Nomos E in Philo and Clement of Alexandria

bus E ea THE PATRISTIC RESPONSE Nomos Empsychos in Philo and Clement of Alexandria John Martens Scholarship on Clement and the concept of the “living law” (nomos empsychos), such as it is, has generally concentrated on the link between Clement and Philo.! There is obvious justification for this connection, but there is another aspect to Clement’s use of the nomos empsychos ideal which has been neglected in the scholarship on Clement, namely, his use of this ideal based on Hellenistic Pythagorean fragments. In this essay I hope to show that the “living law” ideal as outlined in these Hellenistic sources actually suits Clement’s needs as a Christian apologist far better than the ideal as it is portrayed in Philo’s work. The concept of the nomos empsychos as it is used by Clement serves three purposes: (1) to indicate a close link between the Mosaic law and the Logos (Christ); (2) to portray Christ as the true sage in Greco-Roman philosophical terms; and (3) to show that Christ, the “living law,” is both superior to the Mosaic law and the fulfilment of Greco-Roman philosophical ideals. In adopting the concept of nomos empsychos and in “Christianizing” it, Clement LN LAKE LLC RES pe NT TED ON draws not only upon Philo, but perhaps more importantly upon other Hellenistic sources now available to us only as fragments. It is of interest that, as scholars of the Hellenistic fragments have noted,

Clement preserves a fragment of one of these texts, although he of him; to do so is to bring harmony to their microcosm, the state, 325 attributes it to a different author. This appears not to have been and to themselves (Diotogenes: 4.7.62). If they imitate the king and noted by scholars of Clement in the context of nomos empsychos accept his /ogos, they are able to follow the right path and have sin discussions, possibly because the term nomos empsychos itself does and corruption driven from them (Ecphantus: 4.7.64: Diotogenes: not appear in the text. 4.7.62). The Idea of the Nomos Empsychos Before Philo Ecphantus: 4.7.64; Diotogenes: 4.7.61). The Hellenistic Pythagorean The nomos empsychos ideal is located in a group of fragments found in Stobaeus and attributed to followers of Pythagoras, namely, Ecphantus, Sthenidas of Lokri, Diotogenes, and Archytas of Tarenis nomos empsychos (Archytas: 4.1.136). The king who follows God The king becomes their nomos empsychos (Archytas: 4.1.135; texts contrast the written law, which is apsychos, with the king, who is truly lawful; because of his lawfulness, he is able to replace the tum. All these texts, with the possible exception of Archytas’s written law and become a material, are considered pseudonymous. They are usually dated to The written law, thus, becomes unnecessary for the subjects of the the Hellenistic period, generally the late third to early second king. for the king himself perfectly embodies the law. fuller representation of the divine law. century BCE, when much was being published on the theme of Also in other sources, such as the pseudo-Aristotelian “Kingship. ” These fragments deal with the perfect king, and nomos Rhetorica ad Alexandrum (1420a, 21-25), Cicero (De leg. 3.2-> De empsychos, the “living law,” is the most evocative title these authors rep. 1.52; De off. 2.41-42), Musonius Rufus (Stob. 4.7, 67),’ and use to describe the king. Plutarch (Ad Ineruditum Principem 780c), the term nomos empsychos (or logos empsychos) is used to contrast the written law As with most ideal Greek views of kingship, the king embodying nomos empsychos was to be perfect and just.4 He was to be a benefactor (euergetes) to his subjects. He was to be a'saviour (söfer) for them. These attributes are common to Greek kin ngship, especially and the king as law. All of these texts, like the Hellenistic Pythagorean texts, maintain the basic distinction of the nomos empsychos ideal: the law is either written or it is embodied in the the “kingship” speculation of the Hellenistic era.” king, the living law. What sets the nomos empsychos ideal of these (Pythagorean) fragments apart from other Greek views of kingship is found in the king’s relationship with God, his relationship with his subjects, and his ability to become the The term nomos empsychos appears in Philo’s work as many times law for his subjects. as in the Pythagorean fragments (Moses 1.162; 2.4; Abraham 5). The Nomos Empsychos in Philo The king is the unique creation of God; he resembles the rest of However, Philo breaks down the distinction between the law being humanity in outer form, but he is not only human, for he exists in a either written or embodied as living law. This innovation is due to realm between humanity and God (Ecphantus: 4.7.64; Diotogenes: his need to protect the law of Moses. The Patriarchs, who according 4.7.61). He is a friend of God and shares a special koinonia with him to Philo follow the law of nature and become agraphoi nomoi, (Ecphantus: 4.7.64; Diotogenes: 4.7.62). He is also, preeminently, an imitator of God, and his imitation (mimesis) brings harmonia to the kosmos, to the state, and to individual persons subject to him (Ecphantus: 4.7.64,65; Sthenidas: 4.7.63). become nomoi empsychoi as well (Abraham 5-6). He becomes a “god among men” (Diotogenes: 4.7. 