionably “just.” Given a society equalitarian physics; certainly, he makes of equals, it was assumed, justice was sure no effort to break with that tradition. to follow, for none would have the power The attempt first comes with Anaxagoras’ to dominate the rest.' This assumption, doctrine of nous, which, unlike Heracleistrictly physical tus’ fire, is “mixed with nothing, but is sense. It was accepted not as a political alone, itself by itself,’’!®? and has therefore dogma but as a theorem in physical inabsolute,'* one-sided dominion over the as we have seen, had a quiry. It is, nonetheless, remarkable evi- “mixed” forces of nature. But this revolt dence of the confidence which the great proved abortive. It was Plato, the bitter age of Greek democracy possessed in the critic of Athenian democracy, who carried validity of the democratic idea—-a conthrough the iftellectual revolution fidence so robust that it survived translamore strictly, counterrevolution) to a suction into the first principles of cosmology cessful conclusion; and Aristotle followed, and medical theory.'* though with hesitations and misgivings.!* 164 For the supernatural sanctions of the prea general constitutional practice; and (3) (or, implies Solonian concept of justice see my ‘‘Solonian Justice,’ equality pp. 65-66. have seen, Empedocles explicitly asserts of the cosmic of ‘‘honor’’ (rıun) or status. This, as we 165 For the political import of this idea see II. 4. è. r. powers. There is no reason to believe that Parmenides 16 (also 23. 30 ff.; and cf. Hat. iii. 80. 3-6, iii. 142. 3, or Anaximander thought of the powers in any other v. 78). The benefits of democracy are inferred here sense. On the contrary, everything we have seen of from the (IT. 4.0.7. fact 16. that 10; cf. under it men are 16. 35 and 23. 37). autonomous their respective cosmologies implies perfect equality This is not of status among the basic constituents of their cosmos. merely the formal power to issue laws but the more 167 Frag. fundamental power to order one’s own life without aùròs domination by an “alien power” (16. 36). Hippocratic 16 Professor question Kurt von Fritz raises an important (by correspondence): May not the political equivalent of cosmic equality be the idea of balance of power e.g., between kings, classes ephors, senate, or governing apella in bodies Sparta) (as, rather than the idea of equality between individual citizens” Only the latter, of course, would be characteristic of democracy in its mature form. The answer, it seems to me, is in the idea of ‘‘rotation of office,’ which én’ B12: éwurod puépeixral &arıv. treatises oùôeri For xpnnarı, the same see above, n. add\a póvos expression 18. in In medical thought the state of isolation is a sign of disorder: in Anaxagoras’ nous it accounts for order. There could be no more striking evidence of the clear-cut negation of Ionian categories. The Platonic serves this feature of Anaxagoras’ Form connous: it is aùrò xaé’ aùrò, and thus äueıxrov, kadapwrarov. 168 Avroxpares, Frag. B12. Cf. Plato Crat. 413 ec: alrorparopa yap aùròv dvra (sc. Anaxagoras’ nous). 169 For Plato see my ‘‘Slavery in Plato's Thought,” (1) applies to individual citizens rather than to classes Philosophical or governing bodies; Herodotus had registered the conviction that ‘‘mon- (2) is decisively democratic as Review, L (1941),

In their systems we find at last the explicit and thoroughgoing negation of Anaximander’s equalitarian universe. The attributes of divinity are now reserved to one set of superior entities, which alone are perfect, ‘“‘prior,’’!”° sovereign,!”! ageless, incorruptible. Nature is no longer a single mechanical system, composed throughout of the same stuff, ordered throughout by the same laws of motion. It breaks apart into a “hither” and a “vonder.”1? The first, thinks Aristotle, consists of the familiar Ionian opposites; the other, of “something beyond the bodies that are about us on this earth, different and separate from them, the superior honour of its nature being proportionate to its distance from this world of ours.”