Plato, Pythagoras, Aristotle, the peripatetics, the stoics, and Thales and his followers:"on causes"

hora 2 A AN STEEL N 2 JAAP MANSFELD (Universiteit Utrecht) PLATO, PYTHAGORAS, ARISTOTLE, THE PERIPATETICS, THE STOICS, AND THALES AND HIS FOLLOWERS “ON CAUSES” (Ps.-Plutarchus Placita I 11 and Stobaeus Anthologium I 13) 1. Introduction Aétius placit. 111 Diels? “On Causes” (Mepi ultiov) is based the usual way on a chapter in the Péacita of ps.-Plutarch (1 11, Nepi aitiov) and one in Stobaeus’ Anthologium, viz. in book one, also known as Eclogae physicae (1 13, Tlepi aitiov)?. No ' All references to Aétius with the sigéwm Aév. will be to Diels’ edition in the Doxographi Graeci, Berlin 1879 and later repr., pp. 268-444. For the Placita of ps.-Plutarch I have consulted G. LACHENAUD (éd.), Plutarque. Œuvres morales, xu 1: Opinions des Philosopbes, Paris 1993, and IT. Daiwer (Hrsg.), Aetius Arabus. Die Vorsokratiker in arabischer Überlieferung ("Akademie der Wissenschaften und Literatur. Veröffentlichungen der orientalischen Kommission”, xxxm}, Wiesbaden 1980, Stobaeus is quoted from C, WACHSMUTH (ed.), loannis Stobaei Anthologii libri duo priores qui inscribi solent Eclogae physicae et ethicae, Bd. 1-2, Berlin 1884, repr. Zürich 1974. ? A treatise entitled Mepi uitiov is attributed to Theophrastus (Dios. Laert. v 49). Perhaps Stop. antho/ 1 6, 17° (in the chapter Tlepi tóxnz À tadronátov) = THropur. fr. 503 FHS&G belongs with this work (see infra, note 96 ad fin.) Diels attributed this Stobaean lemma to Aétius (1 29, 4), followed by e.g. H. DGRRIE, Präpositionen und Metaphysik. Wechselwirkung zweier Prinzipienreiben, «Museum Hel-

parallels from Theodoret or other such sources for Aëtius are available this time’. Diels’ reconstruction is questionable. In the first part of the present paper I shall argue in favour of a different reconstruction and attempt to explain the rationale behind it‘. In the second part some comments on Aétian lemmas in ps.- veticum», XXVI (1969) pp. 217-28, repr. in Ip., Platonica Minora, München 1976, pp. 124-36, esp. p. 217 = p. 124. But it is a fragment of Arius Didymus, see D.T. Runta, Additional Fragments of Arius Didymus on Physics, in K.A. ALcra-P_W. van DER HorsT-D,T. Runta (eds.), Polybistor. Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy (“Philosophia Antiqua”, ıxxu), Leiden-New York-Köln 1996, PS-PLUTARCHUS PLACIT I 11 AND STOBAEUS ANTHOL. i 13 19 Plutarch and Stobaeus and in the third and last part some on exclusively Stobaean lemmas will be provided, but I shall deal only in passing with the passage from the Timaens quoted by Stobaeus, and shall not comment on his “Ocellus” quotatio n. Commenting on these lemmas is not so easy, and I can here only reconnoitre the field to some extent. A more serious study should have to take all the Placita chapters and individual lemmas into account both as to their interrelations and as to their antecedents, but each time one has to begin somewhere’. Most of the time, naturally, the situation one finds pp. 363-81, esp. p. 376, and J. Mansrrip-D.T. Runia, Aétiana: The Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer, 1: The Sources ("Philosophia Antiqua”, xxm), Leiden-New York-Köln 1997, p. 254; cfr. further infra, note 7, and text after note 12. Works with the title Mepi aitioy are also attributed to Strato (Dioc. LAERT. v 35) and the Herophilean physisian Hégétor (APOLLON. in Hippoer. de articul. p. 23.19). Galen quotes a book of his as &v toig Nepi aitiov Adyorg (xvii 8 p. 171, 9-10 K.). For the Cyrenaics the xepi uitimy törog was a part of physics according to SEXT. Emp. adv. math vu 11 = SS.R. fr. ıv a 168. For the formula xepi uitimv toros cfr. Cic. top. 65: toto igitur loco causarum explicato, and GALEN. de diff. puls. vint p. 664, 3-6 K., ps 10 Kai áxaipos Gnteolu wows Üempiag, tod te Epi tev cv tols opuypois aitiov témov Kai tot nepi tis du abtay zpoyvooem?. 3 Diels’ reconstruction is at Dox. Graec. cit., pp. 309-10. It is reprinted here in the Appendix, together with che text of the sources for this chapter (which now include the Arabic translation of ps.-Plutarch by Qusta ibn Liga). * The first example of such a reconstruction is brilliantly provided by D.T. Runta, Xenophanes on the Moon: A ‘doxographicum’ in Aétius, «Phronesis», xxxtv (1989) pp. 245-69. See also e.g. In., The ‘Placita’ Ascribed to Doctors in Aétius’ Doxography on Physics, in Pia. J, van DER Eux (ed.), Ancient Histories of Medicine. Essays in Medical Doxography and Historiography in Classical Antiquity ("Studies in Ancient Medicine”, xx), Leiden-New York-Küln 1999, pp. 189-250, esp. pp. 199-204; A. Laks, Du témoignage comme fragment, in G.W. Most (ed.), Collecting Fragments - Fragmente sammeln (“Aporemata”, 1), Göttinger. 1997, pp. 237-72, and J. Mansreı.v-D.T. Runta, Aétiana cit., pp. 226-8. On Diels’ methodology, the sources for Aétius, and the working-methods of ps.- Plutarch and Stobaeus see now J. Maxsrerp-D.T. Runta, Aétiana cit. On the sources of Aétius see my preliminary papers Gibt es Spuren von Theopbrasts ‘Phys. op.’ bei Cicero?, in W.W. Fortenna uch-P. STEINMETZ (eds.), Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos (“Rurgers Studies in Classical Humanities”, ıv), New Brunswick N. J.-Londo n 1989, pp. 133-58 (repr. in my Studies in tbe Historiograpby of Greek Philosophy, Assen-Maastricht 1990, pp. 238-63); ‘PAysikai Doxai' e ‘Problemata Physica’ da Aristotele ad Âezio (ed oltre), in AM. BATTEGAZZORE (a cura di), Dimostrazione, argomentazione dialettica e argomentazione retorica nel pensiero antico, Genova 1993, pp. 311-82 (revised and amplified version of ‘Physikai Doxai' and ‘Problemata Physica’ from Aristotle to Aétius (and beyond), in WW, Fortensaccit-D. Guras (eds.), Theophrastus: His Psychological, Doxographical and Scientific Writings (“Rutgers Studies in Classical Humanities”, v), New Brunswick N. J.-London 1992, pp. 63111), and Cosmic Distances: Aëtius 2.31 Diels and Some Related Texts, «Phronesis», x1.v (2000) pp. 175-204. On doxogra phy in general (apart from the literature cited supra) see my papers Chrysippu s and the ‘Placita’, «Phronesis», xxxtv (1989) pp. 311-42: Doxogra phy and Dialectic: The "Sitz im Leben’ of the ‘Placita’, in ANR W, 36.4 (1990) pp. 3076-229, and Doxographical Studies, Quellenforschung, Tabular Presentation and Other Varieties of Comparativism, in W. Burkerr-L, GEMELLI MarCIano-E. MareLteL. Oren (Hrsg.), Fragmen tsammlungen phitosophischer Texte der Antike - Le Ruccolte dei Framment i di Filosofi Antichi (“Aporemata”, 11), Göttingen 1998, pp. 16-40; also see the overview of D.T. Runta, What is Doxograp/y?, in Pas]. van DER Eur, Ancient Histories cit., pp. 33-55, * For other attempts in this direction see my papers Doxography and Diateetic cit., ‘Physikai Doxai’ cit., and Cosmic Distances cit.

PS.-PLUTARCHUS PLACIT. 1 11 AND STOBAEUS ANTHOL. | 15 21 which one only sees one end, or (more rarely) of which one ding lemma in ps.-Plutarch. At anthol. 1 13, 1° we have three further Aétian lemmas (= Aét. placit. 1 11, 6-8), not paralleled is able to see both ends while the long middle section remains in ps.-Plutarch. Ps.-Plutarch at Aét. placit. 1 11, 5 on the other invisible. hand has a lemma on the Stoics in general which is not paraloneself in may be compared to that of noticing a stick of leled in Stobaeus, because it has been replaced by the far more informative and longer abstract from Arius Didymus. The last Stobacan lemma is a pseudo-Pythagorean fragment, “Ocellus ” fr. 3 Harder at anthol. 1 13, 1°. Hermetic and “Pythagorean” II. Reconstructing a Chapter in Aétius Stobaeus has the following lemmas: first (aztbol. 1 13, 1%) a general definition of “cause” (aitıov), followed by what is usually seen as the well-known Middle Platonist triad of principles attributed to Plato. This section corresponds to the first two lemmas of ps.-Plutarch’s chapter (placit. 1 13, 1-2). To the Plato lemma Stobaeus in his usual way appends a slightly normalized but otherwise verbatim quotation from Plato, viz. Tim. 28 A-B, introduced by the formula Aéyer yodv év Tipaio. This is followed by a snippet from Arius Didymus‘ on Aristotle’s four types of cause (anthol. 1 13, 1°). This Ari texts and relatively faithful verbatim quotations from Plato are among Stobaeus’ favourites. The “Ocellus” fragment, with its Platonizing contents and religious overtones, fits in well both with the quotation of the Timaeus passage and with Stobaeus’ predilections. There are no poetic quotations to be found in this short chapter, but otherwise the medley is typical for the first book of the Anthologium: Aétius - Plato Aétius again - Arius Didymus - Aëtius for the third time the “Pythagorean Ocellus”. It is clear that the Aétian chapter provides the framewo rk stotle lemma which has no counterpart in ps.-Plutarch was for this Stobaean chapter. For the moment I shall for the most wrongly attributed to Aétius (placit. 1 13, 4) by Diels’. The part ignore the extras inserted by the anthologist, third Stobaean lemma (1 13, 1°) is a fragment of, or presumasay the quotation from the Timaeus, the two fragment s of Arius Didymus (the first of which is Aét. placit.1 13, 4 Diels), bly rather abstract from Arius Didymus (fr. 18 Diels}* concerning the Stoics; it lists the tenets of Zeno Chrysippus Posidonius in that order, and naturally there is no corresponthat is to and the “Ocellus” fragment. In translating the text of ps.Plutarch I indicate where it differs from that of Stobaeu s (the differences are small). We then have, in Diels’ order (for the Greek texts see infra, p. 65 ff. Appendix): * Not to be indentified, pace Meineke and Diels, with the emperor Augustus’ court philosopher, see T. Göransson, Albinus, Alcinous, Arius Didymus (“Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia”, 1x1), Göteborg 1995, esp. pp. 203-18. His #.4.g. is 233 CE, the date of arrival of Origen at Caesarea, who took his splendid library with him. See D.T. Runta, Caesarea Maritima and the Survival of Hellenistic-Jewish Literature, in A. Rapan-K.G. HoLum (eds.), Caesarea Maritima. A Retrospective after Two Millennia, Leiden-New York-Kéln 1998, pp. 476-95, esp. p. 490. ? See already Wachsmuth ad /oc.: «fort. rectius ad Didymum referas». (1) [A descriptive general definition of cause:] «Cause is that owing to which the effect (occurs) or somethi ng takes place». Stobaeus adds’ the words «for this is sufficient in a descriptive way». (2) «Plato (described) cause in a threefold manner: for he says ['“for he says” omitted by Stobaeus] by what from what with a view to what. He considers the by what to be more Cfr. D.T. Runta, Additional Fragments cit., pp. 372-3, J. MansreLD-D.T. Runa, Aétiana cit., pp. 250-1, and infra, note 87 and text thereto. * Dox. Graec. cit., p. 457. * Cfr. J. MansreLo-D.T. RUNIA, Aétiana cit., p. 223,

potent [“most potent” Stobacus], and this is that which acts, which is intellect». [which is intellect” not in Stobaeus]. (3) «Pythagoras Aristotle [“Aristotle” not in Stobaeus] (hold) that the first causes are incorporeal, and that others are [this “are” not in ps.-Plutarch] according to participation in or by way of attribute of the corporeal substructure». [Final clause not in Stobaeus **:] «So that the cosmos is a body». (5) «The Stoics (held) that all causes are corporeal; for (they are) preumas». [Lacking in Stobaeus]. (6) «Thales and those who come after him" stated the first cause to be immobile». [Lacking in ps.-Plutarch]. (7) «<The> Stoics defined the first cause as mobile». [Lacking in ps.-Plutarch]. (8) «The Peripatetics (held) that of the causes some are sensible, others intelligible». [Lacking in ps.-Plutarch]. PS.-PLUTARCHUS PLACIT. 1 11 AND STOBAEUS ANTHOL 113 23 According to (2) Plato there are three kinds of causes, according to (3) Pythagoras and Aristotle two kinds, and according to (5) the Stoics only one kind. The diaeresis (division) and ordering, then, are according to number: 3-2 - 1", This is a bit unusual, because in the majority of cases an ordering according to number starts with the lowest number. Still, there it is (we shall see shortly why the usual order is inverted in this case), and it provides supplementary proof for the attribution of the Stobaean lemma on Aristotle’s four kinds of cause to Arius Didymus and not, pace Diels, to Aétius, for in the latter it would disturb or even destroy the sequence. The incorporeality versus the corporeality of causes is next", (3) Pythagoras and Aristotle hold that first causes are incorporeal and that the others participate in or are attributes Diels’ order mechanically combines the sequences of ps.Plutarch and Stobaeus. He naturally omits the latter's quotation from the Timaeus and the Didymus fragment he recognized as well as the “Ocellus” fragment, but as we have seen inserted the Didymus fragment dealing with the four Aristotelian causes as his fourth lemma (at Aét. placit. 1 13, 4). His fifth lemma, in the left column containing the text of ps.Plutarch, occupies the position held in Stobaeus by the Didymus fragment on the three great Stoics. His lemmas six to eight are found in Stobaeus only. We now are in a position to inquire about the rationale of the Aétius chapter. This is threefold. The issues on which the authorities which are represented by name-labels differ (diaeresis), or disagree (diaphonia), are (a) the number of causes, (b) the incorporeality versus the corporeality of causes, and (c) the mobility versus the immobility of the first cause. In some cases more than one such issue is concerned in a combination of lemmas. We may look first at the issue of the number of causes. # Delevit Diels. 4 Viz., in the lonian succession. of the corporeal substructure. These “others” therefore are not, in themselves, fully corporeal. Aristotle and Pythagoras do not differ as to the incorporeal causes, but as to the semi-corporeal others. I take it that “participation” has to be linked to Pythagoras and “attribute” to Aristotle (see infra, section III at subsection (3)). (5) The Stoics hold that all causes are corporeal, " For ordering according to number see my papers Doxography and Dialectic cit., pp. 3157-61, and Aristote et la Structure du "De sensibus’ de Théophraste, «Phronesis», xL1 (1996) pp. 158-88; also D.T. Runia, The ‘Placita’ Ascribed cit., p. 203 (on AET. 1 23), and D. MaNETTI, “Aristotle” and the Role of Doxography in the Anonymus Londinensis (PBrLibr Inv. 137), in PH.J. van DER Eyk, Ancient Histories cit., pp. 95-142, esp. pp. 115-20, It is to be remembered that the earliest list of principles (here called “things that are”, övra) starts with the largest number: Isocr. antidor. 268: infinitely many, four, three, two, one, none; for this list and similar early ones see my paper Aristotle, Plato and the Preplatonic Doxography and Chronography, in G. CAMBIANO (a cura di), Storiografia e Dossografia nella Filosofia Antica, Torino 1986, pp. 1-56, esp. pp. 32-9 (repr. with same pagination in my Studies in the Historiography cit.). Y Cfr. J. Mansretn-D.T. Runia, Aétiana cit., p. 251; for another example of this type of diaphonia see e.g. AET. Iv 2-3, with my comments at Doxography and Dialectic cit., pp. 3065-85.