61) His subjects are to enter into koinonia with him and to become imitators They do not, however, replace the law of Moses, for Philo is intent on both explaining how the Patriarchs follow the Mosaic law before it is written, and showing that the law of Moses is in agreement with Greco-Roman forms of law. Thus the either/or character of the contrast is broken down. Anomos empsychos, properly understood,

would not replace the written law; he would follow the written royal language to describe Moses as the “living law.” Rather he law—if this written law were the Mosaic law. claims that Moses too was “governed” by the orthos logos, that is, by 326 John Martens Philo refers to Moses as the “living law” twice: in Moses 1.162 Christ. Clement cannot say that Moses is the equivalent of Christ. and 2.4. He elaborates on Moses as the “living law” particularly in Moses 1.148-162, where he uses the language of nomos empsychos although in using the language of the nomos empsychos he comes tractates to describe Moses as king. In fact, Philo’s description of Clement’s intention in adopting the title nomos empsychos for close to intimating this. Moses in this context resembles that of the king of the Hellenistic Moses must be to show close relationship between the law of Moses fragments in almost all respects. Philo, furthermore, uses language and its true lawgiver: the Logos, Christ. They exist on a continuum. appropriate for royalty and close friendship with God only for the Yet by describing Moses as the living law, Clement does apdescription of Moses. In the language of the exclusive kingship proximate Philo’s equation: the law of Moses equals the nomos model, only Moses is the true “king.” empsychos. This is why Clement must create another stratum upon When Philo also refers to the Patriarchs as living laws (Abraham 5), he diminishes the exclusivity of the designation characteristic of the Hellenistic fragments. Yet the “living law” designation for Patriarchs does not attribute royal exclusivity to them in the same way it aa for Moses. Rather, it gives them the status of the “Sage.”* Thus, unlike the Hellenistic fragments, Philo creates two levels of nomoi empsychoi, those of king and of sage. The Nomos Empsychos in Clement Elements of both the Hellenistic and the Philonic ideal are found in the thought of Clement. In fact, Clement seems intent on maintaining the relationship which Philo sees between the nomos empsychos and the (written) law of Moses, while he also retains the Hellenistic idea that the written law is replaced by the “living law.” which Jesus exists as the “living law.” The Influence of the Hellenistic Pythagorean Texts By designating Moses as the “living law,” Clement not only indicates the close relationship between Moses and the Logos, but between Moses’ law and the Logos. However, when Clement also calls Jesus the “living law,” (specifically in Miscellanies 2.18,3-19,4), interest is focused on Jesus’ royalty and on the contrast between Jesus and written law. In this passage Clement says, .. Sages are sages by virtue of wisdom and those who are under the law are lawful by virtue of the law, and so the Christians, followers of Christ, are royal by virtue of Christ the King (18,3). This will be made clear presently: “That which is Right is truly lawful, and law, by nature, is right reason, and not that which The Influence of Philo resides in letters or in other objects.” The Eleatic Stranger Clement's use of the nomos empsychos in Miscellanies 1.26, 167: demonstrate that the royal and political man is a living law “now Moses was, so to say, a living law, governed by (kybernomenos) the right word,” clearly reveals the influence of Philo, for no other (18, 4). O And suchis he who, on the one hand, fulfils the law, and, on the other hand, “does the will of the Father,”! ! written author made the connection between Moses and the “living law.” openly upon a raised cross, set forth as an example of divine But although Clement does not elaborate here on his designation virtue for those who are capable to see clearly (19,1). The of Moses as “living law,” he is evidently familiar with Philo’s discus- Greeks know that the dispatches of the Ephors in sion of Moses as lawgiver and king or “living law” in Moses 1.148-62. Lacedaemonia have been, by law, written on pieces of wood; Yet when he calls Moses a nomos empsychos, he uses the term also but my law, as I said earlier, is royal, living, and right reason: applied elsewhere to Jesus. For this reason Clement avoids use of “the law, king of all, living and dead,” as the Boeotian Pindar

