On the need for properties: the road to pythagoreanism and back

MAMME MANCS | C. B. MARTIN ON THE NEED FOR PROPERTIES: THE ROAD TO PYTHAGOREANISM AND BACK* ABSTRACT. The development of a compositional model shows the incoherence of such notions as levels of being and both bottom-up and top-down causality. The mathematization of nature through the partial considerations of physics qua quantities is seen to lead to Pythagoreanism, if what is not included in the partial consideration is denied. An ontology of only probabilities, if not Pythagoreanism, is equivalent to a world of primitive dispositionalities. Problems are found with each. There is a need for properties as well as quantities and these properties must be qualitative as well as dispositional. So there is a need for physical qualia (qualities) for the depiction of the intrinsic character of the finest interstices of nature. In order to make any progress in philosophy, and philosophy of science in particular, we must be clear on our metaphysics. Perhaps highest on the list of notions to be clarified is that of a property. The elimination of some elementary confusions about the nature of properties will go far to clean up less fundamental topics. My arguments against universals and in particular against D. M. Armstrong’s account of universals appears in Armstrong et al., 1996(b) and in Martin, 1996(a). 1. LINGUISTICIZATION OF PROPERTIES Predicates are linguistic and mind-dependent entities, whereas many properties of objects are not. Linguisticism is silly, but it is also endemic and largely unnoticed by many passing ontologists. The suggestion of it needs expunging from the motto “To be is to be the value of a variable”, but appears unmistakably in what can be described as a kind of Holus Bolus pS\iRùMACRTI.N, 1 view (Martin 1980; 1993) that suggests that it is the object simpliciter holus bolus that makes each of many statements about it true or false. But when the statements: (A) The passion fruit is round and (B) The passion fruit is purple Synthese 112: 193-231, 1997. © 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

PYTHAGOREANISM AND BACK* ABSTRACT. The development of a compositional model shows the incoherence of such as notions levels of nature zation of being through to Pythagoreanism, lead of only ontology dispositionalities. and quantities and both bottom-up and top-down The mathemati causality. the partial of physics to considerations is seen qua quantities if what is not included in the partial consideration is denied. An if not Pythagoreanism, is equivalent with each. There is a need probabilities, Problems these are found properties must as well be qualitative to a world for properties as dispositional. of primitive as well as So there is a need for physical qualia (qualities) for the depiction of the intrinsic character of the finest interstices of nature. In order to make in philosophy, and philosophy of science in any progress we on our must be clear particular, metaphysics. Perhaps highest on the to be clarified is that of a property. The elimination list of notions of some confusions about the nature of properties will go far to clean up elementary less fundamental and in particular topics. My arguments against universals account et D. M. of universals appears in Armstrong against Armstrong's and inMartin, al., 1996(b) 1996(a). 1. LINGUISTICIZATION OF PROPERTIES are linguistic and mind-dependent entities, whereas many prop erties of objects are not. Linguisticism is silly, but it is also endemic and unnoticed The of needs it largely by many passing ontologists. suggestion from the motto "To be is to be the value of a variable", but expunging Predicates appears unmistakably in what can be described as a kind of Holus Bolus view (Martin 1980; 1993) that suggests that it is the object simpliciter holus bolus that makes each of many statements about it true or false. But when the statements: (A) The passion fruit is round (B) The passion fruit is purple and Synthese 112: 193-231, 1997. ? 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

are true of one and the same object, ticular and different about the object are built to pick in each case that makes it is something each statement in par true. The these out. predicates about (or of) the same object Furthermore, different things (properties) are causally operative in different ways (or inoperative) for different effects. in some event for particular effects only The object is causally operative of some in virtue holus bolus its properties rather than others. It is not operative are needing and every effect. Therefore, properties are and blind. empty properties, objects predicates of for each for causality. Without (Martin 1980; 1993) a doubt, if one compares one needs and dissimilarities Without larities thought to be "in common" between identical universal of the numerically for this is removed and even identification one when sees two objects in terms of their simi some respects to do this concerning them. This has led to the invocation as the common The need element. that object discrimination detection, discrim upon a more basic detection, of about of ination and identification things objects, namely, properties ? and the movements, colors, tastes, textures, loudnesses, shapes, objects temporal pulses and changes and spatial spread of these. This is dependent a mind-shift from the philosopher's usual emphasis upon similarity between objects (that need a respect in which a specific property to be similar) to exact or inexact similarity between or respect (of an object) that since already detected or specified needs no exact requires or inexact further An are similar. the respects or properties respect inwhich an or infant adult may be selectively attending to a specific of an object or to exactly of a number similar property of objects the natural specific properties to the object or objects themselves. Exercising to detect and come to fix upon some specific property and basic capacity or her interests, the agent can group exactly similar properties arousing his without attending either of different can discriminate it parts of the same object or of different objects. And these properties from dissimilar properties. It can do these need of further respects. things without The natural direction discriminating, recognizing, the perception of what is demarcated or iden is within and its for detecting, is through about an as it its and "outline" marked bounded were, object through, (allowing for exact and differences and occasional less-than similarities, "overlap") by tifying properties exact from and to what environment. This else can be achieved about perception at the most primitive the object level of detection and also at the higher catory responses levels of discriminatory, and identifi recognitional comes to needed for cognitive expertise. One gradually acquire cognitive skills reacting to similarities and differences concerning

one has a many-exactly-similar-tropes properties, whether view. If there are many instantiations-of-one-universal then itwill be natural for one to group them. (1) note To extent the physical in a particular property-universal or to (2) note the physical and/or or many exactly similars of some duration or set of many instantiation extent view and/or duration of some one simple instantiations simple trope or to be a strikingly similar procedure. one uses (and whichever of these notations level, vs. universals issue may not come to more than that), it is set of exactly similar At the ontological the tropes the resemblance tropes seems or difference or states of affairs events the properties of objects, or difference to the resemblance between between that is basic objects, events or states of affairs. Two objects are similar to and different from different from one another in virtue of the similarity to and difference things about (properties of) the objects. model This ontological-epistemological is a corrective oriented and false accounts of infants in the womb, as adults we can be as the infant in total disregard Even of the perceptual and the very young. or properties qualities is the case with If one were object development of what has the we may be totally absorbed. This often and even more pedestrian sensualists. composers with which painters, to reject segments space-time that is, things about to overly and conceptual of objects and replace them with the ultimacy or "worms" or fields, there would still be properties, or things had by these segments or fields that would or even be parts of them. These not be these segments or fields themselves more mere measures. than mathematicized Even con properties would be cerning such elementary particles or fields or space-time representations there is need of more sure is such only it is the quantity desert and numbers. Every quantity or mea of there being qualitiesybr which or of which or measure. The alternative is an unacceptably empty than quantities in virtue of Pythagoreanism endorsed unsurprisingly by Quine in "Whither Physical Objects?" (Quine 1976). 2. The anti-realist notes and falsely concludes dependent. On THE COMPOSITIONAL MODEL that there can be alternative that the world the contrary, nature ways of classifying is indeterminate and classification a completely realist way of representing the manifold variety of nature is available (Martin 1993). Such varieties modes as the stability and (observable) of some reproductivity rather than others of interrelated properties in nature make some factors of classification of things more "natural' or "useful" than others.

be factors concerning the evolution of the of the themselves. For instance, classifying organisms complex some interrelatings of properties rather than others produce figure-ground and interest, that in that provide greater ease of recognition perceptions turn produce conditions sustenance for the movement, and survival of the with Correlative this would structures organism. The organism reactivities must be selective, and reject or ignore most and interrelatednesses that exist in nature. Itwould if it tried to accommodate in nature. relatednesses that there are not not survive variety of inter that the unselected the endless not follow, of course, as real as the selected ones. Nor just limits to the scope of interrelatednesses. It does are not interrelatednesses follow in its classifications of the inter it does Square and round pegs do not fit the same way into square or round holes. some relationships of properties Furthermore, simply do not obtain as, for a those for the of unicorn. existence example, required pegs what Believing to it. There seems more is false may no a priori view optimistic sificatory mechanisms for discovering mechanism includes used be helpful for survival and even necessary let us take the to place on this. But that the human organism can provide, has one of the best that nature a mechanism limit at least something of what both perceptual classificatory is basic clas that may in nature. be This and extrapo is used to capacity capacities The latory (from perception) extrapolatory capacities. in terms fashion explanations of the more complex and directly observable and of the simpler. That is, complex with their complex properties things as various wholes may be explained interrelations by reference complex or constitution to their having a composition of simple/simpler parts with are not observable. that and relations directly simple/simpler properties want I shall explore but first I the nature and consequences of this model, to examine and of the notions of wholes of levels and parts being and levels of explanation. It must be evident, even to the ontologically go so must and relations simpler parts, properties Yet it appears that there has been of a system constituents of the relationships to the or of constituents of a whole confusion to the system, the timid, that where wholes. the go complex about whole. a position has very clearly expressed and causality between constituents and wholes, John Searle being that imports levels of and between macros andmicro levels (Searle 1992): in the it is quite common about such bottom-up causation; mysterious on its molecular The solidity of the piston is causally supervenient the causal and similarly, this does not make super solidity epiphenomenal; There is nothing physical world ? structure,