!78 There are two types of motion, each simple and incommensurable with the other: the circular motions of the “more honorable” bodies, which are “perfect” and undeviatingly uniform; the rectilinear, “imperfect,” and “wandering” motions which occur only in the “lower” regions.!"4 Dike and ananke, logical reason and physical necessity, which had merged in the pre-Socratics to banish disorder from the physical universe, are now separated.!% For all its teleological subordination to the “good,” matter remains a residual principle of evil and disorder! From the polemics of Laws x, one would never guess that any of Plato’s materialistic opponents!”” had believed that 174 For the effects of this bifurcation on Aristotelian dynamics see W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Physics (Oxford, 1936), p. 33. Ross points out that in Phys. 244 a 1-3 (he might have added Meteor. 370 b 20-8) there is, nonetheless, a true analysis of circular motion as the resultant of two inverse rectilinear motions. The history of thought offers no better example of a great thinker, hitting on a scientific explanation of revolutionary import, yet missing its significance because of the blinkers of a metaphysical dogma. 175 See my “Slavery in Plato’s Thought,’ p. 296; to the references there cited add Soph. 265 C: airtas abropárns Kal dvev diavolas pvobons f werd Adyou etc.; and Laws xii. 967 a: ävaykaıs.....ob dtavolars. In Aristotle the contrast of the ‘‘good’’ and the ‘necessary’ cause is analogous to the contrast of “‘rational’’ and ‘‘material’’ (Phys. 200a 14: ér rÿ ü\n 7d Avaykalov, rd 5’ où vera év TS Aöyw. De part. anim. 663 b 22-23: ÿ évaykaia VS. # karà Abyov pois). 176 See my ‘‘Disorderly Motion in the Timaeus," archy’’ is unjust in principle, i.e., irrespective of the personal merits of the incumbent; it would produce hybris even “in the best of all men’’ (iii. 80. 3). Plato and even Aristotle, on the other hand, hold that, given a man sufficiently superior in virtue, he should be “sovereign over all’ as a matter of justice (Pol. 1284 b 28 ff., 1288 a 15 ff.). 170 See above, n. 39. 171 Köpios: Plato Rep. vii. 517 c (of the Form of the Good): Tim. 90 a (of the rational soul). More frequently in Aristotle (s.v. in Bonitz, Index Arist.). This is instructive, for the term conveys the nearest Greek equivalent to the modern concept of political sovereignty. 172 Note Plato's use of révée röv rémor, évfdde Versus &v Oeois, éxeice, 6 TÔv Kaxav xaOapds römos (Theaet. 176 a 7-8, b 1; 177 a 5), and Aristotle’s use of ra &vraida (s.v. Bonitz, Index), ra map’ juîr Versus zâxe?, 1) Oevorépa obela. 173 De caelo 269 b 13-17 (Stock); cf. ibid. 269 a 31-33, and Meteor. 339 a 11. Abstracting from Aristotle’s “fifth’ element, one finds a comparable, though weaker, distinction in Plato: in the heavens the four elements are ‘‘purer,’’ “nobler,” etc., than they are “here” (Phil. 29 b-d; Phaedo 109 b-111 b, esp. 110 a), presumably because ‘‘there’’ they are free of the six wandering motions (Tim. 34a). In Laws xii. 967 c (cf. x. 886 d-e) the view that there are ‘‘stones or earth’’ in the stars is denounced as criminal atheism. CQ, XXIII (1930), 71-83, at 80 and 82, n. 3. Hence natural science can be only a “likely tale.’’ And even Aristotle holds categorically that there can be no science of the indeterminate (An. post. 32 b 18); cf. the role of the indeterminateness of matter (à ris iAns &opıorla) in De gen. anim. 778 a 7, and cf. also Met. 1010 a 3, 1049 b 2. 177 Plato here is intent on exposing the basic error of ‘‘all the men who have ever handled physical investigation’’ (891 c [Bury]). He has in mind the most mature physical systems, including atomism; but he draws no fine distinctions and makes no honorable exemptions, for he is convinced that all those who sowed the materialist wind must be held responsible for the whirlwind, i.e., the conventional theory of justice. Tate (CQ, XXX [1936], 48-54) has argued that the butt of Plato’s polemic is Archelaus and his fourth-century followers. Certainly, Archelaus meets the double imputation of materialist cosmology and the conventional theory of justice and thus falls within the scope of Plato’s polemic. But that a second-rate thinker should be singled out as the representative of materialist physics seems unlikely; and as for his “followers,’’ we know nothing about them. I think Tate forces the meaning of véwr Kat ocopâv in 886 d. Since dpxaio. here clearly refers to the theogonies (886 c; cf. Arist. Meteor. 353 a 34), véo Can only mean the more ‘“‘modern,’’ though scarcely contemporary, cosmogonies of scientific physics (cf. Meteor. 353 b 5; and Met. 1091 a 34-1091 b 11: rourai dpxaioı versus borepor copol); what is contemporary for Plato is the