329 says (19,2)? For Speusippus, in his first book to Cleophon, in the Hellenistic fragments, although ignored by Philo. We know seems to write the same things as those in Plato: “For if kingship that for Clement this living law is Jesus. is a worthy choice, and only the sage is king and ruler, the law, Clement returns again to contrast the royal and living law, being right reason, is equally worthy.” And this it is (19,3). But the Stoic philosophers expound their doctrine, attributing only Jesus, the orthos logos, with Spartan law written on wood. Then, using a statement of Speusippus he stresses the identity between to the sage kingship, priesthood, prophecy, legislative power, true law, the orthos logos, and the true sage and king, Jesus. Clement wealth, true beauty, nobility, and freedom; but the sage, and it also plays on the Stoics’ difficulty in finding the Sage, both to explain is granted by them, is difficult to find (19,4).3 why Jesus was not generally considered a Sage, and why such a Sage was not recognized before the coming of Christ.” There is much to unpack in this passage, apart from Clement We find, therefore, that Clement describes Jesus as the living twice calling Jesus the “living law.” Clement is operating with a law, the equivalent of orthos logos, and does so in kingly and royal terms. Jesus is twice compared to written law, once generally and triangle of concerns in this passage, particularly because Moses already earlier has been designated as a living law. Clement is concerned with (1) the Sage, that is, the Greco-Roman wise man; (2) those under the Mosaic law which governs the Jews; and (3) the convergence and fulfilment of Jewish and Christian concerns in the in Clement’s account, a devaluation of the law of Moses with respect person of Christ. to Jesus, the true law, the living law, and orthos logos.!9 Concentration on Jesus’ royalty is not, of course, foreign to Christianity; but in light of the double use of the term nomos empsychos, stress on Jesus’ royalty is probably related here to Clement’s use of the “living law” ideal. Clement has not emphasized the royal quality of the “living law” as it applies to Moses, although it was stressed by Philo. But Clement does note that Christians are royal, and lawful, by the grace of Christ.'* The idea that Christ’s salvific act should serve to make royal those who participate in it is, again, not foreign to Christianity, but the language of royalty and the participatory nature of righteousness here again recall the ideal in the Hellenistic nomos empsychos tractates: by following the king, his subjects become lawful and just. Clement also contrasts law as “right reason” with law “which resides in letters or in other objects,” and then says that the Eleatic Stranger calls such a royal and political man a “living law.” The term does not, in fact, appear in any of Plato’s works. Important for our purposes, however, is the contrast Clement presents between the “written law” and the “living law,” for it is the contrast which is found once to Spartan law. As with the Hellenistic Pythagorean fragments, the nomos empsychos replaces and is superior to the written law. Jesus is not contrasted with the Mosaic law; but there is, implicit While Moses, a living law, is governed by the orthos logos (as is his law), Jesus, the living law, is the orthos logos. Clement is walking a fine line. With Philo he maintains an intimate connection between the orthos logos, thenomos empsychos, and the law of Moses (cf. The Educator 1.88, 2f; 2.75, 1f). And this serves Clement’s purpose, especially in his debate with Gnostics, in demonstrating the continuity of revelation: for the law had a divine purpose and was not to be ignored altogether.!? There is one major difference. For Clement, as for Philo, Moses is governed by right reason; but for Clement, Jesus is right reason: this is more than Philo would, or could, claim for any person. Clement has raised the stakes of Philo’s game: he can protect the law of Moses, and call Moses a “living law,” without regarding either Moses or the Mosaic law as the equal of Jesus. This is because the true law, Jesus Christ, though intimately connected to the law of Moses, is the orthos logos and is not simply governed by the orthos logos, as is Moses, according to Philo.