of my venience back pain on micro is that once you the existence of bottom-up, micro forms of recognize no longer does any work in philosophy. The formal in the causal of the micro-macro present sufficiency present epiphenomenal. conclusion My the notion of supervenience are already the relation causation, of features events in my brain does not make the pain of causation. forms to be asked is a simple one. It is not apparent how things The question of a whole identical with constituents thing have effects upon It is no better to speak of top-down that includes themselves. the whole that are causality. There the question would arise, "How does a whole cause something of its constituents is constituted concerning thing that it is what that are being affected by the whole by?" The constituents to this is the obvious be part of the cause upon themselves. Added constituted must problem of apparent over-determination occurring That is what is "mysterious about such bottom-up is not "a straightforward and what causation arises This a failure from of their interrelations another and whatever and to consider at each and every level. or top-down causation" matter". all of the constituents with all and potential, for one interreactivities, be external to them with the varying degrees of actual may of all of these, allowing, of course, for some degrees of addition or or even qualitative alteration within alteration, subtraction, configuration, are as whatever limits limits for that kind of whole. rough applicable being stability a whole When with is considered all of their interrelations that is to consider as over and above and dispositions for these, as a causal factor of the whole the causal be effects as well be upon its constituents traced to the causal constituents. That is what its constituents and interreactions "over and aboveness" apart from anything concerning all of the constituents. Amongst cannot all of its effects, operativenesses it is supposed of any or even that there will as effects operativenesses is commonly meant upon other things that of any or even all of the by "top-down causality". also applies an over and aboveness notion of the "Bottom-up causality" effect of the whole in addition to all of the effects of the constituents upon one another and whatever is external to them (with all of the effects of acquiringfurther dispositions). This effects doubtful at each invocation level of levels of being with duplicated is tempting only because compositionalist causes and accounts tend to be grossly of wholes to their inadequate. This over and aboveness becomes when the of roles constituents, however, totally incomprehensible are given their fair due in a the constituents well-developed compositional are ordinarily called "collections" or "wholes" or "objects" to, subtracted from, have substitutions made, or be changed in their properties (heated or cooled, for example) with linguistic propriety. model. What can be added

or an object is not inconsistent with a use must of the term "identity" One avoid identity. attributing continuing such that any entity over time can be said to lack continuing identity simply such Attributing because substituted to a whole things it has changed some parts. lost some parts or added or has properties or had of The old example of the statue not just being the ultimate constituents with is the is The constituents clay grossly misleading. clay sculpture just a certain of shape and size within rough limits of allowable or and of the constituents of deformation loss, addition properties change with the further condition of having an intentional formative action of an conformation account. have a compositional agent or agents that themselves account will work In order to make sense of what kind of compositional for what kind of whole or object, we must bounds and properties and relations first decide of what we the spatial-temporal as a whole are designating or an object and what capacities for affecting and being affected by other loss or gain or sub and what actual and possible degrees of allowable things stitution of parts and alterations of their properties there can be. Then and the spatial-temporal toward plotting only then can we make the beginning and bounds of the constituents with their allowable of interrelations range interreactions, and whatever and capacities may be external of these, with one another to them with allowable degrees of stability of the properties and alteration concerning or dispositions and loss, gain, and substitution the constituents for the relevant whole When formulated, suitably are not that there (a) thought one level of ultimate and explanation the constituents and or object to be rendered without in terms of those constituents. remainder constituents), although there are levels of description the thought (b) that and also expresses (cf. pp. 25?28) in all of their interrelatednesses their dispositions be external, and together the model the compositional expresses there of being is rather, (or, only levels for these with one another and interreactivenesses and with whatever may in all of their varying degrees of stability, do fully constitute are the whole and (admitting some additions and subtractions and configuration suitable for being that kind of less than this will do as a compositional model. alterations of properties whole). Nothing This is to think that if the properties and relations of entities are complex then the entities must have simpler considering and their properties and relations must be simpler. The ultimate are best left to theoretical to detect, that we constituents the completeness physics though of the descriptions given to them may be suspect. This general way of talking about the properties of ultimate are constituents and correctness (elementary particles or aspects of fields or superstrings, constituents is not affect

ed by Nancy Fraassen (Cartwright Cartwright's our present about doubts 1980) (van 1983) or Bas van Fraassen's or even future capacity to develop the (known or unknown) properties a complete and true physics. Whatever and of nature have they are no more purely qualitative ultimate constituents or more shall structural in "pure act" than any (I properties. macroscopic take it as obvious therefore cannot and dispositionality The properties of involves that any structural property be used to "explain" dispositionality.) themselves must and non-structural particles elementary more than they mani be capable (at any time or space time segment) of as I fest. This is sometimes believe) (not happily, possible world expressed lines. excluded whose and dispositions concepts Any account of properties even supposedly of elementary particles or fields or strings, etc. Perhaps it is useful to see (without any scientific to the domain application would be grossly deficient. theory of their nature) why existence. The belief reasonable it is rationally to believe inescapable of what were in the existence called in their "insensible "atoms" before that does in the 17th century and unobservable or even a out scientific out well worked upon badly worked corpuscles" not depend theory of their nature. The first stage is to grasp the notion of composition inwhich a (1) of and of a particular kind is supposed to be composed no more is and than of different constituted parts by completely whole kinds in various relations. The individual parts of a chair are not chairs, the individual parts of curry are not curry, and the individual parts of a tree are not trees. second stage is to grasp that things of parts and get smaller by loss of parts. (2) The (3) The third stage, with this knowledge, larger and a ring, worn for a long get is to note how cernibly. That or the ring one cannot observe an increase or a decrease by loss of parts. an explanation that a tree gets indis time, gets smaller one the tree observes closely is, no matter Spurning larger by addition in terms of expansion by addition as with of parts a balloon, the thought of increase in size by the addition of unobservable parts of different kinds in various relations and a reasonable thought entities or observable so as to constitute and we belief, parts of entities the tree is an understandable do not have as plena. to think of observable

with of this is accomplished servable parts of things. That much, no theory of the nature of these unob and it is a great deal, is not threatened by the doubts raised by Cartwright, much we can know about what Locke or even by van Fraassen, called "the finer interstices All about how of nature". in theoretical physics upon our views of The bearing of developments of and language about things taken at the level of "ordinary" observation the macroscopic world between the "scientific is made image" graphic, for example, by the discordances and the "manifest image" (in the phrases ofWilfred Sellars) of color. occurred when, at the My first encounter with that kind of discordance a a I He said that the lecture of attended nine, age public by physicist. of parts called "particles" objects we see, such as a table, were composed see were us or too to feel. These particles had far more that far small for them space between further astonishment, than the space they occupied. to say that these part-particles He went to my were kinds on, of many at very up the objects and these particles were moving, making constantly, on the instant, resolved never great speeds. I thought the physicist mad and, to attend a university where such nonsense occurred. Then close the physicist on to say that it was as if we couldn't get the swarm of particles with senses very rather like being at a great distance from a swarm of went to be almost within enough different and sharper, bees the swarm can appear as a solid object until one gets very close. the excitement Persuaded of the thought by this clumsy analogy, me, on the instant, discussed. to resolve to attend university where such matters set were I had, as others in the audience as well, a view of the solidity of things as some kind of plenum. That was why what the physicist said was so I at this view of from that first. gave up shocking solidity qua plenum moment. When Eddington ton claimed a graduate student at Cambridge, the dispute and Stebbing about the solidity of a table was discussed. I was that theoretical refuted our ordinary arguing that our ordinary physics of a table. Stebbing disagreed, "If I drop a piece of paper on the table, because it doesn't between Edding view of the solidity view was pass inviolate through it". I thought that Stebbing hadmissed thewhole point. The point was that the ordinary implications turned out to be false. that people make of "solidity" as implying &plenum True enough, there are other ordinary implications such as that paper won't of "solidity" just pass through the "solid" desk claim that, often enough, the false implications that remain true. Iwould are in how we think of the and the true implications wrapped together

the shock (as Stebbing can't explain) of of things. That explains self and others in the audience by what the physicist said. my younger Faced with some of the more mind-boggling theories of modern physics, solidity one's most to allow concepts are up for at least enough bending of what is being proposed. intelligent consideration basic and twisting that even in terms of the most anti-intuitive be emphasized of physics considered there is something amongst seriously hypotheses like a relative retention of edges of boundednesses. That is, there would be It should of particles (or aspects degrees of density of populations and relative degrees of stability ofthat density of such populations relative of fields) (or field an at This the level of analogue aspects). provides (or elementary particles for the sizes and shapes and the edges and continuance and field-aspects) movements of things and therefore a further reinforcement for the relationship model of the macroscopic and of macroscopic a realist compositional the sub-microscopic. None of this should that the philosopher suggest should react with dumb from theoretical physics or by faith to the latest and changing revelations or a "That's what they say now" cynicism. disbelief It should ?n arrogant incline to a greater philosophers alertness to alternative the world ways be. may is the setting out of an even more abstract model Ontology the world is than that of theoretical physics, with place-holders entific results theoretical and some excluders science can help one for tempting confusions. another along with, we of how for sci and Ontology hope, minimal harm. This need not be Scientism. compositionalism of actual science has very naturally methodology partial account of the finer interstices be discussed in a later section. 3. At the start, itwill Picking is supposed be helpful It leaves it open that the led to an incomplete and and constituents of nature. This will DISPOSITIONS to get some one term to do all the work terminology straight. that my use of the term "disposition" to do is asking a lot of any single word. Some explanation may that the choice of words has not been thoughtless. help The difference between capacities and dispositions disappears once one to show asks, "Under what capacity conditions be exercisedV (reciprocal disposition partners) would