PS-PLUTARCHUS PLACIT 111 AND STOBAEUS ANTHOL. | 13 25 while (8) the Peripatetics, whose tenet is expressed in epistemic from a numerical point of view, though nothing is said about the terms, said that some causes are sensible (i.e. are corporeal) and corporeal or incorporeal nature of his causes. others intelligible (Ze. are incorporeal). Here a diaphonia is clearly involved, but the order of the lemmas is not good. My Two lemmas remain, viz. (6) Thales c.s. on the immobility of the first cause, and (7) the Stoics on its mobility. A clear diabelief is that Stobaeus, who inserted other material to replace phonia ®. Mobility versus immobility is not an issue in the prethe name-labels Aristotle and Stoics, while copying out the rest ceding lemmas of the chapter. In fact, this pair of lemmas form a sort of appendix. They may be, or not be (one cannot be sure "), of the Aétian chapter overlooked the Peripatetics lemma and so lemmas (7) on Thales c.s. and (8) on the Stoics, which are the remains of a separate Aétian or perhaps rather proto-Aétian chapter entitled “On the First Cause” vel sim. However this concerned with a different theme, but belongs with lemmas may be, there is one undeniable link with what comes before. In (3) and (5). Stobaeus is not concerned with Aétius’ diaeretic a single earlier lemma, (2) on Pythagoras and Aristotle, “first” causes (plural) are explicitly mentioned. In (6) Thales c.s. and (7) decided to add it at the end. It does not make Aétian sense after and diaphonic rationale, as the passages he inserted into the Aétian framework already prove. To restore Aétius’ purposive original sequence we therefore have to correct Stobaeus’ ordering (or rather lack of it). The diaphonic Aétian order is (3) - (8) - (5): (3) Pythagoras and Aristotle hold that of the tw0 kinds of causes some are incorporeal and the others semi-corporeal; (8) the Stoics there is only a single first cause. This diaphonia as to the number of first causes assumed and the fact that first causes are involved nicely connects the first part of the chapter with its second part. How many kinds of causes Thales c.s. posited is not revealed. But we also have (7) the Stoics on the single first cause, and know from lemma (5) that they only assumed one the Peripatetics hold that of the two kinds of causes some are incorporeal and the others corporeal, while (3) the Stoics hold kind of causes. We may therefore, I believe, assume that it is that there is only ove kind, all causes being corporeal. implied that also Thales c.s. posited only one kind of cause. This inserted between (3) Pythagoras and Aristotle, and (5), the fits in with the sequence from the numerical point of view: the chapter then ends with (5) the Stoics, one kind: (6) Thales c.s., Stoics. The fuller Aétian sequence therefore is (1) the descripone kind but from a different perspective: and (7) the Stoics tive general definition; (2) Plato; (3) Pythagoras and Aristotle; again, one kind, from the same different perspective. (8) the Peripatetics; and (5) the Stoics. From (3), Pythagoras and I have not yet said, but it naturally goes without saying that the Aétian lemmas as to their actual contents (the doxai) It follows that lemma (8), on the Peripatetics, has to be Aristotle, to (5), the Stoics, the diaphonia as to corporeality and incorporeality is neatly bound up with the sequence according to number. This diaphonia even explains why the numerical order as a whole begins with the number Zhree (Plato). The sequence (3) Pythagoras and Aristotle (£wo + incorporeal/quasi-corpoare at best pale, modified and simplified versions of the views of the authorities that serve as name-labels. The attribution of the doxa to Pythagoras (Pythagoras himself, no less), who is said to share it with Aristotle is an interesting fiction for real) - (8) the Peripatetics (two + sensible/intelligible) - and (5) the Stoics (one + bodies) is determined both by the number of causes and by the opposition corporeal versus incorporeal, but happens to begin with the number two. Logically, Plato's triad of causes had to constitute the beginning of a sequence arranged # For another example of this kind of diaphonia cfr. e.g. AËT. tv 6, with my comment at Doxography and Dialectic cit., p. 3089. ” See e.g. my papers Doxography and Dialectic cit., p. 3181 and Cosmic Distances cit., and J. MansereLo-D.T, RUNIA, Aötiana cit., p. 232.

which see infra, section III at subsection (3). The tenets have been flattened out and adapted the better to fit in with the diaphonic and diaeretic Aétian rationale. I append my argued reconstruction of the orginal Aétian chapter. It will be noted that it very much resembles Diels’ mechanical reconstruction, the only visible differences (apart from minor ones as to the constitutio of individual lemmas) being the elimination of his fourth lemma (Arius Didymus on Aristotle's four types of cause) and its replacement in a new fourth position by his eighth lemma, on the Peripatetics: Nepi attiov (1) aitiév ¿ori du 6 TO dnotéhecpa ñ bu Ô ovpPaiver TL. (2) Hadrov TPLZOS TO altrove pnoi yap. bg" ov EZ od npös 8 kopibtepov 5 hyeitar to by’ ob TOÛTO Sè Hv tó rotoùv, è PS.-PLUTARCHUS PLACIT. 1 Ji AND STOBAEUS ANTHOL. I 13 27 historical point of view, it is not true to say that there are no links at all between name-labels and contents. In what follows some observations about these sometimes quite tortuous connections will be submitted. (1) aítióv fon <ô1 S>* 16 drotézeopa À 81 è cuupaiver tt. The supplement <61’ 6> in ps.-Plutarch is unavoidable and vouched for by the Stobaean lemma. Note the Verschlinmbesserung in Qusta ibn Luga, (the ancestor of) whose text of ps.Plutarch lacked the second 61 6 as well. The descriptive definition” is originally and basically Stoic. For &v’ 6 in its rôle as a Stoic technichal term see for instance the definitions at Stob. anthol. 113, 1%, printed infra, Appendix. It should, however, be acknowledged that 51 6 is a perfectly common expression: it occurs for instance four times goti vous. in Thucydides, once in the corpus Lysiacum, thirteen times in pata, ta dè xutà petoxny ñ Kata cuupePnkòg Tig CMpATLKT|S the corpus Platonicum", three in Xenophon, nine in Demos- (3) Tluduyópas "Apiototehng Ta pév npôta dita dow- ÚTOOTÁGEOC, Oot’ eivar TOV KÓGHOV COJO. (4) [= (8) Diels] of Ilepirammtikoi tov aitiov eivat tà pèv aicOnta, tà dì vont. (5) of Eroikoi nüvra tú aitia GHHUTIKÉ- nvevpata yap. (6) Ours kai of &yeäng 10 mpwtov aitiov axivntov anepivavto. (7) <ol> Lrwixoi TO np@tov aittov @picavto K1vnTÓv. As is the rule in the Placita literature this time too the order of the lemmas is determined by content, not by the chronology of the authorities that serve as name-labels. “Pythagoras” comes after Plato, and ‘Thales and his immediate thenes, and twenty in the corpus Aristotelicum ”, in various causal meanings. énotéAcona is found for the first time in Polybius, viz. at 1 39, 11 and ıv 78, 5; here it is not yet a technical term. It cannot be paralleled in early Stoic fragments, but as a technical term, viz. meaning the effect of a cause, it is indeed and certainly Stoic. See for instance the ninth chapter of book eight of the Stromata of Clemens Ale- * Supplevit Diels ex Stobaeo; deest in Qusta ibn Luga. 11 0 ps.-PLUTARCH. placit, 19-12 and ı 14-5 (9 Mepi bang, 10 Tlepi idéag, Mepi aitiov, 12 TMepi capdatev, 14 epi ognuérwv, 15 Tlepi followers”, in the sixth position, are wedged in between two 1popártov) all begin with a general definition. Virtually the same definilemmas bearing on the Stoics. tions are to be found at the beginning of SToB. anthol. 111 Fepiöd.ng, 112 Hepi i820v, 113 Mepi aitiov, 114 Tlepi sogazev retà., in third position at 115 Hepi oxnpútov, and again at the beginning of 1 16 Tlepi ypwpatmwv. III. Some Comments on Individual Lemmas of Aétius # Eg. Tim. 46 € 8 in the sense of what came to be called a final cause, Men. 72 € 7-8 in that of a formal cause. Though these lemmas, as pointed out, provide at best only partial and pale information when considered from a modern nal cause), metaph. À 9. 992 a 30-1: uíziov, $1 6 Kai rag voëc Kai rúca pôois nore (efficient cause). # E.g. eth, end. B 10. 1227 a 14: 10 91 6, tot’ gate 16 où Evera (fi.

xandrinus, an interesting medley of Stoic and other ingredients, where it is frequently found in undeniably Stoicizing PS.-PLUTARCHUS FLACIT. 1 11 AND STOBAEUS ANTHOL 113 29 The phrase dpxet yap broypupik®s has been added by Stobaeus *. The word broypagtkas is only found here and at passages *. The formula cupRaiver ti pertains to the effect as actualized according to Stoic doctrine”. It is of course wellknown that the Stoics held that cause is a body which produces an incorporeal effect in another body *; this incorporeality an. pp. 15.15 and 97.32. The adjective broypagixds too is is expressed by the use of 11”. S.V.F. m p. 247 apud Diog. Laert. vi 60. 2 Crem. ALEX. strom. Vin 9, 27, 3-4 = Cunrys. fr. 347 S.V.F. up. 120; ibid. 32, 33-9 = Curvs. fr. 351 S.V.F. n pp. 121-2. Cfr. Sexr. Emp. adv. math. 1x 196-201 = Curys. fr. 337 S.V.F. n p. 118. Also pá Eotıv uvsee Sexr. Emp. pyrrb. hyp. 11 21: tóte yap Kai Ot dnotélea tod ywooxerv Soroùpev, ótav 16 aïrrov adtob 6x altıov abtod Kata GBapev, and CLEM. ALEX. strom. vint 9, 29, 1: nav altıov we altıov <ómAn> dtavoig Anntov tuygäver, Enel tivos Kai npög TIMI (cfr. infra, text to note 82] voctrar tivòg pév, tod drotedéouator, KaÜGTEp À payarpa tod TELven, rpôs tive dé, [kußünep] to EnttHScing Exovtt, xaQanep to nbp TO Edo tov dödnavre yap où kaboet, both absent from S.V.F. For aitiou dg altiov see Crrys. fr. 336 S.V.F. 11 p. 118 apud STOB. anthol. 111, 1° (printed infra, Appendix) Aöyov tav mepi tod aition dg aitiov. x= Cfr. Zen. fr. 89 5.V.F. 1 p. 25 and Posip. fr. 95 E.-K. apud Arium Didymum (printed infra, Appendix) on auufefnkôs and xammyopnpa. For auußeßnxög (‘actualized predicate”) see A.A. Lonc-D.N. SEDLEY, The Hellenistic Philosophers, u, Cambridge et al. 1987, p. 333, and S. Boszien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, Oxford 1998, pp. 23-7. yiveras would perhaps be more in line with Stoic usage (see S. Bonzien, Determinism cit., pp. 19-27), but cfr. e.g. Sexr. Emp. adv. math. xt 22-7 and 33-4 = Curys. fr. 75 S.V.F. 11 pp. 18-9. 2 E.g. Sext. Emp. adv. math, 1x 211 = Curvs. fr. 341 S.V.F. np. 119, and the views of Zeno Chrysippus Posidonius apud STOB. anthol. 1 11, 1°, printed infra, Appendix. See for instance A.A. Lone-D.N. SenLEY, op. cit., 1, Cambridge el al. 1987, p. 199, and cfr. supra, note 20, infra, text to note 82. Senec. ep. Luc, 95, 13 states that decreta (e.g. detinitions of virtues) are the causes of precepts (praecepta) and everything else {et horum causae sunt et omnium). 1 assume that the decreta here are not “sayables" (Aextü) but in order to function as causes have been interiorized, that is to say have been integrated in the regent part of the soul. » Cfr. Posin, fr. 95 E.-K. apud Stop, anthol. 1 11, 1° (printed infra, Appendix): aittov 8° éoti tivos, dv 6 éxeivo, and Zen. fr. 90 S.V.F. 1 p. 25 apud Cic. ac. post. 1 39, quicquam and aliquid. Olympiod. in Aristot. cat. p. 44.1, and ps.-Simpl. ir Aristot. de late and rare. For Úroypapí as the Stoic term for a simpler or preliminary sort of definition see for instance Antipater fr. 23 (2) TlAdt@v tpixòc tó aittov: pnoi yap, be’ où ÉE où npög 8 Kupim@tepov È Aysitaı td bp’ où TobTO di Tv TO notoûv, 6 tou vovg. For the various strings of causes attributed to Plato see the texts collected and commented upon in the opus magnum of Dörrie and Baltes”. The Platonic triad is attested for the first time in the first century BCE, in Varro’s explanation of the mysteries of Samothrace”. We do not # See J. MansreLD-D.T. RUNIA, Aétiana cit., p. 223. > paoi yap is omitted by Stobaeus, presumably because he appends a quotation from Plato {to which we shall revert several times) introduced by the phrase Ayer yodv Ev Tipaio. puoi occurs 37 times in ps.-Plutarch’s Placita and so is Aétian. As so often it does not introduce a verbatir quotation. 2 [H. Dörrıe t]-M. Barres, Der Platonismus in der Antike, Bd. 1, Die philosophische Lehre des Platonismus. Einige grundlegende Axiome/Platonische Physik (im antiken Verständnis) I, Bausteine 101-124, StuttgartBad Canstatt 1996, pp. 118-201 and 387-538. For the triad see also J. Pépin, Theologie Cosmique et Théologie Chrétienne (Ambroise, Exam. | 1, 14), Paris 1964, pp. 17-34, and D.T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the ‘Timaeus’ of Plato (“Philosophia Antiqua”, xLıv), Leiden-New YorkKäln 1986, pp. 171-4. For the attribution of principles to Plato in numerous sources see the evidence collected in R.W. SHARPLES, Counting Plato’s Principles, in L. Ayres (ed.), The Passionate Intellect, Festschrift LG. Kidd (“Rutgers Studies in Classical Humanities”, vi), New Brunswick-London 1995, pp. 76-82 (to whose suggestions concerning AET. 1 11, 2 and Aétius in general, at pp. 77-8, 1 cannot subscribe). © Varro antig. rer. div. fr. 206 Cardauns apud AUGUST. de civ. Dei vn 28 = [H. Dorrie f]-M. Barres, Platonismus cit., ıv, p. 118, Baust. 113.1: in simulacris aliud significare caelum, aliud terram, aliud exempla re-