But Clement’s purposes not only coincide with Philo’s, they go beyond them. Clement wants to argue that the true nomos empsychos, the orthos logos, the King, has come; and he replaces and certain, therefore, that Eurysos knew even more of the kingship 330 331 ever, is that Eurysos was also speaking of the king. We may be ideal, and we may also be certain that Clement knew more of the transcends the written law, even the law of Moses.!® Thus it is ideal.2” How Clement alters his source to provide a parallel with Clement’s Christian purpose to portray Jesus as the true law. But this is also in line with the Hellenistic Pythagorean fragments: the written law is superseded when the living law, the king, comes. And there is good reason to believe that Clement knew these Hellenistic Genesis 1:26-27 is in itself interesting and instructive; but the fact texts, or others related to them. The Fragment of Eurysos: Miscellanies 5.5, 291? that Clement has direct knowledge of texts dealing with the nomos empsychos ideal, and is not dependent only on Philo’s presentation, is of paramount concern. This allows us to confirm the suspicion that Clement knew the nomos empsychos ideal both from Philo and from its initial elaboration in the Pythagorean texts. In making use of these varied sources, The fragment of Eurysos is a puzzling passage for scholars of the Hellenistic fragments. It reproduces, almost exactly, a passage attributed by Stobaeus to Ecphantus in Stob. 4.7.64 (Hense 272,1114). But Clement attributes his passage to Eurysos the Pytha- Conclusions gorean.”” And Clement also alters the sense of the passage. In For Clement the law of Moses is in agreement with the Logos: thus however, Clement creates something new. Jewish law and Greek wisdom converge in the person of Christ. Clement the passage reads, “The earthly form is like the others, in its promulgator, Moses, is a “living law” governed by the Logos. But that it is made from the same material, but it is fashioned by the the true, kingly living law, the Greco-Roman sage par excellence who Supreme Artificer, who in making it used himself as the Archetype.” The passage in Ecphantus reads, “On the one hand the King orthos logos, Jesus Christ. replaces the written law, whether Mosaic or Spartan, is itself the claims the most of the better elements in our common nature, on Clement has used Philo’s claim that the “living law” is in the other hand his earthly form is like the others, in that it is made agreement with the law of Moses, and the claim of the fragments from the same material, but he is fashioned by the Supreme Artificer, who in making him used himself as an Archetype.” Unlike Ecphantus, Clement is not concerned with the king in this passage; he is concerned with showing the agreement between Genesis 1:26-27 and Greek philosophy: human beings are different from and superior to the rest of God’s creation.” Ecphantus’s point is that the king is a unique creation of God.?? But this appears to have been Eurysos’s point as well, as is revealed in a companion piece to this passage, located in Stob. 1.6.19 (1,89), and pointed out that the living law replaces the written law. Clement also maintains Philo’s distinction between two strata of nomoi empsychoi: one is the person governed by right reason (for Philo, identified with the Patriarchs, and for Clement, with Moses); the other is the only king, the friend of God (for Philo this was Moses, but for Clement it was Jesus). For Clement, however, the true “living law” is the orthos logos. This is certainly more than Philo claimed, and very different from any claim made in the Hellenistic Pythagorean writings. There is an by E. R. Goodenough.” Whether Ecphantus copied Eurysos, or obvious Stoic influence on Clement in the claim that Christ is the whether Eurysos copied Ecphantus is a difficult question; but with orthos logos: for the Stoic sage embodied the orthos logos, while Walter Burkert I believe that Eurysos copied Ecphantus.”4 It cannot the Hellenistic Pythagorean texts never describe the king as the seriously be maintained that they are the same person, or that orthos logos. Thus Clement brings together Stoic and Pythagorean Eurysos is a citation mistake for Eurytos.?® Important for us, howclaims about the sage.