are capacities for Capacities under fillments (manifestations) partners). The differences in circumstance cy" and "proclivity" is inwhat of usage between "capacity", "tenden to be the degree of availability is considered of (spatial or temporal) reciprocal disposition partners or per to which there is the start of a process toward a result that or proximity haps would or ful for) their exercises (dispositions certain conditions (reciprocal disposition the degree need the loss of reciprocal disposition partners or the introduction of a reciprocal prohibitive partner to stop or interfere with the disposition of the mutual manifestation. culmination "Capacity" can also be used as the most indicator non-specific for mutual manifestation. of a and "manifestation" as partners reciprocal disposition disposition's to use the terms "disposition" I will continue the basic terms. causal the qualitativity and dispositionality of any real property of thinking of, mode of predication concerning, way of that it is merely in the eye or voice looking at, etc." suggests regarding, If the users of such deontologizing of the beholder. to wish expressions then the users should make claim such anthropomorphism that ontology to endorse this anthropomorphism If the users do not wish fully explicit. Expressing as "a way merely then they should join indicate. expressions Dispositions (1) come in the world the in at least three classes: from the solution and becomes soluble again. are such that what is explo such as explosiveness Dispositions ismanifested, sive when the explosiveness by its being explod and does not become ed, is not recovered from the explosion explosive (3) clearly what are such that what such as solubility is soluble Dispositions the solubility is manifested, when its into solution, by going then ceases to be soluble. However, what is in solution can be recovered (2) in the task of saying again. such as the soundness of a bridge are such that what Dispositions the soundness is sound when is manifested, by its performing cease not to then have does soundness. soundly, I shallmainly be concerned with dispositions in the thirdgroup. All intrinsic properties are dispositional, and dispositionality is fully can be actual though their manifestations are real and actual. Dispositions or not. The properties of elementary particles segments of spatio-temporal fields are not structural states. Yet such properties are not in pure act, that is,

or temporal at each moment manifesting not all of which They have dispositions, in the nature of the case qua elementary not explained in terms of properties I have given arguments (Martin stage all of which they are capable. and, they are always manifesting, their dispositionality particles, of their constituents. is Trying to account 1994) against explaining dispositions not repeat those arguments here. for dispositionality in terms of structural states is misguided, not only because in terms of counterfactuals and will what importantly, dispositional itself in terms of How-structural cleanly discussed A great to discussing advantage elementary macroscopic, that one can avoid some particle reduction at a structural Discussion whether is evidently is structural but, more intrinsically the issue can be more because properties. at the non-structural, properties or elementary of fields vs. non-reduction or macroscopic non level aspects debates. is level is vitiated by debate level are anything over and the usual gesturing toward all of at the higher the properties concerning at a lower level with above properties that are at best ontologically the many varieties of supervenience useless at an elementary and at worst misleading. Discussion level particle (even stops the moves epistemic qualms) terms in of still other properties properties with are epistemically I devised the following verificationism of causal lucky) According of an object there aren case 'tany! in the mid-1950s and later as a counter-example dispositions to Quine, to attempt to account for the at a lower level because (if we as a counter-example to many reductive to accounts account in Word and Object. including Quine's an unmanifested is explicable in terms disposition a structure similar to a structure of an object that has having the manifested supposed disposition. The case is one of a cosmic geographical fact concerning the spatio of It kinds of elementary particles. is supposed that there temporal spread are kinds of elementary in some spatio-temporal particles region of the universe such that they are different from the kinds of elementary parti cles of our own region and the regions are so vastly distant that the many special dispositions they have for intercourse with one another never have never and will have their very special manifestations and nothing else in the universe, in the nature of the case, is like them that does have the mani festations. Yet they have causal dispositions ready to go. The dispositional is as real and irreducible the dispositional as the categorical. is as real and irreducible (Or, as Iwould prefer to say, as the qualitative. Talking of the distinction as being between the dispositional and the categorical can suggest object.) that dispositional is not really categorical: not really "there" in the

A very fly." When Quinean replied, "And if pigs had wings they would I complained that he didn't know any better than I did that this devoted a true case, he responded, "And if pigs had wings they would fly". to point out that somewhat the wit on the occasion irrelevant wasn't (I did not have truth that if pigs hadwings they still wouldn't fly.) and effect Cause Mutual even given different basic terms of the of Reciprocal Partners. Dispositionality Disposition to deal with equipped elementary particles, are well and Manifestation because in the more itself should be explained Manifestation a quark of more than at any time it manifests partners. Start with any disposition is capable reciprocal disposition - a and you find a network Power Net. partner the characterization (This should be useful if needed in physics.) of non-local causality, is one amongst many alternative disposition reciprocal some for mutual manifestations. partners case of the turning with A typical causal situation is Locke's Any in disposition a particular a lock of etc. in of a particular size and hardness, shape, a particular a particular etc., that is showing shape, size and hardness, etc. to the key for their mutual force of resistance or lacking of resistance, a key force of an unlocking. manifestation states for their mutual manifestations of dispositional reciprocity that are their common product is deep and complex. This reciprocity should not be expressed in terms of unhelpful distinctions such as power to give vs. The vs. agent vs. patient, active vs. passive, causal conditions ? whatever conditions. What? is Standing byV. Instead, causally to receive, power standing should have operative aMutual Manifestation. its full status as Reciprocal Dispositional Partner for of one dispositional point is that for the manifestation to be a reciprocal partner with some other disposition states its reciprocating amongst partners, dispositional if they exist and are in the relevant relationship. The lighting is a mutual manifestation of The important it will need state the dispositional state of the match with of the reciprocal a great deal else. the cooperation to be a reciprocal partner partner of the enfolding disposition that needs oxygen amongst This view of the innumerable of properties, reciprocities the simple-minded view and dispositional interconnectednesses unknown but existent still, contrasts with largely that because nature does not lay out The Cause of each event, causality itself is mind-dependent. state is there in the most A dispositional instances or psychological richness of alternative rocal disposition instances. manifestations partners, some simple or complex physical It is there to provide the relevant with of which its multiple alternative recip would be mutually exclusive

in their actualization but ready even never-existent manifestation or to go for present, distant, non-existent, that is, reciprocal disposition conditions, partners. With partners each being for the mutual mani reciprocal disposition must have the and selectivity for such a man each directedness festation, one or more ifestation. If, by misfortune partners do not in fact exist, the and selectivity/or reaching out and directedness contained in the existent partner. is fully has a directedness as solventer of a dispositionality salt and the existence of salt for the mutual manifestation Water not gold even without of a coming into a solution as soluble dispositionality existence of water solution You their manifestation of salinity. And salt has a directedness in water and not aqua regia, even without for that same mutual manifestation of a coming and the into a of salinity. an existent need and does reciprocal partner entity having the directedness but any existent reciprocal partner is sufficient disposition not need the existence of its other reciprocal partners for the existence of its directedness of an existent to what would 4. be their mutual manifestation. FORMS OF INFINITY 1. The Disposition is directive and selec thermostat (D) o? &particular tive to a particular furnace to which at ti Pi for the it is connected alternative mutual manifestations of degrees of change in heat with alternative reciprocal disposition partners of a cat's tail or falling plas ter or coat sleeve the set point of the butcher or ... altering to be infinite. or the tail of a unicorn of the thermostat. This appears and selective^ the mutual manifestation of a particular kind with particular kinds of reciprocal disposition of its quark cousins, wherever or partners of various arrangements 2. The D of a quark is directive readiness for them, even they may be. It has its disposition if they were to cease to exist. This appears to be infinite. whenever 3. The D of a quark is directive and selective for the alternative mutual of various kinds with alternative kinds of reciprocal manifestations distant, unreachable partners proximate, disposition even may not exist. This appears to be infinite. and of kinds that 4. The D of anything probably isn't at all places and times. So, itwill be finite in duration selectedness and extension. of any D (anywhere, anytime) kind for a particular is from But theHere the infinity of directedness and and Now to an infinite number of reciprocal disposition partners of a particular or for any number kind of mutual manifestation

of different of reciprocal disposition partners (actual and non-actual) of a D of mutual manifestation. Duration kinds for different kinds but that is irrelevant helps verification 5. to the ontology. DISTINGUISHING DISPOSITIONALITIES states in exactly similar recip cannot be exactly similar dispositional for different mutual manifestations. rocal partnerships states are complex then in away there can be different If the dispositional There That state partners that have similar mutual manifestations. there can the different aspects of the mutual manifestations dispositional is, amongst also be similar aspects. state can have different mutual that the same dispositional with different reciprocal disposition manifestations partners. For example, the same water thrown on burning wood or burning oil on water has very It is clear different consequences (see below). we state for a particular tend to select as "the" dispositional is the reciprocal disposition kind of mutual manifestation partner that has to its the greatest and availability varying reciprocal disposition stability What of greatest interest to us. not only on with what alternative it is not for it is for but also upon with what alternative partners or, more trivially, that is merely a dispositional state is depends partners What partners or even prohibitive against. 6. NO DISPOSITIONAL STATE IS BOUND TO ITSMANIFESTATIONS INDEPENDENTLY OF ITS POSSIBLE DIFFERING RECIPROCAL DISPOSITION PARTNERS for mutual manifestation The concept of reciprocal disposition partnerhood a loosens the simplistic linguistic bondage of specific and unique disposi a for manifestation. and Instead, it allows that the tionality unique specific state with different reciprocal identical dispositional partners disposition can have different mutual manifestations. state will vary in the nature of its manifestation The same dispositional as it plays ifestations its role as reciprocal disposition partner in varying mutual man its varying reciprocal disposition partners. The differences with can be striking. the same) thrown Water thrown on burning wood and water (identically on oil burning on water has strikingly different mutual manifestations because of the difference between the reciprocal disposition partners in the