“all human laws are nourished by the one law divine” and had thought of this justice in the nature of things not as impersonal order but as a “thought that steers all things through all things.”178 But Plato is right in accenting the difference and neglecting the agreement. His early predecessors had endowed physical nature itself with the attributes of reason, including justice and thought. They had been so absorbed in the discovery that 177 That distinction is foreign to archaic thought and language, as we can see from the systematic ambiguity of words like logos, gnome, and nous.'*% In Plato and Aristotle, on the other hand, the identification of rational thought and rational thing is deliberate. It is achieved not by rationalizing material nature but by degrading matter to the realm of the irrational, the fortuitous, and the disorderly. W. A. Heidel, who was much preoccunever pied by this momentous transformation, stopped to distinguish between the catetook a strangely fatalistic view of the transition: “The transfer of the functions and attributes of the ancient gods to physis by the philosophers of the sixth and nature was rational that they gories of intelligibility and intelligence.'”® influence of this trend of thought. Tate further restricts unnecessarily the reference of the doctrine that the heavenly bodies are “earth applies to Democritus Anaxagoras. (Frag. Tate appeals and A39) to 895 stones”; as much a to this as to show that “Plato cannot be arguing against atomism, according to which motion is eternal and had no beginning” (p. 53); but note the force of of mÂeïoror r@v ToLolrwv. fifth centuries eventually so charged nature with personality that the Socratic teleology was a foregone conclusion.’’!8! The atomist system proves that this de- The frequent inveighing against ‘‘chance’’ and ‘‘nevelopment was anything but a “foregone cessity’’ must have Empedocles and Democritus in conclusion’’—that the natural evolution mind, if we may judge from the reference of similar arguments in Aristotle (for Democritus see the pasof pre-Socratic thought was not toward sages in the ever increasing personalizing of na- Diels-Kranz, Frags. A65-A70). And, since Empedocles was not known for his political theory (Frag. B135 to the contrary notwithstanding), the sequel to materialism that ‘‘politics shares little with nature, much with art’’ (889 d) must surely include Democritus (and his followers, whose existence is not a matter of conjecture). Plato’s concession that politics, on this view, does have a ‘‘small’’ share with nature fits Democritus, who would insist (against the out-and-out conventionalists) product of material that necessity and (Frag. B33; cf. Nausiphanes art is itself ‘‘makes’’ Incidentally, Anaxarchus (Frags. A3 and A5) shows the kind of objectionable politics that could be associated (rightly or wrongly) with the Democritean and thus lends some plausibility to the school worst that Plato imputes against the wicked materialists in 890 a. 178 Heracl. fragment Frag. with B41. ‘‘Governs’’ Anaximander (see connects above, n. predecessors Democritus inherited the universe of homogeneous construction and immanent necessity reared with the thought" (reppôornrer amavra which they scaffolding of had cosmic a nature Frag. B2. 18. 3). ture, but the reverse. From his Ionian Frag. B110. 