know what was his source for the original triad he used for this allegorical exegesis (it may have been a Timaeus commentary, supposing one to have been available which dealt with Plato's principles”), but we do know that (like Cicero) he knew and used a predecessor of Aétius”, who possibly (but see next paragraph) may have been dependent on such a commentary too. There is a not so insignificant difference: in Aétius the formal cause is rendered, as it usually is, by the PS.-PLUTARCHUS PLACIT. 1 11 AND STOBAELS ANTHOL. 113 31 ÈE où and rpòg 6). Theophrastus concurred as to the number of causes to be attributed to Plato, but disagreed as to what these are. He pointed out that Plato for the most part had dealt with first philosophy (Aristotle’s theme in metaph. A), but that, as to physics (viz., in the Timaeus, from which Theophrastus quotes significant terminology) he had introduced two causes, viz. the material and the efficient cause (note that he does not use the prepositional formulas £& où and npös Platonizing formula mpdg 6, in Varro by the Latin equivalent 6). The latter according to Theophrastus he connected with of Peripatetic ” and doxographical origin. Aristotle, discussing the agrapha dogmata and the theory of Forms, had argued that Plato only knew two causes, viz. the formal and the material cause” (note that he does not use the prepositional formulas Timacus accordingly is not a privilege of the commentary liof Greek ka0° 6, which is more Aristotelian. It is however far more probable that the triad of causes is «the power of the god and the good»”. An interpretation of the nature and number of the principles, or causes, in the terature, but already to be found in Theophrastus’ account of the principles of Aristotle’s predecessors from Thales to Plato, Hellenistic Religions (“Etudes Préliminaires aux Religions Orientales rum quas Plato appellat ideas: caelum lovem, terram lunonem, ideas Minervam vult [scil. Varro] intellegi; caelum a quo [Lp* ob] fiat aliquid, terram de qua [LE ob] fiat, exemplum secundum [KaQ’ 6 - not npòg 6!] quod fiat. See also R.W. Suarpres, Counting cit., pp. 79-82. # See Baltes at [H. Dorr FI-M. Barres, Der Platonismus in der Antike, Bd. III, Der Platonismus im 2. und 3. Jabrbundert nach Christus, Bausteine 73-100, Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt 1993, pp. 162-6, who dates the first scholastic uses of the fortlaufende Kommentar to (at the latest?) the first century BCE. # Thus already H. Dies, Dox. Graec. cit., p. 199 ff. 4 Cfr. J. Pépin, Théologie cit., p. 33, who writes that the triad «doit provenir en derniére analyse d’une présentation aristotélicienne de Platon», and goes on to argue that this “présentation” must be later than Theophrastus. , o. si Aristot. metaph. A 6. 988 a 7-10: Máútcov pév oùv nepi caw Enroupévay obta Sudpioev: puvipôv è’ Ex TOY Elpnuévov ón dvoiv uttiatv pòvov Kéypytat, 16 te tod ti ¿ori Kai TH Kata amy DAnv «té. In his De philosophia (Pino de aetern. mund. 39-43 = ARISTOT. fr. 21 R?, 19 c Ross - provided the attribution is correct) however he discussed and rejected Plato’s Demiurge, probably introduced in the discussion for dialectical reasons; see my paper Providence and the Destruction of the Universe in Early Stoic Thought, in M.J. VERMASEREN (ed.), Studies in dans l'Empire Romain”, 1xxvHm, Leiden-New York-Köln 1979, pp. 129-88, esp. p. 142 (repr. with same pagination as Study1 in my Studies in Later Greek Philosophy and Gnosticism (“Collected Studies Series”, cexcu}, London 1989). Also cfr. infra, note 75 and text thereto. # THEOPHR. phys. opin. fr. 9 Diels = fr. 230 FHS&G apud Simp... in Aristot. phys. p. 26.11-3: dbo Tag apyaz Pavaerat noteiv, 16 pév brokeipevov 05 DANY 6 apocayopeve: “navdexes” (Tim. 51 À 7], 16 8° 05 almov [Ti 29 a 6] kui xivotv è repiènte zi) 100 “Weod” Leg. Tine. 30 À 2] Kai ty “rúyadoo” le.g. Tire. 29 x 1, 30 À 2] duvaper. The “good” more properly is the final cause, but according to Theophrastus this final cause works as a moving cause (cfr. already Aristotle on Anaxagoras and others at metaph. A 3. 984 b 20-2: of pèv obv obte brokupBavovte: Gyn tod Kass tv uiziuv apya civat tòv Gvtev Édeouv Kai tiv toradryy Ódev À rival trdpyer toig odor). The doubts concerning the authenticity of this fragment expressed by D.T. Runia, Philo cit. p. 482 note 37, are unjustified. See also THEOPHR. phys. opin. fr. 20 Diels + fr. 242 FHS&G apud Procı.. in Plat. Tim. 1 p. 456.16-7 (appa rently verbatim), à yap pôvos À néliozu Madzov («Plato was the only or the principal person») ci) arö tob zpovoobvto: [scif. the Demiurgel aitia KaTEZpHoato, Onaiv à Oröppuctoz. Cfr. also another quotation (verbatim) Tueornr. fr. 320 A FHS&G apud THEMIST. in Anstot. de an. p. 108.19-21, «fxeivo» pnaiv cétioxertéoy, è ón pupev dv nom PÜOEI To ev he DANY Kat óvvénua, 10 dé altrov Kat TOMTIKÓV»».

an account generally believed, also by the present writer, to be one of the sources of physical doxography of the Aétian type. PS.-PLUTARCHUS PLACIT. 1 11 AND STOBAEUS ANTHOL. 1 13 33 however find that such evidence as is available indeed points to the Hellenistic period, even later, presumably, than Strato of Lampsacus *, If now we combine the accounts of Aristotle and Theo- This triad is consistently paralleled elsewhere in Aétius, phrastus and notice what they share, viz. the material cause, viz. in the chapter “On Principles”; one should be aware of we get the Platonic triad of efficient cause (Theophrastus), the impact of the originally Aristotelian equivalence of “prinmaterial cause (both Aristotle and Theophrastus), and formal ciples” and “causes” revealed by this parallel”. See Stob. anthol. 1 10, 16° at Aét. 1 3, 21% Miátov "Apiotwvog TPEÏG cause (Aristotle). To the best of my knowledge this has not been observed before. What I like to call “retrograde contamination” of doxographical literature, for instance with maapyds, tov Oedv tiv ÖAnv tiv idéav, by’ où ¿E ob npòs 6, 6 de Ed vous ¿ati tod kéouou ”, Y Sé HAN TO ÜNOKEILEVOV yevéoei terial deriving from Aristotle’s school writings or from Plato, is a not uncommon phenomenon”. And Aristotle’s writings may well have been more accessible in Hellenistic times than has been believed on the basis of the story of their being hid in the cellar at Scepsis *. A Platonic triad of causes as expressed by prepositional formulas, atttested as we have seen by Varro, is anyhow earlier than Aétius. Whoever was the first to employ these formulas it is impossible to say”. We shall causes, does not use the prepositional formulas but standard Aristotelian terminology: Cntijoa è’ dv tig noe Aéyovtoc Midtovos kai nomrıköv aitiov [efficient cause] Ev oîg Ayer «tov pèv odv ROIMTAV Kai ratépa Tod ravtòg eùpeiv te Kai Seitor Epyov» [PLAT. Tim. 28 cl, Aa Kui tó où Évekev kai t&Aog [final cause] 81’ dv nahiv Aöyeı «nepi cita návta éoti Kdxcivov évexa ravta» [Ps.-PLAT tóv révrov Pa- . epist. II 312 E] obdetépou tobTOV tav aitiov éuvnpovevcey 6 "Apıotot edng Ev ti SóEn ti NAdtavoc; * Cfr. infra, note 93 and text thereto. 2 H. Diets, Dox. Graec. cit., pp. 215-7, believed that Aëtius himself is responsible for contamination with Aristotle’s esoteric writings. For various examples see J.N.M. BALTUSSEN, Theophrastus on Theories of Perception: Argument and Purpose in the ‘De sensibus’ (“Quaestiones Infinitae”, vi), diss. Utrecht 1993, pp. 195-250 (chapter not to be found in the revised version, H. BALTUSSEN, Theophrastus against the Presocratics and Plato: Peripatetic Dialectic in the ‘De sensibus’ (“Philosophia Antiqua”, ıxxxvi), Leiden-New York-Köln 2000) and my papers Doxography ” ARISTOT. metapb. A 1. 1013 a 16-7: ioayüc Sé Kai tà aitia Myetar návta yap ta aina ápxai, A 2. 982 a 4-6, apyxñs aitiov (next the four causes are listed), A 3. 983 a 24: tay EE A 3. 983 b 6-8. See further J. Pépin, Théologie cit., pp. 60-7; Aristotle's De Generatione et Corruptione, Translated with Notes by C.J.F. Wiizram s (“Clarendon Aristotle Series”), Oxford 1982, p. 86, and [H. Dörrıe TI-M. BALTES, Platonismus cit., IV, pp. 378-9. * [H. Dorrie {]-M. Barres, ibid., pp. 118-20, Baust. 113.2, print and Dialectic cit., pp. 3090-1, Doxographical Studies cit., pp. 24 and 31, and Physical ‘Doxai’ in the ‘Phaedo’, in M. Karpaun-J. SPRUYT (eds.), the ms. text of ps.-Plutarch (see also infra). Diels believed The Winged Chariot. Collected Essays on Plato and Platonism in Honour after 'Apiotovoc, and ai yap adrai repi ravrög Exatépov of L.M. de Rijk (“Brill's Studies in Intellectual History”, ©), LeidenNew York-Köln 2000, pp. 1-17, esp. p. 2 note 7. are confirmed by Qusta ibn Luqa) have been interpola ” See J. Barnes, Roman Aristotle, in J. BARNES-M. GRIFFIN (eds.), Philosophia Togata II, Plato and Aristotle at Rome, Oxford et al. 1997, repr. 1999, pp. 1-69. % Note that ALEX. ÁPHROD. in Aristot. metaph. p. 59.28 ff. (= Arıstor. de bono fr. 30 R?, fr. 4 Ross, Test. 22 Gaiser), who criticizes Aristotle’s statement at metapb. A 6. 988 a 7-10 that Plato only knew two text the words Loxpatys Lagpovickou "Adnvaios, that in this a second 'ABnvotos bdEat (which ted, but they may also have been abridged away by Stobaeus (ethnicon and father’s name are frequently found in the lemmas of this chapter). Baltes, at pp. 392- 33, who points this out, also reminds us that the three principles doctrine, the definition of matter, and that of God as the intellect of the cosmos belong with the «übliche Lehre des Mittelplatonismus». ” Doxa anachronistically attributed to Thales at Ar. chapter Tig éotiv 6 Gedc), presumably because he is the archegete of

Kai Popa”, i8éa SÈ ovoía ácaros Ev toig vonuaoi Kai Taig *. God as the intellect of the universe is wavtaciais tod Beod not, of course, Peripatetic, but Stoic * and Middle Platonist. The positioning of the ideas in the divine intellect is Middle Platonist as well. The description of matter is compatible with Aristotle’s views on the subject. The parallels cited in footnotes 39-41 moreover show to what extent lemmas in the Placita may be coherent. It should however be pointed out that the parallel text at ps.-Plutarch. placit. 897 B lacks the prepositional formulas which accordingly have been abridged away here by the epitomator ”. As to the causes themselves Aétius posits a distinction: «Plato believes the bg’ où, the efficient cause, to be the more potent» of the three (ps.-Plutarch; Stobaeus has “most potent” *). The verbal difference between ps.-Plutarch and Sto- PS.-PLUTARCHUS PLACIT. 1 11 AND STOBAEUS ANTHOL. 1 13 35 baeus is minimal and may be accidental. What is in ps.-Plutarch is sufficiently clear: “more than the other two” is logically equivalent to ‘‘most of the three”. Yet an explanation of Stobaeus’ superlative is perhaps possible. Since the triad of causes is a sort of stenographic rendering of the foundations of the Timaeus, the efficient cause, naturally, represents the Demiurge. Plato at Tim. 29 A 6 calls the Demiurge «the best of causes (äpiotog tHv attıöv)». Compared to this elative characterization ps.-Plutarch’s expression is on the modest side, and Stobaeus’ more in tune”, This does not prove, however, that Stobaeus’ version is what Aétius wrote, since he may well have introduced a slight but in his view significant change. After the Aétian Plato lemma (in which as we shall see he made another change too) he appends Tim. 28 4-8 (see below), from the proem of Timaeus’ virtual monologue in the dialogue, and 29 A is not so far away. Furthermore, the statement concerning Plato’s view on the Ionian succession which has Anaxagoras as a member. Cfr. also 1 7, causality in general in Aétius is also interesting in that it re- 31 (Plato lemma) voids obv 6 Beds. © Cfr. the general definition of matter at AET. 19, 1. presents an (interpretative) effort to modernize Plato by ma- 4 Cfr. the first part of the general definition of iöte at AËT. 1 10, 1. # See e.g. the abstract from Zeno’s [epi tov dAov apud Dios. LAERT. vn 135-6 = ZEN. fr. 102 S.V.F. 1 p. 28, and Curvs. fr. 580 S.V.E. n p. 179; further the abstract from Chrysippus’ Nepi Tpovoias and Posidonius’ Mepi 0eòv book three apud Dioc. LAERT. vi 138 = Cuxxs. fr. 634 S.V.F. ni p. 192 and Posm. fr. 21 E.-K. For the Placita see Sros. anthol. 1 1, 29° (p. 35.9 W.) at AÉT. 17, 23 = Zen. fr. 157 S.V.F. 1 p. 42: Zhvov 6 Etuikôs vodv kócuov mipivov (scil. tov drv king him fully concur with the primary importance the efficient cause acquired in the Hellenistic period *. cause more strictly (/properly speaking) than the others» - i.e. de dicto rather than de re. * On the striking use of superlatives in the Timaeus see D.T. RuNIA, Philo cit., pp. 104 and 144, and Ip., The Language of Excellence in anegivato), and AËT. 17, 33 = Curxs. fr. 1027 S.V.F. 1 p. 306: ot Plato’s ‘Timaeus’ and Later Platonism, in S. GERSH-C. KANNENGIESSER TARCH, placit. 882 A); StoB. anthol. 1 1, 29> (p. 38.3 W.) has vobv évatquity”, vim), Notre Dame 1992, pp. 11-37. The formula kupinrépav ai- Etenxai [...] tov 7 dvotéto [scil. deöv] névrwv vodv év aidépt (ps.-PLu- {eds.), Platonism in Late Antiquity (“Christianity and Judaism in Anti. BEpıov eivar Deóv. tiav occurs once in Aristotle (de gen. et corr. B 9. 335 b 35-6), where however it pertains to the formal cause; no parallel in Plato. lacks toö Kdopov after è Sì Bedc vods gott, and adds 6 dì Beo¢ vob * Cfr. M. FREE, The Original Notion of Cause, in his Essays in Ancient Philosophy, New York 1987, pp. 125-50. For Plato’s not infrequent 4 Ps.-Plutarch's text (again confirmed by Qusta ibn Luqa) also ¿ori toù Kdcpou ad finem (the latter deleted by Diels, followed by Mau, Lachenaud, and Baltes). Possibly the epitomater first scrapped toò kéouov, then repented by supplying a clause at the end. There is no difference between ps.-Plutarch and Stobaeus ad sententiam here. “ Or, less likely: «he holds that the “by which" is said to be the use of “cause” in the sense of an efficient cause or responsible agent see C. NATALI, Le Cause del ‘Timeo’ e la Teoria delle Quattro Cause, in T. CaLvo-L. Brisson (eds.), Interpreting the ‘Timaeus - Critias’ (“International Plato Studies”, rx), Sankt Augustin 1997, pp. 207-13. A useful ana-