on water. In wood sealing it from steam and otherwise wood, and (b) generating to advance that is required for the combustion absorbing fires, water acts as of wood, by (a) effectively covering up the microstructure the oxygen needed to advance the combustion through the and the oil burning burning wood an extinguisher the thermal energy In the case the wood. through (a) does not seal the oil from the air, but rather sinks underneath the oil, but (b) does absorb some of the combustive thermal water steam if the its however reaches will energyboiling point, quickly of an oil fire, water rise through the oil with such kinetic energy that it impels oil particles into the aggregate the air, thus radically exposure of carbohydrates increasing to the oxygen, which radically increases the rate of combustion (which can in turn increase the quantity of steam generated, thus creating an explosive feedback of the loop). This effect is obviously positive just the opposite reduction of carbohydrate in the wood case. The shared exposure to oxygen to water's is the absorb thermal energy, to the point disposition tendency one case steam. In steam the the fire while in of creating helps extinguish the other it exacerbates two radically different The manifestation neuronal pre-synaptic according one disposition different reciprocal the fire. Thus ways given subsequent membrane to neurotransmitter manifests partners. release in itself from the can be excitatory, inhibitory, or neutral nature of the receptor sites in the post to the dispositional The receptor sites may allow entrance of calcium or they may be masked ions (inhibitory), (neu as well. The capacity state exists within these categories from the pre-synaptic membrane remain, of course, exact membrane. synaptic ions (excitatory), tral). Variation of the synapses chloride identical dispositionalities. ly the same with the difference in their reciprocal disposition post-synaptic cells) allowing This becomes particularly differences obvious The only difference partners (the receptors in their mutual manifestations. inmental cases. A can have antagonistic it or block it. reciprocal in in the smiling can be a mutual manifes reciprocal partner for very different and indeed opposite tations according to which of its alternative reciprocal disposition are present and involved. A disposition even extinguish lies disposition partners partners that 7. MANIFESTATIONS ARE DISPOSITIONAL TOO In thinking of how to give an account of dispositions, it could be tempting to treat manifestations raise the question Salt manifesting as themselves or at least not to disposition-free, of their dispositionality. This would be a gross error. its solubility in water by the manifestation of dissolving

can be such only if the salt in solution is recoverable. Whatever is involved event not in in the manifestation pure act, that is, manifesting itself is of which everything One cannot hope it is capable. for disposition-free It becomes obvious and far more numerous manifestations. that dispositionalities are prior to and more basic that is causes than their mutual manifestations, A particular kind of cause and effect may not exist though the do exist but a kind of cause and effect can't exist if dispositions and effects. relevant the relevant dispositions cause and effect require do not exist. So ontological priority to be explained in terms of reciprocal and not vice versa. manifestation and candor disposition partners in their mutual state should be seen in depth as the A manifestation of a dispositional at the time, rather than looking to a temporal iceberg tip of the disposition spread of apparent manifestations leads to the concept of Correlativity and dispositions Manifestations purposes. perhaps for epistemic of Disposition and Manifestation. are correlative. A manifestation This iswhat a relevantly it is only ?sfrom deep enough and broad enough Disposition Base Array iswhat it is only asfor kinds of Base Array, and a Disposition alternative manifestations under alternative kinds of conditions. 8. DISPOSITIONAL DEPTH infatuated lover thinks he hears his lover say, "I believe she will come" and he instantly leaps to agree, saying, "Oh yes, I think she will come". The lover cooly replies, "I said, I didn't think she will come" and the infatuated "Oh yes, yes, Imean, lover sputters (all of this, as itwere, with sincerity), An Imeant that she won't come". One may say that the manifestation base. strong enough disposition 9. does not come from a deep enough, DISPOSITIONAL BREADTH A child is being taught the ten times table and is told that 10 x 2 = 20. nature and instantly learns child is bright and of a strong, determined = 20" under to at least say, "10x2 He has the saying of conditions. many The it from a deep disposition base. However, it lacks breadth. The child does like another child arithmetic, who, when asked what 2 + 2 any even 2 "I know what makes". don't So, with the first child replies, not know makes, one may say the disposition base has depth but lacks breadth.

case. How are we to think best help to consider a non-mental sense to last, of the bridge's in the about the soundness, of being made a truck crosses it? Is it just that the bridge bears the standing up when It will it? Or of the truck crossing stress, without deformation, are many different kinds of events is needed interrelated is it that what to the one in over in which the bridge, time, inmany ways bears stress without question deformation? That cannot be so.We know that the one occasion of bearing the stress need is not enough simply stress-resistant those other the stress on the one occasion in itself and yet we also know that it doesn't events actually to occur for the bearing of to be that of doing so soundly in the sense and that about the bridge on the occasion, required. It should be something halo of the counter-to-the-facts-fact should not be the Rylean disposition about the bridge. We as amanifestation of standing up soundly on that occasion in the stability of the bridge as embodied are able to think of the bridge's of the soundness its sub-structures (with nothing rather than divine or in for untimely deterioration or the purely accidental built interference etc.), wind-carried up of a happenchance piece of gravel, etc. The of the bridge can, then, in terms of its actual disposition base, a a 1 if in /10 of second be there for quite understandably, only hydrogen full bomb blows up the bridge. More might be needed epistemically, but that breakage, proppings soundness is irrelevant. Michael Dummett (1979) gives of a capacity, example This is a poor case because an ill-chosen that of "Good at learning foreign languages". it is tied to performance. The case should be "capable of learning foreign which could be said of those who in fact never get around languages easily", to learning a foreign suggests, language language but their facility with their first and only or wrongly, the further capacity for acquiring rightly foreign languages. If attention is focused mental or non-mental) the richness (whether only on the manifestation or even on a number of manifestations, of directedness the case is to provide that has occurred, then atten we know we can't find what we and selectedness tion is focused in the wrong place, where are looking for. This is reinforced by the unfortunate tional or occurrent" applied to propositional attitudes disjunction "disposi such as believing and a thought, of the that in the occurrence desiring, etc., that suggests a or or or an of word sounding visualizing having the making inscription or saying in one's head, "Oh, dear me, yes" (fill in the "Aha!" experience occurrence relevant aboutingness the whole any way you like), somehow having is there. Yet, whatever occurs "expressive being possible potential" or with a different aboutingness or even none at all. Everybody knows is consistent

that, but the implications must be faced and an explanation if it is not and cannot be there, then you should not make given. Namely, a problem or a is it? On the particular occasion it there! Then where of not finding mystery what else is there? It has been shown to be in the depth and breadth of the actual case base from which disposition is non-mental the manifestation comes, whether the or mental, and in the correlativity of manifestation/row in the actual disposition and disposition for. The richness consists being for din indefinite number of (but not just any) alternative manifestations with alternative consists partners and its specificity reciprocal disposition in what the disposition is not for or may even prohibit. 10. DISTINCTION BETWEEN NOT HAVING A DISPOSITION FOR SOMETHING AND HAVING A PROHIBITIVE DISPOSITION AGAINST IT or Readiness Potential, mental or non-mentdX, simple or an infinity, within of alternative manifestations with limits, an infinity, within of alternative limits, partners reciprocal disposition actual and ?ow-actual, The present and absent and even never-existing. Any disposition isfor complex, are set by the still greater infinity of manifestations as well as the manifestations itprohibits. This limits of directedness is not for the disposition is the ontology of the specificity of dispositionality. can be drawn between: A difference (A) not having (B) having a disposition for manifesting x and The a disposition is essential distinction for prohibiting to understanding x. the constraints and limits of the infinities. This difference is one between (A') a state or entity simply not having a disposition for a particular kind of manifestation, there is about the state or though nothing that would alteration for its addition entity require (B') a state having and kind a disposition of manifestation that is prohibitive against a particular such that itwould for require alteration the addition of the disposition that is prohibited. An example would be of a square peg that is disposed to prohibit fitting in the way a round peg would in a round hole.

see should One than some other that the dispositionality other set of manifestations for or even prohibitive for a set of manifestations is in virtue of what it is not This against manifesting. the limits of the infinities of directivenesses setting the disposition whether psychological, and even whether is the basic ontology and selectivenesses for of states are psychological or non are or they systemic non-systemic (e.g., the dispositional elementary particles). between manifestation Seeing the richness of correlativity one can how understand tion, thought can be an indivisible and disposi unity though The manifestation expressed. fragment gets its fullness of base import by being of a deep enough, broad enough, relevant disposition an That for is of with alternative manifestations alternative array. infinity - an limits. partners infinity within disposition only partially It can be seen just how the disjunction Occurrent or Dispositional Belief and superficial. What is occurrent is some manifestation fragment is clumsy that can have the richnesses the specificity and richness of its import only by being from of the disposition base array of which it is the manifestation. 11. NON-MENTAL DISPOSITIONS AND THEIR KINDS OF DIRECTEDNESS are directive and selective, that is, they are dispositions dispositions to some and of kinds rather than others, and, so they are, whether for things or nature in their mental, directive, projective, discriminatory very physical readinesses for and to what is external to themselves (Martin and Pfeifer Causal 1986). can befar what may never exist ? the fit of a The disposition particular lock for a non-existent soluble in a solvent that does key or a substance not exist in nature and whose manufacture is simply too expensive and so never gets made, and, finally, there may be some fundamental particles irreducibly different in kind from one another that are disposed for reactions to one another but fail to ever manifest separateness. space-time A non-mental dispositional such reactions because of cosmic state needs, just as much as does a mental in terms of that to which the state is directed, state, to be characterized which may or may not be present or even exist. Just as a belief needs content, namely, what would follow the "that" in "belief that ..." so a disposition needs a what-for, namely, what would follow the "for" in "disposition for ... ", e.g., "disposition for dissolving inH2O" (and not aqua regia or xyz).