333 We should not, however, overlook Clement’s own concerns; his regarding the laws. He becomes, therefore, a “living law.” This is a Christian concerns did motivate and drive him. Clement’s reasons return to the language of the kingship tractates and of Clement, but for utilizing the concept of the nomos empsychos are his own as a both their mysticism and Clement’s religious insights are missing. Christian apologist. His battle with Gnosticism over the place of the The ideal of the nomos empsychos has become but another descrip- Mosaic law demanded that Clement make sense of the place of the tion of the function of the earthly Emperor. law in salvation history, and locate it on a continuum which maintained its importance. But his desire to show Jesus as the true law, Notes the true king, and the true wise man necessitated that the place of 1. W. Richardson, “Christ as ho nomos empsychos in Clement of the law be secondary. Using the ideal of the nomos empsychos not only from Philo’s writings, but particularly from the Hellenistic Alexandria and Some Trends in Current Theology,” in Studia Patristica, 15/1, Elizabeth A. Livingstone, ed. (Berlin: Akademie, 1984), Pythagorean writings, allowed him to maintain both of these claims. 361-67; id., “The Basis of Ethics: Chrysippus and Clement of In his use of the nomos empsychos ideal, Clement incorporates both Jewish and Greek elements as he recreates it in light of Christian Alexandria,” in Studia Patristica, 9/3, F. L. Cross, ed. (Berlin: belief. Alexandria and St. Luke’s Gospel,” in Studia Patristica, vol. 6, F. L. Akademie, 1966), 88; id., “Nomos empsychos: Marcion, Clement of This intellectual creation both marks Clement’s originality and Cross, ed. (Berlin: Akademie, 1964), 191; Salvatore Lilla, Clement places him in the mainstream of Christian apology, especially with of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism (Lonrespect to the praeparatio evangelica motif. Clement sees not only don: Oxford University Press, 1971), 76; Annewies van den Hoek, Jewish but also Greek history and thought as a preparation for the Clement of Alexandria and His Use ofPhilo in the Stromateis (Leiden: incarnation of Christ and the Gospel.” In this he builds on Philo’s initial forays into the relationship between reason and revelation. E. J. Brill, 1990). 59-64; Cl. Mondésert, Clément d'Alexandrie. Les Stromates IT, Sources Chrétiennes 38 (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1966), Yet Clement sees Judaism as only one step on the road to truth; 46 n.7 ; Otto Stáhlin, Clemens Alexandrinus. Stromata Buch I-VI, and so he relegates Philo’s apex to the base of the pyramid. In the Band 2 (Berlin: Akademie, 1960); André Méhat, Etude sur les synthesis of Clement, Judaism and Hellenism provide cornerstones ‘Stromates’ de Clément d'Alexandrie, Patristica Sorbonnensia 7 (Paris: in salvation history, but their function, it is clear, was only a support Editions du Seuil, 1966), 380, 390. along the ascent to the top: the person and message of Jesus Christ. 2. Ecphantus: Stob. 4.7.22,64; Diotogenes: Stob. 4.7.61,62; They provided preparatory steps for a journey which ends with faith Sthenidas: Stob. 4.7.63; Archytas: Stob. 4.1.135-138. All further in Christ. references to these texts will refer to the book, chapter, and section Clement’s use of the nomos empsychos ideal represents its grandnumbers in Stobaeus. est synthesis, and not only among Christians. His insights, however, 3. I would be remiss not to mention the problem of dating. Some were not maintained. When next we meet the nomos empsychos scholars, particularly Louis Delatte (Les traités de la royauté d’- ideal in a Christian context it is in Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civile: Ecphante, Diotogène et Sthénidas, Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Novellae. In Novella 105, chap. 4, lines 7-15, we find Justinian Philosophie et Lettres de l’Université de Liège 97, 1942) and Walter referring to the king as the “living law” in the context of a discussion Burkert (“Zur geistesgeschichtlichen Einordnung einiger Pseudoof the hypateia, or “consular governor.” The king is given to his pythagorica” in Fondation Hardt: Pour L’Etude de L'Antiquité Classubjects as a special honor, says Justinian, and God counsels him sique Entretiens: Tome XVIII, Pseudepigrapha I [Genève: Fondation

Hardt, 1972]) do not believe these texts are Hellenistic; they date them to the 2nd or 3rd century CE. I have not found this late dating convincing. My own position is in agreement with that of E. R. Goodenough, “The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship,” Yale Classical Studies 1 (1928): 55-128; Holger Thesleff, An Intro- 5. W. W. Tarn, Hellenistic Civilization (Cleveland and New York: 334 duction to the Pythagorean Writings of the Hellenistic Period (Abo: Abo Akademie, 1961); id., “On the Problem of the Doric PseudoPythagorica: An Alternative Theory of Date and Purpose,” Fondation Hardt: Pour L'Étude de L'Antiquité Classique Entretiens: Tome XVIII Pseudepigrapha I (Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1972); The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period, Acta Academiae Aboensis, Ser. A: Humaniora, v. 30, no. 1 (Abo: Abo Akademie, 1965); Francis Dvornik, Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy: Origins and Background, vol. 1, Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies (Locust Valley, N.Y.: J. J. Augustin, 1966), and Glenn Chesnut, “The Ruler and the Logos in Neopythagorean, Middle Platonic, and Late Stoic Political Philosophy,” in ANRW II. 16.2, 1310-32. 335 Meridian Books, 1964), 48-57; W. S. Ferguson in The Cambridge Ancient History VII: The Hellenistic Monarchs and the Rise of Rome, F. E. Adcock, S. A. Cook, and M. P. Charlesworth, eds. (Cambridge: University Press, 1954), 17-18; Lily Ross Taylor, The Divinity of the Roman Emperor (Chico, CA.: Scholars Press; a reprint of the 1931 edn., Middletown, Conn.: American Philological Association), 1731; Cuthbert Lattey, “The Diadochi and the Rise of King Worship,” The English Historical Review 32 (1917): 321f; Julius Kaerst, Geschichte des Hellenismus, Band II (Leipzig and Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1926), 380f, esp.385; Francis Dvornik, Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy: Origins and Background, vol. I, 210-33; Wilhelm Schubart, “Das Hellenistische Konigsideal nach Inschriften und Papyri,” in Archiv für Papyrusforschung und verwandte Gebiete, Band 12 (Leipzig and Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1937), 1-26. 6. Cf. Aristotle, Pol. 1264a 7. Cf. Cora Lutz, “Musonius Rufus: The Roman Socrates,” Yale Classical Studies 10 (1947): 64-65. Armand Delatte in his Essai sur la politique pythagoricienne (Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l’Université de Liège, 1922), argued that the work of Archytas was genuine. I am of Moses, the “living law,” to the orthos logos is not used by Philo to not certain that anyone else holds this position, but there is a noted describe Moses as the “living law.” It is interesting to note, however, difference in the treatment of Archytas and that of Ecphantus, that in a discussion of Melchizedek as the king (based on Gen. 8. Van den Hoek, Clement (n.1), 59. 