The tems bp’ ob, && ob, npög Ó, in this sense can hardly be paralleled in Plato’s own works, and they never occur in combination. & où, for instance, as a rule has a temporal meaning‘. ¿8 où is however quite often found in Aristotle as a siglum for matter tout court (also for matter gua cause, and for proximate matter)”, sometimes combined with 69’ où as siglum for the efficient cause”. There are also a few more or less coincidental instances of npòg 6 in a teleological sense in Aristotle, but this too is not standard terminology and npög 8 is not, as far as I have been able to see, combined anywhere in Aristotle with either Sq’ où or && où. Even so, Aristotle's occasional combination ¿E od plus bg’ ob may well have been one of the points of departure of the prepositional string as applied to Plato, and should be seen in relation to the attributions of causes to Plato by Aristotle and Theophrastus analyzed above. We may further quote the interesting triad of material, efficient and formal causes as expressed in part by propositional formulas (one of which however is different from its “Platonic” equivalent, viz. with eig instead of rpóc), to be found at metaph. A 3. 1069 b 36-1070 a 2 nav yap neraßdAdcı ti [material cause] kai Óró tivos [efficient cause] Kai eig n° [formal cause]: by’ où [efficient cause] lysis of Plato’s causal doctrine is provided by D. SEDLEY, Platonic Causes, «Phronesis», XLIII (1998) pp. 114-32, but Plato’s more important points and arguments are not an issue in the Placita lemma. - Galen's view is different from that of the Placita lemma, see infra, note 90. a At Prat. Crat. 398 c, and Tim. 36 8 5-6 and 54 A 7 ¿E où does not pertain to the “matter” of the Timaeus. “ E.g. ARISTOT. phys. B 3. 194 b 23-195 a 3; pol. A 8. 1256 a 8-11; de cael. Y 1. 298 b 31; metapb. U 5. 1010 a 20-1, À 2, 1013 a 24; de gen. anim. B 1. 733 b 31-2. * Aristot. #etapb. T 5. 1010 a 20-1; de gen. anim. B 1. 733 b 31-2. % Arıstor. eth. nic. H 11.1152 b 1-3; metaph. O3. 1046b 37-1047 al. © gig 11 is moreover standardly used by Aristotle for the change or development from a to è or conversely, e.g. de cael. A 8. 277 a 14-5: Blog yap tó xivovpevov ER tivos Eig TI perafódacs, Kai tabra LE ob PS..PLUTARCHUS PLACIT. I 11 AND STOBAEUS ANTHOL. 113 37 pév, tod ApWtov kivoüvtoc: è [material cause] dé, y KAN: eig 6 [formal cause] dé, to eiöog. Aristotle's terminology is not always the same”. Stobaeus is of some help in our present context, moreover, for in the Timaeus proof-text he usefully appends to the Aétian Plato lemma (see also above) he succeeds in finding parallels for the prepositions 6x6 and npöc: Tim. 28 A-R, nav Se ad TO yiyvopevov dr’ ditiov tivos [efficient cause ”] £Ë avayKys yiyvecOar navti yap GSdvatov Y@pig aitiov yéveoiv oxelv, Stav oùv 6 ômuonpyôc [efficient cause] pos [formal cause] tO Kata tavrá Exov BAérwov dei krA. What is more, Kai eig 6 etSer étupépet, and the standard formula found at metaph. A 3 983 b 8-9: E où yap Eotıv Gravee tá Svta Kai &5 ob ylyveraı rpbtou Kai etc 6 pBeiperan tehevtaiov, cfr. K 10. 1066 b 36-7; eth. nic. K 3. 1173 b 5-6; phys. T 5. 204 db 33-4 and © 3. 254 a 11-4, and de gen. et corr. A 3. 317 b 24-5. So also Theophrastus, e.g. phys. opin. fr. 2 Diels apud SIMPL. in Aristot. phys. p. 24.18-9 (= fr. 226A FHS&G) : £& dv Sé N) yévecic ¿ori toîg ovat, Kai THY pÜopüv Eig tabre yivecOm. D. FenLING, Die Wie. derhohlungsfiguren und ihr Gebrauch bei den Griechen vor Gorgias, Berlin 1969, p- 217, points our that such balanced formulas must have been quite common; apart from Aristotle and Theophrastus he cites XENOPH 218 27 D.-K. and the final sentence of Dioc. APoLL. 64 8 2 D.-K. = fr. 4 Laks. See further infra, note 96 and text thereto. Interesting echo at PLUTARCH. sept. sapient. conviv. 159 c: anôkkvtm yap &E ob mépuxe tó petaBadAov sic GAAO. 2 Cfr. also the somewhat different series bp’ où [efficient cause] ti or Kad" 6 [formal cause] - €& ob [material cause] at metaph. Z 6. 1032 a 15-25 (on various senses of pbaic). At A 18. 1022 a 14-26 kad’ 6 is explicitly said to be used in four senses, viz. in the same four as aitiov (see further infra, section Iv at subsection (a)). For cig 11 see previous note > Cfr. D.T. Runta, Philo cit., p. 104. | * This passage from the Timaeus is the first of the selection of passages from the dialogue printed [H. DéRRIE t]-M. BaLtes, Platonismus cit., IV, pp. 110-3, Baust. 111.0, where the proposition npög occurs several times. Baltes at pp. 379-81 points out that de facto four types of cause (efficiens, exemplaris, finalis and materialis) are to be discerned here, so that perhaps these Timaean passages were where later exegetes found them.

at anthol. 1 11, 3 in his chapter “On Matter” he likewise helpfully appends a quotation from the Timaeus to the Aétian Plato lemma (Aét. 1 9, 5), viz. 50 bd on the éxpayetov though no verbal parallel for the formula £É ov is to be found there. These two quotations help us to understand in what way some Platonists in retrospect may have looked for prooftexts pertaining to the prepositional triad of Platonic causes in the master’s own oeuvre, but this is by the way. The final part of the Aétian Plato lemma has it that the bq’ ov is the more (or most) potent cause, and adds (ps.-Plutarch’s text, who gua epitomator is not likely to have added anything here): toüto 8° Hv TÓ notodv. 6 goti voüg®. Stobaeus omits the words 6 ¿ori voüg. The reason for this omission, we may believe, is that the explanatory Timaeus quotation he appends mentions the Demiurge (called noınıng by Plato at Tim. 28 c 3, a passage not cited by Stobaeus). The first thing to be pointed out is that the Aétian formula tó rorodv meaning the efficient cause can be paralleled from Theophrastus, in a passage where we also find vois in combination with the prepositional formula bq’ où. In the fragment from the Physikai Doxai dealing with Plato” the term is not rovodv but Kıvoüv (just as in Eudemus’ formulation of Aristotle’s four types of cause apud Simpl. in Aristot. phys. p. 332.6 = fr. 52 Wehrli, verbatim). But in other fragments of the same work we find the term rowobv. See phys. opin. fr. 6 Diels = Theophr. fr. 227 C FHS&G (on Parmenides) apud Alex. Aphrod. in Aristot. metaph. p. 31.14-5, verbatim: 600 nowbv tag apyas, nip Kai yijv, TO pév Gs BAN 16 Se dc altıov Kai rorobv. Also compare phys. opin. fr. 4 Diels = Theophr. fr. 228 A FHS&G (on Anaxagoras)’ apud PS..PLUTARCHUS PLACIT 111 AND STOBAEUS ANTHOI.. 1 13 39 Simpl. in Aristot. phys. p. 27.4 + 15-6 + 21-2: tiv éAcirovoav aitiav averAmpooe [...] tig dè xivñoros Kai tic yevéceos aiTIOV Enéotnoe tov vobv 6 "Avabayöpag, ty’ ob «th. [...], accordingly cuufaiver 800 tas apyag avtov Akyeıv TH TE TOÚ aneipou gio Kai tov vobv. As a matter of fact tò novodv indicating the efficient cause can already be found in Aristotle *, while tomtixòv aitiov for the efficient cause occurs quite often, e.g. Aristot. de gen. et corr. A 7. 324 b 13-4, and is also used by Theophrastus ”. There is no lack of parallels for this phraseology in Aétius. Anaximander is criticized (ps.-Plutarch. placit. 876 A, a criticism absent from the parallel lemma in Stobaeus) because he spoke of matter only and left out the rotoiv aitiov (Akt. 1 3, 3). So is his follower Anaximenes (in both sources) at Aét. 1 3, 4°. Further see ps.-Plutarch. placit. 876 D at Akt. 1 3, 24, where Anaxagoras (as in Aristotle and Theophrastus) is made to introduce 16 [...] rorodv aitiov tév vobv. Also compare Aét. 1 3, 8 (both sources; Pythagoras lemma), 16 nointiKöv aittov kai eldixóv [ps.-Plutarch; didiov Stobaeus], örep goti voús 6 6c (ps.-Plutarch’s Arabic translator Qusta ibn Luga has, in Daiber's rendering: «... die wirkende, spezielle the cause of what is good and of motion (metaph. A 3. 984 b 15-22). The fact that Anaxagoras himself spoke of Nous is irrelevant insofar as Aristotle’s and Theophrastus’ impact on later doxagraphy is concerned. * ARISTOT, metaph. A 2. 1013 b 23-5: 10 dè onéppa Kai 6 larpós Kai 6 BovAevoa; Kai Ólos tó xowbv, núvta Sev à apyi tig neraßokg $ otdoewg, phys. B 3. 194 b 29-32: En 60ev à pyr ms neraßorng à Tpatn À mig Hpepncens, olov 6 Bovdedaas aitıog, xui è nuthp tod téx# Note that after vos the words tod xdouov, found in the parallel passage quoted supra, text to note 39, are absent. So is the god, also found in the parallel passage. # Quoted supra, note 32. # Theophrastus here revises Aristotle’s view, according to which Anaxagoras (and Hermotimus?) were the first to introduce Intellect as vou, Kai bag 16 zorobv tod rorovpévov Kai tó nerußaArov Tod netaßerAopivon, de gen. et corr. B 9. 335 b 27. Cfr. already PLaT.(2) Hipp. ma. 296 E: 16 no1odv Se y’ ¿otiv ode GAAO tt À 16 uinov, and the Cratylus Passages quoted infra, section Iv at subsection (b), and in note 109, * Cf. Aristor. de an. T 5. 430 a 11-3; for Theophrastus see supra, note 32 ad fin. See also infra, note 85.

PS.-PLUTARCHUS PLACIT. 111 AND STOBAEUS ANTHOL 113 41 Ursache ..., nämlich Gott {- mächtig und erhaben ist er -} “ und der Verstand») 2, Accordingly what in the present lemma may at first glance look like Stoic or Middle Platonist terminology in Aétius - and (3) Mvdayópas ’ApiototéAnc ta pév TpOta aitia dopara, TÚ dÈ Katù METOZN VÍ Kata OvpBEBHKOS tig coparikio VIOGTÁGEOS, dot’ civur tov Köcnov Capa. A complicat ed so would be acceptable, even normal, in a Stoicizing or Middle lemma‘. For the Aétian combination Pythagoras plus Aristo- Platonist context where it would not stand out - has most of tle compare Aét. 1 23, 6 (ps.-Plutarch. 890 E only) MMáztov its roots in the early Peripatos. The xpôc è, more difficult to parallel in Aristotle, looks like the addition of specifically Timaean material. This is of some importance for understanding the continuity characterizing the doxographic tradition that is llv0ayópas ‘ApiototéAnc, 1v 20, 1 and v 4, 2 (ps.-Plutarch. 902 F and 905 B only) and 11 10, 1 (both sources) TIvdayöpag MMétov "Apıotort£ing. We have noticed above that Stobaeus omitted the name-label Aristotle because he inserted a lemma at issue here. And as a shorthand rendering of the foundations on Aristotle taken from Arius Didymus. of Plato’s account in the Timaeus the Propositionsreihe is not bad at all, in fact can hardly be bettered although, naturally, it Pythagoras - Plato - Aristotle, or, more briefly (in the present chapter Plato has his own lemma) Pythagoras - Arisfails to preserve Plato’s finer points. A final remark. The Platonic triad of causes, or principles, has been interpreted as having a specifically metaphysical colouring, metaphysical in the old-fashioned sense of the word. But on the one hand the prepositional formulas themselves are quite ordinary, even colloquial Greek, and on the other one should take the existence of strings of prepositional formulas into account which have no metaphysical purport at all. The Platonic string is not “metaphysical” in itself, but became metaphysical because of its extension, viz. because of totle. What I believe is that what we have in these Aétian passages is one of earliest surviving explicit attestations of the constructed Pythagorean diadoche, or succession, later also found in Nicomachus of Gerasa and Hippolytus®. In a way this construction has its roots in Aristotle himself, who in his critical historical overview at metaph. A 6 links Plato not only with Socrates and Heraclitus but also and even especially with the Pythagoreans (not: Pythagoras), though he emphasizes the differences ”. The most important of these differences the Timaean entitites these formulas refer to“. © Useful comments at W. BURKERT, Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism, Cambridge MA 1972, pp. 59-60. “ Added by the pious translator, or a gloss by a pious reader. e Cfr. Senec. ep. Luc. 65.12: quaerimus, quid sit causa? ratio scilicet faciens, id est deus. = For the deformations see J. PÉPIN, Théologie cit., pp. 18-25. “ For these metaphysics see e.g. H. Dörrıe, Präpositionen cit. For other strings see infra at III (4) on Aristotle, note 75 and text thereto for “the Peripatetics” and a string in Sextus Empiricus, and note 102 for a Stoic doctrine. Strings of prepositions also occur in the New Testament: epist. Roman. 11:36, St ÉE adroù Kai du’ aùtoò Kai cig abtov tà névta, cfr. 1 epist. Corinth. 8:6, epist. Coloss. 1:16, epist. Hebr. 2:10. For the relation to Greek philosophy see the account of G.H. van Kooten, The Pauline Debate on the Cosmos, Leiden 2001, pp. 111-3. “ For Nicomachus see my Prolegomena Mathematica from Apollonius of Perga to the Late Neoplatonists (“Philosophia Antiqua”, Lxxx), Leiden-New York-Köln 1998, pp. 86-7, 118. Especially note NicoMacu. intr. arithm. 11 28, 1 at p. 140.14-6 Hoche: Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle. For Hippolytus see my Heresiography in Context: Hippolytus' ‘Elenchos’ as a Source for Greek Philosophy (“Philosophia Antiqua”, Lvi), Leiden-New York-Köln 1992, pp. xv-xvn and passim. “ For the less cautious contribution of the early Academy and Theophrastus see W. Burkert, Lore cit. pp. 62-6, and, for its influence on the later traditions, pp. 53-83. But pace Burkert the inclusion of Aristotle in several Aétian lemmas (cited supra, text after note 65) makes derivation of these lemmas from Theophrastus most unlikely.