state may be directive (as well as mental) dispositional a to in reference that is indeterminate individual or in a particular A non-mental in a way in reference. that is determinate (to &particular individual) and capacities for A particular hen has or has not a set of dispositions an and the hen have furthermore, may egg (not any particular egg) laying a set of dispositions for laying a particular and capacities egg provided way by the causal context (e.g., the one egg that has actually begun to form). enter where the direct Externalism (and "broad content") may unarguably in the edness is to a particular context, entity, uniquely provided physical rather than to just anything to be of a particular that happens kind. or having a belief for that matter) (or kindness, understanding in the and "fully", at &particular time, head, without Holding can be "holistically" as well as soundness magic, can be namely as an actual disposition-state at the time or ever. manifestations in the bridge array that may at a particular or may time, not have actual of a disposition-manifestation is such that for some a come must it from a relevant thing to be particular kind of manifestation to be a base, and for something deep enough, broad enough disposition must it of base alternative kinds manifestations. befar typifying disposition The correlativeness Nature comes in package set of manifestations will The dispositionality for a deals, or power-nets. also be not for or prohibitive against an infinite Recall that this is how ontological limits are set upon the infinities of directivenesses and selectivenesses intrinsic to each dispositional It should also be state, whether simple or complex. are states in their own right. that manifestations remembered dispositional number of other manifestations. or Readiness So dispositions and not for and even prohibitive a limited directive exist embodying for programs an of manifestations under against infinity as above. This account of the dispositional scope as described readinesses and selective the disposition with the Correlativeness is such that the manifestation and manifestation base much. it isfrom Every disposition far the richness How modalities Potentials is in this way of and rule-following further explanation With externalism or of. It is natural such a holistic a model "carries" of disposition the richness of that so little can carry so web. can go in mathematics in its use to explain Saul Kripke) needs help to see (contra (Martin and Heil, forthcoming). running riot in semantic circles, it should that even in the simplest form of directedness, through the dispositionality of the the simplest non-mental property simplest non-psychological can be internalist and narrow. Projectability to any entity, the directedness of of-a-kind-x-that-may-come-along states and obviously dispositional is satisfied within does not require the entity itself by its that the dispositional

anything x-like as their "typical cause". Indeed, with any reciprocal nothing x-like may even exist. But that is how it goes are in the observer or in the whether dispositionalities partner disposition as well as is intrinsic to non-mental This directedness the environment. states have themselves dispositions It would to outside. narrow be outlandish and selectiveness the directedness in kind. similar function. An externalist or broad for the to inside, is also readily available states toward an individual rather than just In such a case the individual x must be in an account, going from outside of a dispositional directedness to anything narrow, to outside inside and internalist that is, it goes from inside to go against nature itself and deprive of such a natural of mental dispositions it is clearly and mental thing of the kind x that can partner) of the (reciprocal disposition such that it is the only network actual causal serve as a manifestation condition states. dispositional In the concepts a way ifestation" of "reciprocal disposition partners" and "mutual man content can be seen to bridge the narrow content-broad environment gap. The physical to be reciprocal be considered of perception. ifestation The and the individual human mind should for the mutual man partners disposition reaching out comes from both sides of the in their mutual manifestation. partnership The externalist and the internalist both miss to the mutual to go) manifestation the point. The directedness of perception is found in each (ready state of a perceiver or state of the environment partner whether disposition even if the other does not exist! And both are needed for the actualization of the perception that is their mutual manifestation. and selectiveness It is clear that forms of directedness non-psychological level. psychological more is needed to make Given actuality a purely are free and should not be asked for all over again It will, of course, need further work to discover nature the directedness and selectiveness gifts of at the what mental. a realist view of dispositions as fully actual even without the or their reciprocal disposition of their manifestations partners, account of properties has a degree of plausibility. dispositional This plausibility is enhanced by the impossibility of characterizing any that is, as existing without any implications qualitative, I shall argue, however, that in the end, it is equally to characterize any property as purely dispositional. property as purely of dispositionality. implausible 12. PROPERTIES ARE NOT ONLY DISPOSITIONAL Sydney Shoemaker (1981), James Fetzer (1981) andHugh Mellor (1974, 1991) have been recent proponents of the claim that a property is identi

its causal cal with Take powers. for example the following from passage Shoemaker (1981, p. 332): Suppose, however, that all of their causal powers and potentialities, all of their dispositions to influence other things or be influenced by other things, were exactly the same. Then, I they would suggest, in the narrow their properties all of share sense, all of the "intrinsic" properties. Likewise, when I say that the loss by my pencil of the property of being fifty miles south of a burning barn, or the property of being such thatGerald Ford is President, a real is not the cash change, value of this is that the or acquisition loss of these so called properties does not in itself make any difference to the causal powers of a thing. This a view suggests about intrinsic what properties, properties in the narrow sense, are. According to this view, what constitutes the identity of such a property, what makes it the particular property it is, is its potential for contributing to the causal powers of the things we could indicate all of theways inwhich the having of this property that have it_If could contribute to the causal powers of things, we would have said all there is to say about the nature intrinsic this property. of Shoemaker's Before evaluating let us consider erties, statement Such, at any rate, is my suggestion. account of prop dispositional point. A lack of candour beset the purely a more general the great reductive such as phenome ontologies also The used and and behaviorism, nalism, operationalism. vocabulary a clear view of their ontological these theories discouraged in presenting of commitments. or logical some of I am not entailment trying accounts. to push these views I am perfectly and then just add "etc." Then vocabulary for consideration. got away with: (a) Phenomenalism x in the next room": For "There is an happy the doctrines into giving translation if they scrub up their will at least be ready tend to look x to me if were in good working order and I were to go into my sensory capacities the next room and view in the direction ofx etc." The italicized part of the "It would is not expressed in terms of the basic terms of the ontology. When ? to do so and to scrub the vocabulary is made clean attempt ? the putative analysis in purely phenomenal terms that is, to reformulate its anti-intuitiveness becomes apparent. sentence the candid got away with: (b) Behaviourism am For "I imagery having mental of as played by Glenn as if hearing Glenn Gould play 'Greensleeves', if I thought the occasion called for it, that itwas as or, by saying sincerely, etc." if Glenn Gould were playing 'Greensleeves', Gould": "I would 'Greensleeves' behave in terms of the the italicized part of the sentence is not expressed Again, and basic items of the ontology. "Hearing", "sincerity", "thought" are not terms. When the candid attempt ismade to scrub the vocabulary behaviour clean, the anti-intuitiveness of the view becomes apparent.

view that very same holds true of the Shoemaker-Mellor?Fetzer is exhausted in their dispositionalities. is intrinsic to properties all which The (c) The Dispositionalist For "x and y are equal the same containers gets away with: tofit or not fit into in length", "x and y are disposed in the same way ignoring their width and weight, etc." and Behaviourism. story is no different than it is for Phenomenalism and The need is to couch all of the vocabulary in terms of dispositionalities The only dispositionalities. Let us demand maximum are treated as only that up front. Explicitness is necessary but particularly in the domain of the mental candour here. If properties let us have capacities/dispositions, in all ontological domains, of the ambiguity of terms such as "behaviour" where sensory stated explicitly, the feedback may be implicit. When (therefore, sentient) because Shoemaker?Mellor view is revealed to have of a the anti-intuitiveness are for (namely, of all the properties of whatever the dispositions on this to just further dispositions themselves. What, reduction the manifestations) view, is introspected as the very quality of thefeel of the feeling of a kind Indeed, what, on this view, is the account of the (non-number) of quality length as directional spread seen or felt of a form of extension? Your knowledge of the existence of physical x or mental y has to involve of pain? the causal set of dispositions y. That set of dispositions that belief. This, however, content of x and y to affect your belief that x or that on that occasion is specifically for operative does not establish that the (contra Shoemaker) or more know is set believe than the of causal you nothing or functions that make you or would make you believe x or y. of what dispositions believe that all that appears to be qualitatively intrinsic Dispositionalists to things just reduces to capacities/dispositions for the formation of other for the formation of other capacities/dispositions for capacities/dispositions the formation of-And, of course, the manifestations of any disposition can only be further dispositions for_This image appears absurd even if one is a realist about capacities/dispositions. note It is like a promissory that may be actual enough but if it is for only another promissory note which is ..., that is entirely too promissory. The dream of either a purely qualitative, or a purely non-dispositional account of is No dispositional properties philosophical property is fantasy. in "pure act", free of all unfulfilled potency unless it is a property no the number 2). And is only its capacity (or perhaps property production It is my of further capacities for_ that the suggestion properties any state of affairs must be qualitative of entities as well of God for the that are constitutive as dispositional, and dispo

sitional as qualitative. They are correlative (Locke), complemental, in their intrinsic and and covariant when they are displayed as well inseparable, irreducible form at the level of the "finer interstices". What has been (misleadingly) called "The Limit View" (Martin 1994, treats any p. 519) purely qualitative and dispositional, cannot not as a two-part compound of the and non-dispositional and of the purely non-qualitative but as a two-sided dispositional-qualitative coin. These intrinsic property as fully as unrealizable be abstracted be considered distinct and separable elements, but must limits for different ways of being the same and is not to the point. The dispositional unitary property. Supervenience are equally basic and irreducible; the qualitative one being basic in a property and the other being The above characterization too suggestive in equiangular of a mixture. there is no direction for "supervenient". in terms of "different ways of being" is still It is even more than necessary covariance (as and equilateral). For any property that is intrinsic and irre are one and the same is qualitative and what is dispositional ducible, what property viewed property is directive as what that property exhibits of its nature and what that and selective for as itsmanifestations. These cannot be prised apart into the purely qualitative in the qualitative is exhibited informs of the dispositional, and what and determines is exhibited what and the purely and determines is the forness What dispositional. what is the forness of the dispositional in the qualitative. There informs is no direction or dependence. There is no reduction of one to the other. The only way that this can be expressed is by claiming that the qualita are one tive and dispositional identical with another and with the unitary of priority intrinsic property itself. This is perhaps that different representations it happens a surprising identity, but frequently turn out to one's surprise to be of the identical entity. claimed identity may be easier to see once one understands clearly that it is not a matter of one aspect being non-relational (the qualitative) and the other aspect being relational This is because (the dispositional). This is not a relation between what dispositionality It is not a relation because is its manifestation. exist and be "ready to go" with is dispositional and what can fully of the manifestation the dispositional the total non-existence and the reciprocal disposition Their partners needed for the manifestation. or absence does not affect the readiness of the dispositional non-existence state such that itwould What is qualitative like a two-sided have to alter in order to have and what its manifestations. is dispositional coin or a Janus-faced figure for any property is less than it is like an ambiguous drawing. A particular drawing, remaining unitary seen and considered one way as a goblet-drawing and unchanged, and differently may be consid