9. The verb used by Clement, kybernaö, to describe the relationship Sthenidas, and Diotogenes. L. Delatte does not, for instance, deal 14:18), and in the allegorical interpretation which follows, Philo says with Archytas in his book; he considers him earlier. Thesleff also the king is governed (kybernomenon) by the orthos logos (Leg. All. considers Archytas’s work earlier than that of the other three. So, 3.79-80). too, does Burkert, who believes that the Pythagorean writings of the 4. Plato, Pol. 300c; Rep. 425a-c; Aristotle, Pol. 3.11,13. Cf. also 10. The term does not appear in Plato. Mondésert, Clément d’Alexandrie. Les Stromates II; and Stählin, Clemens Alexandrinus. Stromata Buch I-VT, Band 2, point to Pol. 295e and 311bc. 11. Cf. Matt. 7:21; 21:31; 1 John 2:17. Jerome Hall, “Plato’s Legal Philosophy” in Indiana Law Journal 31 12. Pindar, frag. 169. Hellenistic period in general may be based upon genuine writings of Archytas. (1956): 183, 192. See L. Delatte’s discussion in Les traités, 123-63, for the development of the kingship ideal with special attention to the nomos empsychos ideal in Greek thought. 13. The translation is my own. ‘14. Méhat, Etude, 380, n.224. 15. Nevertheless, in Clement’s Protrepticus 10.86, he states that when Christ came he was neither “disbelieved” nor “unrecognized.”

337 16. Van den Hoek, Clement (n.1), 46: “Clement determines the rank 19. Also found in Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum (FPG), vol. of his concepts to a significant degree on the basis of time: that is, 2., Friedrich Wilhelm August Mullach, ed. (Paris: Firmin-Didot & whether they are before or after the advent of Christ. Law and Sociis, 1928-1935), as Eurysos, frag. 1, 112. 20. The passage is found in Ecphantus word for word. The only differences that I can see are two case endings. The only other philosophy are ranked together since they belong to the earlier phase. They are necessary before the advent and useful but not indispensable after it.” 17. W. Richardson, “Nomos Empsychos: Clement, Marcion” (n.1), 192. Clement walked a fine line in his debate with the Gnostics, for he himself had gnostic sensibilities and his orthodoxy was somewhat in question in the ancient church; H. B. Timothy, The Early Christian Apologists and Greek Philosophy (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1973), 77-79, 91-98; Elizabeth A. Clark, Clement’s Use of Aristotle (New York and Toronto: Edwin Mellen Press, 1977), 7, 23-26, 33-36; Lilla, Clement of Alexandria (n.1), 226-34. For this paper, “Gnosticism” is defined on Clement’s terms: “false” Gnostics are those whose life is too austere, and so mock the goodness of creation; or those who accept fragment attributed to Eurysos is located in Stob. 1.6.19 (Hense 210, 25-212, 17; also found in Mullach, FPG, vol. II, as Eurysos, frag. 2, 112). No information regarding his birthplace or date is provided. The ideas, however, are in line with those in his other fragment— they are concerned with the true and false nature of things—and he even mentions the nature of the king. Perhaps as significantly, the text is written in Doric. One of his rare words, autautothen, is located also in Archytas, Diotogenes, and Ecphantus (cf. also n.27). Because of Clement’s use of his work and because he is not gathered with the other Pythagorean fragments, I choose to regard him as a follower of these Hellenistic authors. This remains hypothetical. Clement finds in the nomos empsychos ideal a welcome response 21. The point which Clement is intent on making in this passage may be related to his polemic against idolatry. He glosses Gen. 1:26 in the context of a polemic against idolatry elsewhere and makes much to Gnostic contentions that the Mosaic law simply caused fear of the fact that only humans are made in the image and likeness of (Strom. 