JAAP is that Plato according to Aristotle was the first to introduce the distinction between what is corporeal and what is incorpre construction of a diadoche of the kind mentioned 68 above leaves ample room for the attribution of tenets to a particular member, or members, of the succession, or hairesis: Platonic doctrine may with a clear conscience be attributed to the purported archegetes Pythagoras, or even to Plato's pupil Aristotle. Conversely, Peripatetic doctrines may be attributed to an early Pythagorean, as in the pseudo-Pythagorean tract On the Nature of the All published as if written by “Ocellus”, presumably to be dated to the second century BCE, or in the Tlepi tav ka0ékov Adyav of “Archytas” based on Aristotle’s Categories, to be dated not later than the first century CE. To a remarkable degree this is the case also here. Timaeus, Plato’s fictional spokesperson in the dialogue, is represented as (or was believed to be) a Pythagorean”, and the dogmatic pseudo-Pythagorean tract On the Nature of Cosmos and Soul by “Timaeus Locrus” was written to prove that Plato had taken over the main doctrines of the Timaeus from the Pythagoreans, or at the very least written by someone who sincerely believed (just as the early Academics and Theophrastus as well as, to a considerable extent, Aristotle) that Plato belongs with the tradition of Pythagorean philosophy. As Franco Ferrari pointed out to me during the discussion following the oral presentation at Rome, the present lemma has as its background Plato’s distinction between two kinds of causes at Tim. 46 c-E (which has no counterpart in “Timaeus Locrus”). The Timaeus, 1 have come to believe, really was a ® See W. Burkert, Lore cit., pp. 30-2. “ See M. Barres, Timaios Lokros. Über die Natur des Kosmos und der Seele (“Philosophia Antiqua”, xxi), Leiden-New York-Kéln 1972, pp. 1-4, and W. Mare (ed.), Timaens Locrus. De Natura Mundi et Animae (“Philosophia Antiqua”, xx1v), Leiden-New York-Köln 1972, pp. 83-5. PS.-PLUTARCHUS PLACIT. 111 AND STOBAEUS ANTHOL. 1 13 43 kind of super-market for ancient exegetes, who managed to find there all and whatever they wanted or needed. At Tim. 46 ce “Timaeus” (i.e. Plato) states that there is one type of causes that are primary (aitiag npdtac) because they belong with intelligent nature and the soul, which is invisible (G6patov) in contrast to the four elements, all of which are visible bodies (c@pata rúvta ó6patá). The soul and intelligence, we may infer, are incorporeal, and so are the primary causes. The other type of causes, called auxiliary (ovvaitia) and secondary (Sevtépac) by Plato - though people in general, he says, consider them to be primary - , are moved by others and move others through the force of necessity (xatà dvayxns). The term ávúykn is suggestive: in some passages it is one of Plato’s names for what later came to be called the material principle *. The secondary causes belong with the elements which are bound up with the material principle Plato elsewhere calls «the errant kind of cause» (to tig nAavauevng elos aitiac, Tim. 48 A 6-7). In the Aétian lemma this doctrine of the Timaeus is summarized as tú pév aporta aitia dompata, ta de Katd petox Ay À xutà ovpPeBnKds tig copar Úrootúceos. We observe that aporta altra corresponds to Plato's aitiug aportas and in fact is directly derived therefrom, and that their attribute dompata represents his dópatov. The peculiar formula c@paun óróotacig” (‘corporeal substructure”) corresponds to ® E.g. Tim. 47 E 5-48 a 2: peperypévy yap odv fi tobde 100 kéopou yéveois ÉE “Avayxns te Kai Nod ovotéoeus £yevvhôn. See further F.M. Cornrorp, Plato's Cosmology. The ‘Timaeus’ of Plato Translated with a Running Commentary, London 1948 and later repr., pp. 159-77, on “Reason and Necessity”. # No parallels earlier than a number of Christian writers (Basil, Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, Epiphanius), and the late Platonists Proclus, Simplicius, and Philoponus. The term óró01a017 occurs several times in Aétius, in the sense of “material” (Stop. anthol, ı 12, 1* at AËT. 110, 1; ps.-PLUTARCH. placit. 910 n at AËT. v 27, 1), or in opposition to Enpucig

Plato’s o®@puta and avaykn (or rather "Avay«n). The (Platonic) relation of these causes to the material principle is expressed by the originally Platonic concept of participation (uetoyi). I believe this pertains in the first place to “Pythagoras”. “Aristotle” is brought in by means of Aristotle's technical term sunßeßnxög, used a shade kataypnotixas. It has to be acknowledged that (like “Pythagoras”) he posited the PS.-PLUTARCHUS PLACIT. I 11 AND STOBAEUS ANTHOL. 113 45 (Tim. 53 c-55 c, 55 D-E, 56 c) these elements themselves are constituted of the prime material factor and the incorporeal triangles and polyedra which determine their respective characters. One may add by the way that the doctrine that the cosmos is a body is also Stoic, see e.g. Chrys. fr. 550 S.V.F. n p. 173 apud Plutarch. de stoic. rep. 1054 E-F, a verbatim quotation from the second book of Chrysippus’ Ox Motion: téexistence of primary incorporeal causal entities, viz. the First Aeov pév 6 KOGHOG Gud éotiv. And ps.-Plutarch. 886 E at Mover or First Movers; though these apparently are final Aét. 1 4, 1-2 (which actually in this author is a single lemma, rather than efficient causes, gua “First” they may indeed be not two), summarizing no less than three Aétian lemmas (cfr. called “first causes”. kata guußeßnKög seems to embrace all Stob. anthol. 1 21, 6°; 20, 1°, and 20, tat Aét. 11 4,1:4,2 and the Aristotelian causal factors which are bound up with mat- 4, 7), states that according to Pythagoras, Plato, and the ter. What is interesting is that “matter” itself is not presented Stoics the cosmos is corporeal, a statement that is consistent as a cause here (quite un-Aristotelian!), but as something in with the Got sivat tov kócuov có ua in the other lemma. which the causal factors inhere. Stobaeus really was on the Aristotle himself once makes a distinction between two types of causes similar to that found in Plato’s Timaeus. In right track when he deleted “Aristotle” from the Aétius lemma and substituted the abstract from Arius Didymus on chapters nine and ten of the second book of the De generatione the four Aristotelian types of cause. If the above analysis is correct, we have also found an et corruptione he discusses the causes of coming to be and explanation for the final phrase @ot’ givar tov KOopOV CÓMO, as well as the formal cause are involved; note that the latter is passing away in general. He naturally argues that the material found in ps.-Plutarch only. Diels considered this to be have explicitly said to include the final cause (de gen. et corr. B 9. been interpolated”. But a non sequitur it is not: the cosmos 335 b 7: (e dè to où Evexev à popgi] Kai tó cidos). But he would not be produced as apotelesma in the form of body if the corporeal qualities (resulting from participation) were not insists that we also need a third cause of continuous coming to be and passing away. This turns out to be the cause of motion present in “matter”. This is good Platonic doctrine, set out in the Timaeus. See Tim. 32 8 8-c 2, where 16 tod Kéopo0u oGpa (for which cfr. also 28 B 8) comes into being as a whole consisting of the four elements”; as we are to learn shortly and change, or the efficient cause, specified in chapter ten as (Stop. 1 26, 5 at AËT. 1 31, 5; Ar. 115, 1, both sources; ps.-PLUTARCH. 894 F-895 A at AËT. nt 6) or to vonpa (Stop. 18, 14 at AÉT. 1 22, 6, and once in its original sense (Ps.-PLUTARCH, 895 D at AET. m 9, 5). ps.-PLuTARCH. 901 B at AËT Iv 14, 2 is corrupt. % Dox. Graec. cit., pp. 61, 65: “inepta additamenta”. He blamed Aétius himself, or a dumb scriba. ” Apparently a well-known passage, discussed by PLUTARCH. de an. the «motion along the inclined circle» (B 10. 336 a 32)". Now Aristotle argues that his predecessors only dreamed of this third type of cause and were never explicit about it”. He procr. 1016 p-E, 1017 a; quoted Eus. praep. evang. x1 32, 2 and xm 18, 4 and Stos. anthol. 1 20, 9°. Also cfr. AËT. 1 6, 4. "Passage discussed by J. Pepin, Théologie cit., pp. 24, 65-7, but not in relation to the present Aétian lemma. * This is somewhat surprising in view of what he says about Anaxagoras Hesiod Parmenides Empedocles at metaph. A 3. 984 b 8-4. 985 b 3, though we should take his rider into account (985 a 10-8: «They

then gives two examples (B 9. 335 b 9-336 a 12), viz. Socrates in the Phaedo, who argues that the Forms are causes of coming PS.-PLUTARCHUS PLACIT. I 11 AND STOBAEUS ANTHOL. 1 13 47 the Peripatetic” (Aristotle occurs in tv 2, 6, both sources again; chapters Iv 2 and tv 3, on the soul qua incorporeal to be and passing away, and others (viz., the early materialists, whose view is to be preferred to that of “Socrates”) who believed that matter itself, e.g. the hot, or fire, is the cause of and gua corporeal, belong together). The other cases with motion. Both these options, naturally, are argued against and “On Sense-Perception and the Senses”, where “Aristotle” is the name-label “Peripatetics” derive from Stobaeus. Stob. anthol. 1 50, 3 at Akt. placit. ıv 8, 4 (in the chapter rejected. It is not entirely to be precluded that Aristotle has at 8, 6) has an interesting lemma with prepositional formulas Tim. 46 c-E in mind, since he stands Plato’s hierarchic order on its head and in this dialectical context prefers the point of and a blend of Stoic and Peripatetic terminology: kata toda view of those who according to the Timaeus passage call those causes primary which according to Plato are secondary. We Gpyuvov kai aicOntmprov, Ka’ 6 À évépyeta, Kai <ob> Evexa notice anyway to what extent the Aétian lemma distorts Aristotle’s view by attributing to him the exact reverse of what he really is Aétian rather than Didymean, for the introductory believed. And we also see that this lemma attributes to “Pymatter, in Aétian lemmas found in Stobaeus only. The usual thagoras” the Platonic distinction between corporeal and informula is oi (Gé). There is a single parallel for kata tows in corporeal entities which according to Aristotle (metaph. A 6, see above) the Pythagoreans did not make”. Arius Didymus, viz. in the account of Stoic ethics at Stob. Nepıramrkoög tetpayas EE où 16 Hyepovixdv, dl où tò tó aioOntôv #. I had some doubt as to whether this lemma xatà toúg cannot be paralleled in ps.-Plutarch or, for that anthol, u 7, 7 p. 79, 14 W., xatà tods and tñc aipéoeuc tabtys. But this is not enough. What is more, in favour of (4) oi Nepixatytixoi tóv aitiov civar tà pév atofnté, tà Aétian authorship is the fact that the lemmas at Aét. 1 8, 2-4 dì vonté. Several chapters in Aétius feature “Aristotle” as are arranged according to a numerical sequence: Epicurus two well as “the Peripatetic(s)”, in separate lemmas”, so what we factors, Plato three, the Peripatetics four. have in the present chapter is no exception. At Aët. plaeit. n 3 “Aristotle” (in both sources) is found in lemma three, “Heracleides and all the Peripatetics” in lemma five. Stob. anthol. 1 49, 1° at Akt. placit. ıv 3, 10 has the name-label “Xenarchus ” The 54 où of this lemma for the Spyavov is paralleled in Philo (see infra, note 97) and in Sextus Empiricus, see immediately below: ¿E où does not pertain to matter but apparently to the moving cause, while xu0' 6 for the energeia apparently pertains to the specific effort one has to make. One is reminded of Sextus Empiricus’ use of preposiseem to have come into contact with two of the causes which we have defined in our On Nature, viz. the material and the moving cause, but only vaguely so and in no way clearly», etc.) It also is quite surprising that the Demiurge is not mentioned (see supra, note 31). Obviously Aristotle did not take the god of the Timaeus any more seriously than he did Parmenides’ Daimon or Hesiod’s Eros, but he could have mentioned him nevertheless. # Cfr. W. BURKERT, Lore cit., p. 60. * 1 here simply follow Diels’ questionable reconstruction but have checked the sources. tional formulas in a similar context, viz. in his discussion of the criterion at pyrrb. byp. u 22-84 (chapter 5: repi tod by" ob, 6 nepi tod 31 ob, 7 epi 100 Ka’ 6) and adv. math. vn 263-313, 320-34, 343-58, 370-9, 388 ff. Announced at pyrrh. byp. tr 16: 10 Aoyıköv kpirápiov Akyoıt’ div tpixd:, ro bp’ ob [efficient cause] kai 16 81” où [instrumental cause] Kai tó Kad’ è [specific effort], olov bp’ où pév avOparos, dv où Sé fitor ataByore i) fravou Kad’ è Sé 1] TpoGHoAN tig pavtacias, Kad’ Hy 6 ivdporos Emıßakkeı kpivew did tivos tv rporipnpévwov, The sense of these formulas is in some cases different, but the agreement as to the use of 61 ob and xa0’ è is noteworthy.