it is a two-faces-staring-at-one-another-drawing. are not distinguishable parts or components ered, faces The goblet and the or even aspects of the the one without considering, drawing, although we can easily consider or even knowing The the other. is identical with the of, goblet-drawing two-faces drawing. Itmight be thought, however, that something could exist in a qualitative state. Perhaps we may be able to think of state but in no dispositional is inert and unchanging, but that is different from that totally something A thing or property that is intrinsically any dispositionality. being without incapable of affecting or being affected by anything else actual or possible a case of inertness: is not merely about what clear Getting of what question their qualitativity empirical including physical domain cal domain. (which it amounts to no-thing. are determines the scope of the in particular there are or may be, properties as well as their dispositionality, in either the properties includes "theoretical" entities) or the psychologi 13. DISPOSITIONS AND QUANTUM THEORY one can speak of measures. Instead of measuring operations or observations been interpreted as encoding measure Quantum theory has commonly ment and the unreducible predictions, as unreducible of affairs" understood ed in measurement predictions. This indeterminacy probabilities interpretation imposes an essential in the theory. The choice described of quantum events mind-dependence to interpret the wave function is whether Arthur Fine has shown of measurement referring to the wave laconic as a physical continuant at all. vacillation in Schr?dinger's inter as between predictions as a function real continuant. pretation Schr?dinger's a fascinating letter of 13 July of quantum "states (less than unity) stat to and not referring Fine (1986) describes 1935 to Einstein: Schr?dinger then proceeds to set out briefly what he thinks is going on; namely, that the classical physical model has in fact been abandoned but that instead of replacing it with another, one has simply declared all of its determinables to be exactly measurable in principle and in addition prescribed with wise, philosophical expressions that these measurements does not trouble are the only real things, us at all that our claims which is, of course, about the model metaphysics. are monstrous. Then in fact In such a mood in which he attempt (very different from the mood ed interpretations in terms of wavelength models), Schr?dinger rejects all a to model. Even the model of and intermittent attempts sparse provide measurement events as the only "real" posits is described dismissively

him as "metaphysical". ically hungry between. This vacillation philosophers, whether few crumbs for ontolog provides or something in realist, anti-realist, and the tendency to deprive properties The drive to Pythagoreanism their nature may take the form of limiting basic physical descriptions claims concerning statistical or probabilistic purported states. of to Einstein (1949) stated this doctrine clearly, thoughwith the strongest disapproval: They [Born, Pauli, Heitler, Bohr, andMargenau] are all firmly convinced that the riddle of nature the double of all corpuscles and undulatory (corpuscular has character) in essence found its final solution in the statistical quantum theory. On the strength of the successes of this theory they consider it proved that a theoretically complete description of a system can, in essence, involve only statistical assertions concerning the measurable of quantities this system. is taken seriously, and if this is not to be a Pythagore of pure "probabilifying then it is an ontology anism of pure numbers, ? or in embedded bundles facts somehow nesses" probability probability Ifwhat is claimed space-time. if it is not Pythagorean, The ontology of such probabilifyingnesses, may or as equivalent to primitive dispositionalities, be expressed propensities, potentials. a specific A probabilifyingness manifestation-directed so there may is more like a propensity disposition. Propensities of a certain degree be a propensity than it is like can admit of for outcome A degree; and of a certain degree for outcome B. wave that take Schr?dinger's Let us consider interpretations as a state that grounds or is the truth-maker for the measurement tions and probability statements concerning that its "theoretically complete description measurement ... involve[s] function outcomes only predic such statistical assertions". an interpretation of quantum as of affairs" probability-less-than-unity Such theory represents quantum "states states that ground measurement of a state of On such an interpretation, the full characterization predictions. it excludes affairs is just in terms of unreducible any further probabilities; terms A not of that itself in be could expressed complement probabilities. is that of full characterization in terms of tendencies parallel interpretation tendencies. of a state of affairs just in terms of unreducible bundles or states is of probability facts or even probability Speaking an terms in of of alternative pure but unspecified way merely speaking it is claimed of their onto tendencies. This becomes most apparent when logical status that they are not reducible to and need not have or be based on a ration of actual relevant occurrences. What other than tendencies could be

frequencies? with non-occurrent ground for such cases of probabilities no for mathematization The opportunities doubt affords this metaphysics an added the ontological respectability. states of affairs only in terms of unreducible Characterizing proba status that is not Pythagorean, is then, if it has an ontological bilities, a or to terms in characterization of unreducible tendency just equivalent The probability for a particular propensity properties. satisfied or actualized outcome (less than 1) or the tendency can be state of affairs in the absence of the is for or the propensity the probability is to. in a higher order account of irreducible disjunctivity a as a primitive rests in probabilifying "linking" or "connecting" probability above relation between universals pure "happening", (Armstrong, 1983) The irreducible in a way that is far from it does no work results. Even clear. Even for the production a view that admits such disjunctive allowing "linking", of the particular disjunct that actually or propensities has tendencies primitive taking us up and not the similar of being a metaphysical about indeterminacy -1 am pointing out complaint It is like a nomination for a disjunction procedure problem to the very production This is not a naive irresolubly disjunctive of the specific result itself. gap. of candidates, but it does not decide among them. Were it to elect one or itwould decide for one rather than another, and thus candidate, disjunct them. If there is not such a selection be determinate between of one disjunct not an election rather than another success between then there is of a disjunct at all. The explanation of the or production of a disjunct, short of magic, would or a production of a candidate be incomplete, and the links in this disjunctive the result but only to a pre-result determination an account or production the candidates of disjunctivity that could linkage would not take us to of disjunctivities. We need take us to the result. This is no more than a graphic in current models collapse in terms of a primitive of what is anti-intuitive presentation of the wave function. Perhaps an account flutter" would help. "disposition A disposition flutter would be an ontologically into the basic and rather than something primitive oscillator of the built irreducible of the elementary itself properties particle fixed by hidden conditions outside the particle and its intrinsic properties. Each flut of the flutter (oscillation) of the dispositions intrinsic to the properties an irreducible of the particle, however ontic ground for the manifestation would be unpredictable, of a determinate result. a disposition Thus conceived, flutter is intrinsic to irreducible properties of an elementary There is no need to look to hidden factors particle. to the basic properties extrinsic of the particle itself, just as the rate of

as intrinsic to the nature of an been represented "decay" has sometimes not to atom and be explained by extrinsic and hidden causes or variables. The intrinsic disposition flutter itself is not a mutual manifestation of partners though the particular flut of a disposition disposition reciprocal flutter may, with its reciprocal partners, have a mutual manifestation. The disposition flutter may occur too quickly to measure, thus appear ing to be random or non-determinate. Or, the impression irregular giving intrinsically the disposition flutter may be of non-determinateness. If a disposition flutter is intrinsic, it is like other irreducible intrinsic or aspects of spatio-temporal for elementary and basic particles one for field theory): their presence segments (if exchanges particle theory factors in terms of anything is not to be explained this sort provides maximum determinacy. and nature that relations account in causal situations of PYTHAGOREANISM 14. It appears else. An between properties involved or contingent. An example of necessary relations between is how a round peg does not fail to fit into a round hole the way a square peg does. A seeming of contingent relations example in a causal situation is that obtaining between between distinct properties the freezing of water and the expansion of water. may be necessary distinct properties of contingency Examples consonant and with gestion in causal situations, Locke's sug following exam the Limit View, may be only "seeming" ever do, to what constitutes macroscopic entities ples. When we get, if we we get down to a specificity of how the work the fittings within the "finer interstices" amongst gets done. As we move cor and the "insensible of contingency the appearance may disappear. are suited to the mathematicizations of quantities puscles", measures its accruing And necessities. the relations within the most It is there that the of nature with intimate parts of nature get their expression (and it is tempting to think theirfull expression) and mathematical in terms of algorithms Let there be a warning: "This way see that physics eration" qua has tended to be, formulae. lies Pythagoreanism". in Locke's We should a "partial consid phrase, a denial of quantities and not let it become of the properties for and of which the quantities have a the measures and expungement measure. of things at the macroscopic and molecular The properties levels are of of their of constituents in all their interre complexes simpler properties and interreactivenesses. The tendency toward Pythagoreanism latednesses increases as the posited constituents, and their changes, are further and

from direct observation. further removed assessed the quantities ticle physics, from the observable projected and by the direction derived At the level of the entities of par are and change potentials and measuring devices, mathematical These models. for changes of objects changes from available quantities do service for what is required for mathematizations which the theory is to be ultimately expressed. in terms of are The properties that the quantities of changes and change potentials are not be explicitly not terms but in considered denied, except of may of their numerical nature. From a Pythagorean point of view, quantities are nested or grouped uniquely of projected change and change potentials as intrinsic to, and typifying of, the numerical nature of some theoretical like of rather and mathematical formulae number-packets algorithms entity, and change potentials stand for over and above pure quantity can be disregarded in the "partial consideration" qua the numbers formed by the mathematicization of projected quantities of in space-time. changes of which What the changes This non-regard of the properties and change potentials. in terms occur and change potentials stand, can, if it turned into changes or perhaps the propertyless become Pythagoreanism therenesses a denial, of the simple atoms of extreme atomism. We have been led by Quine and by others to think that necessity and are one, that there is no distinction in reality between them. contingency There was a comic strip inwhich one character says to the other, "Marriage two people become one". In the next panel, the second character is where the statement. In the final panel, the second character considering asks, "Which one?" answer seemed to be, "All is contingent". But then, in "Whither Quine's is clearly (1976), he took the step from the need for the existence Physical Objects?" measure of numbers for quantities) for physics, with an invocation of (the the Principle of the Identity of Empirically Isomorphic Theories (a very fancy term for the verificationism all is number, that is, numbers Quine never rejected), to Pythagoreanism and their relations the mathematicization of space and time: Carnap was propounding such a Koordinatensprache already in 1934 [Logische Syntax der Sprache, pp. 11, 40], and not because of constraints on the notion of physical object from the side of physics; for the scheme has also a certain other mathematical are wanted in physics anyway, intrinsic appeal. Numbers so one may as well enjoy convenience for physical objects; and having objects as coordinates then, come thus far, one and their can economize a little by dispensing with the physical objects_As physicalists we have ? welcomed bodies with open arms On the other hand themathematical objects attained the ontological scene only begrudgedly for services rendered_It is ironical, then, that we at length find ourselves constrained to this anti-physical sort of reduction from the side of physics itself. It is this I have wanted to bring out.