10]). [Emp. Frag. There is every reason B103; cf. to believe that this is the general assumption among the pre- Socratics; cf. the identification of thought with the krasis of the elements in Empedocles and Parmenides and of soul with fire in Heracleitus and air in Anaximenes. this 180 Aóyos, ‘‘account,’’ both in the active sense of 153). accounting (Aöyos as speech and/or thought) and in the (Frag. objective sense of the character of things which makes B134) speak explicitly of a divine ‘‘mind’’; and Parthem capable of being so accounted (Aóyos as mathe- Xenophanes menides’ (Frag. Being was B25) also, and no Empedocles doubt, conceived as mind on the principle of the identity of thought and being. Needless to say, in all this the accent falls not on spiritualizing nature but on naturalizing spirit. matical proportion, etc., which can objects themselves [Leucip. s TE Kal LU UT , ávayxnsl). Frag. Similarly, be in physical B2: rmávra é Móyov yvoun could also be used to mean not only the coynoscens but also (though In Anaximander the Boundless itself has the properrarely) the cognoscendum, ties of the gods (Frag. 3). In Heracleitus the governing yvœuas mind is still plain fire (Frag. B64). In Xenophanes, same sense as the onuara of fire and night in Parm. in Theog. 60, e.g., where the well-known karüv yrouas God is described in words which Parmenides applies Frag. BS. 55 (“*Merkzeichen” unchanged to his Being (cf. Xen. Frag. B26: dei 5’ & vods, Liddell and Scott cite Hdt. vii. Tavr® piuver With Parm. Frag. B8. 29). (sense) rod ffuaros. 179 On the contrary, they made, all too confidently, the opposite assumption—that ‘‘all things have has exactly the [Diels-Kranz]). As for 162: oros à vóos 181 epi dicews, Proc. Amer. Acad. Arts and XLV (1910), 79-133, at 94-95. Sciences,

equality and cosmic justice. The structure equal in size and at unequal intervals.!86 completed, As for the earth, its breadth and length the scaffolding could be dropped. The order of nature is now asare sured through the impenetrability of the southern atoms,!® the eternity of their motion,!*3 unequal in weight.!3® Cosmic equality has unequal,!®” and the northern and of the cylindroid are halves the infinity of their number and form. lost its importance, for cosmic justice no Thence Democritus could have deduced longer makes sense. Justice is now a hu- “the balanced strife of the first beginman device; it applies solely to the acts nings,” the and relations of conscious beings. It is not equilibrium of creative and destructive arbitrary, for it is rooted in the necessities forces.!84 These theorems appear in Epicuof man’s nature and environment. But the equality of opposites, rus under the title of isonomia. Democritus could have made the same deductions and claimed the same title; there is no evidence that he ever did. Compared to Anaximander’s, the design of the Democritean universe is indifferent to equality: The infinite worlds are neither does man find it in the universe as such; it is a product of civilization and art.!89 Justice is only the form which the immanent order of nature achieves in the mind and works of man. Justice is natural, but nature is not just. QUEEN’S UNIVERSITY KINGSTON, ONTARIO unequal in size and power and at unequal intervals from one another.!® Earth, sun, moon, and stars are also, no doubt, un- 18 The first I infer from (1) the general gravitational theory, which entails that the largest bodies are sifted toward the center and (2) the fact that sun and moon were originally composed of a substance that ‘‘resembled the earth’’ (Strom. 7 182 See Lucr. i. 485-86 and 592-98, where the uniformity of nature is derived from ávriruría. 183 For the conservation of motion see Hippol. Ref.i. 13.4 Lucr. i. 294-307 (cf. Epic. Ep. ad Hdt. i. 39, and the ultimate 18 Cicero ND i. 19. 50; cf. also Lucr. ii. 567-76 (successive supremacy in ‘‘nunc hic nunc illic superant = Frag. A40: ‘‘neither is the height of the planets equal’’; but even this would be enough to spoil the symmetry of Anaximander's scheme. 187 Frag. source in Parm. Frag. B8. 7). B 15 (Agathemerus i. destructive collisions between worlds, ‘‘the greater overcoming the lesser (Aét. ii. 4. 9 Frag. A84). Moreover, A94 188 The south being more temperate, ‘‘the earth is of produce and growth’’ (Frag. A96 18 Hippol. Ref. i. 13. 