2.8.39, 4-5) and that Christianity represented a clean break God (Protrepticus 10.79-84; cf. 12.93). Clement also shows anger at Alexander’s supposed deification (Protrepticus 10.77) and claims that the human being sui generis was made by the Supreme Artist (ho aristotechnas pater) as a living statue (agalma empsychon, 10.78). 22. Philo preserves a statement similar to Ecphantus’s in terms of rules and laws of moral conduct as matters of indifference (Strom. 3.5.40, 2-3). from the errors of Old Testament teaching. Clement affirms the importance of law while simultaneously affirming the pre-eminence of Jesus Christ and the true, spiritual nature of law. The Mosaic law, it is true, was only a measure of grace until the fulness of Jesus Christ—as, in a sense, was Greek philosophy—but Clement felt it keystone of Philo’s structure, is devalued in a certain sense by the superiority of the king’s creation, but he does not share similar language. Philo, fragment apud Antonius Melissa, Sententiae sive loci communes, Pars Il, sermo 2 (Jacques Paul Migne, Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Graeca. 136, col. 1012bc). Cf. Glenn Chesnut, “The Ruler and the Logos in Neopythagorean, Middle Platonic, and Late Stoic Political Philosophy,” in ANRW 11.16.2, 1328, for the text and Clement when he puts the law on the level of worldly culture as a English translation. preparatory phase and makes the two, so to speak, a pair of sym- 23. E. R. Goodenough, “The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship,” Yale Classical Studies 1 (1928): 76. necessary to defend the place of the law in order to defend basic rules of moral conduct among Christians, and to proclaim the active role of God throughout history. 18. Van den Hoek, Clement (n.1), 46: “The law of Moses, the metrical buttresses for the essential edifice.” Cf. Clement, The Rich Man's Salvation, 8.939-940; 9.940.

24. Walter Burkert, “Zur geistesgeschichtlichen Einordnung einiger Pseudopythagorica” (n.3), 52, insists correctly that Eurysos cannot be a citation mistake for Ecphantus. But could it be a citation mistake for someone else? Could it be the Pythagorean Eurytos (Diogenes Laertius 8.45; Iamblichus, vit. Pyth. 146, 148, 267-69), about whom we know much more? This is a tempting proposal, but see the following note on the impossibility of this suggestion. 25. Thesleff, An Introduction (n.4), 69; Texts, 87-88, maintains that Eurysos is a citation mistake for Ecphantus, but this would mean that Clement not only cited Eurytos for Ecphantus, but that his misspelling was the same as that of Stobaeus in 1.6,19! Eurysos would then be the creation of a citation mistake and two misspellings. 26. Delatte, Les traités, 177-80 suggests that Ecphantus copied Philo in adopting the “living law” ideal. This leads to an incredible hypothesis. Ecphantus, he suggests, borrowed Philo’s view of humankind created in the image of God, and altered it to apply only to the king in the nomos empsychos ideal, for which he was also dependent upon Philo. Eurysos then borrowed this view of the unique king and modified it in line with general Jewish claims regarding the creation of all humanity. Clement then borrowed this passage to support a Judeo-Christian view of human creation. It is far more likely that Clement adapted the ideal of the unique king, the living law, as found in Eurysos to suit his Christian claims about the creation of humankind. 27. The passage which Goodenough located in Stob. 1.6,19 would appear to be dependent upon a passage which Stobaeus attributed to Diotogenes (Peri Hosiotetos: 4.1,133). The case cannot be argued here. 28. Cf. also Plutarch, Ad Ineruditum Principem, 780c; and the pseudo-Aristotelian Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, 1420a, 21-25. The phrase logos empsychos appears in both of these cases. 29. H. B. Timothy, The Early Christian Apologists and Greek Philosophy (n.17), 59-71.