objects, Physical next, evaporated into space-time but regions; this was the outcome of physics itself. Finally the regions went over into pure sets; still, the set theory itself was there for no other reason than the need as an adjunct for mathematics to physical theory. answer to the question, "Which one?" might that, the Quinean is "All better be, necessary". which results in a world of pure number This unfettered deontologizing seems as clear a reductio as in philosophy. There are two hoary alternative After on the road back from detours anism. Reversing sures and Measure direction Potentials further back Once abstraction back from is just old fashioned to the Measurer's again. Moving Measurers' possible measure-observations all over again. Subjectivism as well of Pythagore to the Mea the Quantities the unworldly to move Operationalism measure-observations all over and is just Idealism-Phenomenalism we recognize that the properties of nature require the qualitative we can see that there is no alternative remaining as the dispositional, for the road back from Pythagoreanism but to ask, "What are the physical qualia (that is, qualities)?" inconsistent with the conservation of is not to ask for anything or meant to The is indi of the laws energy thermodynamics. only question cate that mathematizations in physical theory are partial characterizations This and at work: to make the need for qualities explicit or measurable. by something not measured Prop of and dispositional erties (including both qualitative aspects) elementary these properties may turn out to particles or segments of fields, whatever be, are what change and have typical change potentials whose measures of what is changing is not to add more work are ascribed and given quantities. These properties have been tacitly there as they needed to be. We should see physics as a partial consideration qua projected quantities and not as the expungement of prop of changes and change potentials, all along and dispositions there are those for which their qualities including What the and amongst the simpler properties change potentials. quantities erties "insensible the macroscopic that constitute properties corpuscles" sentient or non-sentient, may be a great surprise. are, whether The qualities extent of shape and size are intrinsic that have of the entities of the "shell" and provide them. These really the form and qualities are space-fillings noted by Berkeley andHume and Blackburn (1990), in that they are needed as intrinsic to what has size and shape and are to what the limits. They are needed of size and shape are the extensional properties for what is changing or different in virtue of which all of the quantities

of ultimate constituents such changes and differences are assessed. aspects of fields or super-strings) should not be the ontologically qualities that for many have come to be thought qualities needed These secondary the status of the question aside leaving primary qualities, to affect observers. we consider the need in the finest interstices of nature, When (whether particles, questionable of in terms of of their powers even (that is, qualities), and unknown, among largely unregarded (qualities) required for the sensing and for physical qualia the qualia belong the feeling parts of physical nature. But first things first. Let us appreciate need for physical qualia (qualities) and make sure we do not leave out any that are needed. them should An in terms of a purely qualities for potential alternative its dispositionality account of neuronal function with directional vector trajectories would like the on-the-go American a pure dispositionalism something Driver. Every arrival point is seen only as a point Sunday nature of what is present at any point and the qualitative embody for departure, in the driver's is of no interest. The qualitative nature of what occupies the place progress is spelled out in terms only of its actual and potential trajectories from to other and its actual and potential trajectories places. The qualitative is in turn spelled out in terms only of nature of what is at those places ... etc. This vectorial mathematizes well, but one needs a model approach vectors and single directional (for connectivities) explicitly incorporating of what are connecting) with cell groups (for the properties to the other. research emphases of each made necessary It is almost to place neural for functionalist inevitable exclusive network. driven the neuronal the different researchers and theorists interconnections within emphasis upon This is the road to Pythagoreanism the of the brain. Against this is a useful corrective by Getting (1989, p. 187): of connectivity is essential, network the upon knowledge operation depends et interaction" al. and network, (Selverston 1983) among multiple "cooperative synaptic, are inherently No of which cellular properties, non-linear. many longer can neural networks Although be viewed as the interconnection of many like elements by simple excitatory or inhibitory Neurons synapses. intrinsic properties are not only sum that allow them not just excitatory of a neural operation a diverse set of with synaptic inputs but are endowed to generate Likewise synapses complex activity patterns. or inhibitory an equally set of properties. but possess diverse The as the parallel must or network be considered of neurons action classes of neurons, each with potentially different input/output relationships and intrinsic capabilities The interconnected task by synapses is to discover chological potentials have been those a host of complex properties. in psy quality-disposition properties, for which and domains, changes change quantities. At the most basic level of elemen or non-psychological given with

this task needs not only the discipline of physics and what tary particles nose a "a for reality", but also called Bertrand Russell great deal of luck. ? I am not suggesting This is no threat to the laws of thermodynamics the addition of "an excess and evident to the mind what the work of work from nowhere", but of making salient to the properties in virtue of which is intrinsic taking note of what is needed to make natural not be expressed only in terms of further and other mathematical however these may essential formulae, is done. It is simply "whole". properties algorithms be for the depiction This will of the intrinsic character of the "finer of interstices nature". is, then, a physical qualia-qualities problem, if any, arises for mental qualia-qualities. There problem, aside what leaving 15. Emergence If thewhole is complex (see Section 2), let us try to talk and think about the simpler we constituents and their relationships it as well that constitute as can. If the shape of a cloud is hazy and not sharp-edged, in the middle less and less dense at the periphery enough project degrees of density of elementary particle or ... ) in a spatial-temporal fields or superstrings it is still dense so that one can (or aspects of populations and with region varying the shape of the cloud. As Russell degrees of stability to constitute always are never wholes saw, and before him, Locke, observable physical sharp edged because of the penumbra of what Locke called "fleeting particles". is constituted So, also the "sharp-edged" shape and size of a footruler a of elementary remainder of without density-cloud particle populations, etc. Reassuringly, this density-cloud has extensional and consti properties tutes the extensionality of the macroscopic whole. or The reduction. extensional emergence properties So this is not a case of of the whole are found in the density The seemed We of being of elementary particles. populations is a clear case of ontological of fluidity reduction to be simple (fluidity) to the smoothly tumbling molecules. case stop looking for cases of emergent properties to another level say, from the micro-physical should from of what one level to the macro or from the macro-physical to the micro-physical because surely physical, are not really anything in virtue of being complex, the macro properties over and above complexes The causal work of simpler micro properties. of the micro should not get done twice over at the level of the relationships over macro at level of and then the the that all again properties properties in these of micro properties. relationships only consist

to think in terms of cases of emergent properties is at subse or same level (uni-level emergence segments at the quent stages space-time rather than multi-level is the only and basic level which also emergence) The place such that the question to some of reduction still more basic level does not arise. It seems to demand at the elementary particle level of physics in particular concatenations intrinsic property produced of par that produced ticles must be in the concatenation it. Somewhere in the and of desert, perhaps, very special complex concatenations particles may excessive that every in the hope be produced of the occurrence ticipated of such specially of both anticipated and unan under the conditions only occur that would intrinsic properties complex elementary particle concatenations. Emergence, itwould appear, may occur at the most basic level of elementary particle a on The doctrine twist medieval that of all the (or it), physics. perfections in the effect must be found in the cause, does not seem (intrinsic properties) to be self-evidently true. The world would be not only dull, but absolutely not be a bad and evenly dull. So emergence may theoretical or explanatory thing. The emerging properties physical terms of general laws. This, thing, not even a bad can be encapsulated, with luck, in them no less ontologie ally of course, makes emergent. Emergence as we don't of properties, have idea, so long might appear to be a metaphysically magical at non-emergence. look carefully If there is no emergence then all simple and intrinsic properties of the effect would to be found in and extracted the cause. This from "pipeline" view of causality. On that account boring than it appears to be. I say "extracted from the cause" because to me to explain how the intrinsic properties in the cause-that a very though be able may that is the model in the effect is, they had to come from it somehow. The new-emergence peculiar, possibility. to suggest more intuitive The denial of emergence responsibility. that would need very careful defence whatsoever. degree of plausibility can be called the is a great deal more the world that occurs had to be found Extraction is one, metaphysicians That would be their alternatives. is a daring and development and exciting ontology in order to have any can all such as armies, social clubs or the year's weather Group wholes be treated compositionally. Predicates such as "winning the battle", "having a membership or too much rainfall" are not translated into rally" "having statements about the ultimate constituents to find entailments between such predicates these complexes and statements about and there should be no attempt embedded in statements about the ultimate constituents. What fully