2 and 3 (Democ. Frag. A40). the 1. 2); Frag. (Eustathius, schol. to Il. vii. 446). weighed down in that direction, where it has an excess . . et superantur item’). Hence = Frag. A39). As for the intervals, the only definite statement is = the worlds are dissimilar in contents: ‘‘in some there is no sun nor moon, in others larger ones than ours, in still others more [sc. than one sun and moon]....and there are worlds devoid of animals, plants, and all moisture’’ (Hippol. loc. cit.). 189 See Frags. B172-73: ‘’good’’ = Aët. iii. 12. 2). and ‘‘evil’’ are not in nature as such, but in what man does with nature through the power of his art and its ‘‘teaching.’’ For the application of this principle to the origin of human civilization, see Democ. Frag. The validity of this material as a source of Democritean ideas has been disputed; but see ‘On the Prehistory in Diodorus,’’ AJP, LX VII (1946), 51-59.

http://www.jstor.org LINKED CITATIONS - Page 1 of 2 - You have printed the following article: Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies Gregory Vlastos Classical Philology, Vol. 42, No. 3. (Jul., 1947), pp. 156-178. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0009-837X%28194707%2942%3A3%3C156%3AEAJIEG%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23 This article references the following linked citations. If you are trying to access articles from an off-campus location, you may be required to first logon via your library web site to access JSTOR. Please visit your library's website or contact a librarian to learn about options for remote access to JSTOR. [Footnotes] 2 Solonian Justice Gregory Vlastos Classical Philology, Vol. 41, No. 2. (Apr., 1946), pp. 65-83. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0009-837X%28194604%2941%3A2%3C65%3ASJ%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23 57 The #### in Anaximenes and Anaximander W. A. Heidel Classical Philology, Vol. 1, No. 3. (Jul., 1906), pp. 279-282. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0009-837X%28190607%291%3A3%3C279%3ATDIAAA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F 85 The Logos of Heraclitus Edwin L. Minar, Jr. Classical Philology, Vol. 34, No. 4. (Oct., 1939), pp. 323-341. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0009-837X%28193910%2934%3A4%3C323%3ATLOH%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23 119 On Anaximander W. A. Heidel Classical Philology, Vol. 7, No. 2. (Apr., 1912), pp. 212-234. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0009-837X%28191204%297%3A2%3C212%3AOA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.

http://www.jstor.org LINKED CITATIONS - Page 2 of 2 - 139 Plato's 'Technical Terms' H. C. Baldry The Classical Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 3/4. (Jul. - Oct., 1937), pp. 141-150. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0009-8388%28193707%2F10%291%3A31%3A3%2F4%3C141%3AP%27T%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2 169 Slavery in Plato's Thought Gregory Vlastos The Philosophical Review, Vol. 50, No. 3. (May, 1941), pp. 289-304. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108%28194105%2950%3A3%3C289%3ASIPT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q 176 Priscian's Quotations from Terence J. D. Craig The Classical Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 2. (Apr., 1930), pp. 65-73. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0009-8388%28193004%291%3A24%3A2%3C65%3APQFT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V 177 On Plato: Laws X 889cd J. Tate The Classical Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 2. (Apr., 1936), pp. 48-54. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0009-8388%28193604%291%3A30%3A2%3C48%3AOPLX8%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T 189 On the Pre-History in Diodorus Gregory Vlastos The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 67, No. 1. (1946), pp. 51-59. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-9475%281946%2967%3A1%3C51%3AOTPID%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.