In the same Aétian chapter there is another lemma with the name-label “the Peripatetics”, Stob. azthol. 1 50, 16 at Aët. placit. ıv 8, 14: oi Tlepınarnrıkoi oùk GvEU pév ovyKatadécems tac aiodijoerg, où pévtor OvyKatabécetg. But Stob. 1 50, 14-6 at Aét. ıv 8, 12-4 is a sort of appendix to this chapter, listing differing tenets concerned with KxataAnyis and ovyxatdQecic with (in succession) the name-labels Stoics, Academics, and Peripatetics. It may, or may not, originally PS.-PLUTARCHUS PLACIT. 111 AND STOBAEUS ANTHOL [13 49 the causal doctrines of Aristotle (and Pythagoras ...) and the Peripatetics at Aét. placit. 1 13, though the difference as formulated, as we have seen, is more a question of wording and perspective than of content. The reason behind the mention of both Aristotle (and Pythagoras ...) and the Peripatetics may be that in the third lemma Aristotle belongs with the platonizing Pythagorean succession, or hairesis, and that the Peripatetics gua school had to to be listed too - a school which in have been (part of) a separate Aétian, or even proto-Aétian, this context, Le. on the basis of the tenet attributed to it, is a chapter ”. branch of the Pythagorean hairesis. Next is Stob. antbol. 150, 23 at Aét. placit. ıv 9, 7, in the chapter “Whether the Senses are Veridical” (where Aristotle is at 9, 3; Stobaeus only): oi Mepirarn tixol napa tas dovapers tov aicOntnpiov [scil, tag Kata pépos alo@moe1g yivecdaı], as opposed to the pores theory of the lemma which comes before. In this chapter too there is a second lemma with this name-label, Stob. 1 50, 29 at Aét. rv 9, 12: oi Tepixatytixoi tov vontov [scil. tas HSovac Kai tas Abrus eivar]: où yap rüot (5) ot Zrwixoi navte TÁ aitia OOUaTIKÓ: tvevpata yap. For the well-established fact that according to the Stoics causes are corporeal see e.g. Ar. Didym. fr. 18 Diels apud Stobaeum, quoted infra, Appendix. What may be noticed is that navta before ta aitia not only brings out the diaphonia with Pythagoras, Aristotle, and the Peripatetics, but also leaves room for distinctions between different types of causes. We paivetat tà adtà fidéa te Kai Aunnpa KabdnEep Acuxú TE Kai know that the Stoics distinguished between antecedent and péhava. The diaphonia here is with Epicurus in the preceding lemma, to whom the view is ascribed that pleasures and pains derive from the perception of sensibles. The last item to be mentioned is from ps.-Plutarch’s proem, placit. 874 F at Aét. placit. prooem. 3. Here “Aristotle containing causes, and also spoke of perfect and supplemenand Theophrastus and all the Peripatetics” are cited for their view on the division of philosophy. No difference, let alone disagreement. This harmony puts the distinctions between Aristotle and the Peripatetics as set out in the chapters cited above into sharper relief. In some cases it clearly was of some relevance to point this out, just as throughout the Placita differences between the Stoics in general and individual members of the school, or between Plato and other Academics are not infrequently highlighted. Accordingly this also holds for tary causes®. But as far as we know Aétius was not interested in these differences; even the far more detailed Arius Didymus abstract just cited provides no information on this score. The reason for their corporeality as given in this lemma, viz. that they are ““breaths”, and so parts of the divine Preuma which is the novotv par excellence, pertains to their active rôle and internal strength *. Only bodies can act, for only bodies °° Overview at R.J. Hankinson, Cause and Explanation in Greek Thought, Oxford 1998, pp. 238-52. * See Cic. top. 58: unum [scil. genus causarum est] quod vi sua id quod sub cam vim subiectum est certe efficit, on which see P.L. Donısı, Fato e volonta umana in Crisippo, «Atti dell’ Accademia delle Scienze di Torino», crx (1974-75) pp. 1-43, esp. pp. 3-4, and de fat. 42-3 on which see In., Fato eit., pp. 4-10, and M. FREDE, Original Notion cit., pp. 139- » See supra, note 15 and text thereto. 40; also S. BOBzIEN, Determinism cit, p. 53 note 97, and at greater

PS.-PLUTARCHUS PLACIT. 1 11 AND STOBAEUS ANTHOL. [ :3 51 possess pneumatic force. But we should acknowledge that this is water, etc.) The Greek word dkivntov means “unchanged” lemma merely characterizes the causes gua corporeal, not qua as well as “unmoved”. The lemma in the doxography thus is a causes; for information about the latter we have to turn for much compressed rendering of Aristotle's point, which moinstance to the abstract from Arius Didymus apud Stobaeum. reover was implicitly accepted by Theophrastus who pointed Assuming one may use later terminology: to be a (body with) condition for being a cause, but not a sufficient one. To be a out that Anaxagoras was the first to posit the efficient cause“. We have also seen above that in Aétius’ chapter “On principles” two of Thales’ purported followers, Anaxicause a body also has to be a npög ti (or tivi) más Eyov. And mander and Anaximenes, are criticized for failing to take the this ti or tivi must be an émitndeiws Éyov®. moving, or efficient, cause into account”. pneuma, scil. a Únokeipevov noıöv and mac éyov is a necessary (6) OuAñs kai ot Epeöfig 16 npôtov aitiov axivntov úxepívavto. At first glance this is odd, even if we are prepared to take Thales and his following (oi épeëñc) cum grano salis. But we should not do so. A closer look demonstrates how a doxographical lemma on Thales c.s. can state that these philosophers believed the First Cause to be immobile. We do know that the early Ionian monists posited a single principle (Aristotelian term) only. Aristotle criticizes them for pre- Generalizing statements about the early physicists, as we see, are already found in Aristotle. In the Aétian Placita this tendency is even stronger. Thales, of whom Aristotle and Theophrastus did not know very much, becomes a symbolic figure, not unlike his counterpart Pythagoras. To both these figure-heads (for Pythagoras see for instance supra, this section at subsection (3)) doctrines associated with their purported fol. lowers may be attributed (name-labels sometimes added, somecisely this reason at metaph. A 3. 983 b 6-18: they posit a times not). But the issue of the part, or rather the variety of parts played by succession (diadoche) and school (hairesis) in the single material substance as element and principle of things, Placita literature is too big to be treated in the present paper. which remains what and as it is because according to them nothing comes to be or perishes simpliciter (toùto atoiyeiov Kai tadtnv apy act cival tv Óvicov, Kai 5a todto obte (7) <oi> Etmkoi tó rpótov aïriov bpiouvro kivntóv. The first Ze. most important cause of the Stoics is without yiyvecOar ovdev ofovtat obte anddAvabar, dg tig ToLadTHS doubt the God, who is not only the nowodv and mover, but púceos del o@Copévys). Even if we force ourselves to disrealso is moved and changes throughout the cosmological-andgard the a-historical treatment of the early monists as a sort of cosmogonic processes *, crypto-Eleatics®, the fact remains that according to Aristotle their single principle, or cause, in itself remains unchanged {not affected by coming to be and passing away insofar as it * See supra, text to note 57, ® Supra, text to note 60. Thales may be included ad sententiam, because according to Aristotle and Theophrastus (supra, note 57 and text length in In., Chrysippus’ Theory of Causes, in K. TERODIAKONOU (ed.), Topics in Stoic Philosophy, Oxford 1999, pp. 200-1. 2 Cfr. supra, notes 20 and 22. © Cfr. phys. A 4. 187 a 27-8 on the Koi? 66Éa tv quowx@v, and A 8. 191 a 24-33. thereto) Anaxagoras was the first early physicist to posit the moving cause. Note moreover that at ps.-PLUTARCH. placit. 873 D (part of text omitted by Stobaeus) at AËT. 1 2, 2 Thales is criticized because he only spoke of matter and left out tó eldog $ kukodpev Èvreléyeiav, Kai Ñ OTÉPNOL. * See Plutarch's paraphrase of what was to be found in book one of

IV. Some Comments on Other (Stobaean) Lemmas PS.-PLUTARCHOS PLACIT. | 11 AND STOBAEUS ANTHOL. 113 53 önAoüv is intransitive, but I prefer to take it as transitive, The word éxaotov pertains to “each” of the four prepositional Stobaeus’ chapter not only depends on the Aétian chapter formulas that follow. The formula oyuaor tig Epunveius as a whole as its matrix, but is also, as to several of the can be paralleled®: tig fpunveiug ox mua, “form of exprespassages he chose to insert, much influenced by the 61 6 of sion”, pertains to (the meaning of) a metaphor or formula. So the general descriptive definition in its first lemma. The Dithe translation of this lemma is: «Aristotle said that one madymean lemma, anthol. 1 13, 1° on the three Stoics, emphasikes each cause clear if one uses such figures of expression as zes that all three said that the cause is a 6’ 6. The final lemma, anthol.1 13, 2 on “Ocellus”, is introduced by a phrase the following, and calls the “from what” <the matter>, the which without doubt was written by Stobaeus: OKedAog Épnthe “owing to what” the end». cev civut aitiov 81 6 yiyvetai n. “by what” what acts, the ‘according to what” the form, and This lemma can be exactly paralleled. Porphyry apud Simpl. in Aristot. phys. pp. 10.35-11.3% states rerpaz@s obv (a) anthol. 1 13, 1°, second text: ’Apiatotéàng Epnoe dnAobv Exaotov yp@uevov cyMpuor tig Eppn veias TOLOÚTOLG, 16 te & où Aéyovta <tiv DANv>, Kai tó KO" où td noLoby, TO dè xu0’ è 16 cidoc, tó Se 61’ 6 to tédos. It has been pointed out above that this lemma is to be attributed to Arius Didymus”. brackets by Diels as a “fraus Stobaci” and not even mentioned in C.A. Hureman, Philolaus of Croton. Pythagorean and Presocratic, A Commentary on the Fragments and Testimonia with Interpretive Essays, Cambridge 1993. Épaoav on the other hand occurs five times in ps.-Plutarch, The verbal form égnoe is not Aëtian, but typical for Arius Didymus and occasionally used by Stobaeus himself, e.g. in with two Stobaean parallels; this form is therefore Aëtian. the “Ocellus’’ lemma at the end of the chapter (see above), and he also interpolates it in an Aétian lemma where ps.Plutarch lacks a verb", Wachsmuth in apparatu states that # Cfr. GALEN. de meth. medend. x p. 225.4-5 K.: 26 yap preypalvor EAKOS OUTMOL LEYOHEVOV duorov HEV EZEL TO THs Eppnveius oye 10 pi- Kpov Eixos, schol. veter. in Pindar. pyth. 4, schol. 318 b 3-4: tò di 1%: Epunveiag cy pate wARotaKis VAZxpav KEZpnzal. * Porma. fr. 122F Smith (= [H. Dörrıe f]-M. Bares, Platonismus cit., IV, pp. 142-6, Baust. 117), attributed by Smith to Porphyry's Commentary on the Physics. SENEC. ep. Luc. 65, 4-11 (= [H. Dorrie t]-M. BALTES, Platonismus cit., 1v, pp. 132-5, Bast. 116.1) lists and discusses Chrysippus’ On Providence at de stoic. rep. 1052 c = Crys. fr. 604 S.V.F. up. 185, tov Ata pnoiv abgeobar péypic dv sig aùtàv Gnavta Katavurwon, and his report at de comm. not. 1077 p-E = Curys. fr. 1064 Aristoile's four types of cause but does not use prepositions. He goes on S.V.F. n p. 312. idea, and includes (65, 8) the following Platonic list, this time using pre- # Cfr. supra, notes 2 and 7, text after note 12, and section 111 at subsection (2). Its very briefness suggests that we are dealing with an abstract from a larger context. For proof that Stobaeus abridged and to say (a-historically) that Plato “added a fifth”, viz. the exemplar or positional formulas (applied to the making of a statue): id ex quo aes est, id a quo artifex est, id in quo forma est quae aptatur illi, id ad quod exemplar est quod imitatur is, id propter quod facitentis propositum est. There is a modified a Didymean text (Ar. DinyMm. fr. 36 Diels) compare Eus. praep. evang. xv 18, 3 with Stos. anthol. 1 20, 1°, on which see the compartial parallel in Galen's De usu partium (in p. 464.7-465.10 ment of D.T. Runia, Additional Fragments cit., pp. 366-7. Galen first discusses a view he ascribes to Plato, viz. that the akonög # Anthol.1 18, 4” at AËT. placit. 19, 3. Anthol. 1 24, 1' at AÉT. 19, 3 has no counterpart in ps.-Plutarch, but here Epnoev will be a Stobaean addition too, see J.MansreLp-D.T. Runta, Aétiana cit., p. 232. Also cir. anthol. 1 21, 69 at Air. u 5, 5 (Aha Épnoe xtà.), included between = (I. Dórrie f]-M. BALTES, Platonismus cit., ıv, pp. 138-41, Baust. 116.2). {final cause, aim) tis évepyrias is the first, or primary, cause for all things that come to be. He then formulates a doctrine he accepts {nueis [...] ouygopnouvzeg), listing five types of cause expressed by prepositional formulas: rp&:ov pév Kai p@diota, dl è yiyvetai tt [final

ñ apy Kata tov ApictotéAnv: À yap tó ÉË od ag À DAN À tó PS.-PLUTARCHUS PLACIT. 111 AND STOBAEUS ANTHOL. I 13 55 apparently referring to Aristotle’s historical overview in »me- Kad’ è de tó eidos $ tó BQ’ OD bc tó ro1obv $ TO Bt’ Ó (e Td taph. A, agreed, see fr. 52 Wehrli apud Simpl. in Aristot. phys. téhoc. To be sure, the sequence is slightly different, and p. 322.6-9 (= Porphyry uses ápxh instead of aittov - but cfr. ibid. p. 115.1): Aéyer 6 Eténuog Óti «tO pév broKeipevov Kai TO [Dórrie] and Baltes cit, pp. 128-9, Baust. 11.4-5, where he says 60aydc Se N üpxn Aéyetal, toouvray@c Kivobv apórtos rúvies [scil. all the physicists] Aru@vto. tiv kai tó airıov. This paraphrases a statement of Aristotle him- Se poppñv noAAoi, 16 SE Ob Éveku ÉAUTTOVEG Kai Ext puxpov». self”, so the substitution is entirely legitimate from an Aris- Note that the only prepositional formula used by Eudemus is totelian point of view. the standard Aristotelian où Evexa, not found in the later I submit that Arius Didymus and Porphyry depend on strings of prepositions. Accordingly the term terpuxüg and the same exegetical tradition. This particular series of prepothe identifications of the four causes as matter, form etc. we sitional formulas cannot be paralleled from Aristotle's own have in Arius Didymus and Porphyry derive from Aristotle, works, though we have seen above that he occasionally prowhile the petrified prepositional formulas found there reprevides clusters of prepositional expressions - but we have also sent a later development”. noticed that the prepositions used by him may vary”. It is It is not possible to say what happened between Aristotle interesting to adduce what he has to say about the formula and Arius Didymus: the situation, as already pointed out in xa’ 6, which according to Arius Didymus and Porphyry the introductory section of the present paper, may be compapertains to the formal cause only. This formula is discussed red to that of having a stick of which one only sees both ends, at metaph. A 18. 1022 a 14-26; according to Aristotle is has while the long middle part remains invisible. The only eviseveral different meanings (Aéyeta1 noAkaxüg), to begin with dence that Aristotle’s followers the Peripatetics used a prepoas many meanings as there are causes (6Am@g SÈ 10 Ka” è sitional string consisting of four items is found in Aétius, but ioux@c Kai tó aittov dnépéet), of which the formal cause the context is different and the prepositions (one of which is comes first and the material second. For the quartet as diitself different, and one entirely lacking) are mostly used in a scussed at length by Aristotle one may further refer to medifferent way”. And the only observation by an early Peripataph. A 2. 1013 a 24-b 28, where the only prepositional formula is && ob for the material cause, and to phys. B 3. prepositional formulas is in a fragment (not verbatim) of Eu- 194 b 23-195 a 3, where we have the combination £ë ov plus demus, who argues that motions and comings into being are tetic I have been able to find concerning the correct use of où évexa plus 614 ti. As to the fact that there are four types of cause Aristotle is explicit, see metaph. A 3. 983 a 26-7: tà & ait Akyeraı terpaxós. His pupil Eudemus of Rhodes, cause], devtepov &', Up" où yiyvetar [efficient cause], Kui tpitov, && où * The passage metaph. A 3.983 a 24-b 1 (= [H. Dörrıe {]-M. BarTES, Platonismus cit., tv, p. 128, Baust. 115.0) briefly discusses the four types of cause (on the possibly Academic origin of this doctrine see Baltes, at p. 407, with references). Cfr. also phys. T 7. 207 b 34-5: Enei Se tà aitia duypntar rerpayà; KtA. See further the elaborate discussion of the [material cause], kai tétaptov, 6v où [instrumental cause], kai neuntov, four types of cause at phys. B 3, esp. 195 a 15-6: Gavia dè ta viv eipnel PobAet, tó xa0' 6 [formal cause]. # Metapb. A 1. 1013 a 16-7, quoted supra, note 37. péva aitia els téttapas ninter tpdmong Tovs pavepozätovs. For Eudemus % Supra, notes 48-52 and text thereto. cfr. infra, note 96, 4 See supra, text to note 78.