and is the whole constitutes complex object, group, event, state, process, at any particular moment may vary at some other For example, in some cases there may be some inhibitory factors such inhibitory elements. that required other factors to overcome or relation property, occasion. to be complex wholes Considering numerous and connectivities relationships is external the simple constituents in their with one another and with what to them and their potential for these with accept (dispositions) and of properties, alterations replacements able subtractions, additions, it should be clear that if there is a sim (cf. Section 2 for details), then it is a simple property ple, emergent property ofthat complex whole the of the That is, it is ultimate constituents. amongst simple properties etc. only in the special of all of the constituents found and complex and interreactivities interrelations one to with another and whatever is external with their varying degrees of stability their potentialities that are just what the whole comes to or, if you like come down to. No them and together doubt, this simple interrelatednesses numerous have enormously emergent property would we never that discover. There may be a case of might that fit the non-pipeline view in theoretical physics. acquiring properties case of neutrino oscillation inwhich It is the still conjectural the neutrino muon and oscillates from three forms: (1) electron neutrino, neutrino, (2) of properties (3) tau neutrino. This suggests not just a new combination the neutrino already had, nor properties extracted from something else, but a new the neutrino of If that is rather the acquisition then so, property. by emergence! It does not count against a property or quality to say that it is emergent. correct. A non-emergence view of the world does not seem to be obviously That still leaves itwide open as to what 16. (a) Explanatory Different kinds properties emerge from what. REDUCTION Reduction are not "reducible" of explanations (that is, by entailment or translation) to one kind of explanation the items and happenings though in different kinds of explanations mentioned be that is, "reducible", may over and above) come down to (be nothing mentioned in that explanation. mentioned without One may in any kind of explanation that interest-circumscription are mind-dependent, the same items and happenings think of the occurrence in an interest-relative the explanation would of an event way such that not be what it But interest-relative. theory-laden, to objects or events and how they are themselves this applies or language-relative. It should constituted they are not interest-relative is. Explanations none

not take too much fact that the to see that this is just the obvious effort or could can figure in many different explanations there were simply no explainers. in none because or event same object have figured (b) Ontological Reduction Leaving aside irrelevant matter of supervenience, of whether something A the ontologically onto comes concerns the question some over isn't and above to, just consists in, anything the reduc work in such since Wisdom's John know, 1940s, logical reduction down to, reduces thing B. As we tion does not require or entailment translation relations between about A and B. It requires only the success of the disclaimer reduction: There are two criteria for a plausible statements "nothing over and above". (i) in order to be reduced is being reduced must be complex to its simpler constituents. Intuition is tricky because we can err What in our judgment of what is simple or what is complex. Beliefs seem obviously and desires the sensed aspect of a complex, specific pitch of an auditory input seems simple. The reducing constituents should intuitively fit the nature of (ii) what mere is being reduced. correlation, That however is, it can't be ad hoc and it can't be exact. The double helix had the right fit for the gene to the expert eye and have the right fit for fluidity. It is not evident tumbling molecules smoothly that neuronal firings have that same kind of right fit for the features of even for many expert eyes. This iswhy so many of the workers in experience to themselves back the of sentience. neuroscience keep coming "problem" "What else can it be, stupid?" or "You'll get used to the The arguments, idea" would not be considered If the qualities of the experiential to familiar reduction conclusive neuronal in other areas of science. are simple and are not evidently fit for they find their then unreduced properties, the elementary way as unreducible amongst properties particles or fields are unreduced or strings, or ... as the unreducible properties of extension of kinds of particles. in the degrees of varying density populations There is no flouting causes from nowhere. here of the laws of thermodynamics a matter of not leaving It is simply in by bringing out the intrinsic of what is involved in the work that is done. properties is whether The question the case of the properties of immediate experi as in the case of the properties ence is unreduced or reduced extension as in the case offluidity.

17. MENTAL CHAUVINISM to show how quantitative we are in our scientific I have attempted repre sentations of nature. Our reasonable demand for measurable experimental results in science may lead to the unreasonable titative of such results. interpretations of numbers Pythagoreanism into numbers. perhaps It was between shown in space-time to purely quan this tended toward a limitations seen how with space-time itself collapsing how different the simplest, Itwas most cannot meaningfully be thought of as emergence at the basic level of levels of being, but as uni-level ? irreducible uncomposable of nature the elements or aspects or strings or_At that level the dictum that the medieval legislation ? ? cause must of the effect in be found the the perfections pipeline view that would preclude the possibility of some intrinsic irreducible properties found in a concatenation that were explained of particles by but not also found in some other concatenation of particles, and there do seem to be elementary particles it seems an absurd cases of this within theoretical is not an absurdity, possibility can be normal of fields to endorse If that physics as with neutrino oscillations. then nature need not be a bore and emergence and have natural explanation and not be inexplicable and anachronistic mystique. Putting these results together shows how giving room for the qualitative nature of experience need not be more strange, difficult, mystery monger ing, or in defiance of the laws of nature than would be the giving room for nature of non-mental the qualitative entities that may have been physical overlooked in giving exclusive to their and perhaps priority quantitative character. dispositional How is the qualitative internal model fit for evolution? for external is a perfect The quality display It is the natural material for such projections. use (rather than inference). There can be sensory and sensory projective like griddings for percepts, dreaming, imagery, illusion, and hallucination with varying degrees of and changes of qualitative occupancy. The the feel of the feelings in our upsets and qualitative provides our can unease of at it such that delights, failure, feelings anticipation, be evoked inmemory of actively dealing with imagery for the continuance what it is used to represent. (A. Damasio 1994 provides a neurophysiolog of this.) It is also what is apt for savouringthe qualities of and the of the feel of experience qualities feelings, negative as well ical modelling sense as positive The ones. include argument has been that the nature of the physical world the mental) cannot be fully characterized in terms of only titative and/or powers (dispositions that get turned (that will the quan into probabilifications

but also requires the qualitative. And, itwas that tend to Pythagoreanism) behaviorism and operationalism, argued, like old forms of phenomenalism, itwas never spelled out in full their sparseness was attractive only because An explicit in a inclusion of the qualitative, whether candid explanations. more case or a non-mental not is "work" and there mental case, adding It is only explicitly the laws of thermodynamics. the fulfilling of the of character what has already requirements qualitative ontological The need for qualitative quantity and the work potential of dispositionality. fore flouting to be complete as a property in the physical world. to return to a function that is found in most, and probably is the need character I now want mental cortical systems. There may be a relatively simple all, mammalian answer to some perplexing to be found in the function. It should problems seen in in work how close to conscious detail (in be cortical progress) the non-conscious functioning to do in such detail essential autonomie is. This is system vegetative in order to be very clear about just what functions are lacking in these subtle and complex non-conscious systems. is that of internal signals. An internal signal The function Iwish to discuss is a signal generated within a central integrative control center primarily that center, that does not typically produce output to what is for use within outside that center. The internal signal is qualitatively similar to an external signal that has its cause outside to what is outside that center. This mention function is noteworthy the center and that typically produces output for its statement having to make explicit So the is an essential similarity. qualitative ingredi there is not and cannot be any specification However, of qualitative ent of this function. qualities are in fact similar. That is kind of open entity has such a function. I shall give a range of four instances of such a function: to me by R?diger Bittner, of case, mentioned (i) There is the beautiful internal and external mail. This is a case of what is either internally or in terms of the function itself of what to what left entirely being such that the internal and external mail (input) are The internal mail similar. is given internal input and output qualitatively use within the system. Whereas the external mail is given external input and output use outside the system. (ii) A chess computer registers (external signal) an opponent's move. A externally internally generated signal is used as a starting point in the game. This modelling includes internal possible moves uses moves external to the machine could resembling corresponding qualitatively for modelling uses caused similar and internal uses of internal signals which make, similar to possible (external signals) registrations could make. would be qualitatively of moves the opponent

(iii) There seem not to be any internal signals given only internal use similar to external signals of the very job-oriented that are qualitatively it with lesser or greater technical difficulty However, systems. vegetative to induce such a functional should be possible capacity. To the many steps in between (iv) intermediary bridge species, I want to make a very special place for the qualities of the internal signals and their uses of the mammalian higher and most primates, for the specially itself. human species Each of these four requires for internal function the qualitative of its own internal and external signals that it uses internally. But not be any qualitative similarity between any of the four. I shall be a mental and value and even similarity there need savour those sentient that make our internal and external signals similar simple and qualities ? or complex in the internal unreduced and reduced that are embedded function of the inner life of our minds. chauvinist NOTES * Iwish to thank John Heil, Hugh Mellor, and Dan Ryder for their help in discussion, criticism and constructive for suggestions this paper. Also, I wish to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Grant and the Fellows of St. John's College, Cambridge for theirgenerosity and hospitality from 1January to 31 June, 1995 ingiving me membership in the College and a very generous grant as a Visiting Scholar. For reprints, please write to the author at theDepartment of Philosophy, University of Calgary, 2500 University Drive NW, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, T2N 1N4. Fax 403.289.5698. REFERENCES Armstrong, London. D. M., Armstrong, D. M.: 1989, Universals: D. M.: 1983, What C. B. Martin, and U. T. Place: A Debate, 1996, Dispositions: An Opinionated Introduction, Westview Routledge, Press, Boul der. Armstrong, is a Law of Nature? Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Blackburn, Simon: 1990, 'Filling in Space', Analysis 50(2). Cartwright, Nancy: 1983,How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford University Press, Oxford. ' Damasio, Antonio: 1994, Descartes Dummett, Michael: 1979, 'Common Essays Presented tion and Identity: Error, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York. in G. F. Macdonald and Physics', (ed.),Percep to A. J. Ayer With His Replies to Them, Macmillan, Sense London. Einstein, Albert: 1949, 'Reply to Criticisms', in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, Library of Living Philosophers, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Fetzer, James: 1981, Scientific Knowledge, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht.

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