more properly characterized by the eis 6” than by the €& onTM. Nevertheless, the situation regarding Aristotle is not so bad when compared to that in which we find ourselves regarding lemmas on for instance the Stoics in Arius Didymus and Aétius, where we can only see one end of the stick. Amalgams of the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Peripatetic strings are found in Philo”, so (as was to be expected) it is certain that not only PS.-PLUTARCHUS PLACIT. 111 AND STOBAEUS ANTHOL, 115 57 the Platonic but also the Aristotelian and Peripatetic series have to be dated before Aétius. (b) anthol. 1 13, 1°, too long to quote here” (see infra, Appendix). This fragment of Arius Didymus, especially the section on Chrysippus, is discussed elsewhere”. For the section on Posidonius and the Didymus fragment as a whole see Kidd’s commentary **. In the Zeno section the formula aitıöv ¿ou 50 6 yivetui tt echoes Plato's at Crat. 413 a 3-4, 6 è yap % Cfr. supra, note 51. * Eupem. fr. 94 Wehrli apud SiMPL, in Aristot. phys. p. 863.4-5: Ev tovtoig 6 Ebônpos rpootiAneiv ón rácal at Kivioetg Kai ai peraPolai uno tod cig 6 paid. ov Aéyovtat Y and tod EE 00 kr. (For Eudemus’ standard formulation of the four Aristotelian types of cause see supra, text to note 93). Strato may have disagreed, see fr. 72 Wehrli apud SimeL. in Aristot. phys. p. 807.3-4: è Etpatov tiv kivnotv où pdvov Ev TH kivopivo pnoiv elvas, GA wai Ev td EE ob kai év 16 Ets 6, «TA. We should observe that both in the Eudemus and in the Strato fragment the propositional formulas are substantivated (ro sig 6 etc.), just as in the formulas found in Sextus Empiricus (supra, note 78). This indeed points to a discussion about such formulas, provided Simplicius’ rendering is to be trusted. Nothing is known about the contents of Strato’s Mepi uitimv (supra, note 2). From the fragments of the Physikai Doxai on the principles it is already clear that Theophrastus subscribed to Aristotle’s doctrine of the four types of cause. He uses £& o not infrequently in the sense of proximate matter, with verb forms such as rorodarv or ouvriléaoiv, e.g. hist. plant. 1v 7,5, de caus. plant. tv 7, 2, and the preposition sig standardly with petafoA or petaPadrrery, e.g. bist. plant. n 3, 1, de caus. plant. u 16, 4, de sens. 85, civar BÈ Kanvov pév petafoanñv él bdatog sic dépa, Spixany Se tv él dépos eis dbwp. (Also cfr. supra, note 51.) There are a few examples of amalgams of prepositional clusters and of causes/ principles in his works, but there is no standardization: e.g. de caus. plant. 1 11, 2: aváyxn yap dia tó tas pitas und’ Gua und’ dpoims Exe À tobs axpepövas pt SéyeoOan pnd’ éExnéttery di Gv à apta PAdotnans. tubrta dé dia ti Kai tives Evexa yévort Gv, oùx süloyov cineiv, metaph. 9b 27-10 a 2: tovtols KUTÚLOLZOV TÁ ze ApiDTA KIVODVTA Kai TO Tivos Evera RËyew wai tic 4 hor Exdatov. At fr. 503 FHS&G (see supra, note 2) he is said to have distinguished «four different causes (tertipmv aitiov rotkidow): choice, <nature>, chance, and necessity», but there are ro prepositional formulas in this passage, and the context is quite different. # See Pinto quaest. in genes. 1 58 (Greek fragment ed. Petit, exegeyiyvetat, tout’ Eott 16 uttiov. Whether or not this formula really derives verbatim from Zeno himself, and whether or not, if such were to be the case, Zeno would virtually be echoing Plato I do not know. His thesis that the presence of a virtue makes someone virtuous sounds Platonic enough, see e.g. Plat. Theaet. 145 D 11: copia dé y ota Gogoi oi sopoi . I am aware of the differences. What should at any rate be observed is that Stobaeus sis of genes. 4:1: cinev [scil. Eva after the birth of Cain] éxtnaduny aOponov did tou Prod): GhA0 TO <<br6 uvos>> Kui <<éK tivog>> Kui <<31G TIVOZ>> TO EV <<EK>> the EE DANS, TO SE <<brd>> ds uitiON, TO dì <<ó1>> (5 dpyavov, and de cherub. 125-6 (= [H. Dörrıe t]-M. Bates, Platonismus cit., 1v, p. 130, Baust. 115.2), esp. 125: apo: yap THY tivos yeveoıv nolLG del ovveAeiv, 1d do" ob, 16 EE où, 16 St od, tò $1 6 Kai Zot: tó pév bg’ 0d tó aitiov, £5 où dé N bn, 31 où di 16 &pyadeiov, 50 è dé y aitia. The two Philonic texts are studied by J. PÉpix, Théologie cit., pp. 349-51, and D.T. Runaa, Philo cit., pp. 172-4. Runia also quotes the slightly different list at de prov. 1 23 in a new translation from the Armenian. He states: «Apparently the scheme is so well-known {scil, in Philo's days] that it scarcely needs explanation» (p. 172). % Perhaps abridged and rewritten by Arius Didymus, see supra. nole 87. * See my paper Chrysippus’ Definition of Cause in Arius Didymus, «Elenchos», xxn (2001) pp. 99-109. TM LG. Kipp, Posidonius, 1: The Commentary (i), Testimonia and Fragments 1-149 (“Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries”, xiv A), Cambridge 1988, pp. 380-4. # Sec D. SebLEY, Platonic cit., pp. 116-7 with note 6.

PS.-PLUTARCHUS PLACIT 111 AND STOBAEUS ANTHOL. I 13 59 adopts the Zenonian formula in the phrase which introduces the “Ocellus” fragment at the end of the chapter, anthol. 113, 2: ‘OxehAog Épnosv siva aitiov dl 6 yiyvetat tí. Another, formula è’ 6 was restricted to the kind of causes (viz., conpresumably coincidental link between the Didymean Zeno It has been pointed out by scholars that effects, being incorporeals, cannot be causes so cannot be links in a causal section and the “Ocellus” quotation is that both passages state the common-place idea that the soul is the cause of life; to Zeno the phrase dia tiv yuyñv yivetat TO Civ is attributed, while “Ocellus” has <Cma>, tadta 8" altiov puy. taining causes) instantiations whereof are listed in the Didymus fragment. chain. True, but the affected bodies, that is to say the bodies at which the effects do or did obtain can, so the chain Furthermore, it is Zeno’s view is that it is impossible for is real enough. Clem. Alex. strom. vi 9, 273 (= Chrys. fr. 347 S.V.F. up. 120), xai ei pév ti &otıv uitiov kai rountikôv. the cause to be present without the effect being realized immediately"; according to later Stoic doctrine this holds for todto Kai aitiov xtA., makes the point that only Medea is containing causes only. The interchangeability of “cause” and “owing to which”, here atttributed not only to Zeno but also to Chrysippus and Posidonius, was criticized. The objection is found in Clement of Alexandria and Cicero; this is directed more specifically against the so-called chain (some scholars prefer to speak of “series”) of antecedent causes '”, so perhaps Zeno’s use of the toto révroc goti Kai de Ó, el Sé ti ¿oi SV è, où RaVTMS the cause (aïtiov) of her offspring: the trees cut down for the Argo on mount Pelion and each intermediate “owing to which” that followed is a 54 6 of her having offspring, but not an aitiov'. This really is an objection, not (in spite of the inclusion of this passage in the S.V.F.) a point of Stoic doctrine, though it may be indebted to a discussion among later Stoics about the extensions of 51 6 and aïriov, respectively. Zeno’s apparently less sophisticated theory (we know very 322 Of the three examples given in the Zeno section two concern the primary virtues wisdom and temperance, e.g. 54 thy ppovnoiv yiverar tò ppoveiv. Other reports (in a different context) about the effects of virtue use different prepositions, see AR. DinyM. apud STOB. anthol. n 7, 5%, pp. 69.17-70.7 W. = Curys. fr. 74 S.V.F. ur p. 18, and Sexr. Emp. adv. math. x1 25-6 = Curys, fr. 75 S.V.F. m p. 18 (various definitions of the dyaBóv): Kad” Eva pév tpórov To bg’ ob ij dp’ ob Eotıv w~EAeio@ar, è Sh ápxucótatov bripye Kai dpery (scil. virtue as the source of utility), [...] kaQ’ Etepov dè tó Kad’ 5 cuupaiver dpersioOar (scil. virtues and virtuous actions). Cfr. E. SPINELLI (a cura di), Sesto Empirico. Contro gli Etici, Introduzione, edizione, traduzione e commento (“Elenchos”, xxiv), Napoli 1995, pp. 181-8, also for references to earlier literature (but there is no discussion of the prepositional formulas). What is the relation, if any, of these combined formulas to those pertaining to Plato, Aristotle, or the Peripatetics I do not know. ! For the chain of causes see e.g. PS.-PLUTARCH. placit. 885 B at AËT. 128,4 = Curys. fr. 917 S.V.F. 11 p. 265: eipuóv aitiwv (definition of fate; the earliest attestation); ÁLEX, APHROD, de fat. pp. 191.30192.11 = Curys. fr. 945 S.V.F. i pp. 272-3; [ALEx. APHROD.] guaest. et solut. 1 4 pp. 8.29-10.30 (five times; cfr. Curys. fr. 962 S.V.F. ı pp. 279-80); PLOT. enn. ui 1, 4: tev aitioy tov cippov; ProcL. in Plat. remp. Il p. 29.15: cippov [...] tov aitiov pepikv xui bAwv; also see the next note. The eipnög (without aitiwv, which are implied) is mentioned five times and attacked at length by the Cynic Oenomaus apud Eus. praep. evang. V1 7, 23-37 who clearly (like Alexander, ps.-Alexander and Plotinus) considers it to be the sig/um for the Stoic theory of fate. For Oenomaus see A. Brancacci, Libertà e fato in Enomao di Gadara, in ID. (a cura di), La filosofia in età imperiale. Le scuolee le tradizioni filosofiche, Napoli 2000, pp. 37-67, esp. pp. 56-64. " See R.J. Hankınson, Cicero’s Rope, in K. ALGRA et al., Polyhistor cit., pp. 185-205, and S. BoBzien, Determinism cit., p. 50 (who observes that the eippds is not attested for Chrysippus, but one should acknowledge that the term plays a conspicuous role in Oenomaus' arguments against Chrysippus; see previous note). 1" See also Cic. top. 61, de fat. 34, with the comments of R.W. SuarPLES, Cicero: On Fate {De Fato) & Boethius: The Consolation of Philosophy IV.5-7, (Philosophiae Consolationis), Warminster 1991, p. 184.

little about it, though) as presented here at any rate is not affected by this criticism. PS.-PLUTARCHUS PLACIT. I 11 AND STOBAEUS ANTHOL. 1 13 61 for instance what came to be called the antecedent and containing causes. Accordingly I vote for a distinction between The first part of the text of the Chrysippus section is Posidonius’ general ö1' 6 and his np@rov no1o0v as referring to corrupt. I argue elsewhere! that Wachsmuth’s supplement is superfluous (as are others that have been proposed), and that the text makes perfect Stoic sense once Std is eliminated, the Stoic god: the latter is a 64 6, but the former is not as follows: Xpboinnog aitiov eivat Léyer di 6, Kai TO pév aitiov dv Kai o@ua: kai aitiov piv Gti, où GE aitiov [Sid] tu. This tt represents the incorporeal effect. As to the Posidonian formulas aittov & £otí tivos, 81" è identical with the latter, though it may represent the preuma, in an acting body, which is a particle of this god. The Stoic god, as is well-known, is a principle (apy), next to matter which is the other principle !!°. There is some evidence that one of the many names of this god is “cause”, for according to Stob. 1 5, 15 p. 79.1-20 W. = Chrys. fr. 913 éxeivo, $ tó apótov norody, Y tò apynyov romoewg Kidd argues that % - ñ indicate equivalent alternatives, and that S.V.F. n pp. 264-5 (printed by Diels as Aét. placit. 128, 3 - in 10 dpynyòv romhocos is another term for the np@tov motovv section, from p. 79.8 ff. W. is not paralleled in ps.-Plutarch !) in the sense of First Cause. For this meaning of rp@tov Chrysippus held that one among the many appellations of God noroöv he refers to Stob. anthol. 1 11, 1° tò np&tov aïriov, but this lemma (though in the same Stobaean chapter) is Aétian not Didymaean"*, and Kidd admits that np@tov could pertain to “something more immediate”. One should add that apynyov too may pertain to something more immediate *”, Even so, Kidd’s interpretation of tò rpatov no1oûv is attractive. On the other hand, the formula 31 6 is much wider than “First Cause” in a theological sense, and may well embrace the chapter [epi ciuapuévns, “On fate” -, though the crucial attributed from a variety of perspectives is Aîtiu "2, This cannot be entirely right in view of Chrysippus’ distinction bet- 0 E.g. Dioc. LAERT. vit 134, with references to Zeno's On Substance, Cleanthes' On Atoms, book one of Chrysippus' Physics (“near the end”), Archedemus’ On the Elements, and book two of Posidonius' Physical Treatise. #3 Von Arnim in the 5. V.F. has failed to notice Diels’ attribution to Aétius and gives Stobaeus as the source. ps.-PLUTARCH. placit, 885 R at Air. 128, 4 = CHrys. fr. 917 S.V.F. ni p. 265 (cfr. supra, note 103) in this same chapter has a brief lemma defining fate, with the name-label 10% See supra, note 99. 1% See supra, note 100. Stoics, which is not paralleled in Stobaeus though ad sententiam it 1 See supra, section M at subsection (7). roughly corresponds to the second part of the Stobaean lemma cited 59 Cfr. PLAT. Crat. 401 D: 16 obv aitiov Kai 16 dpynyov adtav elvul in the text to the present note. Therefore it is most likely that Stobaeus 10 Mody, PoLyB. 1 66, 10.4-6: oyzdóv ag eineiv apynyov Kai póvov almov yivetur otüoeog, Ar. Dipym. apud STos. anthol. 117, 10 (= Curys. in his usual way replaced a brief Aétian lemma with a larger and more informative piece taken from another source, viz. Arius Didymus again. fr, 378 S.V.F. ut p. 92, on the Stoic pathe}: ta pév aporte eivar Kai See D.T. Runta, Additional Fragments cit., pp. 377-8, who has the Didymus fragment begin at p. 79.12 W., Moipus xtA. dpynya, GALEN. de nat. fac. 1 p. 129.1 K. (Script. minor. n p. 194.201 Helmreich = Erasistr. fr. 131 Garofalo): 16 $' fig npom te Kai apynyac aitiu tobrov, n> ok EneoKéwato (scil, Erasistratus); de loc. aff vin p. 442.12 K.: thy àpynyôv atriav. On the other hand Cleanthes in the second line of his Hymn (ir. 537 S.V.F. 1 p. 121) addresses Zeus as piceng apy nye. Kidd, foc. cit., quotes [ArtsTOT.] de mund. 399 a 26: tv rpotny ui dpyéyovov [apyiyyov[ov] ? JM] uitiuv. 2 Note that the restoration of PHiLoD, de pietat. col. 4, 25-6 Henrichs is hypothetical ({kakciaOlat, Alia] 6 ötlıl 7° "(raviov aïniov Kai kú) “mov *]). See A. Henricus, Die Kritik der stoischen Theologie in Pllere, 1428, «Cronache Ercolanesi», Iv (1974) p. 15 ad foc. But cfr. Ston. anthol. 1 1, 26 = Curys. fr. 1062 S.V.F. n p. 312, attributed to Arius Didymus (fr. 30) by Diels, attribution doubted by Wachsmuth

ween aittov, “cause”, and aitia, “explanation” or “account” of the cause. But reports about the Stoics are not always meticulous as to terminology. Plutarch, for instance, in the De Stoicorum repugnantiis and De communibus notitiis, paraphrasing Chrysippus and arguing against him, fails to distinguish between aitıov and aitia and uses the latter more often than the former. And Latin authors, whose language only has the word causa, are prevented from making the distinction at all. However this may be, it is not at all unlikely that Posidonius, as argued above, distinguished between the god, or np&tov norodv, as aitiov (still a 54 6) on one side, and the PS..PLUTARCHUS PLACIT I 11 AND STOBAEUS ANTHOL. 113 63 3. The two final Aétian lemmas form a sort of appendix, as the issue is considered from a different perspective. 4. Several Aétian lemmas can be traced back to a Peripatetic tradition, which to some extent bridges the gap between Aristotle and Theophrastus on the one hand and Aëtius on the other: 4,1. The Aétian lemma with the name-label Plato is a reformulated combination (somewhat influenced by an exegesis of Plato’s Timaeus) of the accounts by Aristotle and Theophrastus of the number and nature of the causes adopted by Plato. This is of some importance for the prehistory of the Middle aitiov or 31 6 in a wider sense on the other. It is even not to be precluded that xp@tov rovodv and apxnyöv romoeog are Platonist triad of (Platonic) principles - cfr. infra, 4.2 - and ambiguous, and do not only refer to the very First Cause but may also pertain to a rather remote cause, for instance to the taphysics”, we have noticed, is not a matter of these preposifateful timber hewn on Pelion. that of the so-called “metaphysics of prepositions’. This “metions themselves but of the nature of the entities they refer to. 4.2. Comparison of the Aétian lemma with the name-label Plato with the Stobaean version of Att. 3, 21 reveals the influence of Aristotle's view that “causes” and “principles” V. Conclusion may be used interchangeably. What, hopefully, have we learned from comparing the two chapters “On Causes” in ps.-Plutarch and Stobaeus and from the study of their individual lemmas? The chief results that have been argued for may be summed up as follows: derives from Aristotle's criticism of the early physicists, taci- 4,3. The Aétian lemma with the name-label Thales c.s. tly accepted by Theophrastus. 4.4. Though the term 16 noioby for the efficient cause sugpests a Stoic environment (and would not be noticed as something special in this environment) it can be paralleled in 1. The Aétian chapter provides the framework for the Stobaean chapter. Theophrastus, and Aristotle (and even to some extent in Plato). 5. The tenets of the Aétian lemma with the name-labels 2. The sequence of lemmas in Aétius is based on (a) a diaeresis of causes according to number, (b) a diaphonia according to the opposition incorporeal versus corporeal, and (c) another diaphonia according to the opposition immobile versus gesis of) a passage in Plato’s Timaeus. The attribution to Pymobile. his pupil Aristotle. ad loc., and by D.T. Runia, Additional Fragments cit., p. 377: Aia 5£ aÿchapter - he wasn't, of course, obliged to. He had to insert rdv Agyovow, Sti ráviov sotiv altıog Kai $1’ adtôv nüvra. the lemma with the name-label Peripatetics as his last excerpt Pythagoras and Aristotle are ultimately drived from (the exethagoras and Aristotle is to be explained against the backdrop of a constructed Pythagorean succession including Plato and 6. Stobaeus did not follow the rationale of the Aétian

PS.-PLUTARCHUS PLACIT. 111 AND STOBAEUS ANTHOL 1 15 from Aëtius, added a quotation from the Timaeus to the 65 APPENDIX: SOURCE TEXTS lemma with the name-label Plato, and made minor changes in the wording of individual lemmas. He further intelligently PS.-PLUTARCHUS Placita 1 11 (882 E-F) inserted abstracts from Arius Didymus to replace the Aétian name-label Aristotle and the lemma with the name-label 10”. Mepi aitiov Stoics (it is clear that he had made a serious study of both mn Pythagorean tract ascribed to “Ocellus”. 6.1. The insertion of a brief abstract from Arius Didymus on Aristotle’s doctrine of the four types of cause is aimed against the presence of the name-label Aristotle in Aétius. Though Aristotle’s view is correctly represented, the string of prepositional formulas (just as that ascribed to Plato in the Aétian lemma with his name-label) is due to later attempts at systematization. But there are several passages in Aristotle , aitióv £oti 10 dxotéZeoua i) 1 6 cupaiver n. sources before he started making and arranging his excerpts). At the end of the chapter he piously quoted from a pseudo- , N an a sa e [Dátov tprzag 16 aitiov- pnoi yap by" ob ¿E où npög è KUPIDTEPOV $” Nyeita TO dp’ Ob: TOÙTO 8’ Av TÒ ro1oùv, 6 goti VOUS. | [Tv0ayó pas "ApiototéAns tà pév aporta aina dcópara, Ta SE Kata perognv À Kata cup fefn ios ris CQUUTIKT]g ÜTOSTÚCEOG: MOT EÏVAL tov KÉGHOV SOJA. oi Irwikoi navta ta aina [= S.V.F. 11 340 p. 119] osmpatrd RVEUHGTU yap. QUSTA IBN LUQA Placita 1 11 Daiber where the four types of cause are listed and discussed, and the word tetpayas already occurs in one of them. A precise parallel in Porphyry suggests that Arius Didymus and Porphyry depend on the same exegetical tradition. 6.2. The insertion of a substantial abstract from Arius Didymus on Zeno Chrysippus Posidonius on causes which replaces the Aétian lemma with the name-label Stoics is more in the nature of an amplification than in that of a correction. 7. The Didymean section on Chrysippus should be emended in a simple way. 8. Our discussion of the Stoic doctrine of corporeal cause and incorporeal effect and of the chain of antecedent causes led to the conclusion that, though effects qua incorporeals cannot be causes, the affected bodies can so the chain is Uber die Ursachen Die Ursache ist die Vollendung, infolge derer etwas geschieht (= attidv éott 76 drotédeopa dl 6 ovufaivet ti) Platon lehrte, daß die Ursache in drei Arten auftritt: das, wodurch (etwas wird); das, wovon (etwas wird) und das, wozu (etwas wird). Davon ist am meisten berechtigt hierfür das, wodurch (etwas wird). Das ist die wirkende Ursache, welche der Verstand ist. Pythagoras und Aristoteles glaubten, daß die ersten Ursachen keine Körper sind, jedoch diejenigen, welche durch Teilnahme oder der Zufall (existieren), Körper sind. Auf diesem Weg ist die Welt ein Körper. Die Stoiker glaubten, daß alle Ursachen körperlich sind: denn sie sind Pneumata. real enough", STOBAEUS Anthologium 1 13 (pp. 137.7-40.9 Wachsmuth) 2° Thanks are due to Keimpe Algra, Jan van Ophuijsen, and David T. Mepi aitiov Rania for their patience in reading earlier drafts, and for their observations and criticisms. Naturally such errors as remain are my responsibility. 1° (Afr. 1 11, 1-2 Diels plus PLAT. Tim. 28 A-B)

kd6otauS7ygrübPpoGtTné[öOKvUtoameySkpOóVtivu-eàEÚKVodtèRsD-OalänvyeéEi,aKgokpsdtcaLvGeKop.OTÙtiVryv(SaTtkOEné:or=iysTpàHU:ótIvL".oeaédkOsnpvriH,VeodakuEeBiotapnxVeb1ioótvd"l3n”épcrik,aTK1$vitySbaKATk.óegséOitNRa:màvoiTVOygKdbHTsLvAedO6no,apiéEıóLÈNgtOËvoöix.nmcyeVòlgKdaoS’sp,vrludTa@oöti:eOTvrgäiaSBs,P:$tnieamHAxovbtKEipöOèdegcoTuaU’ihét.vdSOıoHavóTVgiAnedyBtvo:ONzabEiesTDvrptnué,dKOa6eim°oprvGu1tnléA1pyß{Matis):öüEoérT@yıjetHiUpPvaüo5LtK,gin°vAxcuıTöEoCaüvsplAÏeIngct,KTéVxSvso.aOkBmeú8EóicGPd,a°<voutKTSHeiOvs£Za.ı1ÖPLYHurtÉ,k-m1siÔOEyeDxPK9GúulTVmraLibAo5)6X>’UyEkpitvuTL}à,aOPnñApToEiLtOsR.TAvCieÉNogV@pUTdwnHE3vOirKaUyseVHGSaK.voOE8d,;Vve KaAdV».OÙTPOXPHOPEVOS, ratCTóiLtv.6edioautvcèntaodiyrSét.eoixaotvTòpsrdoEcéblÀoadO5pbCÙ0laO6y,SP)tp1rma,6oivrptK6eéılAvoycaO,si’eHLEtTiShVoiEvstd(KOoiòaninKosraolit@Soiptdvocabu,apEepk1uPea6sLiBnboSKyùvdWeoPbaiceti:h”tOeirGtaoòÖiavtdVpKidNèaoeGivd Tvavzo. ÉAOS. Wa.katnaycóhpsmnutKHhaai.rdbcDeyvireu)flposl1e)pof6wnr-e.k8dò(Uc1s=ep,Gn'eeAt1Orak,G(BéAdkËvcvTodö.onrntou"a1àv,°].2. {SnTSytd61éú°aiobt6syvvu(E.aavAeCop$lEnr'tuuXiZo.aoıvtrp6ñ:uiyrb:yvn:Dv«sodaanr.ivtelmpi6ünottygpfıancvimryEo.tdSavninv!1éc3Tp$}"6fpnfOar.y}rS1ùotb6UOtpXv0asi1r”bSÚtppi86,è.nTgtyb$oVdOGiyùòD1ok.Lpté,rgGFiayóv1b,.6ekn0vltrèôosaTynvpûrotÓip.ôy6govpè=es¿.etvTy8ZateOo&ai1ATayeitEcOvSdoni8EHbecptoa;.riKviyo’,AaaPgf1Kù,ertapo6o.iyanlAsvósÀtero8oalEnvv9.ttioye1dnbuovSAdutbfb.éowertdatVys.viè.aegvyF9rTatòé.AE5Hn<ogvJéa3uxYrmAe1ypS£oEoa1&vpP.vptPdi.6U-ueta.MvKc6yoAnB2ADd.ioKvvc5Nr)AÉyeaSnéùxnriEpFeoonvKaxlEi>wTtyeduEvLiv,Orsé.vD: {XpZusbiñnrnevoa}co.{vTakoseouitsave.iodv}: cTyomipaspvöaHoibevctóÓvpiYatn.ovyptwLiTokSKdvixea1vtOnli4ùyt xpmuam8sToyedélibtpvn°ıOaùvpota,r: E"SApnıÈyCorpnYÉoKUptGoAeädvTOneLgVvÀctCETuMKepOÚBaiTetXvOSftnNaKsxiıTaoY.ÓMrpduovStacedéólapy-aóevtrpaàs, TxRtadOpKaoLiepSOayUévnToit,ıOcv tbETKUopMta6PriyùéxoOróto’,aGvc-: ÀpuPpovienoitvo.g 1(D3iA-e14lr,s0?.) úybropaxgiepKéls. uitiov.

Atrus Placita 1 11 Diels!” PS.-PLUTARCHUS STOBAEUS ta. Mepi aitiov. Mepi aitiov. (1) Altióv eoti <ó G> tó dnotéAcopa $ Sy 6 ovppat- (1) Altióv got öl’ è 16 drotédeopa À OU 6 oupPaiver tt. ápxel yap broypagiKdc. VEL TL. (2) MAdtev tpıyag to aitiov: (2) HAdtw@v tprya¢ tò ultıov, pnoi yap, dp” où El ob tps by’ où EE où rpòg S& KUPIO- 6 Kupi@tepov è nyeitu TÔ ve” ob tolto SÈ Tv TO noLodv, 6 ott vode. tatov $' Tyeltal T0 by’ OÙ, TOLTO dè HY TO Toroùv. (3) MvOaydpas "Apıorotäing Tú uEV mpata atta acmpata, (3) Mudayópas ta pév apata Ta SÈ KUTA PETOXTV À Kata Hetox Ry à xutà ovufieBnxos TiS GMpatikis brootdcews eivan. ovuBeBrios THS SOPATIKTS bnootasEws. [Dot eivaı tov aitla dompata, ta dé Kata xöonov có]. (4) "Apiototéans tonos ôn- Aodv ÉKaoTOv 57M MAGI tüs IPOLEVOV Epunveias TOLOUTOIS. TO te EL OÙ Méyovta nv DANY, Kai TO Dg’ ob TO rorodv, TÓ dì Kal’ 3 TO cidoc, TO dé dl 6 tO TÉAOG. (5) Oi Ztmixoi révra tà aitia CMOPATIKG TVEDUATOA yap. (6) Burns Kai of Epebiic TO Rp@tov ultıov akivytov àrephvavto. (7) <Oi> Etaikoi 14 mpdtov aitlov Mpicavto KIVNTÓV. (8) Oi Mlepınamrıxoi tév attiov civat ta pév uioünté, tá Se vonta. te Underlining in individual lemmas indicates textual differences between the two sources. ID. ANTA GZ Ti LeSoe & VAGDE Bo, . ri. D STA NELLA DER AS